I. INTRODUCTION
1. From 16 to 21 December 2012, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) undertook a joint mission to Guinea Bissau. The dispatch of this mission was requested by representatives of the current Bissau-Guinean authorities and those of the regime overthrown by the coup d’état of 12 April 2012, during a meeting held under the auspices of the AU, in New York, on 28 September 2012. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at its 340th meeting, held on 2 November 2012, supported this initiative. Subsequently, the extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja on 11 November 2012, requested that the deployment of the mission be expedited. In a statement to the press dated 13 December 2012, the members of the UN Security Council welcomed the decision to send this mission to Guinea-Bissau.
2. It is against this background that the five organizations involved in the management of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau met in Addis Ababa on 1 December 2012. At this meeting, they agreed on the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the mission and its modalities (Annex I), as well as on its timeframe. It was agreed that the AU would coordinate the preparation and conduct of the mission.
II. COMPOSITION, OBJECTIVES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MISSION
3. The joint mission included representatives of the five organizations concerned (the list of its members is attached as Annex II). As stated above, the mission was undertaken based on the ToR attached hereto, as agreed at the consultative meeting of 1 December 2012. More specifically, the mission had the following objectives:
(i) to assess the political and security situation on the ground;
(ii) to examine the underlying causes of the recurrent crises in Guinea Bissau;
(iii) to consider the possibilities of a consensus on the way forward among the Guinea-Bissau partner organizations;
(iv) to facilitate the formulation of a set of recommendations on the best ways and means for the organizations concerned to work together in order to help Guinea Bissau overcome the short, medium and long-term challenges facing it; and
(v) to make recommendations for the establishment of an appropriate monitoring mechanism.
4. In Bissau, the mission met the current authorities, including the President of the Transition, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice, as well as other officials from these sectors; the Bureau of the People’s National Assembly (ANP) and the Parliamentary Committee in charge of amending the Transition Pact and the Political Agreement concluded in Bissau between the military junta and 17 political parties under the auspices of ECOWAS; the Bureau of the National Electoral Commission (CNE); the various political parties, both those supporting the current Transition and those not taking part in it; civil society organizations, including women's associations, traditional chiefs and religious leaders; as well as social and occupational groups (business circles, the Bar Association and a group of journalists). The joint mission also met with members of the diplomatic community in Bissau. The full list of stakeholders consulted by the mission is attached as Annex III.
5. In terms of methodology, the mission, whose members held a preparatory meeting upon arrival in Bissau, carried out consecutive meetings with the various stakeholders, based on their availability. Each meeting began with a brief presentation of the ToR, which had already been transmitted to the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders by the AU Liaison Office in Bissau, followed by an articulation of their views and positions on the various issues covered by the mandate of the mission, and a question and answer session. At the end of their consultations, the members of the mission met in the evening of 20 December 2012, to draw the conclusions of their visit and to agree on the elements to be highlighted in their report.
III. CONTEXT OF THE JOINT MISSION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
6. Guinea-Bissau had just emerged from the trauma resulting from the purported coup attempt of 26 December 2011, when President Malam Bacai Sanha died on 9 January 2012. After the first round of the early presidential election held on 18 March 2012, Carlos Gomes Júnior, then Prime Minister and candidate of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), took the lead, and, on 29 April 2012, was to face Kumba Yala, candidate of the Party of Social Renovation (PRS), who came in second. Although the election was deemed free, fair and transparent by international observers, five candidates, including Kumba Yala and Serifo Nhamadjo, who had polled second and third respectively, rejected the results, arguing that massive fraud had occurred; accordingly they demanded that the election be cancelled and organized anew.
7. In order to break the deadlock that ensued, a joint ECOWAS/AU/UN mission travelled to Bissau on 30 March 2012, to meet key Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. While international partners were working to resolve the crisis, the Government’s request for the deployment of an international protection force and the misunderstanding that arose regarding the mandate of the Angolan Military Assistance Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG) exacerbated the mistrust between the Government and the military leadership, resulting in the overthrow of the regime, on 12 April 2012, and the subsequent withdrawal of MISSANG.
