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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRWC</td>
<td>African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAFAG</td>
<td>Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Child Protection Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICRS</td>
<td>Information, Counselling and Referral Systems</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<td>NDDRC</td>
<td>National DDR Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OGN</td>
<td>Operational Guidance Notes</td>
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<td>PCRD</td>
<td>AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Transitional Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAAFAG</td>
<td>Women Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>XC</td>
<td>Ex-combatants</td>
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A: Purpose of the Guideline

This guideline aims to provide African stakeholders, particularly AU member states, but also the AU, RECs, RMs, and PSOs with operational guidelines to assist in designing and building institutional frameworks for a national DDR programs. The guideline will attempt to provide an outline on how, from a national perspective, African governments could best engage national institutions, mobilize funding, create partnerships, manage the downsize military structures and support the transition of XCs as they transition to civilian life.

While drawing from the experiences in Africa and catering to the particular needs of stakeholders on the continent, the Guideline is also compliant with international legal standards and norms, and is complementary to other existing DDR frameworks such as the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). However, these Operational Guidelines are drawn from the point of view of national authorities to address the issues and options from a national perspective in order to promote national ownership.

B: General Principles

**Definition of DDrR**

*Disarmament refers to the process by which the XC is disarmed and safely stored or destroyed.*

*Demobilisation is the process by which XCs are formally discharged from the armed forces or armed group. After demobilisation, the XC is officially considered a civilian.*

*Reinsertion is the small “r” of the DRR process. It is defined as short-term assistance provided to XCs immediately after demobilization, as a form of transitional assistance to help cover their basic needs and that of their immediate families before entering into the reintegration program.*

Contd.
Reintegration is the longer-term process through which an XC regains a civilian life. In most cases, the reintegration process involves not only the XCs but also their family and community. Reintegration is multi-faceted and includes social reintegration through which the XC is accepted back into the community; political reintegration where by the XC acquires a role in decision-making processes; and economic reintegration which allows the XC to gain a livelihood through gainful employment.

B.1 National Ownership

Ensuring national ownership of reintegration programming is essential for its success and sustainability as well as its ability to be integrated within the broader national stabilisation and development planning. National ownership ensures that the intervention is informed by an understanding of the local context and conflict dynamics as well as the dynamics between the XC and the local population.

Although the government may receive financial and technical assistance from partners, it is the responsibility of the national government to ensure that it is leading the process from the design to implementation. It is also the responsibility of the government to ensure that there is sufficient coordination within the government ministries and local government, between government and national civil society and between the government and external partners. In contexts where state structures are weak, the principal of national ownership still requires that national authorities be involved national reintegration programming with a view to progressively taking over responsibilities as their capacity develops.

A government exerts national ownership by contributing its own national contributions to the DDR process, leading the engagement with national and
international stakeholders, building the capacity of its national institutions, ensuring coordination and division of responsibilities between the national and local government, national leadership over the M&E of external support to DDR, implementing effective public information strategies, keeping the armed groups engaged and informed and creating links to other peace building and development initiatives.

B.2 Harmonize the DDR Program with Other National Processes and Policies

For the DDR operation to deliver the intended results, the government needs to ensure that the DDR program is coherent and complementary to other national policies and programmes. The responsible DDR authority needs consult and create linkages with other institutions at the national and local level in order to prevent conflict and enhance synergy and cooperation. This is particularly important when designing the reintegration program as the program should be designed as part of the national development and recovery efforts. The program should also be de-conflicted with land, employment, transitional justice policies as well as commensurate with the capacities of national institutions.

B.3 Consult with National and International Stakeholders

An effective DDR process needs to be designed in consultation with a broad group of stakeholders. The government, possibly the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) itself, should take the lead in this consultation process. Consultations should be held with the military, the key line ministries, local government authorities, political parties and representatives of armed groups as well as civil society, traditional and religious leaders. Consultations should also be held with members of the international community including the AU, UN, RECs/RMs, and funding sources including the World Bank and diplomatic missions. Holding consultations at the initial stages will create a better understanding of the landscape, avoid possible conflicts and create inclusivity in the DDR process.
B.4 Promote Choice and Respect

Clear criteria and a selection process is needed from the outset when identifying combatants that will participate in the DDR process. Those who participate should do so as a choice rather than being forced to participate. Forcing participation often creates resentment and may lead to further conflict. Normally, when downsizing national militaries, the national forces will select those members who will participate. When choosing members of armed groups, it is particularly important to have clear criteria on which members qualify for the DDR process. These criteria should be communicated to avoid the feeling of unfair treatment. These criteria should also avoid the creation of perverse incentives or the tendency of individuals to mobilize additional recruits in order to gain the benefits of the DDR process. Even once a combatant is selected to participate in the DDR process, the individual should have the choice as to where they settle and what livelihood they want to pursue. Participants, and their dependents, should be treated with respect throughout the process and should not be discriminated due to their religion, gender, ethnicity, location or background.

