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REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA
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I  INTRODUCTION

1. At its 177th meeting held on 11 March 2009, Council agreed to extend the mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for three months starting from 17 March, 2009. At its 190th meeting held on 22 May 2009, Council agreed to reconvene in mid-June 2009, to review comprehensively the situation in Somalia, on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Chairperson of the Commission, and to take the required decisions, particularly with respect to the renewal and of strengthening the mandate of AMISOM.

2. This report provides an update on the developments that have taken place in Somalia since the 177th meeting of Council. It concludes with observations and recommended actions on the way forward.

II.  POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. During the period under review, there have been unrelenting attempts by anti-peace elements to derail the political process in Somalia. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and his Government have exerted tremendous efforts to bring on board some influential clan leaders, elders and Islamic clerics in order to broaden domestic support for the stabilization of the country. However, from early May 2009, increased attacks by insurgents on the capital, Mogadishu, have threatened to reverse the important achievements made by the President and his Government since relocating to Mogadishu in January 2009, in implementing the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008 and promoting peace and reconciliation.

4. Nonetheless, thanks to the continued goodwill and support demonstrated by the international community towards the Government and people of Somalia, the Djibouti peace process has generally remained on course. In this respect, the most significant development was the pledging conference on Somalia held in Brussels, Belgium, from 22 to 23 April 2009, which generated US$213 million dollars in pledges from 15 (fifteen) countries and 2 (two) regional institutions, in addition to in-kind and services contributions from several other countries, to support AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces. The conference was hosted by the EU and jointly chaired by the United Nations and the African Union. I participated in the conference, which was also attended by representatives of 60 countries and regional organizations, including Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

5. Participants at the pledging conference emphasised the need to stabilize Somalia, by strengthening AMISOM and building a Somali Police Force of some 10,000 personnel and a National Security Force of 5,000 up from the current 3,000 and 2,000, respectively. Following the pledges, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed
welcomed the contributions made and expressed his gratitude to the international community for its response and solidarity with the people of Somalia during this critical period. As follow-up on the outcomes of the Conference, AMISOM has been engaging with the UN, EU, and other partners and donors in strategic and technical level meetings to develop mechanisms for accessing, tracking and managing the funds pledged in Brussels.

6. On 13 May, the Commission convened a consultative meeting in Addis Ababa that brought together the Defense Ministers and other representatives of the AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the United Nations and other international partners, to review the situation in Somalia. The meeting strongly condemned the aggression perpetrated against the TFG and the civilian population by armed groups, including foreign elements who are bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process, as well as regional stability. In this respect, the meeting expressed deep concern at the reports regarding the support provided to these armed elements by external actors, and stressed the need to conduct a full investigation into the matter in order to identify all those involved in these destabilisation activities, with a view to facilitating the imposition of appropriate sanctions by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council, in accordance with the decisions and resolutions taken by these two organs. The meeting welcomed the outcome of the Brussels pledging conference, called on all AU member States to provide the requisite financial, technical and military support to the TFG security forces, reaffirmed the determination of the AU and the larger international community to do everything in their power to sustain the on-going peace and reconciliation efforts, and expressed support to the TFG and its President.

7. During the past three months, the international community has expressed its confidence in the TFG and the political progress made as demonstrated by increasing levels of diplomatic engagement focusing on Somalia. The President and his government received international delegations from Finland, Norway, and US in Mogadishu in April 2009. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed undertook visits to Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Kenya, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda. During those visits, the President called for support for training and rebuilding of the Somali Security Forces and meeting their needs, the rebuilding of vital economic infrastructure in Somalia, and assistance in combating piracy in off the Somali coast.

8. My Special Representative for Somalia has also been engaging the Government on the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. The SRCC visited Mogadishu on 17 and 18 May 2009, at which time he paid a courtesy call on the President of the TFG. He seized the opportunity to deliver a message from me on the AU’s commitment to the Somalia peace process. President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed acknowledged the critical role being played by AMISOM to stabilize Somalia, particularly at this time when the Government is facing serious political and security challenges. The President further requested material assistance to the TFG, a substantial increase in AMISOM troops, and the enhancement of AMISOM’s mandate to include the training of Somali forces. Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali
Omar Sharmarke highlighted the need for targeted sanctions on those undermining the peace efforts, while recommending that the international community and AMISOM should supervise Somalia airspace. He further highlighted the need for the international community to impose a naval blockade on Kismayo and Merka ports to stop the importation of weapons the insurgents and the generation of revenue which has been fuelling the conflict. To facilitate the disbursement of contributions donated to Somalia through the AU, my Special Representative has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Prime Minister of Somalia on 30 March as well as an annexure to this MOU on 3 June 2009.

