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OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
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WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE
AFRICAN MISSION IN THE SUDAN
October 2004

ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS) IN THE DARFUR REGION OF SUDAN

SUMMARY

In the Communiqué adopted by the Thirteenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union held on July 27, 2004, on the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare and submit to it, for consideration, a comprehensive plan on how best to enhance the effectiveness of the AMIS.

The comprehensive plan contained in the present document is based on consultations with the parties, members of the affected population, and humanitarian providers. It also takes into account, and seeks to build upon, the experience of AMIS to date. In keeping with the 28 May 2004 agreement with the parties on implementation modalities, it provides for a significant increase in military observers as well as an enhanced element to protect them. In a new departure reflecting the requirements on the ground, the operational concept contained in this document would add a civilian police component, to assist in monitoring and capacity building for the police now being deployed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) to enhance security in Darfur.

The report contains an annual budget of approximately US$ 220 million for the enhanced AMIS. This provides for 450 military observers (including Chadian mediation and members of the parties) organized in 45 x 10 man teams located in 8 sectors, a total of 2341 military contingent personnel, 815 civilian police, 132 other civilian support staff and 32 staff in the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) at the AU HQ. It is recommended that the deployment of the Mission should be conducted in phases, depending on the situation on the ground and logistic requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. It is generally agreed that the initial AMIS deployment has been useful, but that the Mission’s effectiveness has been constrained by its small size as well as logistic challenges. The military observers currently deployed, no matter how efficient and dedicated, cannot hope to provide meaningful monitoring coverage to an area that is roughly the size of France. The Government of Sudan (GoS), as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), have indicated that AMIS has not always been able, due to its limited capacity, to carry out its tasks in a timely manner.

2. In the same vein, many internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as persons who have recently returned to their homes, are still deeply concerned about their security. This general feeling of insecurity does not contribute to the likelihood of strict adherence to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed at N’djamena on 8 April 04. It will also continue to hinder the willingness of some who have weapons to lay down them down voluntarily. Perhaps because of these factors as well as other considerations, there is an emergent consensus among the parties as well as the affected population that AMIS should be strengthened.

3. There are many indications that an international observer presence, if sufficiently widespread, would have a positive effect in promoting both the perception and the reality of security. This, in turn, would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and, beyond that, the return of IDPs to their homes.

4. In view of the continued activities of outlawed groups in some areas, however, an increase in the number of observers would have to be accompanied by an expansion of the protection element. The role of this element would be to protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations. Protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS. In accordance with the normal humanitarian responsibility of military personnel, the AMIS protection element would only be in a position to protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability. The military plan for an expanded military observer mission and protection element is found at Annex A.

5. In addition, there is an acute need for a civilian police component to assist with monitoring and building the capacity of the GoS police. While a large number of police have recently deployed to the Darfur region, they are distrusted by many of the local population, who therefore do not feel that their security has been enhanced. In addition, the effectiveness of the police could be heightened with training in a variety of techniques that are needed in the current situation, such as a proactive approach to patrolling, as well as systematic efforts to build confidence and trust with the affected population. The proposed civilian police component, which would involve monitoring as
well as training, would help to address these and related requirements. The concept of operations for this component is found at Annex B.

6. An expanded AMIS will only be effective if the parties on the ground, as well as the affected population, are well informed of the mission, what can be expected of it, as well as the limits on its role. Therefore a proactive public information strategy and campaign will be required, especially within the mission area, but internationally as well.

7. The expansion of AMIS will be carried out in stages, as described in the Annexes. When complete, it will be a larger and more challenging operation than any conducted by the AU to date. The current AU capacity to provide direction and support to AMIS is already stretched to the limit. Fundamental to the success of the expanded mission, therefore, is the provision of additional staff who would comprise the DITF at AU Headquarters. This must be augmented by additional capacity in both Khartoum and El Fasher prior to the implementation of the Plan.

Annexes:

A. Military Plan for a Strengthened AU Observer Mission in Darfur.
ANNEX A

MILITARY PLAN FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE AU MISSION IN THE SUDAN (AMIS)

References:
A. Humanitarian cease-fire agreement (HCFA) on the conflict in Darfur.
B. Agreement with the Sudanese parties on the Modalities for the establishment of the cease-fire commission and the deployment of Observers in Darfur.
E. Security Council resolution,
F. 15 point Decree on security and Relief situation in Darfur 08, July 2004.
G. Darfur Plan of Action between GOS and United Nations.