B.5 Provide for the Needs of Special Groups

It is important that the government identify special needs groups such as the ill and disabled as well as CAAFAG and WAAFAG. Special programs are needed for these individuals that cater for their special needs.

C: Operationalising Reintegration Programing

C.1 Contexts Where DDR Occurs

Any DDR process in Africa is unique and ranges from demobilising parts of a standing army to the demobilisation of disparate armed groups. Any design of a DDR program and the organizational framework to manage it, should be based on the particular needs and objectives of the situation. DDR processes also
take place in a range of security situations some of which are very fluid. Broadly, these situations include:

i) **Peace Agreement**: A DDR process may be negotiated as part of a peace agreement. In such a situation the parameters of the DDR are already established, although the details of implementation often need continued attention.

ii) **Absorption of armed groups into the regular security forces**: Armed groups may have been absorbed into the regular security forces either as part of a peace agreement or part of the counter-insurgency arrangement. In either case, DDR process is generally the same as they are in theory one coherent military structure. In these situations, SSR factors need to be carefully considered.

iii) **Defeat of an armed group**: In the situation of an outright defeat by one force over the others such as in wars of national liberation, the defeated side will either be absorbed or demobilised. The winning side will also require DDR to right-size their force.

iv) **As a component of stabilisation efforts**: DDR, or DDR-related programs, can also be implemented as part of confidence building or stabilisation efforts. These programs are generally adapted to specific armed groups or areas which require special attention to address the security situation.

"Yes, but our case is special"

*If you ask a national official to explain the challenge of demobilization and reintegration in their country, nine out of ten, the official will say that DDR in their country is not like the others. Indeed, all DDR operations have their specific history and are being implemented within a particular political process. There is no blueprint that can be applied to all contexts. The design of any program needs to respond to the challenges and opportunities at hand. In fact, it would be difficult to point out where and when so-called ‘traditional DDR’ has actually been practiced*
C.2 Pre-Conditions for DDR

In several contexts, such as Sudan, South Sudan and DRC, while DDR has assisted in managing the conflict it has not been successful in resolving the conflict. This is because DDR cannot replace political commitment to resolve the conflict but must form part of a broader set of policies and processes, such as SSR, political reform, transitional justice, community-based violence reduction and national reconciliation. Unless DDR is being as part of counter insurgency operations to promote defections among the opposing side, DDR needs to take place where there is a basic level of agreement and confidence in the political process. If too much is invested in DDR without other processes or conditions in place, DDR will likely not contribute to successfully transforming combatants into productive members of the community and there is a high likelihood of re-recruitment.

Case Study: The Sudans

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) contained a commitment to start a DDR programme. However, despite years of major investments in the process, it became evident that the parties were not sufficiently prepared to significantly reduce the size of their armies.

In situations where the pre-conditions for DDR do not exist and members of armed groups are reporting to or being captured by AU PSOs or national forces, there is often imperatives to provides these combatants with support in order to assist them to return to their communities, support them so that others in their group will follow their example or on humanitarian grounds. This type of support should avoid the provision of financial packages but rather services such as:
• Educational grants
• family tracing
• medical and psychosocial support
• life-skill training;
• referral to development opportunities and job creation
• provision of physical protection

In these situations the AU PSO or national government will need to have an in-depth understanding of the background of the people that they would be assisting as well as the risks associated with the support. In some instances, for example, support may antagonise another war-affected group creating tensions and sources of conflict. Another risk is that the providing support to XCs without an agreement and manageable monitoring system might actually encourage others to join. Preferably, any such support provided should be a part of a broader peace process.

Case Study: DRC

Since the closing of the National PNDDR process in eastern DRC in May 2011, MONUSCO, together with the Congolese national army, has continued a type of DDR process without political arrangements with the armed groups. In some situations, particularly with foreign armed groups of the M23, FDLR, ADF and LRA, DDR has worked in concert with military pressure to promote defections and has resulted in either the neutralisation of the armed group or a significant reduction in their numbers. However, particularly with domestic armed groups, there has been rampant re-recruitment with some DDR processes inadvertently resulting in a conflagration of the size and number of armed groups.