9. On 18 May 2009, the UN Security Council adopted a presidential statement in which it reaffirmed its support to the TFG as the legitimate authority in Somalia under the TFC, and condemned the recent renewal in fighting led by al-Shabaab and other extremists, which constitutes an attempt to remove that legitimate authority by force. The Security Council demanded that opposition groups immediately end their offensive, put down their arms, renounce violence and join reconciliation efforts. The Security Council urged the international community to provide its full support to the TFG. Finally, the Security Council expressed its concern over reports that Eritrea has supplied arms to those opposing the TFG, in breach of the UN arms embargo, and called on the Sanctions Monitoring Group to investigate. In its resolution 1872(2009) adopted on 26 May 2009, the Security Council called on all Somali parties to support the Djibouti Agreement and welcomed in this regard President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s call for all opposition groups to support this process. The Security Council reiterated its condemnation of the recent resurgence in fighting, emphasizing that Somalia’s long term security rests with effective deployment of the National Security Force and Somali Police Force.

10. On 20 May 2009, the IGAD Council of Ministers held its 33rd Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, to deliberate on the security situation in Somalia. I addressed the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting and reiterated the African Union’s commitment to fully support the TFG and particularly noted the efforts made by the TFG in so short a time, including promoting good neighborliness. I strongly condemned the aggression against the TFG and called on the international community to rally support for the Government which is the legitimate representative of the Somali people.

11. The IGAD Council of Ministers noted with grave concern the aggression perpetrated against Somalia and, recognizing that the assailants have exploited the porous borders of the country, called upon the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone, except for humanitarian purposes, as well as a sea blockage, especially on the ports of Kismayo and Merka. The meeting also condemned in the strongest terms possible all individuals and countries, in particular the Government of Eritrea and its financiers, who continue to instigate, train, fund and supply the criminal elements in Somalia. In this respect the meeting, having further condemned the acts of the Government of Eritrea calling for the overthrow of the TFG and attacks on AMISOM, called upon the Security Council to impose sanctions on the Government of Eritrea without further delay. The meeting reiterated its
commitment to support through all necessary means the TFG and the formation of its institutions; called for the extension of AMISOM mandate; welcomed the outcome of the Brussels pledging conference and called for the speedy disbursement of the pledges made; expressed appreciation to the AMISOM TCCs and urged all the other countries that have made troop pledges to fulfill them; and stressed the need for close cooperation and effective partnership between the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the IGAD, the AU and the League of Arab States, in dealing with the Somali situation.

12. Council will recall that, at its 190th meeting held on 22 May 2009, it considered the situation in Somalia in light of the outcome of the 33rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers. Council requested the United Nations Security Council, in line with the relevant provisions of the IGAD communiqué, to impose a no fly zone and blockade of sea ports, to prevent the entry of foreign elements into Somalia, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia which are carrying out attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM. Furthermore, Council requested for the imposition of sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, especially Eritrea, providing support to the armed groups engaged in destabilization activities in Somalia, attacks against the TFG, the civilian population and AMISOM, as well as against all the Somali individuals and entities working towards undermining the peace and reconciliation efforts and regional stability. Council also appealed to all the AU Member States to urgently provide all the required support, including military, to the TFG in order to enable the Government neutralize the armed elements carrying out attacks against it. Council reiterated its call to all the Somali parties who have not yet joined the peace process to do so without further delay.

13. Throughout the period under consideration, the Commission has coordinated with the international community in condemning attacks against the Transitional Federal Government and the Somali people. In this respect, I issued press statements on 12 and 19 May, drawing the attention of the International Community to the gravity of the situation in Somalia. The EU Troika, the UN, and the governments of the US, France and Norway, have also issued similar press statements expressing full support for the TFG.