8. The coup d’état was unanimously condemned by the international community. ECOWAS, the AU, the CPLP, the EU and the UN, all demanded the restoration of constitutional order and, on the basis of their respective instruments, took measures against the junta. Differences of approach soon emerged, preventing Guinea Bissau’s partners from acting in a unified manner to advance the shared goal of restoring constitutional order and contributing effectively to the lasting resolution of the many challenges facing Guinea-Bissau.
9. Internally, the coup led to deep divisions between the political parties signatory to the Transition Pact on the one hand, and those which refused to be part of it, especially the PAIGC, on the other. The mediation undertaken by ECOWAS, following the conclusions of its extraordinary summit held in Dakar on 3 May 2012, led to the reconfiguration of the Bureau of the ANP. Consequently, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, who was the Acting Speaker, became the Interim President of the Transition on 10 May 2012. Mr. Braima Sori Djalo, who was the second Deputy Speaker of the ANP, is now the Speaker. Prior to this decision, the Forum of Political Parties and the military had put forward the idea of forming a National Transitional Council, as was done in 2003. On 22 May 2012, following consultations among the signatories of the Transition Pact and the visit to Bissau by an ECOWAS ministerial-level delegation, a transitional government headed by Mr. Rui Duarte Barros was set up, bringing together the parties signatories to the Transition Pact, except for some political parties, including the PAIGC, even if some of its leaders have, on an individual basis, joined the institutions established within that framework. It was agreed that the Transition would not exceed twelve months and would conclude with the holding of credible presidential and legislative elections. At the same time, ECOWAS deployed a Mission to support the Transition (ECOMIB), which took over from MISSANG. The latter’s withdrawal was completed on 9 June 2012.
10. Despite these efforts, the ANP, which is dominated by the PAIGC and where the majority of the signatory parties to the Transition Pact are not represented, remained paralyzed. In order to overcome this impasse, the President of the Transition conducted consultations that led to the holding of the first session of the ANP’s 8th term on 15 November 2012. On 20 November 2012, the members of the Parliament decided unanimously to extend its mandate until the conclusion of the Transition period, as the term of the Legislature was to end on 28 November 2012. In the same vein, on 23 November 2012, the two largest political parties, namely the PAIGC and the PRS, reached an agreement on the distribution of posts in the Bureau of the Parliament. In addition, a Parliamentary Committee of eleven members, led by the PAIGC and tasked to review the Transition Pact and the Political Agreement, was established to facilitate the broadest possible participation of the political stakeholders in the Transition, as well as the revision of the May 2012 Transition Pact and Political Agreement.
IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH BISSAU-GUINEAN STAKEHOLDERS
11. The mission held in-depth consultations with the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. While these covered all aspects of the ToR, each of the mission’s interlocutors highlighted those issues that best corresponded to his/her current concerns. All the stakeholders welcomed the dispatch of the joint mission. At the same time, they expressed the wish for such an initiative to have been taken earlier, not only as a sign of solidarity with a population that was a victim of a situation beyond its control, but also as a way of ensuring that the decisions taken by the international community with regard to Guinea-Bissau were well informed. While recognizing that the solution to the problems facing their country was first and foremost in the hands of the Bissau-Guinean people, they stressed that without international assistance their efforts could not succeed. In this regard, many of them underscored the fact that the differences in approach and perspective among Guinea-Bissau partners constituted an additional challenge in finding a solution to the crisis.
12. The following paragraphs summarize the views expressed and positions taken by the interlocutors consulted by the joint mission. They cover various aspects of the problems facing Guinea Bissau.
A) General considerations
13. While expressing different opinions, the various interlocutors consulted by the joint mission were unanimous in their call for the international community to situate the current challenges in Guinea Bissau in a historical perspective, bearing in mind the country's trajectory since its independence. Undoubtedly, there was an element of exploitation for political purposes in the view thus expressed. But it is undeniable that the problems of impunity, human rights violations and repeated military interference in governance are longstanding phenomena. Similarly, the issue of the reform of the defense, security and justice sectors must be understood against the background of the role played by the army in the liberation of the country and in the 1998 – 1999 war, as well as the inability of this revolutionary army to successfully evolve into a truly republican army.