C.3 Legal and Political Instruments of National DDR Processes

National DDR frameworks become increasingly relevant when there is a relatively stable and legitimate government which can exert control over most
of its territory. In situations where a government decides to downsize its own national military, a clearly defined National DDR Policy, issued as part of an interim constitution or a provisional order of the government, could suffice.

In situations where the demobilization follows an armed conflict without a clear victorious party, such as in Burundi in the 2000 or the Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan in 2005, the parameters of the DDR process will usually be defined in a ceasefire or peace agreement. Such agreement would preferably contain the objectives, eligibility criteria, institutional mandates and structure and timeframe of the DDR process. While it is important to have clarity on the DDR process, providing too much detail may also create a risk by limiting flexibility or not being pragmatic. Even where there is a peace agreement that outlines the parameters of a DDR process, the new government should still issue a National DDR Policy either as an executive order or DDR Policy document that is in line with the parameters of the peace agreement but which provides more detail.

This DDR policy document should designate one government authority to manage the development and implementation of the DDR program. Generally, African governments have created National DDR Commissions (NDDRC) which bring together representatives of the main ministries, including the Ministry Defence. This has been done Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and many other countries. Creating a NDDRC has the advantage of creating synergy among line ministries and creating a bureaucracy that is capable of developing and managing a complex program. In other situations, however, governments have designated focal points within the Ministry of Defence or even created a separate DDR Ministry.

The National DDR Policy should contain the following components:

i) Objectives and timeframe of the DDR program
ii) Role of the DDR in the broader developments in the security sector
iii) Targeted size of the national armed forces after the downsizing
iv) Eligibility criteria for those to be demobilized and to receive reintegration support
v) Steps in the DDR process
vi) Possible benefits for the combatants being demobilised
vii) Linkages with other national policies and programmes.
viii) The mandate and institutional structure of the national DDR authority as well as oversight and coordination mechanisms

In addition to the National DDR Policy document, the designated DDR authority will need to develop an operational project document which provides for the details of the DDR operation including a list of the activities, division of responsibilities, costing and a description of the funding modality.

In addition to the National DDR Policy document, the national government or parliament may also need to issue a legal instrument that provides for a qualified amnesty for ex-combatants or another document that provides for the legal status and process for ex-combatants. As experienced in the case of Somalia, it should be noted that the inclusion of the death penalty as a punishment for ex-combatants may limit the ability of international actors to support the DDR program.

In situations where PSO mandates are given a mandate to conduct or support DDR operations, it is the PSC and UN Security Council mandate that provides the authority and scope of intervention.

C.4 Establishing Political Oversight and Coordination

There are a variety of formulas for creating the national organisational structure to implement national DDR programs. Although there is no one approach, it is recommended to have at least two levels of administration in order to promote oversight and accountability:

i) Political and Strategic Oversight Body: This body is generally referred to as the National DDR Commission (NDDRC). The NDDRC is a composed of a broad-high level range of government authorities that meet in a committee to approve strategies, policies and programs proposed by the technical committee as well as to manage the politics of the DDR process. The NDDRC is also responsible for liaising with
partners including the AU, REC, and the UN as well as mobilising donor support. Most importantly, the NDDRC ensures that the armed forces or other armed groups remain committed to the process and that the DDR program is consistent with other government policies.

The NDDRC is headed by the most senior government official, usually the President or Prime Minister and is composed of senior representatives from the:

i) Ministries of defence and interior  
ii) The national security forces  
iii) Relevant ministries, such as that of finance, justice, agriculture, labour, youth, social affairs, information, etc.  
iv) Parties to the peace accord  
v) Agencies associated with the reconciliation process  
vi) Civil society organizations

In several countries, such as Angola, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, the DDR was indeed led by a NDDRC. The name, however, can change though the powers and responsibilities remain the same. In CAR and Somalia, this body is embedded in a ministry, usually either the Ministry of Defence or Interior. The advantage of not being within a ministry is that it could more easily cut across different sectors and deal with the most critical political questions.