14. The TFG has swiftly endorsed the decision of IGAD and Council on the imposition of a no-fly-zone and blockade on airports and seaports in the southern and central regions of the country that are used by Al-Shabaab and other insurgents. Announcing the decision following a Cabinet meeting on Monday, 25 May, Information Minister Farhan Ali Mohamoud noted that the measures are aimed at curbing the flow of arms and foreign fighters into the country and they do not include any restriction on humanitarian flights and shipments. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, addressing a press conference in Mogadishu also on Monday 25 May welcomed the IGAD and AU declarations on the situation in Somalia, and called for increased international support to the TFG to combat the threats from insurgents and their foreign backers.
15. On 6 June, AMISOM, IGAD and UNPOS jointly convened a consultative meeting in Nairobi with 16 African countries which had pledged during the Brussels conference, to provide training and service support for the Somali Security Forces. The meeting was held with a view of facilitating coordination and harmonization of all ongoing and future training support and services and to avoid wastage of scarce resources.

16. In further support by the International Community for the peace process in Somalia, the International Contact Group on Somalia, meeting in Rome, Italy, on 9-10 June, issued a statement supporting IGAD’s decisions of 20 May and Council’s decisions of 22 May. The Contact Group also expressed support for the Government of President Sharif Ahmed and recognized the important role of AMISOM and the TCCs. The ICG further requested members of the international community which made pledges in Brussels to rapidly disburse their contributions. At the end of the meeting, the Government of Italy decided to reopen its Embassy in Mogadishu.

17. During the reporting period, the TFG has continued with its efforts to enhance its capacity and consolidate the gains made since the signing of the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008. In April 2009, the Government approved a three-month budget for priority areas, including security, and began implementation of the budget, including payment of salaries for soldiers and the police force. In that same month, 343 members of the TFP, sitting in Mogadishu, endorsed the implementation of Sharia law throughout Somalia, a move that received domestic support. On 13 May 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed signed the legislation instituting Sharia in Somalia and promised to appoint a committee of experts to reconcile the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) with the imposition of Sharia. Implementation of Sharia has been one of the key demands of the opposition groups.

18. The steps taken by Government are in line with its commitment to reach out to those groups still outside the peace process, including al Shabaab and Hisbul Islam, with a view to making progress on reconciliation. In this connection, a faction of Hisbul Islam led by Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad Inda Ade, which had earlier implemented a cessation of hostilities with the TFG under the mediation of Somalia Islamic Cleric, has agreed to join the Government. However, al Shabaab and other hard-line leaders of Hisbul Islam, including the leader of ARS-Asmara Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, have rejected these reconciliation efforts and have pursued an agenda of undermining the Djibouti Agreement.

19. On 23 April, Sheikh Aweys Dariye flew into Somalia, after unsuccessful reconciliation talks in Sudan with TFG representatives. Since his return, he has engaged elders, clan leaders, politicians, religious leaders, business community and other groups in consultations. He has also held meetings with some of the Hisbul Islam, al Shabaab and political opposition groups with a view to forming a united opposition under his leadership to wage war against the TFG and AMISOM. He has been pressing ahead on the war path with external support. Aweys,
together with al Shabaab and Hisbul Islam, have since extended their destabilization to two previously peaceful regions which were under the political control of the Government.

20. The Somali President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has repeatedly called for dialogue with the militant opposition but without success so far. The Somalia Islamic Clerics Council, the Hawiye Cultural and Unity Council and Hawiye clan leaders have led several efforts at mediation, but the militant Al Shabaab and the Hisbul Islam faction allied to Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys have remained defiant, and have mobilised insurgents to launch attacks on positions of the TFG and AMISOM. The insurgents insist that they will not join the political process unless AMISOM troops are withdrawn from Somalia and Sharia law instituted, and that their concerns over the TFC and the current power-sharing arrangement based on the 4.5 formula must be resolved. In recent weeks, there have been signs of divisions within the ranks of the insurgents, and in few instances some moderate elements have defected to the Government.

21. On the ground in Somalia, both the TFG and the expanded Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) have made some progress in implementing the Djibouti Agreement and directing the political process in the country, including taking steps to build functioning state institutions in Mogadishu and other regions under its control. The Government has held regular cabinet meetings, to establish revenue collection mechanisms, signed trade and cooperation agreements with neighbouring/friendly countries, established an anti-corruption commission and begun the reorganization of its security forces.

III. SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The security situation in Somalia and in Mogadishu, in particular, remains extremely volatile with a real possibility that the gains being made by the TFG could be reversed. A key driver for this has been ARS-Asmara leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who returned to Mogadishu on 23 April. After holding meetings with various stakeholders in Mogadishu, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys met with the leaders of Hizbul Islam and Al Shabaab to form a united opposition to wage war against the TFG and AMISOM.