I. Situation
1. Since the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004, there has been a degree of adherence by the parties to the signed agreement, although violations still occur. These violations have been reported mainly from the South West of the Darfur region. Due to the limited capacity of AMIS, it has not been possible to confirm most of the reported violations. As a result, the security situation throughout the region remains a concern. The number of civilians leaving their villages for the safety of the IDP camps continues to grow. In the perception of many among the population, the threat of raids and looting of villages remains significant. Additionally, the perceived threat to individuals is particularly high outside larger settlements.

2. In accordance with the HCFA, the GoS has begun to deploy increasing numbers of police officers to the region. Until now, the effect these additional police officers have had on the real and perceived security situation has been limited. The population’s lack of trust in the police force and other government organizations will be a major obstacle to overcome in the process of returning to normality.

II. Assumptions
3. It is assumed that:
   - All parties will comply with the HCFA with References B and C.
   - The Parties agree to the Strengthening of AMIS as given in this Plan.
   - Donors will fund the necessary expenses to allow the execution of the given Plan.
• Protection of civilians is the responsibility of the GoS.
• A comprehensive Peace Agreement is signed between both Parties.

III. Definitions

a. Military Component

4. The Military Component is the entity of military personnel, consisting primarily of Military Observers (MILOBSS) and the supporting Protection Element for the MILOBSS, deployed by the AU to the Darfur region of Sudan.

b. Pro-active Monitoring

5. Pro-active monitoring requires a geographically dispersed, mobile and structured patrolling programme, which is based on timely intelligence and analysis. It also requires a regular, highly visible presence at all necessary sites and engagement with the population, thereby improving security and stability in an area, without either having to resort to violence or encouraging an escalation of military response.

c. Protection Element

6. The protection element of the Military Component consists of those troops tasked specifically with protecting the MILOBSS and other AU personnel, equipment and installations.

IV. Political Aim and AU Strategy

a. AU Political Aim

7. The Political aim is to assist the parties to reach a political settlement in Darfur, contributing to a stable, peaceful and united Sudan.

b. AU Strategy

8. The AU with the support of the international community will achieve this political aim through the phased deployment of an enhanced Military Observer capability to conduct pro-active monitoring of the compliance of the parties to the HCFA and the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1564. This enhanced, pro-active monitoring mission will enable the AU to take timely political and diplomatic action to maintain pressure on the parties to comply fully with the HCFA and reach a political settlement.
c. **Strategic End State**

9. The strategic end state foresees the restoration of a secure situation throughout Darfur that is underpinned by a political settlement, thus allowing a safe environment for the return of IDPs and refugees.

V. **Mission of the Military Component**

10. The Mission of the Military Component is:

- to monitor and observe the compliance of the HCFA;
- to assist in the process of confidence building;
- to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties to the HCFA and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.

VI. **Concept of Operation**

a. **AMIS Intent**

11. The Intent is to strengthen the monitoring capacity of the AMIS to a level where it conducts pro-active monitoring and through political and diplomatic means increase the level of compliance of the parties to the HCFA thus discouraging attacks on civilians.

b. **General Concept**

12. The military component will establish eight sectors including Abeche in Chad as shown on the map at Appendix 1. The MILOBS teams will operate from their team sites within the boundaries of their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). The TAORs should be based on current regional and administrative boundaries and must be consistent with those proposed for the civilian police component. Each Sector HQ will have a Team Site co-located with 3 MILOBS teams and associated force protection (Sector HQ site). In addition each sector, less Abeche, will have an additional team site (MILOBS Group site) with a further 3 MILIB teams and associated force protection. The associated force protection element will be 3 platoons in the Sector HQ sites and 2 platoons in the MOLOB Group sites. The Sector HQ at Abeche in Chad will have 3 MILOBS teams and a force protection element provided by Chadian Army.
13. Each MILOBS team will consist of 10 individuals, and appropriate levels of protection provided from an infantry platoon. The team composition required for specific missions is to be determined by team leaders in accordance with guidance from the AMIS chain of command. Deployment of MILOBs will be phased to coincide with the development of infrastructure and the availability of key enabling equipment (eg. Vehicles and communications equipment). Sector HQ will have additional staff augmentation and both sector HQs and MILOBSS Group sites will have an appropriate support group. The Sector site at Abeche will be tailored to the specific requirement of the tasks in Chad. The Force Commander will retain the authority to adjust the concept to meet the operational and logistic requirement on the ground redeployment of in-place forces. A diagram showing all the elements of AMIS is at Appendix 2.