14. The interlocutors consulted by the joint mission also warned against any approach that would place the blame for all the woes of Guinea Bissau on the military alone. While the military certainly has its share of responsibility, politicians have also played a negative role. In particular, they used the army to serve their own political ambitions through partisan promotions, which compromised the military hierarchy, and sometimes encouraged the army to overthrow their opponents. Some of the interlocutors, including Ambassadors, pointed out that politicians were receiving members of the military in their homes or were visiting the barracks at odd hours, and that they sometimes paid the military in return for their support. Thus the army, as an actor in the conduct of the affairs of State and a victim of a pernicious patronage system, remains a critical element in the process to reform the State. Consequently, any lasting solution to the crisis in Guinea-Bissau requires a reform of the political class; it also demands, above all, that the military demonstrate pro-activeness and commitment for the required reforms to be successfully implemented, the first of which concerns the defense and security sector, in order to build on the political achievements made and to consolidate democracy and promote the rule of law.
15. To return to the immediate challenges, many interlocutors of the joint mission pointed out that in March 2012, they were already warning signs on the horizon, and that the presidential election in Guinea-Bissau had only been the immediate trigger of the coup d’état, which was the continuation of a trend which saw no Head of State completing his term in office, since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1994.
16. Almost all the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders firmly condemned the coup d’état. Moreover, the transitional authorities said they did not approve of the illegal breach of constitutional order. In particular, the President of the Transition stated that he had agreed to assume his functions only on the condition that the process lead to the restoration of constitutional order. It should, however, be noted that some political parties, clearly a minority, stated that they saw in the coup d’état a salvation for Guinea-Bissau.
17. This condemnation did not mean that the situation should return to what it was prior to the coup d’état. For many interlocutors, such a return to the status quo ante could only be achieved by force, with far-reaching consequences. Under these conditions, the goal should be to work towards the holding of elections as soon as possible, which would put in place a legal and legitimate authority. The differences expressed pertained to the degree of inclusiveness and the duration of the Transition.
B) Specific Issues
(i) The Transition Process
18. As pointed out above, a Transition process was initiated under the auspices of ECOWAS. Gradually, some of the actors who had refused to join in the process eventually supported it. This includes some members of the PAIGC, even if they were regarded as dissident elements, such as the President of the Transition, and the Party did not consider itself bound by these decisions which it viewed as being made on an individual basis. In addition, the ANP resumed its functioning following the consensus reached by its members. Moreover, the MPs extended the mandate of Parliament before its expiry, which was due on 28 November 2012. While welcoming that latest decision, some interlocutors of the mission, including members of the international community represented in Bissau, were keen to stress that this was not entirely a selfless decision, as it was also motivated by the desire of the MPs to preserve their salaries and other material benefits.
19. At the same time, the PAIGC considers that the current Transition is not inclusive and should be expanded. In this regard, and given that it holds the majority in the ANP, the PAIGC requests that the position of Prime Minister be allocated to it. This demand is rejected both by the current authorities and by other actors of the political class, for whom the PAIGC is paying the price for its initial rejection of the compromise that was reached. They further stressed that the President of the Transition is from the PAIGC, even if he was subject to disciplinary measures, for having stood as an independent candidate in the presidential election (he had challenged the manner in which the PAIGC candidate was designated) and nine other members of the Government are also from the PAIGC. However, they stated that they were open to solutions that would allow more room for the PAIGC. Conversely, other parties affirmed their opposition to any leadership role for the PAIGC in the Transition, accusing that Party of being the root cause of all woes faced by Guinea Bissau. Asked about its current representation in the Transitional Government, the PAIGC stressed that the PAIGC dissidents could not claim the title of party members because they were under sanctions.
