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**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION
ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION**

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ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the provisions in the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted by the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU), held on 28 February 2004 in Sirte. The CADSP recognizes that the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the use of landmines, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are among the key common threats to security and stability on the continent. The purpose of the report is to support the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in exercising its powers pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1(n), of the Protocol relating to its establishment regarding promoting the implementation of regional and international instruments on arms control and disarmament. The report is also expected to contribute to the efforts towards realizing the aspirations underpinning Agenda 2063, the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration and the AU initiative on ‘*Silencing the Guns*’.

2. The report provides an overview of the efforts undertaken at the continental level in all areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as of the gaps, challenges and opportunities at hand. The report concludes with a set of recommendations that aim to strengthen existing norms and propose measures to be implemented by the Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the Commission.

II. CONTROLLING ILLICIT PROLIFERATION, CIRCULATION AND TRAFFICKING OF SALW

a) Overview of trends in illicit SALW proliferation, circulation and trafficking

3. Large scale arms proliferation commonly takes place during conflicts and the breakdown of law and order where government-held stockpiles are captured and acquired by domestic and/or foreign armed groups. In the aftermath of armed conflict, foreign fighters and mercenaries return to their countries of origin with significant amounts of arms and ammunition. Trafficking across land and sea borders also occurs through medium and large shipments by organized criminal groups, or small scale illicit trade by petty criminals. The sale of service weapons and ammunition by soldiers often takes place at a smaller scale, but can pose challenges over time. Lack of proper inventory control and accountability measures largely accounts for the diversion of weapons on the continent.

b) The regional and global framework to control illicit SALW

4. The 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (UN-PoA) remains the overarching international policy instrument and is further strengthened by other key policy and legally binding instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted in 2013. The AU’s Commitment to the UN-POA was expressed through the *Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW* adopted by the Ministerial Conference of

the AU, held from 30 November to 1 December 2000. The AU also strongly supported the ATT process through adopting the Common Position endorsed by decision *Assembly/AU/Dec.472(XX)* of the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held on 27-28 January 2013 in Addis Ababa.

5. In Africa, and at the sub-regional level, AU Member States have developed legally-binding instruments such as the 2001 Southern African development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials; the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on the Control, Prevention and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States; the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on SALW, their Ammunitions and Other Related Materials, and the 2010 Central Africa Convention for the Control of SALW, their Ammunition and Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair or Assembly (Kinshasa Convention). With the exception of the Kinshasa Convention, all these regional instruments are in force.

c) AU efforts to control illicit SALW

6. To foster integrated and coordinated action, the Commission developed the AU Strategy and Action Plan to Control the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW, which was adopted by the 20th Ordinary Session. The Strategy and Action Plan provide a framework for common action and outline the different roles and responsibilities of the Commission, RECs, regional bodies and Member States in implementing the international and regional instruments.

7. The Commission continues to mobilize Member States to ratify and/or implement the regional and international instruments and also endeavours to provide them with direct support in implementing various aspects of their regional and international obligations. Notable among these efforts is the project entitled '*The Fight Against the Illicit Accumulation of Firearms and Explosives in Africa*' launched in 2010. The project is currently in its second phase concluding in June 2016. Another key project is the *AU-Germany Project on Illicit SALW Control and Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) in the Greater Sahel Region*, which was launched in 2015, and aims to address gaps and coordinate assistance provided by various partners and implementing agencies to Member States in the Sahel region. In the specific case of Somalia, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has implemented an arms registration system in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 2182 (2014) and 2244 (2015). The Commission is currently procuring arms marking machines and facilitating the deployment of an electronic record keeping system to further support this undertaking.

8. The Commission also recognizes the need for an integrated and coordinated approach among regional actors and continues to work through the AU-Regions Steering Committee on SALW established in 2008. Chaired by the Commission, the Steering Committee brings together RECs, regional bodies with a small arms mandate and international partners. In 2013, the Steering Committee, which convenes biannually, included DDR in the scope of its work and has since convened six meetings. The Steering

Committee provides a platform to enhance information sharing, coordination, joint prioritization and action review.

d) Gaps, Challenges and Opportunities

9. The international and regional legally binding instruments remain the foundation for coherent, transparent and effective action to control illicit SALW. Nonetheless, further progress is required to achieve their universality on the continent. The status of ratification of the instruments is detailed in annex 1.