c. **Structure of the Military Component**

14. The Military Component will consist of:

- The Force HQ
- One airmobile Infantry Company which constitutes the Military Component Reserve
- One EOD/Section
- One Light Field Engineer Platoon
- One Military Police Platoon
- Eight Sector HQs
- Six MILOBSS Teams at each sector (less Abeche, which will have 3 Teams)
- One enhanced Infantry Company in each sector with organic logistic support.
- An Aviation element that includes 18 medium transport helicopters two per sector (except Abeche which will have one helicopter) with an additional 3 helicopters, which will be retained at El Fasher.
- The Military Component will establish eight sector sites. The Teams will operate from their Sector sites within the boundaries of their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). The TAORs should be based on current regional and administrative boundaries and are consistent with those proposed for the civilian police component. Each MILOBS team will consist of ten MILOBSS, with representation of the parties, and an Infantry Protection Platoon. Sector HQs will have a support group (Level I medical facility, maintenance package and fuel operators).

d. **Locations**

15. The Force HQ will be located in El Fasher and the Military Component will be deployed in eight Sectors within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) including Abeche. It
will also have a Monitoring and Liaison Office in Chad and a Liaison Office in Khartoum. The Sectors are:

- Sector I: El Fasher
- Sector II: Nyala
- Sector III: El Geneina
- Sector IV: Kabkabia
- Sector V: Tine
- Sector VI: Abeche
- Sector VII: Zahingei
- Sector VIII: El Daien

e. **Scheme for Expansion of AMIS**

16. The scheme for expansion will be conducted in 5 phases. The detailed Deployment Plan is at Appendix 18. Phasing will take account of the political requirement for early expansion of the monitoring effort, the requirement for balanced deployment and the necessity for pre-established operational and logistic force enablers. The expansion of AMIS will commence with the completion of outstanding infrastructure work necessary to support in-place forces followed by the establishment of additional infrastructure and operational capacity necessary to support the expanded AMIS. As logistic and operational capacity becomes available, deployment of additional MILOBSS and protection force will commence sequentially. Orientation training will take place for new MILOBSS in El Fasher prior to onward deployment to assigned sectors. Training for the protection force will be conducted by TCCs prior to deployment and augmented by final orientation on arrival in the AOR.

17. M Day given below represents the endorsement of the expansion of the AU Observer Mission in Darfur by the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

- **Pre-Phase: Current to M-Day – Planning and Logistic Preparation**
  This includes: the development of the operational and logistic plan for expansion of AMIS, including initial reconnaissance of new sites; the recruitment of the Darfur Integrated Tasks Force (DITF); inform donors/partners of the additional financial and resource support requirements for AMIS; preliminary alert from the AU to TCCs and AU donors/partners for MILOBSS and protection force; commence procurement of additional required materiel and construction infrastructure. This phase will be considered complete when the Military Staff Committee has considered the plan and the AU PSC has endorsed it.

- **Phase 1: M + 30 Continuing Logistic Development and Strengthening of MILOBs Capacity.**
  The pledging/force generation process will be completed. The DITF is in place at the AU HQ in Addis Ababa. Existing sites will be expanded as a first priority and construction, within means and capabilities, will commence in new sector sites.
The transition from the existing CFC HQ to an AMIS Military Force HQ will commence and existing MILOBS teams will be strengthened from 8 to 10 personnel by an augmentation wave of MILOBSS (24 additional MILOBSS). Additional vehicles and equipment will be deployed to support this transition. The training and orientation process will commence. Phase 1 will be complete when the DITF is in place, the Force HQ transition is complete and existing MILOBS teams have been strengthened.

- **Phase 2: M + 45 Continued Expansion of Sites and Deployment and Training of additional MILOBSS.**
  Expansion of existing sites is to be completed including the key command and control site at El Fasher. Development of new sector sites is ongoing and MILOBs Group Sites has commenced. Deployment, orientation and training of 60 additional MILOBSS will be conducted in El Fasher. This phase is completed when the existing sites are completed and the first wave of 60 MILOBs have deployed to assigned sectors.