20. During its meetings with the current authorities, the mission was informed that the Transitional Government planned to develop a roadmap specifying the terms of the Transition, on the basis of nationwide consultations. The mission was also informed of the establishment by the ANP of a parliamentary committee of eleven members, led by the PAIGC and comprising of representatives from the PRS, the Republican Party for Independence and Development (PRID), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the New Democracy Party (PND), tasked to review the Transition Pact and the Political Agreement. During its meeting with the members of that committee, the mission inquired about their efforts and the specific objectives pursued. It emerged that the committee hoped, at the end of its work, to make the Transition more inclusive and to adjust its parameters, including those relating to its duration, as well as to facilitate the adoption of a Pacte de régime which would be a single and revised version of the Transition Pact and the Political Agreement, intended to govern the Transition. It is, however, important to underscore that some Bissau-Guinean political parties, including those that do not have a parliamentary representation, expressed opposition to this approach, arguing that it was abnormal for a party that had deliberately decided to stay outside the Transition to revise its terms. They argued that the PAIGC should first join the Transition Pact by signing it, before seeking its revision.
21. Similarly, "Voz de Paz", a Bissau-Guinean NGO focused on political and humanitarian action, issued, on 16 November 2012, an appeal for the preparation of a new social contract, under the auspices of the Bishop of Bissau. The NGO representatives explained to the joint mission that their approach was the result of a thorough reflection on the trajectory of Guinea-Bissau since independence. The transition from the colonial to the independent state had failed, as demonstrated by the chronic instability in the country. In this context, it is necessary to formulate a vision for Guinea-Bissau on the basis of a new social contract between the State and the civil society. Asked whether the initiative, as well as those spearheaded by the parliamentary committee and the Transitional Government, were in competition with each other, the NGO representatives said that while these initiatives had been launched at different times, there was a consensus among their authors on measures to be undertaken. They also pointed out that they had the support of the current authorities.
22. Another issue that came up repeatedly related to the duration of the Transition. Under the current arrangements, the Transition must be completed by April-May 2013. Some Bissau-Guinean actors requested the speedy organization of elections, since only an elected government would have the required legitimacy to carry out the necessary reforms in the country. In contrast, others argued for a longer Transition, to ensure better preparation for the elections and to carry out some of the necessary reforms, in particular those relating to the defense, security and justice sectors.
23. The representatives of the current authorities and their supporters among the political parties protested against the marginalization of the Transitional Government by the international community. They argued that such a situation could only hinder the completion of the Transition. While acknowledging their shortcomings, they pleaded for the international community’s understanding of the challenges facing the country. The joint mission noted that the transitional authorities had managed to regularly pay the salaries of public servants, at times with the support of ECOWAS and/or Nigeria, and facilitated the revival of parliamentary activity following the dialogue conducted with all the stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau.
(ii) The Electoral Process
24. In the eyes of the Bissau-Guinean actors, the necessary conditions to ensure free, fair and credible elections are not yet fully met. This applies particularly to the biometric census, which is perceived by some of the local stakeholders as an ideal remedy for the shortcomings denounced during the last presidential election, but disputed by others because of its cost and the time required for its implementation. Indeed, the total budget submitted by the Government for organizing the elections amounts to 32 million Euros, which cannot be mobilized without strong international support. In addition, and in order to ensure transparency, all stakeholders were of the opinion that the choice of a credible and trustworthy company for the biometric census requires international tendering, a process which has not yet been launched.
25. Furthermore, and as indicated above, the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders have divergent positions on how to sequence the reforms that the country urgently needs and the future elections. For some, who are proponents of what could be described as a "political" vision, a dominant trend among the interlocutors consulted by the mission, priority should be given to accelerating the process of comprehensive reforms, especially in the defense, security justice, public administration and political sectors, as well as with regard to the fight against impunity, drug trafficking and organized crime and the promotion of national reconciliation. The objective is to create conditions for stability after the elections. Without these reforms, the elected government, like its predecessors, would be in danger of being overthrown as soon as it takes any initiative perceived as being detrimental to the vested interests of some groups. In sum, the elections are crucial to ensure legitimacy and constitutional legality, but they are not a panacea to the problems facing Guinea Bissau. In such a scenario, the Transition should be as inclusive as possible to provide it with the degree of consensus necessary for its success. A minority view supports a purely legalistic approach. This is particularly true of the Bar Association, which argued that priority should be given to emerging, as soon as possible, from illegality, because only an elected government would have the necessary legitimacy, both in the eyes of the people of Guinea-Bissau and the international community, to initiate and implement the necessary reforms. Assuming that the calendar of the Transition cannot be respected, they propose that the election be held before the end of 2013.
