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REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report provides an update on the situation in Darfur and efforts to achieve lasting peace in that region. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS

2. Significant progress was made in the negotiations in Doha during the reporting period. The Mediation, led by the Joint Chief Mediator, Djibril Bassolé, now Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burkina Faso, and Ahmad Al-Mahmoud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, succeeded in putting together a draft Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The DDPD contains provisions on all the major substantive areas which Darfurian stakeholders, including armed movements, civil society, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, political parties and the Government of Sudan (GoS) have indicated as issues that have to be addressed to end the Darfur conflict. The provisions of the Doha Document were presented by the Mediation to the participants of the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (ADSC), held from 27 to 31 May, 2011 in Doha, Qatar, which they discussed in working groups and plenary sessions.

3. I wish to commend UNAMID leadership for supporting the Conference by facilitating the selection and transportation of 245 representatives of civil society from Darfur to Doha, and by deploying UNAMID personnel to serve as committee chairpersons, presenters, and rapporteurs. The Conference brought together more than 500 delegates representing IDPs, refugees, civil society (including women and youth groups), the GoS, elected officials, tribal leaders and the Darfuri diaspora. The Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) also participated actively at the Conference. I wish to note, with regret, that other armed movements, particularly the two major factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi, were not represented at the ADSC, despite having been invited.

4. At the closing ceremony, on 31 May, the Darfuri stakeholders endorsed the Doha draft peace document as the basis for reaching a permanent ceasefire, a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement, and sustainable peace and stability in Darfur. The Conference, therefore, called on the GoS and the armed movements to make every effort to reach a permanent ceasefire and a comprehensive peace settlement on the basis of the document. The general perception and agreement is that the Doha document contains substantial improvements on previous agreements as it addressed issues that were never addressed before (such as human rights and fundamental freedoms), as well as substantial provisions on wealth and power-sharing and compensation for IDPs and refugees. In addition, the Conference endorsed the establishment of a Darfur Implementation Follow-up Committee, headed by the Government of Qatar and comprising other international
partners, that will work with the AU and the United Nations to assist the parties in reaching and implementing an inclusive and comprehensive agreement.

5. The Doha Outcome document was presented to me by the Meditation on 13 June 2011, at the AU headquarters. The Mediation also made similar presentations to the League of Arab States Secretary-General and to the UN Secretary-General in Cairo and New York, respectively. Following that event, on 22 June, the UN Security Council met and held an informal interactive dialogue with the Mediation team to discuss the outcomes of the ADSC. Thereafter, the Security Council issued a press statement in which, it *inter alia*, welcomed the ADSC as ‘a significant step forward and as the basis for achieving a comprehensive and inclusive peace in Darfur’. The Security Council also called on all parties urgently to resolve their differences and to make every effort to reach a permanent ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement as soon as possible on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

6. On 14 July 2011, in Doha, the GoS and the UJM signed the Darfur Outcome Document. This event was witnessed by His Highness Sheikh Hamad Ben Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, and attended by the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, as well as the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea and the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic. The AU was represented at the signing ceremony by the Deputy Chairperson of the Commission, Erastus Mwencha, and the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), former President Thabo Mbeki.

7. This achievement notwithstanding, there are still a number of challenges to be addressed. The continuing refusal of the SLA/Abdul Wahid and SLA/Minni Minawi to join the peace process remains a major concern. The challenge is to determine the modus operandi of bringing these hold-out movements and others into the peace process and the deadline for such a strategy. The situation is compounded by the recent alliances of these movements which, regrettably, are not geared towards achieving a comprehensive and inclusive political settlement.

III. DARFUR POLITICAL PROCESS (DPP) AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

8. At its 271st meeting held on 8 April 2011, Council called for the immediate commencement of the DPP, requested UNAMID to make all necessary preparations in this respect as a matter of priority, and emphasized that the DPP should proceed in a manner concurrent with, and complementary to, the Doha Talks. At its 17th Ordinary Session, the Assembly expressed full support to the efforts being made by the AUHIP, with the support of UNAMID, to expedite the launching of the DPP, in line with relevant AU decisions, as a way of addressing, in a comprehensive and inclusive manner, the challenges of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. It welcomed the commitment of the Government of Sudan to establish an enabling environment, and called on AU partners, in particular the UN Security Council and its members, to fully support this process and take the steps expected of them to facilitate the work of the AUHIP in this respect.

9. Indeed, in order to consolidate the gains of the ADSC and the broad endorsement of the Doha Conference, there is a need to keep the momentum, widen the involvement of the
stakeholders, galvanise and foster the ownership of the peace process by the larger Darfuri population as a means of furthering popular support for it. In this respect, and with a view to facilitating the early commencement of the DPP, UNAMID, the AUHIP and other international partners are currently engaging with the Government on steps to be taken to facilitate the successful conduct of this process.