22. The beginning of May witnessed unprecedented protracted and fierce attacks by Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam targeted mainly at the TFG, with sporadic shelling of AMSIOM positions in Mogadishu. This onslaught by insurgents has also seen the use of a suicide bomber targeting a key TFG strategic installation on 24 May. In addition to carrying out an offensive in Mogadishu, insurgents have also simultaneously launched a campaign in the central regions of Somalia against pro-TFG allies, Ahlu Sunna Wal jama’a.

23. Despite the determination of insurgents to overthrow the TFG, evidence indicates that both Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam are embroiled in internal conflict. Hizbul Islam has suffered a setback with the loss of a key ally. Recently, Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siad aka Indho Adde defected to the TFG with a significant
arsenal of arms. Internal differences have forced Al Shabaab to replace Mukhtar Robow as its spokesman, and appoint Sheik Ali Mohamud Rage as his replacement. In a sign that can only indicate growing dissatisfaction, Dr Omar Iman was replaced as the chairman of Hizbul Islam by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

24. The period under review has further witnessed a large number of foreign fighters engaged in the current offensive and in most cases commanding attacks in Mogadishu and other regions. These foreign fighters, calling themselves Mujahdeen, have reportedly established a base in Daynile district in Mogadishu.

25. The prevailing security situation in Somalia has translated into a worsening humanitarian situation. The recent heightening of insurgent activities and the resultant clashes between government troops and armed groups led to heavy civilian casualties and displacement of persons. It is difficult to tell with precision the exact number of conflict-related deaths (including suicide bombings); however, unconfirmed reports indicate that resumption of hostilities during the second week of May has led to the death of an estimated 170 people in a two week-period. Additionally, approximately 520 people are said to have been wounded following heightened insecurity during the month of May 2009. The ever-increasing number of war-wounded has strained the already over-stretched health facilities in Mogadishu and environs. In an effort to augment existing health services, AMISOM level II hospital continued to provide health care to war-wounded civilians.

26. As at 25 May 2009, an estimated 60,000 people had been displaced from Mogadishu to various locations, including Afgoye, Lower & Middle Shebelle, Lower Juba and Gaalkacyo. The IDPs urgently need life-saving interventions particularly food assistance, water and sanitation, tarpaulin/plastic sheeting (for shelter) and other non-food items. The deterioration in the humanitarian situation in centre/south Somalia could be attributed to the protracted conflict, drought and dwindled remittances from overseas. There have also been reports of population outflows into Kenya through Dobley. The number of refugees arriving in Kenya is yet to be established after the registration and verification by the appropriate authorities.

27. Humanitarian actors have continued to provide critically needed assistance under increasingly life-threatening conditions. During the reporting period, humanitarian workers continued to be faced with abductions, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions and even killing. There have also been cases of looting of humanitarian supplies, vehicles and equipment owned by humanitarian organizations. On 17 May, a UNICEF warehouses in Jowhar containing equipment and humanitarian supplies was looted. The supplies were meant for supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs targeting an estimated 85,000 malnourished children in Centre/South Somalia. Cold chain equipment was affected, destroying thousands of doses of measles and polio vaccines meant for Somali children. The motive behind these criminal acts remains unknown. Some believe that the abductions and killings may be part of a long-term political agenda and are intended to intimidate the UN so as not to deploy. Others have dismissed them as mere criminal predatory activities characteristic of most conflict situations.
28. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, the UN SRSG, and humanitarian agencies have condemned the violence and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and have called for protection of aid workers and unhindered access to the needy population. Humanitarian access has been considerably constricted. Similarly, patients cannot get to health facilities. Some health facilities closed due to heightened insecurity.

29. The humanitarian situation has been compounded by the drought conditions which have led to reduced yields (in some cases total loss of crops), loss of pasture accompanied by death of livestock leading to loss of income and assets, increased unemployment and devastation of livelihoods.