- **Phase 3: M + 60 Continued Construction of new Sector HQs and MILOBs Group Sites and Augmentation of MILOBs and Protection Force.**
  Completed construction of the two new Sector HQs and continuing development of the MILOBs Group Sites in order to facilitate the deployment of the full capability at these locations. Deploy a second wave of 120 MILOBSS to El Fasher for training and orientation, augment the sector HQs in accordance with Para 6 above. Commence deployment of the protection force from TCCs to the Mission area. This phase is complete with the completion of the new sector HQs, the second wave is deployed forward to sectors and the deployment of additional protection force forward to sectors has commenced.

- **Phase 4: M + 75 Full Establishment of Sector HQs and MILOBSS Group Sites.**
  Phase 4 will be complete when the Sector HQs, with one co-located Team Site and all remote MILOBSS Group Sites are ready to receive and employ MILOBs and protection troops. Deploy a third wave of 120 MILOBSS to El Fasher for training and orientation. Continued deployment of the protection force to support MILOBSS.

- **Phase 5: M + 120 Full Deployment throughout the Sectors.**
  Phase 5 will be complete when the final 30 MILOBSS have been trained and deployed to sectors, all MILOBSS Group Sites have been established and the Military Component, including all elements of the protection force, are deployed and have achieved full operational capability.
e. **Method of Operation**

18. Each Sector HQ and MILOBs Group Site will be co-located to provide an integral mobile and static protection. This will provide the Sector Commanders and the TAOR Commanders with the ability to conduct observation tasks in areas where there is a security threat. In addition, it gives the flexibility to create MILOBS Teams with Platoon protection to match threat levels as well as demonstrating an increased military presence where necessary.

19. The system of sectors and MILOBS Teams is designed so that the majority of the locations requiring observation are located within a radius of 60 – 70 Kms from a Sector Site. Within this radius, it is assessed that MILOBS Teams can reach 2 to 3 observation locations per day by vehicle. This should ensure that most locations within the TAORs are visited twice per week.

20. Patrols can be conducted with unarmed MILOBS Teams only or with MILOBS Teams accompanied by a platoon from the protection element, in accordance with the security threat assessment. For locations requiring observation that are more than 70 km from a Sector Site, a helicopter may be used. Alternatively, a multiple-day vehicle patrol with a temporary presence in the observation area, may be deployed to monitor the outposts. Multiple-day vehicle patrols should always be protected.

21. The protection element should be employed using different methods according to the given situation or the specific aim of each operation. An infantry platoon should always accompany a MILOBS Team in unsecured areas, or where there is deemed to be a security threat. An infantry platoon may accompany or follow a MILOBS Team to show presence and force when necessary, or to patrol the outskirts of a village during a visit from MILOBSS. These methods should be used to enhance the creation and perception of a secure environment. Air patrols may also be used to deter and contain militias, in particular those militias of a mobile or nomadic type. A combination of MILOBSS, and ground and air assets together with protection elements may be used for detection and surveillance.

22. Protection Elements should be prepared to deploy on the orders of Sector HQ in order to protect humanitarian activities, to provide protection and security in certain key areas in accordance with their mandated tasks.

**VIII. Tasks**

a. **Common Tasks for Sectors I to VII**

- Establish Sector HQs and Sites according to the scheme of deployment.
- Liaise with the local authorities of all parties at Sector and TAOR level.
• Monitor and verify the activities of all parties in the TAOR including safe areas.
• Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps, through the GoS.
• Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties.
• Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population.
• Monitor and verify the overall security situation within the AOR.
• Monitor and verify attempts of the GoS to disarm government controlled militias.
• Investigate and report about allegations of violations of the HCFA
• Protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations.
• Protect observer patrols on vehicle and heli-borne deployment as required.
• Be prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within means and capabilities and in accordance with Rules of Engagement (ROE).
• Be prepared to protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities and in accordance with ROEs.
• Provide visible military presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.

b. **Sector HQ in Chad**

• Establish and maintain liaison with Chadian and French Forces.
• Monitor the security situation in and around the refugee camps in Chad.
• Monitor the movement of refugees across the border.
• Monitor the overall security situation in area of the border, and in particular the movement of the parties and militias.

c. **Military Headquarters El Fasher**

• Establish and maintain contact with all parties to the conflict.
• Coordinate the monitoring and verification activities of the MILOBSS and protectors.
• Facilitate the delivery of the Humanitarian assistance.
• Monitor and supervise the disarmament of the Militias.
• Facilitate the return of IDPs and Refugees to their homes.
• Support CFC activities.
• Provide administrative, logistic and financial support to the MILOBSS and Protectors.
d. **AMIS Mission Headquarters in Khartoum**

