PRESENTATION BY DR. ALHADJI SARJOH BAH, DIRECTOR, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT, AT THE THE THIRD MEETING OF THE EXPANDED MECHANISM FOR THE SUDAN CRISIS

ADDIS ABABA, 31 MAY 2023

• Since the last meeting of the Expanded Mechanism, held on 2 May 2023, the AU has been working on a number of issues.

• It has convened two meetings of the Trilateral Mechanism, to agree on the way forward. It has also convened a meeting of all humanitarian organizations working in Sudan to discuss how to cooperate.

• The Africa CDC has convened a meeting with ministries of health of Sudan and its neighbours to discuss support to the devastated health sector in Sudan. It has allocated an amount of USD3 million to acquire urgent medical supplies and medicines, which it is working on transporting to Port Sudan.

• The AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security has also convened a meeting with Sudanese women to explore ways of supporting them – there have been reports of an alarming increase in sexual assault by the warring parties.

• The AUC has been finalizing its De-escalation Plan, now referred to as the Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of Sudan.

• On 27 May 2023, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union met at the level of Heads of State and Government, under the chairmanship of the President of Uganda, H.E. Yoweri Museveni.

• This third meeting of the Expanded Mechanism is the first engagement we are undertaking following the PSC summit level meeting that took place on Saturday, to share the outcomes of the meeting and to discuss the way forward.

• The PSC communique provides a clear distillation of the AU’s policy, which is encapsulated in the Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. The six elements of the Roadmap are;
➢ this Expanded Mechanism, to ensure coordination of all efforts of regional and international actors;
➢ immediate, permanent and inclusive cessation of hostilities;
➢ effective humanitarian response;
➢ protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and full compliance with IHL;
➢ recognizing the critical role of neighbouring states who are impacted by the spill-over of the conflict; and
➢ resumption of an inclusive political transition process, that takes into account the contribution of all Sudanese stakeholders, towards a democratic civilian government.

• The AU is embarking on a tour of regional capitals, to express our concerns at the crisis in Sudan, and the potential impact on the neighbouring states, and indeed the continent as a whole, if the fighting is not arrested immediately and an inclusive political process allowed to start.

• At the last meeting, it was agreed that the AU would consult to put in place a Core Group that would guide the work of the international community in addressing the Sudan crisis. We are now ready to convene the Core Group in the coming week. It is comprised of the Trilateral, plus LAS and EU, and the members of the Quad.

• Jeddah process has led to the signing of the short-term ceasefire agreement. How do we transform that process, which laid the basis for further talks, into a process that is more inclusive? That can lead to a permanent, comprehensive ceasefire?

• And while doing that, we need to start planning and preparing for the inclusive negotiations on a political process, one which would address both the immediate and long-term causes of the Sudanese crisis. While disagreements over the reform of the security sector did provide the immediate trigger for the conflict, Sudan and the Sudanese need to address the systemic grievances that date back decades.

• The African Union is working to support such an inclusive political process, which would allow for the full representation of the voices of all sectors of Sudanese civil society and political parties.