30. On 13 May 2009, the Humanitarian Affairs Unit of AMISOM convened a meeting at AMISOM Headquarters in Nairobi with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (UN-OCHA) to discuss the coordination of humanitarian delivery and areas of collaboration between the Unit and OCHA. The Unit also initiated contacts with some embassies and humanitarian agencies to solicit urgently needed medical supplies and equipment for the three AMISOM field hospitals in Mogadishu. In response, the UK High Commission in Nairobi is making available to AMISOM an amount of £75,000.00 for the urgent purchase of medicines for AMISOM clinics in Mogadishu, while the Italian Government provided medicines and medical equipment to the Government of Somalia by organizing cargo flights into Mogadishu on 19 and 23 May, respectively.

IV. AMISOM DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

31. The current AMISOM military strength in Mogadishu stands at 4,274 troops, comprising 3 Infantry Battalions from the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and 2 Infantry Battalions from the Burundi Army. AMISOM is still 4 battalions short of its mandated strength of 9 Infantry battalions, plus maritime and air components. AMISOM also requires military staff officers to assist in running the administrative and support functions of its Military Component at the Force HQ.

32. AMISOM forces are currently deployed at Villa Somalia, the Old Siad Barre Military Academy, KM4, the Airport and the Seaport. The routes between these locations are patrolled frequently adding those links to the area of influence of the AMISOM Forces. AMISOM troops are performing critical tasks including:

- providing security in some parts of Mogadishu;
- providing security to the Government of National Unity and its Institutions;
- providing security to UN personnel and other visiting VIPs and diplomatic officials in Mogadishu;
- counter-IED and other patrols, and
- providing humanitarian assistance to locals such as medical and water.
33. The current strength of the AMISOM Police component stands at 6 police officers, all of whom are based in Nairobi pending deployment to Mogadishu by June 2009. They form the leadership element of the Police component and they comprise the Police Commissioner, his Deputy and four others. In addition to the current leadership, AMISOM now has 89 police trainers, advisers and mentors from the Ghana Police Service, who are scheduled for deployment to Mogadishu within the coming weeks to commence the crucial task of training the 10,000 all inclusive Somalia Police Force in line with the Djibouti Agreement.

34. The AMISOM Police Component has already started performing the following strategic tasks:

- building of a comprehensive personnel database of the Somalia Police Force;
- development of a comprehensive policy for Registration, Vetting, Selection and Recruitment and Training policies, which are based on international standards and best practices for the Somali Police Force;
- development of an updated, comprehensive Training Strategy for the Somali Police Force;
- establishing a Police Steering Committee as part of the coordination mechanism between itself and UNDP to support the Somali Police Force;
- evaluating and assessing the current UNDP sponsored training for the Somali Police Force in Uganda to ensure that it conforms to international, democratic and professional police standards and practices.

35. It is to be recalled that during the period beginning 20 November 2008 to 7 December 2008, the Commission embarked on a drive to generate military troops and police officers for AMISOM. The outcome of these efforts are only now beginning to bear fruit as Sierra Leone and Malawi have offered one battalion of 850 troops each, while Ghana has provided 148 police trainers, mentors and advisers. The Commission’s Selection and Assistance Team has already finalized the assessment and selection of Ghana Police Officers in readiness for deployment under AMISOM. In the meantime, steps are underway for the deployment of the third Burundian battalion, as well as for the commencement of the relocation of the AMISOM civilian leadership from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

V. UN CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION AND SUPPORT TO AMISOM

36. Council will recall that UN Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) has requested the Secretary-General to provide his assessment in advance of its decision regarding the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation as a follow-up force to AMISOM. The Secretary-General was also requested to develop recommendations on the mandate of the envisaged peacekeeping operation. In his report to the Security Council dated 16 April 2009, the Secretary General proposed the following four options:
(i) The first of these options is the transition from AMISOM to a UN peacekeeping operation (Option A), which will expand its presence progressively across Somalia. The plan foresees force strength of 22,500 troops, deployed across 5 sectors, and supported by maritime and aviation components. The Mission will also include a substantial police component of about 1,500 police officers and 8 formed police units. The primary role of such a peacekeeping operation would be to contribute to the creation of a secure environment that would permit the safe provision of humanitarian aid, help the Djibouti peace process to make progress, allow the rebuilding of the Somali state institutions to take root and support ongoing recovery efforts. Such a force would operate under a Chapter VII mandate. It is expected that a UN peacekeeping operation would be deployed under conditions that would allow it to operate effectively. These conditions include obtaining the consent to deploy of all Somali actors on the ground, and the adequate pledges of troops and required military capacities by Member States.