10. Beyond the ratification of the legally binding instruments, illicit SALW control requires a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework. While existing legislation varies among Member States, some are often incomplete or out-dated. The performance of national mechanisms on SALW is also affected by weak mandates and inadequate national funding. Similarly, national action plans lack sufficient resources for their effective implementation. Moreover, few Member States have instituted research and data gathering protocols to monitor arms trafficking and levels of armed violence. This consequently undercuts their ability to design and prioritize targeted programs and evaluate their impact.

11. Poor stockpile management and weak security renders legally-held stockpiles vulnerable to diversion and susceptible to the risk of explosions. Effective stockpile management requires governments' ability to sustain good safety and security practices, properly dispose of surplus, enforce effective accountability and control measures, as well as maintain effective procurement procedures. The progress achieved in arms marking and record-keeping also varies among Member States, with some having only partially completed arms marking, while others are yet to begin. In many instances, reliable and accessible records that correspond to marked weapons have not been properly kept or maintained.

12. Trafficking and circulation of weapons across international borders often follows patterns and routes of human and goods movement and have been linked to other transnational criminal activities, such as contraband smuggling. This is further exacerbated by limited border control capacities, poor governance and public services, and the absence of viable economic alternatives to illicit enterprises.

13. Illicit small arms pose a great threat to the safety and security of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and impact the implementation of their mandate. PSOs are also increasingly involved in disarmament and stabilization operations, however, they do not always possess the required operational and technical capacities. Moreover, arms and ammunition owned by PSOs often run the risk of theft and looting and could be later used to attack troops, civilians or enter into illicit circulation.

14. Currently, there are eight arms embargoes in effect in Africa imposed by the UN Security Council that ban, restrict or place controls over the transfer of weapons to certain entities. Reports of the UN sanctions committees have highlighted limited institutional capacity of states in monitoring and enforcing embargoes, particularly with regards to

border controls, as well as the problem of effective information sharing among states and sanction committees.

15. Finally, and while it is recognized that women and children account for the majority of those adversely impacted by armed conflict, there remains significant gaps in measures aimed at mitigating and responding to this impact during hostilities as well as in post-conflict situations, including gender-based violence, recruitment and sexual exploitation of children, and the socio-economic consequences of armed conflict on women and girls.

III. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

e) Challenges confronting DDR processes

16. The processes of Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) on the continent are faced with multiple political and operational challenges that are encountered in the different phases. In many instances, disarmament and demobilization are not included in peace agreements signed to end armed conflicts or their modalities and timelines are not adequately negotiated and agreed upon. Following peace-settlements, the initiation of DDR programs are undermined by, among others, the lack of political will on the part of the armed factions. Distrust on the part of the combatants in the process also creates serious challenges. Furthermore, the absence of clear timelines, an oversight mechanism, national ownership and the lack of the requisite financial and operational capacities also leads to prolonging the process. Re-integration is often hindered by the absence of the requisite socio-economic structures, transitional justice and national reconciliation. Failure to address the re-integration needs of both ex-combatants and host communities therefore cause inter-communal strife or puts ex-combatants at the risk of recidivism and recruitment into criminal groups.

17. Moreover, DDR is increasingly being conducted in the absence of formal peace agreements as part of interim stabilization interventions or counter-terrorism operations. This requires well planned and robust implementation and oversight mechanisms. Additionally, many conflicts on the continent are of a cross-border nature that entails repatriation and reintegration of ex-combatants in other countries.

f) The AU DDR Capacity Program

18. In order to provide a continental strategy and operational framework to enhance DDR effectiveness, address the range of challenges faced, and develop responses to the evolving nature of DDR, the Commission launched the AU DDR Capacity Program in collaboration with the UN and the World Bank. The program was developed through a series of consultations with RECs, regional and international experts and training centres, and is guided by the principles of national ownership and sustainability and aims to break the recurring cycle of violence.

19. The first phase of the program, extending from 2012 to 2015, consisted of three pillars: institutionalization of DDR capacities within the Commission and RECs; establishment of a DDR resource and research centre, and support to DDR processes undertaken by

Member States and PSOs. In this regard, the Commission deployed DDR experts to the AU Mission for the Central African Republic and Central Africa (MISAC), the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) and AMISOM. The experts supported the respective missions in assessing DDR needs, sensitizing national authorities, and developing approaches to DDR and related components as part of the on-going peace-making and peace-building processes. The Commission also retained the requisite DDR expertise at headquarters level to steer and coordinate the implementation of the program.