- Establish and maintain contact with the GoS, Embassies and other relevant organizations.
- Coordinate activities with UN.
- Oversee and manage all mission activities.
- Coordinate all logistics and procurement in support of all AMIS activities.
- Establish an air operations cell to coordinate all AMIS air operations between Khartoum and AOR.
- Coordination of official visits to AMIS in conjunction with Military Headquarters in El Fasher
- Coordinate and monitor all AMIS support activities with PAE and other contractors
- Provide regular reports to AMIS Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) in Addis Ababa

e. **Military Component Reserve**

- Provide the Military Component Reserve at High Readiness throughout the operation.
- Be prepared to reinforce military activities in the Sectors.
- Be prepared to provide protection for high value targets.
- Maintain a platoon at high readiness, 24-hours per day, for hostage rescue operations and crisis reaction.

f. **Field Engineer Platoon**

- Be prepared to deploy temporarily (for up to two weeks) to different locations throughout the AOR.
- Assists in the establishment of temporary outposts
- Assists in humanitarian projects within capabilities
- Conduct Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks

g. **EOD Section**

- Conduct EOD tasks
- Deal with common types of Land Service Ammunition (LSA)
- Conduct liaison with UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

h. **MP Platoon**

- Assist the Military Component Commander in maintaining discipline and order within the Military Component.
- Investigate allegations of misconduct by military personnel.
• Be prepared to react to riots and civilian unrest that may threaten AMIS.

  i. **Aviation**

  • Provide air mobility for the MILOBSS and Protection Element within the Sectors.
  • Provide airmobile area patrolling and reconnaissance.
  • Provide airmobile observation of remote locations.
  • Provide an element at High Readiness to support the Military Component Reserve.
  • Provide an airmobile logistic resupply facility to remote locations and areas inaccessible by vehicle.
  • Provide Air transport for medical evacuation.

  j. **Interpreter Pool**

  • Assist all military components in communication with the local population.
  • Deploy to sectors in accordance with the Military Component Commander’s plan.

  IX. **Command and Control**

  a. **Chain of Command**

  23. The Force Commander of the AU Military Component reports to the Commissioners to Peace and Security through the Head of Mission. All military personnel are OPCON to the Force Commander of the AU Military Component. All MILOBSS in a Sector are TACON to their respective Sector Commanders. The sector Commander is to nominate a senior Team commander in each MILOBS Group site. Infantry Companies and platoons in Sectors and MILOBSS Group sites respectively are TACON to their respective Sector and Team Site Commanders. National contingent Commanders (NCCs) will be the most senior deployed officer from the respective TCC. The Protection force elements will remain ADMINCON to their internal Chain of command i.e. within a sector a company commander will have DMINCON of his platoons.

  b. **Communication**

  24. Satellite communication links (with voice and internet capability) will be established from:

  • AU HQ (DITF) to AMIS Mission HQ in Khartoum and AMIS Military HQ in El Fasher
  • AMIS HQ to Sector HQ and between Sector HQs
  • Sector HQ to MILOBs Group Sites.
25. Between the AMIS HQ and the Sector HQs, and between Sector HQs and MILOBSS Group Sites there will also be a long range radio link Communications; between the Sector HQ and the MILOBs patrols communication will be established by HF link and VHF and satellite phone.

c. **Liaison**

26. AMIS will enhance its Mission HQ in Khartoum, including military liaison personnel, to liaise with GOS and UNAMIS in accordance with Para 8c above.

27. The coordination of the AU Military Component with the humanitarian operation will be fulfilled by liaison; attendance at the regular OCHA meetings and access to the Humanitarian communications network will provide the coordination function at Sector HQ and Team Site level. This is to be coordinated with the UN and other partners.

X. **Support**

a. **Support Organization**

28. The AU will establish in Khartoum an administrative management office with the following functions:

- General Administration (including personnel)
- Mission Budget.
- Legal Adviser.
- Procurement.
- Movement/Air planning and coordination

29. Within the Mission HQ in Khartoum the AU will also establish a Logistic Operation Center (LOC) with the following functions:

- Supply.
- Transport management including air operations.
- Fuel management.
- Contract management.
- Cash office and other general support functions.

b. **Deployment**

30. MILOBSS will deploy from sending nations to the Mission Area through Khartoum by civil air transport. Their deployment will be coordinated by the DITF in conjunction with the Mission HQ in Khartoum and Military HQ in El Fasher. The protection force will be deployed by air transport directly to El Fasher for Reception, Staging and onward
Movement (RSOM) to Sector HQ locations where they will take over their equipment. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) will be deployed in combined air/land transport to Sector HQ locations. Troops will deploy from the Sector HQ locations to the MILOBSS Group Sites as formed units, by land movement.