**Case Study: Uganda**

*Depending on the country, different DDR institutions may exist. For example, Uganda managed its DDR of its national army in the 1990s through the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) chaired by a senior General. In 2000, the Ugandan government established the Ugandan Amnesty Commission to manage both the DDR process for rebels who renounced the rebellion. Whatever the name given, it is still important to have two levels of government oversight.*
i) Technical Implementation and Management Body: This body is generally called the Executive Secretariat (ES) of the NDDRC. It is responsible for the technical development and implementation of the DDR program as well as the monitoring of the activities. The head of the ES could also be a member or even the Secretary of the NDDRC. The main tasks of the ES include:

- Function as Secretariat of the NDDRC (preparation and follow-up of decisions);
- Design and propose the DDR operation
- Planning for implementation
- Technical coordination with national and international partners
- Dialogue and reporting to funding agencies;
- Selection, contracting and supervision of implementing partners
- Management and operational oversight
- Procurement of goods and services
- Financial accounting
- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of DDR activities
- Reporting to the NDDRC and other stakeholders

The structure of the ES depends on the specific design of the DDR operation, the mandate of the NDDRC, the funding modality, and the role of the various partners. Some of the key considerations in structuring the organization are: efficiency, flexibility, transparency and accountability. In general terms, the ES should include the following units with their respective tasks:

- Disarmament and Demobilization: Sometimes the national military or AU PSO has already taken care of this step but the ES still needs to verify eligibility
- Reintegration Support: Contracts implementing partners and liaise with the relevant line ministries; manage reinsertion packages for XCs; may manage the Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). This unit would need to work closely with the Operations Unit.
- M&E: Monitors and evaluates project as well as maintain the Management Information System (MIS)
- Public Information and Communication: This unit is sometimes called the
Information and Sensitization Unit.

- Gender: Ensures gender issues are taken into account including support to WAAFAG
- Children (CAAFAG): this component may be managed by the Child Protection Unit within the armed forces or another child protection body
- Disability and health issues: support physical rehabilitation, medical checks and services, voluntary and confidential HIV testing and counseling, trauma counselling, etc.
- Operations: supports all logistics and procurement
- Administration and Finance
- Information Technology (IT)
- Human Resource Management: includes management of staff at the state or provincial

Once the mandate and structure is defined, the degree of decentralization needs to be established. The ES normally needs to implement DDR-related activities throughout the country. Therefore it is generally essential that the NDDRC operates offices at the regional/state/provincial level to implement the program and maintain relationship with local stakeholders. This may include establishing liaisons at the community level including XCs who are recruited and trained for outreach and program management.

Centralised leadership and management are important especially in the early phases when critical decisions are made and procedures are developed. However, there will be a need to progressively decentralise particularly in the reintegration phase. Clear reporting chains need to be established so that the ES HQ can maintain oversight and monitoring of the program.

Recruitment of ES staff should be based on technical merit and competence. The composition of the team will also need to reflect the various groups in the country. However, staff members within the ES should be technicians not actual representatives of these groups.
C.5 Factoring in Groups Associated to Armed Forces

The national DDR program needs to include issues and support to related to groups that are broader than the traditional DDR operations. Even if support for these groups is being done by other agencies than the NDDRC, it is important that links be established and the support available by communicated. These groups may include:

i) **Dependents of XCs:** Normally the support provided to the XC should be allocated with consideration that this support will need to benefit the dependents of the XC.

ii) **Women Associated with Armed Groups (WAAFAG):** All the needs of women who are not combatants may not be addressed as dependents of XCs. As a result a support program may be needed to provide for these women though not necessarily be the NRCCP itself.

iii) **Children Associated with Armed Groups (CAAFAG):** Children require special services.

iv) **Communities where XCs resettled without registration:** Where there is spontaneous return, it may not be possible to identify individual combatants. As such, programs may need to be designed to benefit the community as a whole.

In Burundi some of the senior management of the NDDRC Executive Secretariat change with time due to changes in the government as well as changes resulting from the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. These changes are sometimes necessary to maintain the political engagement of the relevant parties.
C.6 Partners

C.6.1 Implementing Partners

To implement a DDR program, the government will need to work with a range of partners beyond its own line ministries. These implementing partners include:

   i) UN agencies
   ii) International and National NGOs
   iii) Private sector companies

The need of the government to rely on implementing partners depends on its own capacity. Even where the government outsources implementing partners to provide a service, it is important that the NDDRC provide the framework and monitor the quality of the service being provided.

C.6.2 Other Partners

Besides implementing partners, there are a range of other partners that the NDDRC will need to coordinate and communicate with. These include:

   i) Regional Organisations: AU, RECs
   ii) International Organisations: UN, ICRC, World Bank
   iii) International and Regional Diplomatic missions
   iv) Media outlets
   v) Civil Society: youth, traditional, faith based, human rights, advocacy

These partners are particularly important when national institutions are not yet fully developed and experienced. In Africa, there is always a dilemma when countries come out of conflict: there is an immediate need to release and address the needs of combatants as soon as possible but the national authorities responsible are not fully developed or prepared. This often creates the need for national authorities to give up some ownership of the DDR process to external partners who can provide immediate services while the national
authorities continue to develop their own capacities. In such a situation, one of the top priorities must remain the training and mentoring of national staff.