20. The DDR Resource and Research Centre was established to provide opportunities for learning and information sharing, and provide harmonised trainings on the basis of best practices and integrated standards. The Centre facilitated the process of developing DDR knowledge products including the DDR Compendium compiling experiences and lessons learned from DDR programs on the continent, a DDR Training Manual, and multiple Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) tailored to the African context and reflective of the changing DDR context. The OGNs cover issues relating to detention, women and children, reintegration, national initiatives, foreign fighters, and countering violent extremism. The Centre also produces periodic newsletters and maintains a website to facilitate exchange of, and access to, information and technical resources by practitioners and researchers.

21. Furthermore, the Commission provided support to seven Member States that made requests, as well as to AMISOM and the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's resistance Army (RCI-LRA). The support was designed pursuant to the national and regional context as assessed through field visits and consultations with national stakeholders. In this regard, the Commission, in collaboration with RECs and implementing partners, undertook mentoring missions to national DDR programs, developed DDR funding modalities, deployed consultants to assist national commissions, facilitated national stakeholders' consultations towards building consensus on DDR and its modalities, trained staff of national DDR commissions, assisted in the development of national Standard Operating Procedures, and supported study tours and exchanges of experiences among Member States.

22. The action plan for the second phase of the project is currently being finalized and priorities include support to AU-led or supported peace-making processes to ensure the adequate integration of DDR into the scope of peace agreements, as well as strengthened technical and operational support to Member States, PSOs and other missions, including the RCI-LRA and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram.

IV. MINE ACTION

g) Overview of the regional and international framework

23. The use of landmines was initially regulated by the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, which was later amended in 1996. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APMBC) was

later adopted in 1997. More recently, Protocol V to the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) was adopted in 2003 to deal with the problem of unexploded and abandoned ordinance. The threat caused by cluster munitions was also addressed through the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. The status of ratification of the aforementioned instruments among Member States is indicated in annex 2.

24. The OAU/AU has long expressed grave concern over the tragic consequences of the use of landmines. This was expressed by resolution CM/Res.1593(LXII) of the 62nd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, held on 21-23 June 1995 in Addis Ababa; decision CM/Dec.363 (LXVI) of the 66th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held in May 1997 in Harare; decision AHG/Dec.135(LXX) of the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the OAU, held in July 1999 in Algeria; and decision EX.CL/Dec.164(V) of the 5th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU, held on July 2004 in Addis Ababa. In these resolutions and decisions, the AU policy organs supported international efforts towards banning landmines and addressing the threat of ERW, and urged all Member States to accede to the international instruments.

h) Overview of the level of contamination and progress in clearance

25. AU Member States that are party to the APMBC have completed the destruction of their stockpiles. Regarding cluster munitions, some progress has also been made whereby 3 Member States parties to the CCM have completed destruction of their stockpiles, while destruction is planned or underway in another 6 Member States party. Clearance of contaminated areas remains the main challenge. Prior to the entry into force of the APMBC, territories of 36 AU member States were contaminated by landmines. By the end of 2015, 12 remained impacted by varying levels of contamination. Regarding contamination by cluster munitions, 6 Member States, including parties and non-parties to the CCM, continue to suffer light to medium contamination.

i) Challenges and gaps in mine action and explosive hazard management

26. To date, the 12 Member States that have not yet completed clearance were granted deadline extensions pursuant to the APMBC that range between 31 December 2016 and 1 October 2022. In some of these cases, the extension is not to fulfil clearance obligations but to survey contaminated areas and develop national action plans. Overall, mine clearance remains an expensive, dangerous, labour intensive and slow process. The lack of the requisite technical expertise and human resources, inadequate training and equipping of deminers, weakened mine action programs, on-going conflict and political instability, inadequate local and international financing, and the lack of political will are all factors that undercut completion.