10. The GoS continues to prepare for the holding of a referendum on the status of Darfur. Recognising that it would be preferable for the parties to reach agreement on the issue through negotiations in Doha or, failing that, by forming consensus on the matter during the DPP, UNAMID and the AUHIP engaged with the GoS to persuade it to reconsider its position and postpone the referendum to a later date to enable greater popular buy-in and consultations on the matter during the DPP. I am gratified to report that both the GoS and the LJM have agreed to defer the holding of the referendum to at least one year after they sign the Doha agreement.

IV. UNAMID DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

11. UNAMID’s strength both in international and national civilian personnel has continued to increase. As of 30 June, the number of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 4,466, of whom 1,145 are international staff, 2,835 national staff and 486 United Nations Volunteers. This represents 81 per cent of the approved strength. The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 18,014, representing 92 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555. The strength of UNAMID Police stood at 2,751 (of which 80 per cent are men and 20 per cent women), representing 73 percent of the authorized strength of 3,772. The Formed Police Units personnel stood at 2,233 or 83 per cent of the authorized strength of 2,660.

12. This increased strength has, in particular, enabled both UNAMID military and police components to increase the number of long and medium range patrols to new locations, including to Jebel Marra, the border between South Darfur and South Sudan, as well as to the northern parts of west Darfur, opening access and providing escorts to humanitarian and other UNAMID activities. This has enabled UNAMID to achieve one of its core mandates of protecting civilians.

V. SECURITY SITUATION

13. The security situation in Darfur remains mixed across the three states of the region. While sporadic and intermittent fighting is continuing in some parts of Darfur, mostly in North and South Darfur, most areas are relatively stable and secure. Aerial attacks by SAF aircraft on armed movement forces were a major source of insecurity for the population during the reporting period. Associated clashes between SAF and movement ground forces were relatively infrequent and mainly took place in sparsely populated areas.

14. A temporary lull in fighting between Government and movement forces, which began in late February, ended on 10 April, when SAF carried out an aerial attack on a combined SLA-Minni Minawi and JEM force in Muzbat (127 kilometres north of Kutum), North Darfur. Additional aerial attacks and clashes between SAF and movement ground forces took place in the same area, from 11 to 13 April. It was reported that, on 17 April,
UNAMID observed SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM convoys further east, near Jebel Eisa (37 km north of Malha) and El Hara (62 kilometres north of Malha), respectively. Intermittent fighting has continued since then between the armed movements and GoS forces, particularly in the areas of Shangil Tobaya, in North Darfur, and Jebel Marra, in West Darfur. Recent clashes include the fighting that occurred on 18 and 19 June between unknown armed men and the SAF in Shangil Tobaya, resulting in close to 1,000 civilians seeking protection at UNAMID’s nearby team site. Elements from the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid (SLM-AW) and Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) and SAF fought from 15 to 23 June in the area of Jebel Marra, in West Darfur.

15. The security situation in Darfur is compounded by a number of factors, including the impact of the Libyan situation and the proliferation of weapons in Darfur; the strategic alliance of the armed movements in the field for operational and coordinated attacks on GoS forces; attempts by SLA/MM to consolidate its hold in largely-populated areas; the relocation of SLA/MM and JEM forces to areas in the north-west of Darfur; and the tribal dimension of fighting, resulting in attacks by militia forces and inter-tribal clashes. All of these aggravating factors have resulted in more deaths, increased displacements of civilian populations and destruction of property. They have also resulted in greater denials of access and restriction of movements of UNAMID and humanitarian actors. I wish to appeal to all those involved to refrain from any acts that restrict movements of UNAMID and other humanitarian actors.

16. I wish to commend UNAMID’s military and police personnel for the enhanced collaboration between UNAMID and local GoS military and police authorities for the maintenance of a robust posture, which culminated in the substantial reduction in the number of attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel during the period under review. Unfortunately, this welcome trend was recently shattered by an attempted ambush by unknown assailants on a UNAMID convoy in west Darfur on 30 June during which an Ethiopian peacekeeper was killed.

17. On 6 June, the three crew members contracted by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, who were abducted on 13 January at Um Shalaya in West Darfur, were released. Regrettably, the crew spent almost 5 months in the hands of their kidnappers, and they were released following intensive efforts of the Government, WFP and UNAMID. The two civilian staff of UNAMID arrested by the NISS in Nyala and North Darfur were also released.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND ACCESS

18. With a view to improving humanitarian access, on 1 May, UNAMID and humanitarian agencies launched ‘Operation Spring Basket’, which is an initiative designed to enhance access and deliver aid to parts of Darfur that have been inaccessible for several months. The operation, which aims to reach approximately 400,000 beneficiaries, involves UNAMID and aid workers conducting needs assessments and delivering aid. Preparation for the operation involved reaching a series of agreements between UNAMID and OCHA and the parties to the conflict. During the operation, humanitarian supplies were delivered to locations in the deep field, including areas in SLA-Abdul Wahid controlled territory that had not visited, by any humanitarian agency since 2009.
VII. WATER CONFERENCE