In such situations support must be found from external agencies with experience in these matters, such as the AU, UN (including UNDP) or the World Bank. Donors could also assist in bringing in expertise in the start-up phase. However, the government needs to ensure that it decides on the actual policy and strategy decisions. When expert staff are seconded to the ES, loyalty and reporting lines still need to go to the ES management rather than the external agency providing the support. No unit of the ES should be seen as working for an external agency.

C.6.3 Coordination Mechanisms

In principle it is the national government’s responsibility to invite partners to support the DDR. Once partners have been identified it is important that the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder be clarified as well as the relationships among them. Once those have been defined, coordination will be required at several levels. Leadership over the coordination of support to the DDR national program is the responsibility of the government as well as the issuance of regular progress reports.

i) Policy Level: The NDDRC should lead although the NDDRC may request the AU and UN to take an active role in the coordination, particularly if there is a peacekeeping mission in the country. This could even include a co-chairing mechanism with the UN, AU or a major multilateral funding mechanism such as the World Bank.

ii) Operational Level: The ES of the NDDRC should lead in the coordination of the implementation and operations of the DDR program. The co-chairing mechanism could, however, be considered where there is a peacekeeping mission.

iii) Finances: If there is more than one donor financing the DDR program, the donors themselves may agree to coordinate their contributions and organise platforms for dialogue with the government. Whatever the platform, the NDDRC should attend these meetings and be prepared with a list of needs that are cross referenced with existing contributions.
This will create clarity as to the remaining funding gaps and avoid the duplication of funding for a particular item.

iv) **Joint Operations Centre (JOC):** At the early stages of the program, a JOC can be formed with the key actors such as the ES, the national military, police and AU or UN, to coordinate on a daily basis the pressing operational issues. The JOC addresses and resolves immediate issues and ensures adherence to the agreements and standards of operation.

v) **Technical Coordination Committee:** This committee can be formed to coordinate the reinsertion and reintegration phases of the program. The Committee is usually chaired by the ES and includes representatives of the main stakeholders such as the AU, UN, UN agencies, government agencies, donors and implementing partners. Technical committees could also be formed at the regional level to ensure coordination in the provinces.

vi) **Special Interest Groups:** Special coordination mechanisms may be established to cater to the needs of particular issues or groups such as sensitisation, CAAFAG, WAAFAG, the ill and disabled, etc.

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**Case Study: MDRP**

The World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the greater Great Lakes Region was a multilateral trust fund for DDR programs in the region. Besides providing a funding modality for governments, MDRP also provided effective coordination among donors as well as a broader coordination platform for interaction between all the DDR stakeholders in the region.

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C.7 Completing the DDR Program

Once the objectives of the DDR operation are achieved or there are no more combatants to process, the institutional infrastructure for the DDR will normally be closed down. It is therefore important to consider early on how the DDR institutions and infrastructure will be discontinued or converted at the end of
the operation. Anticipating the completion, national authorities should consider how the institutions and experience gained could best benefit the country in its entirety.

Anticipating the end of the DDR operation is also important in the communication with the XCs and their communities. After a certain period of time the XCs should no longer count on the advice and services from the ES. They should not expect special treatment as XCs, since they would have become regular citizens, engaging in society and the economy as others without a military past.

D: Financing

Based on the objectives and strategy in the policy documents, the NDDRC should create a project document that includes an initial budget against a list of activities. As funding will not normally come from one source, it is beneficial for the government to keep the funding structure by agreeing on a funding modality where donors can pool their resources.

As first step, the government should determine how much of the DDR program it can fund from the national budget. Generally, the more national funding is invested in the DDR program, the more national ownership and flexibility the government will have. If the direct involvement of the national military is politically acceptable in the DDR process, it could provide a wide range of services in the disarmament, demobilisation and transportation of the combatants.