27. Victims' assistance is another key pillar that has not received the required attention and resources. This is largely due to the fact that challenges to victims' assistance are a reflection of the overall state and quality of the national public health system and social and economic support policies. The full and effective implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Continental Plan of Action for the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities for 2010 – 2019, thus, becomes critical

components to ensure that victims are well provided for within an adequate national system.

j) AU mine action and ERW strategic framework

28. The Commission launched the AU Mine Action and ERW Strategic Framework for the period 2014 to 2017. Building local capacities, enhancing inter-African cooperation and assistance, and supporting transition to national ownership and financing are the core principles guiding the strategy. The Strategic Framework consists of three integrated components. The first component focuses on advocacy for universal ratification and compliance with the international instruments, as well as mobilization of assistance and support for national programs. In this regard, the Commission mobilizes Member States through organizing sensitization workshops and annually commemorating the International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.

29. Through the second component, the Commission aims to provide direct technical and operational support to national programs. To date, the Commission has provided a number of Member States with demining equipment and collaborated with regional training centres in delivering training to Member States' practitioners in explosives disposal and management in line with the International Mine Action Standards. The Commission further convenes forums at which Member States can exchange experiences and best practices in all pillars of mine action. Moreover, and within the framework of the AU Border Program, the Commission is taking steps to support demining border areas in order to facilitate demarcation.

30. Support to AU-PSOs in explosive hazard management and threat reduction is the focus of the third component of the Strategy. In this respect, the Commission aims to assist AU-PSOs in assuring that they have the appropriate capacity to fulfill the mission mandate, which includes training and mentoring in ERW clearance, Counter-IED, medical, combat engineering, risk awareness and applying best practices in arms and ammunition management.

V. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

k) Overview of the regional and international framework

31. In 1964, the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which culminated in the adoption of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) in 1996. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa was opened for signature in 1991.

32. In 2002, the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted *decision AHG/Dec. 182 (XXXVIII)* in which it expressed support to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and called for its universality. The AU

also highlighted the importance of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to regional and global security in resolution *Assembly/AU/Dec.472(XX)* adopted by the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in January 2013. On 26 March 2015, the Chairperson of the Commission called for the universality and effective implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

l) Status of implementation, gaps and challenges

33. While Member States have expressed strong commitment to the regional and international instrument as evident by the commendable rate of ratification, as shown in annex 3, efforts towards the full and effective implementation are hindered by various constraints, including competing developmental and security priorities and lack of the required capacities. Additionally, the majority of AU Member States are still to acquire the infrastructure, technological capabilities and knowledge to harness the benefits of peaceful chemical, biological and nuclear sciences and technology.

m) AU efforts to support implementation

34. The Commission has provided capacity building support to Member States in areas of legislation, enforcement and reporting, and organized consultative forums to explore effective ways to implement the disarmament regimes in light of the competing national developmental priorities. In this context, the Commission pursues a development-oriented approach, in coordination with RECs, regional bodies specialized in chemical, biological and nuclear science and technology, research and educational institutes, as well as industry associations.

35. Under the memorandum of understanding on cooperation signed with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2006, the Commission promotes the ratification of the CWC and its full implementation and co-organizes forums with National Authorities established pursuant to the CWC to review progress, challenges and lessons learned. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba in 2009, the Commission has continued to provide support to the Conference of States Parties and serve as the interim secretariat of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).

36. More recently, the Commission, in collaboration with the Implementation Support Unit of the BWC, organized a meeting of Member States to discuss and promote its universality and effective implementation. The meeting, *inter alia*, discussed the devastating Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak as well as the weaknesses and challenges of national public health sectors to detect and contain disease outbreaks.

37. The Commission continues to collaborate with the 1540 Committee to enhance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on the continent. In April 2016, an assistance and review conference will be held to mobilize support from international partners in response to requests for assistance submitted by Member States pursuant to the resolution. The Commission is also collaborating with Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) to convene, in April 2016, a regional conference to review the progress and challenges to its universality and entry into force, and review its implementation on the

continent, including the operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities hosted by Member States.

VI. OBSERVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

38. I remain deeply concerned by the continuing threats to peace, security and stability in the continent posed by the illicit proliferation of SALW, the continued existence of landmines and ERW, as well as the different challenges posed by WMD and related material to regional and international security. I call upon all Member States, RECs/RMs and other concerned stakeholders to renew their commitment and redouble their efforts to address these threats in compliance with the regional and international instruments. I am pleased that the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held on 30-31 January 2016 in Addis Ababa, commended the efforts undertaken by the Commission, Member States, RECs and the international partners to advance the implementation of the regional and international regimes against illicit SALW and WMD. I reiterate the call made by the Assembly to the PSC to pay particular attention to the threat posed by illicit SALW within the wider context of conflict prevention and management and the need to apply a development-oriented approach to the implementation of the WMD regimes. The Assembly further stressed that Member States should renew their efforts and commit the required human and financial resources to ensure sustainable action.