On the whole, the UN concludes that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation would, at this stage, constitute a high risk option. With the prevailing divergent views among Somali political actors, including the attitude of actors that remain outside of the peace process, the likelihood that a peacekeeping operation would trigger opposition from those elements opposed to the peace process is high, and they may portray the Mission as a new enemy.

(ii) In light of the above assessment, the second option, Option B, is for the UN to continue with the strategy set out in resolution 1863 (2009), which is to strengthen AMISOM while building Somalia’s security institutions. In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this line of action constitutes a pragmatic approach and demonstrates ways and means of UN continued engagement with the peace process in partnership with the African Union, donors, and Somalis. These activities, coupled with the on-going mediation efforts, and its humanitarian and recovery activities including the activities of other humanitarian organizations, all represent a credible approach, in the assumption of the UN to realize the strategic objectives.

(iii) The third option, Option C, seeks to expand Option B through the establishment of a “light footprint”, which involves the relocation of elements of UNPOS, the UN Support Office for AMISOM and the UN Country Team to Mogadishu. The Secretary General described this option as a prudent one, striking a balance between security concerns and the need for closer engagement with Somali actors in Mogadishu and allowing more effective planning, delivery and oversight of the strategy outlined in resolution 1863(2009).
(iv) Finally, Option D envisages a scenario under which there may be no international security presence in Mogadishu, given the risk of a possible degeneration of the fragile security situation and divisions among the Somali actors. The Secretary General stressed that this option represents a response to difficult circumstances and not a preferred state of affairs.

37. In his observations, the Secretary General indicated that, while the deployment of a UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation should remain the UN goal, realistically achieving that goal would require fulfilling certain conditions. He therefore recommended an incremental approach based on the following phases: maintaining the current UN engagement as approved in resolution 1863(2009) (support to AMISOM, support in building the Somali security institutions, and support for the political process and recovery and humanitarian activities); if security conditions permit, the UN engagement would then be extended to the second phase, based on the activities set out in Option C; following an assessment, the Security Council would review the UN role and decide whether the conditions and timing are conducive to the take over from AMISOM as set out in Option A.

38. In resolution 1872(2009) adopted on 26 May 2009, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to take the steps he identified above and to report on progress by 30 September and again by 31 December 2009. In the meantime, the Security Council requested the AU to maintain and enhance AMISOM’s deployment. It welcomed the efforts of the Mission to protect some strategic areas in Mogadishu and encourage it to continue to assist the TFG in the establishment of the Somali security institutions.

39. Council would recall that, in a letter dated 30 January 2009 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General outlined the details of support to be provided to AMISOM, including provision of logistics capacity support package to be funded from UN assessed contributions and to comprise the equipment and mission support services normally provided for a UN peacekeeping operation of the same size; and financial support from UN Member States, through the envisaged Trust Fund, which would allow for funding to be channeled to AMISOM to cover reimbursements and, eventually, to help procure necessary contingent equipment. This letter was a follow-up to resolution 1863(2009) of 16 January 2009, in which Security Council request the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund to provide financial support to AMISOM, as well as to provide a logistical support package to the Mission.

40. I am pleased to inform Council that, on 7 April 2009, the General Assembly approved the first phase of the UN logistical support package for AMISOM, to the amount of US$ 71.6 million. I also would like to inform Council that the Commission and the UN Secretariat are in the process to finalizing the Memorandum of Understanding that will define the modalities for the implementation of the support package, including the respective roles, responsibilities and liabilities of the two organizations. In the meantime, the United Nations has put in place a Support
Office for AMISOM in Nairobi, with outfits in Addis Ababa and Entebbe. Immediate areas of support have already been identified, and steps are underway to address issues related to the construction of AMISOM headquarters and level 2 hospital. Furthermore, the United Nations has continued to provide assistance for the planning and deployment of AMISOM through experts seconded to the AU. These experts are in addition to the planners provided by the EU and NATO.

41. In its resolution 1872(2009), referred to above, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, as well as technical and expert advice in the planning and deployment of AMISOM. It urged member States, regional and international organization to contribute generously to the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM.

VI  OBSERVATIONS

42. Significant progress has been made in the political process over the past months. The inclusive Government of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed is making sustained efforts to broaden the political process and consolidate the gains made towards reconciliation and, in this respect, I call on all Somali stakeholders to demonstrate the necessary spirit of compromise and accommodation to further peace, security and reconciliation in their country. At the same time, the TFG continues to be faced with huge challenges ranging from the relentless attacks carried by armed groups opposed to it, including foreign elements, to weak institutional capacity and serious financial constraints.