In regards to external financial support, there is a range of funding mechanisms that could be considered to channel these resources. A DDR program can use one or several of these mechanisms.
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<th>Funding Modality</th>
<th>Key Features</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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| A. National budget | • Government uses national funds to finance priority activities  
• National accountability mechanisms apply | • Promotes national ownership and demonstrates commitment which may encourage additional external assistance  
• Reallocates military resources to national development |
| B. Bilateral support to the government | • Depending on the conditions, the government can use this as it would its national funds | • Governments emerging from conflict generally do not have the capacity to manage and account for funds given by international donors |
| C. Funding from AU or UN Peacekeeping Operations | • AU or UN peacekeeping operations could facilitate disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion activities  
• Both could also provide technical and logistical assistance to the government | • Budgets related to peacekeeping operations generally cannot be used for reintegration programs |
| D. Support from UN Agencies | • There are a range of options with UN agencies based on the agreement negotiated with the government  
• One option is the direct execution by a UN organisation (DEX)  
• Another option is the direct implementation of by the government (NEX) | • One disadvantage of UN agency funding is that, if the NEX is not utilised, the funds can only be used by UN agencies. |
From the perspective of national ownership and capacity building, the preferred modality would allow the funding to be managed by the ES of the NDDRC. This would in principle be possible with national financing, World Bank managed multi-donor trust funds, World Bank loans or grants, or UNDP’s National Execution (NEX). Throughout the operation, agreed upon financial management and procurement rules would be applied and regular reporting, supervision and audits conducted.

Where an external funding modality is agreed upon, it is important that the selected financial management agency be embedded in the ES so as to create synergy with the government authority and build the capacity of national staff. Where the capacity of national institutions is too limited, the preferred option would be to pool finances through a UN agency that can both manage funds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Modality</th>
<th>Key Features</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| E. World Bank or AfDB Load or Grant | • National DDR Program would be drawn up and approved by the Bank  
• Government would implement normally with technical assistance  
• Requires close Bank supervision and accountability | • The advantage of this system is that it strengthens national systems  
• If it is a loan, the government will eventually need to repay |
| F. Multi-donor Trust Fund         | • Funding could be managed by the World Bank, AfDB or UN                     | • Strict management systems are needed  
• UN Trust Funds can only be used to fund UN agencies                                           |
| G. NGOs                           | • NGOs can receive funding directly from donors to provide specific services particularly in the area of reintegration | • Strong coordination and oversight needed from the government                                  |


and implement the program. However, this latter option would make it difficult for national authorities to oversee DDR operations and it may impede its development.

**Case Study: MDRP**

*In the years before independence, the direct implementation of the DDR program by a UN agency created major inefficiencies and disconnections with the NDDRC which contributed to poor results.*

**E: Cross Cutting Issues**

In order for the DDR operation to be an effective component of a broader peace-building and development process, coherence and synergies are required with related national policies and programs. It is important to consider the long-term impact, even when DDR activities are sometimes designed and implemented under time pressure and focussed on immediate results.

**E.1 Security Sector Report (SSR)**

Whereas DDR may operate on a different timeline, DDR needs to be closely connected to SSR. Ideally, linkages between SSR and DDR would be framed in government policy documents and strategies. An agreement on the role, size and composition of the new security forces will make it easier to determine how many and who need to leave the military to return to civilian life. A program to right-size the military through a DDR process will also save government funds which can then be re-invested in modernising the military.

The risks associated with XCs returning to their communities are also linked to the ability of the government security services re-establishing security in those
areas. There must also be sufficient law enforcement facilities to ensure that misconduct by XCs is handled as a matter of civilian law and order. In some cases a process of SSR might be a precondition for the DDR to be successful. If the forces lack sufficient civilian oversight, the credibility of the DDR process may be jeopardised and could even lead to conflict.

In relatively stable countries, the process of downsizing the national military may not require a DDR process. After the development of mature security sectors, a management cycle develops where the hiring and retiring soldiers ensures that the military is the right size.

E.2 Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation

Societies emerging from conflict usually require some type of transitional justice or national reconciliation process. There are a multitude of mechanisms that could be use for this purpose including reparations, truth commissions, national dialogue, criminal prosecution, qualified amnesties or any combination thereof. These processes occur outside of the DDR process. However, as the XCs are generally the perpetrators of possible criminal acts, the choice of the transitional justice mechanism may influence the confidence of the XC to fully engage with the DDR process. The use of transitional justice mechanisms may also assist reintegration process by giving a sense of justice back to the affected communities. As such, DDR and transitional justice initiatives need to be coordinated. Practical steps that could be used to integrate both processes include:

i) Provisions stating that the DDR program will respect and promote international law
ii) Only qualified amnesties are permitted (excluding genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes)
iii) Collaboration between the DDR authorities and criminal investigations
iv) Use of vetting process when absorbing members of armed groups into the regular military
v) Participation of XCs in truth commissions or other similar processes
vi) Consider community-based rather than XC targeted reintegration support
vii) Utilize indigenous and informal traditions for administrating justice or settling disputes
viii) DDR authorities should consult with victims’ groups and communities receiving XCs
ix) Encourage the transformation of rebel movements into political parties
x) Identify a transitional justice focal point in the NDDRC
xi) Sensitize XCs on the importance of transitional justice processes

E.3 Disarmament and Weapons Management

The disarmament component of DDR usually only involves the weapons carried by the combatants being demobilized. Depending on the situation, the weapons remain in armouries of the national armed forces or are destroyed. Given that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in post-conflict societies, measures need to be taken to control them to ensure that the government maintains a monopoly on the use of force. These measures may include the review of national legislation or improvements in regional cooperation. The DDR process and could be linked to these broader measures.