39. Therefore, in line with the Assembly decision and the Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU of the African Heads of State and Government, and to further the goals of the AU initiative on '*Silencing of the Guns: Pre-requisites for realising a conflict-free Africa by the year 2020*', the following recommendations aim to map out the way forward to consolidate gains made and address the most pressing challenges:

- (i) The PSC should prioritize the issue of SALW as part of its conflict prevention and resolution efforts, including taking measures to curb the flow of weapons and ammunition into conflict zones. In this regard, the PSC should work closely with the UN Security Council and its sanctions committees, including within the framework of the Annual Joint Consultative Meeting, to explore means to contribute to enhanced monitoring and implementation of arms embargoes in a coordinated manner;
- (ii) AU PSOs should be consistently mandated and capacitated to assist Member States in all aspects relating to illicit SALW control as required by the environment in which they operate. PSOs should ensure proper management of mission-held arms and ammunition, as well as those collected during military operations and disarmament activities. Incidents of theft and loss should also be responded to appropriately including through documentation and other remedial measures. PSOs should be adequately capacitated, to conduct disarmament and demobilization as a stabilization intervention or post-conflict measure;
- (iii) Member States should renew their commitment to the ATT, in line with the spirit of the African Common Position, by ratifying or acceding to it as early as possible, and commit full implementation of regional instruments. Member States and RECs

- should also implement integrated border management approaches that contribute to confidence, alternative livelihoods, and address the underlying conditions that perpetuate insecurity. In this regard, Member States that have not yet done so should ratify or accede to the AU Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention);
- (iv) The PSC is urged to ensure that DDR is negotiated and explicitly integrated, with clear obligations and timelines, into agreements on the cessation of armed hostilities. This will ensure that obstacles faced in initiating and completing DDR processes are mitigated. Concerned Member States should work jointly and coordinate their efforts to ensure that the regional dimensions of DDR, including repatriation and reintegration, are properly addressed and coordinate their efforts to mitigate spill-over effects during conflict and in post-conflict situations;
 - (v) Member States and RECs should effectively include reintegration programs into broader post-conflict recovery efforts. DDR programs must also be planned in coordination with, and in support of, national SSR and reconciliation efforts, as well as socio-economic development policies. Furthermore, Member States should assume greater ownership of their DDR programs and devote the required human and financial resources to guarantee their success and minimize reliance on unpredictable international financing;
 - (vi) I urge the concerned Member States to develop concrete action plans outlining how they intend to meet their landmine and ERW clearance obligations and strive to ensure that mine action programs are fully owned and led by national stakeholders;
 - (vii) I appeal to Member States to renew their commitment to meeting the needs of victims of landmines and ERW, as well as persons with disabilities in general, by ratifying or acceding to the CRPD and reaching the targets outlined in the Continental Plan of Action for the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities for 2010– 2019;
 - (viii) The Commission should contribute to the acceleration of landmines clearance, including through providing the necessary forums and operational frameworks to address gaps and bottlenecks, facilitate inter-African cooperation, and mobilize adequate financial support;
 - (ix) A comprehensive approach to IEDs threat mitigation in environments in which AU PSOs are deployed should be developed taking into consideration the totality of mission planning, deployment, and operations;
 - (x) The policy organs of the AU should consistently call upon the concerned members of the international community to work earnestly towards complete nuclear disarmament, the early entry into force of the CTBT and the ratification of the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba;

- (xi) The Commission should engage the range of regional bodies involved in the areas of chemical, biological and nuclear science and technology to ensure an effective and development-oriented approach to the implementation of the WMD regimes. Furthermore, the Commission, in collaboration with RECs and the relevant regional and international bodies, should undertake a study to evaluate the risk of weapons proliferation and terrorism related to WMD on the continent, gaps in security measures, and the level of preparedness to natural and human triggered chemical, biological and nuclear emergencies;
- (xii) AU member States should speedily ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba and fulfil their financial obligations towards African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) in a timely and consistent manner to guarantee that it effectively fulfils its mandate.