**Appendices:**

1. Sector and Boundary Schematic  
2. Elements of the AMIS  
3. Elements of the Military Component  
4. Mission Structure  
5. AMIS Force Disposition  
6. Military Component HQ  
7. Sector HQ
ANNEX B

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CIVILIAN POLICE COMPONENT PLAN FOR
AN EXPANDED AU MISSION IN DARFUR (AMIS)

References:

A. Humanitarian cease-fire agreement on the conflict in Darfur.
B. Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of
the Cease-fire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur.
C. Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations 29
July 2004.
D. Security Council Resolution.
E. 15 point Decree on Security and Relief situation in Darfur.08, July 2004.
F. Darfur Plan of Action between GOS and United Nations.

I. Current Situation

1. Police organisation in the Sudan remains at the lowest echelon amongst the
National security organisations. The organizational and operational structure of the
Sudanese Police is similar to the army. The GoS states that there are 9000 police in
Darfur providing police services to the people in the region. The GoS has promised to
add 6000 additional police to various areas, including IDP camps and population
centres, to protect the lives and property of the civilian population and build the
confidence of the people.

2. Following the initial AMIS deployment to monitor the HCFA, it was generally
agreed that the Mission’s effectiveness has been constrained by size, logistics and
mandate. Subsequently, the conditions on the ground continued to be tenuous, with
continued violations of the ceasefire, attacks on civilian population and the security of
the IDP and Refugee camps. In this regard, AMIS expects that building confidence
within the civilian population requires enhancement of local security conditions, which
goes beyond ceasefire monitoring activities.

3. While a large number of police have recently been deployed to Darfur region,
they are distrusted by many of the local population, and therefore do not feel their
security has been enhanced. This will continue to hinder the willingness of the IDPs and
refugees to return to their homes as well as communities to lay down their weapons.

4. Of the 6000 to be deployed, 3912 are already on the ground. The actual figures
are difficult to verify.
5. Police reinforcements in and around the IDP camps are operating from temporary tentage. The Sudanese Police units are armed with AK47s and machine guns. There is limited patrolling and responding to incidents reported by the civilian population.

6. Logistic support is extremely basic. In addition, many have not yet been fully oriented and briefed on their tasks and how to handle the crisis in a manner which gains the confidence of the civilian population.

II. Assumptions:

- All parties will comply with the HCFA
- The Parties agree to respect the conventions on the human rights and international humanitarian laws.
- The protection of the civilian populations is the responsibility of the GOS.
- Political talks continue with a view to final peace agreement.

III. Critical Issues of Concern for the Civilian Population

- Human rights violations:
The issue of human rights violations is of primary concern to all. Attacks on civilian populations and displacing them from their villages, have been prevalent in this conflict. Extensive fear prevails amongst the IDP population and their movements remain restricted within the periphery of the camps.

- Security provisions in the IDP and refugee camps:
There have been reports of raids and violence in the IDP and refugee camps. Armed men are said to be in and around the vicinity of some campsites and are continuing to create fear and intimidation. The main focus for protection concerns the threat to life, freedom of movement, forced relocation, sexual violence, and restriction to humanitarian assistance, social services, sources of livelihood and basic services.

- Smooth delivery of Humanitarian support elements:
Although humanitarian support efforts have improved, there is a prevalent fear of disruption to these efforts. Militias continue to hinder the ability of humanitarian agencies to operate freely, which further exacerbates the plights of the displaced people.

- Public security and law enforcement issues:
  1. The return of the population into their areas of domicile will depend upon effective law enforcement and provision of public security. Although the government has deployed additional police to support the provision of security, their effectiveness is a matter of some concern. The provision of effective and efficient policing will be a crucial factor for the return of
normality in the region. The deployment of the GoS police would benefit from greater field level operational coherence, within the framework of an overall strategic plan.