19. Against the background of its understanding that the scarcity of water is one of the major drivers of conflict in Darfur, UNAMID continues to assist Sudanese authorities to plan and mobilize resources for water projects aimed at helping rural and urban communities in Darfur to gain access to this invaluable resource. One of such major support was the recent holding of the first-ever ‘Darfur International Conference on Water for Sustainable Peace’, in Khartoum, from 27 to 28 June, 2011. The Conference, which was jointly organized in collaboration with the GoS and the UN agencies, particularly UNICEF and UNEP, attracted over 300 participants, including national and state stakeholders, experts on water usage and distribution, development specialists, as well as a wide range of donors. A total of about half a billion dollars was pledged at the Conference to fund the projects already identified for implementation. UNAMID is actively following-up on the conclusions of the Conference. I wish to congratulate UNAMID once more on this initiative.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

20. I would like to join the Assembly’s Ordinary Session in Malabo in stressing the need for renewed efforts to bring about lasting peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur. In this respect, I note with satisfaction the conclusion of the Doha political talks, the endorsement of the Draft Outcome Document by the ADSC and the signing of this Document by the GoS and the LJM. I congratulate these two parties for their courage and for putting the interests of the Darfurian people above any other consideration. I consider this as a positive development that will greatly contribute in bringing about sustainable peace, security and development to the people of Darfur. I also commend the efforts made by the State of Qatar, in particular the work accomplished during the last three years by Mr. Djibril Bassolé and by Mr. Ahmed Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, the Qatari State Minister for Foreign Affairs. I reiterate AU’s call to the other armed rebel movements to cease hostilities in Darfur and join the peace process so as to put an end to the suffering of the Darfurian people.

21. The signing of the Agreement by the Government of Sudan and LJM now paves the way for the start of the DPP, which is so critical for the achievement of lasting peace in Sudan. Indeed, the DPP is complementary to the Doha process. The DPP will build on the Doha Document, which covers most of the substantive issues, and reflects the input of both the parties and civil society. I encourage the AUHIP and UNAMID to expedite their efforts.

22. The DPP is a process that will allow Darfurians to reach consensus on core elements of a political settlement for Darfur. As its name indicates, the DPP is characterised by three elements. First, the DPP is a peace process in Darfur, for Darfurians, by Darfurians. The role of international actors is limited to making the process possible. Darfurians know better than anyone else what they need for a peaceful future. While people negotiating on behalf of Darfurians, outside Darfur, negotiate on the basis of positions, Darfurians in Darfur are more inclined to negotiate on the basis of their interests, including that of peaceful co-existence. Second, the DPP is a political process. The armed conflict in Darfur is rooted in a political conflict, which needs a political solution. Darfurians have political views and are divided accordingly. Only a political process can foster a political consensus that will
deligitimise armed conflict. Finally, the DPP is a process. What happens during the numerous meetings that will constitute the process is as important, if not more important, than any resulting text. If the process succeeds in uniting Darfurians on the basis of a common interest in peaceful coexistence, it will be more difficult for armed belligerents to sustain or create divisions.

23. To be successful, the DPP requires an environment in which all constituents can participate freely. The GoS has the primary responsibility to establish the enabling environment for the DPP, and I note with satisfaction the commitment made by the Government in this respect. However, the enabling environment cannot be a precondition for the commencement of the DPP. As the purpose of the DPP is to reach an agreement that ends the conflict in Darfur, one cannot make an end to the conflict a precondition for such a process. Moreover, imposing strict preconditions on initiating and pursuing the Process runs the risk of handing a veto power to spoilers. I strongly call on our partners, in particular the UN Security Council and its members, to fully support this process, which has been endorsed by the highest decision making organ of the AU, and to take the steps expected of them to facilitate the work of the AUHIP and UNAMID in this respect.

24. UNAMID has achieved tremendous successes in the implementation of its mandate and continues to make great strides in its primary responsibility to protect the civilian populations in Darfur. I wish to thank the Joint Special Representative, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, for his excellent and exemplary leadership of the men and women, both civilians and in uniform, who continue to serve the cause of peace in Darfur. I also thank Council for its focused and unrelenting engagement on the Darfur situation.

25. As Operation Spring Basket and the Water Conference have shown, there are still major challenges to be met and more efforts are still required to bring peace and stability to Darfur. UNAMID’s role in Darfur is increasing and will be much more necessary in the implementation of the Doha Outcome and the DPP. It is for these reasons that I recommend to Council to renew UNAMID’s mandate, which comes to an end on 31st July 2011, for a further period of 12 months. Council may also wish to request the United Nations Security Council to also authorize the extension of UNAMID’s mandate for one additional year. In the meantime, I urge all stakeholders in Darfur to extend the required cooperation to UNAMID to enable it fully discharge its mandate and effectively support the efforts aimed at brining about lasting peace, security and stability.