E.4 Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs

In some cases the return of XCs to their communities coincides with the return of former refugees or IDPs to these same communities. Tensions within the community could arise that complicate the reintegration process if the XCs is given considerable support upon their return while the war-affected community

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**Case Study: Northern Uganda**

In Northern Uganda, the number of IDPs returning to their communities was fifty times larger than the number of LRA returning. As such, the Ugandan Amnesty Commission worked through community leaders and organisations to sensitize the communities that XCs must be received well in the communities in order to encourage the others who remain in the bush to return.
does not. Prior consultation and a clear communication effort is necessary. The NDDRC should work closely with the government agencies responsible for rural development and the resettlement of returnees as well as with local leaders.

**E.5 Employment Creation and National Recovery**

In a society emerging from conflict a core challenge to facilitate the creation of sustainable employment. The creation of jobs is important for reintegration of XCs as well as the general population. The lack of jobs could create opportunities for armed groups to remobilise their forces or increase criminality. Any economic reintegration assistance to XCs should therefore not be designed and implemented in isolation but be closely linked to broader employment creation and national development measures.

**E.6 Regional Dynamics**

The design of any DDR operation and its institutional framework should also consider possible regional and international aspects, especially in countries with interrelated conflicts and porous borders. In such cases, combatants and weapons are known to move back and forth across borders and there is the risk of ‘recycling’ combatants of different nationalities.

The movement of combatants across borders requires countries to cooperate on a number of issues including the repatriation of foreign combatants. To do so, it is important for countries to establish procedures by which their nationals are returned to their country of origin where they can either be demobilised, integrated into the national force or dealt with by the judicial authorities. Depending on the specific regional situation, the AU, RECs or UN can play an essential role in getting the relevant national agencies to collaborate and guiding them through these sort of complex issues.

The regional nature of conflicts is also part the solution. Economic and development cooperation within the APSA, and the growing role of the RECs/RMs, also provide potential opportunities for reintegration efforts of XCs. Where there are existing trade or monetary unions, there are also opportunities for XCs to find jobs and livelihoods in neighbouring. However, to ensure that the regional
dimensions are used as a positive rather than a negative, it is important that a country coordinate with and be transparent in their reintegration planning with other interested countries.

Case Study: Northern Uganda

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Case Study: LRA

After the movement of the LRA into CAR in 2008, the LRA became composed of individuals from four countries. Initially under an inter-governmental arrangement and now under an African Union mandate, the four countries are cooperating to neutralise the LRA including through the promotion of defections. As many of those defecting do so in a foreign country, states and partners such as the UN missions and ICRC facilitate their repatriation.
Annex: Case Study Matrix