IV. Current Issues with the GOS Police Force in Darfur

7. The Government of Sudan has outlined 15 Decrees on security and relief for the situation in Darfur (8 July, 2004). The decree stipulates the recruitment and training of 6000 new police to be deployed to Darfur. This includes establishing police stations in all IDP camps in order to receive complaints on violations of human rights and also to spread security. The following issues will impact on the effectiveness of the AMIS Civilian Police Component.

- Quality of the Police and technical support. Physical training and military tactics form the basis of current police training, whilst behaviour and fundamentals of policing receive less attention. Furthermore, police are equipped with heavy military hardware and lack the proper police equipment and technical skills that help to minimise the risk to life and collateral damage. Proper equipment and training to contain and manage crowds and demonstrations are not evident. There is a dire need for patrol vehicles to allow efficient response to call-outs. The lack of proper maintenance for existing police vehicles critically hinders operational capabilities.

- Public Confidence in the Police. Public confidence and trust in the Police is low. The Police are regarded as an extension of the army and the public perceive no difference in their approach, behaviour and actions. Confidence is further damaged by the fear of recruitment of the militias into the police. The Police Service will require a genuine and sustained confidence building exercise if it is ever to win the trust of the population. Given the particular threat to women in the current crisis, the male dominated police service is seen as insensitive to the concerns of the female population.

- Concerns of the local Police. Police have also been victims of this sustained conflict. Numerous attacks on police posts have left many police men killed or injured. Police perception is that the militias and bandits are equipped with more sophisticated and heavy weapons making themselves very vulnerable.

V. Civilian Police Component

a. The Civilian Police Component is the entity consisting of Civilian Police Observers and supporting the confidence building efforts by the AU among the civilian population.
b. **Pro-active Monitoring**

8. Pro-active monitoring of civilian police activities with a view toward enhancing the confidence of the civilian population, requires a geographically dispersed, mobile and structured patrolling programme which is based on regular contact with communities, IDPs, Refugees in collaboration with the Government of Sudan Police.

VI. **Mission of the Civilian Police Component**

9. The Mission of the Civilian Component is:

- Monitoring the deployment of the GOS police forces in Darfur.
- Monitoring and verification of GOS police activities in IDP camps and communities.
- Facilitating communication between police, community leaders and civilian population to address local issues.
- Provide technical assistance at the request of police authorities.

VII. **Main Tasks**

10. In coordination with the other components of the Mission, the Civilian Police component in Darfur will be responsible for the following:

- Assist in the development of proactive public confidence building measures.
- Establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police authorities.
- Collaborate with Sudanese police in day-to-day community policing activities in communities and IDP camps.
- Establish and maintain contact with community leaders to receive complaints or seek advice on the issues of concerns.
- Carry out patrol functions within villages and towns and IDP camp in the AOR along with Sudanese Police.
- Observe, monitor and report the effective service delivery of the local police.
- Investigate and report all matters of police non-compliances of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.
- Assist in coordinating international support for the capacity enhancement initiatives, including training and logistical support.

VIII. **Personnel Requirements for AUMIS Civilian Police Component**

11. The following composition is anticipated as a basic requirement:

- Police HQ support element 15 Civilian Police
Observation and monitoring team  
800 Civilian Police

IX. Phases of implementation

12. The civilian Police observers would be deployed in 4 phases.

- **First Phase** - (Mission set-up and mission planning phase)
  During the Mission set up and planning phase the AU DITF will work with the initial 15 man police team comprised of the Commissioner and Planning Officers, deployed to El Fasher to complete the recce and develop a deployment plan.

  **End state**: To create a concept of operation and deployment plan which forms the basis for the implementation of the mission mandate. The deployment of the police observers will be based on the concept of operations developed by the initial team deployed in phase I and linked to the deployment of the MILOBSS and Protectors stated in the military plan.

- **Second phase**: (Conference building Phase)
  Four hundred and fifty (450) police Observers will be deployed in this phase. Police Observers will co-locate their bases with the local police and embark on confidence building initiatives.

  **End State**: Wide coverage of Police deployment of GoS police.

- **Third Phase**: (Comprehensive police service delivery phase)
  Three hundred and fifty (350) Police observers and mentors this will mark the completion of the full-scale deployment of the police component.

  **End State**: the delivery of expected services by GoS police to all the people in Darfur in compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.

- **Fourth Phase**: (Mission exit Phase)
  This phase will mark the withdrawal of the police component from the Mission. The withdrawal will start with formed Police units and subsequently the police observers, mentors and trainers.