Annex 1: Status of ratification of the regional and international instruments on SALW¹

P: Party S: Signatory

Member State		Firearms Protocol	SADC Protocol	Nairobi Protocol ²	ECOWAS Convention	Kinshasa Convention	ATT
1	Algeria	P		-			-
2	Angola	P	-	-		S	S
3	Benin	P		-	P		S
4	Botswana	P	P	-			-
5	Burkina Faso	P		-	P		P
6	Burundi	P		P		S	S
7	Cameroon	P		-		P	S
8	Cape Verde	P		-	P		S
9	Central African Republic	P		S		P	P
10	Chad	P		-		P	P
11	Comoros	P		-			S
12	Côte d'Ivoire	P		-	P		P
13	Dem. Republic of the Congo	P	S	P		S	-
14	Djibouti	P		P			S
15	Egypt	P		-			-
16	Equatorial Guinea	P		-		S	-
17	Eritrea	P		P			-
18	Ethiopia	P		P			-
19	Gabon	P		-		P	S
20	Gambia	P		-	-		-
21	Ghana	P		-	P		P
22	Guinea	P		-	P		P
23	Guinea-Bissau	P		-	P		S
24	Kenya	P		P			-
25	Lesotho	P	P	-			P

¹ Information published by the United Nations <https://treaties.un.org/> and provided by SADC Secretariat, ECOWAS Secretariat and RECSA

² Nairobi Protocol is open for signature for countries outside the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions

Member State		Firearms Protocol	SADC Protocol	Nairobi Protocol ²	ECOWAS Convention	Kinshasa Convention	ATT
26	Liberia	P		-	P		P
27	Libya	P		-			S
28	Madagascar	P	-	-			S
29	Malawi	P	P	-			S
30	Mali	P		-	P		P
31	Mauritania	P		-			P
32	Mauritius	P	P	-			P
33	Mozambique	P	P	-			S
34	Namibia	P	P	-			S
35	Niger	P		-	P		P
36	Nigeria	P		-	P		P
37	Republic of the Congo	-		P		P	S
38	Rwanda	P		P		S	S
39	Sahrawi Arab Dem. Republic	-		-			-
40	São Tomé and Príncipe	P		-		S	S
41	Senegal	P		-	P		P
42	Seychelles	P		S			P
43	Sierra Leone	P		-	P		P
44	Somalia	-		-			-
45	South Africa	P	P	-			P
46	South Sudan	-		-			-
47	Sudan	P		P			-
48	Swaziland	-	P	-			S
49	Tanzania	P	P	S			S
50	Togo	P		-	P		P
51	Tunisia	P		-			-
52	Uganda	P		P			-
53	Zambia	P	P	-			S
54	Zimbabwe	P	P	-			S

Annex 2: Status of ratification of the international instruments on Landmines, ERW and persons with disabilities³

P: Party

S: Signatory

Member State	CCW	CCW Protocol II (Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices)	CCW Protocol II Amendment	CCW Protocol V (ERW)	APMBC	CCM	CRPD	
1	Algeria	P	-	-	-	P	-	P
2	Angola		-	-	-	P	-	P
3	Benin	P	-	-	-	P	S	P
4	Botswana		-	-	-	P	P	-
5	Burkina Faso	P	P	P	-	P	P	P
6	Burundi	P	P	-	P	P	P	P
7	Cameroon	P	-	P	P	P	P	-
8	Cape Verde	P	P	P	-	P	P	P
9	Central African Republic	-	-	-	-	P	S	-
10	Chad	-	-	-	-	P	P	-
11	Comoros	-	-	-	-	P	P	-
12	Côte d'Ivoire	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
13	Dem. Republic of the Congo	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
14	Djibouti	P	P	-	-	P	S	P
15	Egypt	S	-	-	-	-	-	P
16	Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	-	P	-	-
17	Eritrea	-	-	-	-	P	-	-
18	Ethiopia	-	-	-	-	P	-	P
19	Gabon	P	-	P	P	P	-	P
20	Gambia	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
21	Ghana	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
22	Guinea	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
23	Guinea-Bissau	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
24	Kenya	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
25	Lesotho	P	P	-	-	P	P	P

³ Information published by the United Nations <http://au.int/en/treaties/status>; https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en