43. Against this background, the importance of continued support by the international community hardly needs to be over emphasized. In this respect, I welcome the outcome of the Brussels pledging conference and the renewed commitment of the international community to the promotion for lasting peace, reconciliation and security in Somalia.

44. I would like to reiterate the need for all concerned, both within the region and outside, to refrain from any action likely to undermine the ongoing efforts and threaten the security of AMISOM personnel, including through the provision of equipment, funds and other forms of support to the armed groups opposed to the TFG. I intend, as requested by Council, to continue to reach out to all concerned to convey the AU position, which, in line with that of IGAD, is to fully support the TFG as the legitimate authority of Somalia. I seize this opportunity once again to strongly condemn the aggression perpetrated against the TFG of Somalia and the civilian population in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by armed groups, including foreign elements, bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process, as well as regional stability, and express deep concern at the increased presence of foreign elements in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. I look forward to the investigation being carried out by the UN Sanctions Monitoring Group in order to identify all those involved in these destabilisation activities, with a view to facilitating the imposition of appropriate sanctions by Council and the UN Security Council, in accordance with the decisions and resolutions taken by these two organs. In this respect, I welcome the expansion of the mandate of the Monitoring Group to
include investigation and reporting of any attack against AMISOM forces the TFG and humanitarian operations, as well as other acts aimed at undermining the peace process.

45. It is crucial that every efforts be made to strengthen AMISOM and ensure that the Mission reach its authorized strength. I welcome the pledge by Sierra Leone to contribute one battalion to AMISOM and urge AU Member States and partners to provide the required logistical support for the early deployment of this battalion. Furthermore, I urge the AU Member States that have pledged troops to AMISOM to urgently deploy them. I would like to, once more, put on record my appreciation to the TCCs and AMISOM personnel, as well as to all countries and institutions providing support to the Mission.

46. Council will recall that, pursuant to its decision of 19 January 2007, it authorized AMISOM to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. To this end, the concept of operations for AMISOM provides that the Mission shall comprise 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime, coastal and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team. More specifically, AMISOM was tasked to undertake the following:

- support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
- provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions;
- assist in the implementation of the NSSP, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somalia security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners;
- provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
- facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs; and
- protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence.

47. However, with the current tense security situation in Mogadishu in particular, and Somalia in general, there is a strong need for strengthening AMISOM to fully play its role. In this respect, it is important that AMISOM be equipped to deter or
otherwise defeat attacks against its personnel and to enhance its capacity-building contribution as a direct support to the TFG and its institutions, especially the military and police, in their efforts to stabilize Mogadishu and other parts of the country. This would require that AMISOM be provided with protection means, requisite military hardware, air and maritime assets and that efforts be expedited to bring the Mission to its mandated strength of 8,000 troops.

48. I welcome the steps taken by the UN in order to ensure the timely delivery of its support package to AMISOM. I also welcome the outcome of the pledging conference held in Brussels in April 2009, and express my gratitude to all the AU member States and partners who pledged support on that occasion. It is crucial that the pledges made are fulfilled in earnest so as not to lose the momentum being witnessed in the peace process.

49. Needless to stress that sustaining peace in Somalia require that adequate support be given to the Somali security institutions. Indeed, as stressed by the IGAD Council of Ministers at its meeting of 20 May, only the rebuilding of the Somali security forces will ensure the long-term stability of Somalia. The pledges made to this end in Brussels are timely. I would like to seize this opportunity to urge AU member States to extend whatever support they can to enable the Somali forces play the role expected from them. Equally important is the need to support socio-economic recovery, provision of basic services and rebuilding of the institutions of governance, including capacity building. I encourage the international community to extend the necessary assistance. On its part, the Commission intends to identify key areas in which immediate support could be provided by the AU and member States.

50. I am deeply concerned by the prevailing humanitarian situation and the plight of the civilian population. I once again stress the obligation by all the parties to comply with international humanitarian law and ensure unrestricted humanitarian access and assistance. I pay tribute to the humanitarian organizations and personnel for their dedication.

51. I recommend that Council extend the mandate of AMISOM for an additional period of six months starting from 17 June 2009. At the same time, efforts will continue to be made for the UN Security Council to authorize the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.