Key characteristics of recent DDR operations in African countries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Decision to demobilize</th>
<th>Legal DDR Documents</th>
<th>Forces to be demobilized</th>
<th>Political Oversight</th>
<th>Management of the Program</th>
<th>External support</th>
<th>Financing arrangements</th>
<th>Link to SSR</th>
<th>Link to Transitional Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Angola  | i. DDR efforts before 2002 floundered due to weak political support; Agreement on DDR reached between UNITA and GoU following defeat of UNITA  
ii. Luena MoU, Addendum to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, between the GoA and UNITA  
iii. Letter of demobilization policy (2003) | i. Unintegrated UNITA combatants  
Regular FAA combatants  
Disabled and underage combatants; very few female combatants. | National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilized and Displaced (CNRSPPD) established June 2002 and chaired by Minister of Interior | Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants (IRSEM), implementing the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) | Offices in 18 provinces. | World Bank supported design of DDR program, and coordinated donor support through the MDRP | IDA financing + MDRP MDTF + Government national budget | DDR contributed to downsizing of the FAA | No direct link |
| Burundi | i. Political agreements between the Government and rebel groups  
iv. Force Technical Agreement (FTA) between GoB and CNDD-FDD and FAB (2003) | i. Rebel forces who did not integrate to the new national forces (NDF)  
Once integrated, NDF downsized  
FNL demobilised in separate process | National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR), chaired by the President | Executive Secretariat (ES) of the NCDRR, implementing the Programme National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (DRRP) | Underage soldiers also responsibility of ES-NCDRR, assisted by UNICEF | Financial and technical support through MDRP framework, close cooperation with UN Office in Burundi (UNOB) | World Bank IDA grant and MDRP MDTF.  
IDA grant. | Integration of combatants of all armed groups into the NDF | No direct link |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DDR Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>i. DDR efforts before 2002 floundered due to weak political support; Agreement on DDR reached between UNITA and GoU following defeat of UNITA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ii. Luena MoU, Addendum to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, between the GoA and UNITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unintegrated UNITA combatants, Regular FAA combatants, Disabled, and under-age combatants; very few female combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilized and Displaced (CNRSPDD) established June 2002 and chaired by Minister of Interior</td>
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<td>Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants (IRSEM), implementing the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Offices in 18 provinces. World Bank supported design of DDR program, and coordinating donor support through the MDRP</td>
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<td>Financial and technical support through MDRP framework, close cooperation with UN Office in Burundi (UNOB).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>i. Political agreements between the Government and rebel groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>v. Separate agreement with FNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rebel forces who did not integrate to the new national forces (NDF)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Once integrated, NDF downsizing FNL demobilised in separate process</td>
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<td>Executive Secretariat (ES) of the NCDRR, implementing the Programme National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (DRRP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Underage soldiers also responsibility of ES-NCDRR, assisted by UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 2009 a Technical Coordination Team (TCT) replaced the ES</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>i. DDR rooted in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ii. Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC (2002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>iii. Transitional Constitution; the memorandum on military and security issues (2003)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>iv. 36 resolutions adopted by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demobilization and reintegration of signatories to Global Accord: FAC, MLC, RCD, RCD-ML, RCD-N, Mayi-Mayi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-20% of fighting forces were children</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Demob by Min. of Defence; reinsertion by Min. Social Affairs; supporting role by Min. of Solidarity &amp; Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oversight of PNDDR by Interministerial Committee on DDR (CIDDR)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DDR Commission (CONADER), implemented, PNDDR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 2007 CONADER replaced by project management unit in Min. of Defence &amp; private accounting firm managed financial and procurement matters.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial &amp; technical support through MDRP framework + bilateral donors support to GoDRC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank IDA grant, MDRP MDTF, AfDB grant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New national force created (FARDC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Qualified amnesty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Decision to demobilize</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>DDR undertaken following major war with Eritrea, Agreement on the cessation of hostilities. No further need of such large armed forces.</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>i. DDR undertaken following major war with Eritrea. Agreement on the cessation of hostilities. No further need of such large armed forces. Funding agreement with the World Bank. Demobilisation entailed controlled reduction in force of standing national army, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Prime Minister's Office for policy issues; Ministry of National Defence Force for disarmament &amp; demobilization; Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSA) for reintegration assistance. Federal Project Management Units (FPMUs) of MoLSA reported to Emergency Recovery Project Management Units (ERPMUs) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Regional council responsible for implementation at region, zone and woreda levels. Through the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) IDA credit plus GoE own contribution. Special accounts created at National Bank of Ethiopia. Fund used exclusively for payment of reinsertion and reintegration. Bureau program fund account and Regional Finance Bureaus transferred it to woreda finance office bank accounts. Since initiation of the EDRP, defense expenditure declined from 40% to 17% of recurrent Government expenditure. Share of social services increased from 15.3% of the total expenditure in FY1999/2000 to 22.5% in FY2001/2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>i. GoR decision to downsize RDF and support reintegration of former armed groups. ii. Letter of Demobilization Policy. Demobilization of RDF combatants and members of armed groups and support their transition to civilian life; Rwanda DDR Commission (RDRP); Min. of Defence provided logistical assistance; Min. of Local Government and Social Affairs supported reintegration for CAAFAG. Technical Secretariat of RDRC implements the RDRP. 12 provincial RDRC offices. Min of Social Affairs supports Community Development Committees (CDC). MDRP framework used. MDRP MDTF, IDA, DFID, Germany, GoR, AU. Reallocation of Government expenditure from defense to social and economic sectors. No direct link. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) created reconciliation process in DDR camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Decision to demobilize</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>i. Peace agreement facilitated by external intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005)) included DDR commitments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


The UN IDDRS provides additional guidance to legal issues. See: United Nations, 2006, section 2.10, p. 17.