Member State		CCW	CCW Protocol II (Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices)	CCW Protocol II Amendment	CCW Protocol V (ERW)	APMBC	CCM	CRPD
26	Liberia	P	P	P	P	P	S	P
27	Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28	Madagascar	P	P	P	P	P	S	P
29	Malawi	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
30	Mali	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
31	Mauritania	P	-	-	-	P	P	P
32	Mauritius	-	P	-	-	P	P	P
33	Mozambique	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
34	Namibia	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
35	Niger	P	P	P	-	P	P	P
36	Nigeria	S	-	-	-	P	S	P
37	Republic of the Congo	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
38	Rwanda	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
39	Sahrawi Arab Dem. Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
40	São Tomé and Príncipe	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
41	Senegal	P	-	P	P	P	P	P
42	Seychelles	P	P	P	-	P	P	P
43	Sierra Leone	P	-	P	P	P	P	P
44	Somalia	-	-	-	-	P	P	
45	South Africa	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
46	South Sudan	-	-	-	-	P	-	-
47	Sudan	S	-	-	-	P	-	P
48	Swaziland	-	-	-	-	P	P	P
49	Tanzania	-	-	-	-	P	S	P
50	Togo	P	P	-	-	P	P	P
51	Tunisia	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
52	Uganda	P	P		-	P	S	P
53	Zambia	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
54	Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	P		P

Annex 3: Status of ratification of the regional and international instruments on WMD⁴

P: Party **S: Signatory**

Member State	NPT	BWC	CWC	CTBT	PELINDABA	BAMAKO CONVENTION
1	Algeria	P	P	P	P	
2	Angola	P	-	P	P	S
3	Benin	P	P	P	P	P
4	Botswana	P	P	P	P	-
5	Burkina Faso	P	P	P	P	S
6	Burundi	P	P	P	P	S
7	Cameroon	P	P	P	P	S
8	Cape Verde	P	P	P	S	-
9	Central African Republic	P	S	P	S	P
10	Chad	P	-	P	P	P
11	Comoros	P	-	P	S	P
12	Côte d'Ivoire	P	S	P	P	P
13	Dem. Republic of the Congo	P	P	P	S	P
14	Djibouti	P	-	P	S	S
15	Egypt	P	S	-	S	P
16	Equatorial Guinea	P	P	P	S	-
17	Eritrea	P	-	P	P	-
18	Ethiopia	P	P	P	P	P
19	Gabon	P	P	P	P	P
20	Gambia	P	P	P	S	P
21	Ghana	P	P	P	P	S
22	Guinea	P	-	P	P	S
23	Guinea-Bissau	P	P	P	P	S
24	Kenya	P	P	P	P	S
25	Lesotho	P	P	P	P	S
26	Liberia	P	S	P	P	S

⁴ Information published by the United Nations <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/> and the AU Office of the Legal Counsel <http://au.int/en/treaties/status>

Member State		NPT	BWC	CWC	CTBT	PELINDABA	BAMAKO CONVENTION
27	Libya	P	P	P	P	P	P
28	Madagascar	P	P	P	P	P	S
29	Malawi	P	P	P	P	P	-
30	Mali	P	P	P	P	P	P
31	Mauritania	P	P	P	P	P	S
32	Mauritius	P	P	P	-	P	P
33	Mozambique	P	P	P	P	P	P
34	Namibia	P	-	P	P	P	-
35	Niger	P	P	P	P	S	P
36	Nigeria	P	P	P	P	P	S
37	Republic of the Congo	P	P	P	P	P	P
38	Rwanda	P	P	P	P	P	S
39	Sahrawi Arab Dem. Republic	-	-	-	-	P	-
40	São Tomé and Príncipe	P	P	P	S	S	S
41	Senegal	P	P	P	P	P	P
42	Seychelles	P	P	P	P	P	-
43	Sierra Leone	P	P	P	P	S	S
44	Somalia	P	S	P	-	S	S
45	South Africa	P	P	P	P	P	-
46	South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	S
47	Sudan	P	P	P	P	S	P
48	Swaziland	P	P	P	S	P	S
49	Tanzania	P	S	P	P	P	P
50	Togo	P	P	P	P	P	P
51	Tunisia	P	P	P	P	P	P
52	Uganda	P	P	P	P	S	P
53	Zambia	P	P	P	P	P	S
54	Zimbabwe	P	P	P	S	P	P