(iii) Defense and Security Sector Reform
26. One member of the Government who received the joint mission described the army as "an unfortunate legacy of the war of liberation because it brought independence but also violence". Due to the role it played for the independence of the country, the army remains attached to its history of struggle. It gradually positioned itself as the indispensable power and continues to govern the political life of the country. This is what explains its propensity to call into question the established order, in defiance of the popular will. The Bissau-Guinean army, which is characterized by an inverted pyramid and an ageing force, absorbs a substantial part of the national budget. Against this background, there is no need to overemphasize the need for the defense and security sector reform (DSSR). This reform is a necessity, a priority and a prerequisite for the stability of the country, as it seeks to transform the defense and security forces into a truly republican institution, respectful of the rule of law. This exercise started in 2006, but its implementation suffered a setback following military events of 1 April 2010, which resulted in the arrest of the then-Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Jose Zamora Induta, and of the then-Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Junior, by the current Chief of General Staff, General Atonio Indjai. All national and international actors recognized that as long as there is no progress in this area, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to contemplate the next steps.
27. The military, through the Minister of Defense of the Transitional Government and the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, reaffirmed their willingness and readiness to implement the DSSR, provided that it is undertaken in an objective manner, and that all those who would be demobilized, and who deserve the gratitude of the Nation, are able to leave with dignity. This is the fundamental reason for the establishment of a pension fund, whose objective is to support and assist the demobilized personnel for a period of five years. In fact, the military officials claimed to be ready to fulfill their responsibility should the international community be truly willing to support the DSSR. Such an exercise should involve improving the living conditions of the military. During the meeting with the Chief of Staff, the latter requested that, before any discussion, the members of the joint mission visit the premises of the army headquarters. The mission was able to see, for itself, the unacceptable conditions in which the soldiers lived.
(iv) Impunity and Violations of Human Rights
28. The issue of impunity came up repeatedly in the discussions with the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. All recognize the acuteness of this issue, stressing that the successive Bissau-Guinean governments were confronted with this problem and that each of them had had its share of non-elucidated political assassinations whose perpetrators remained unpunished.
29. The authorities, including the judiciary, raised the problem of lack of resources and competent personnel that prevented justice from being attained. The President of the Supreme Court stated that, despite those difficulties, the courts were about to complete their work on some of the cases before them. The joint mission also met with the President of the Supreme Military Court, the body which is responsible for dealing with crimes of a military nature, as well as with all other crimes committed by military personnel. He also underscored the lack of resources. Other interlocutors emphasized the lack of political will and the limits imposed on the judiciary by the powerful military, the politicians and some lobby groups. More generally, the issue of impunity is also related to political instability and the weakness of the State. Therefore, it cannot be resolved in a lasting manner without strengthening the State. Others, stressing that the State of Guinea-Bissau is not in a position to deal with some of the most sensitive cases of impunity in the country, called for the establishment of an international tribunal. Still others instead emphasized the relevance of transitional justice, advertising for some of them for a tabula rasa approach, which will involve absolving all violent crimes committed in the past and start afresh on a new basis.
30. A number of interlocutors consulted by the joint mission spoke about the violations of human rights committed since the coup d’état of April 2012. These span from intimidation to summary executions, through the harassment of journalists, attacks on freedom of expression and demonstration, as well as roadblocks that impede movements within the country. Added to these are the case of military and political leaders who sought refuge in the EU Delegation in Bissau after the coup d’état, claiming that they feared for their lives. The EU expressed its readiness to hand them over to the Bissau-Guinean authorities for them to be tried, but first demanded written assurances from the Government regarding the preservation of their lives and the transparency of the judicial process. During the discussions the joint mission had with the Bissau-Guinean authorities, the latter argued that, as a sovereign State, they cannot give such guarantees.
(v) Drug Trafficking
31. In conformity with its ToR, the joint mission raised the issue of drug trafficking with all its interlocutors. The representatives of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that drug trafficking had substantially increased since the coup d’état of 12 April 2012. They described Guinea-Bissau as a transit country for drugs from Latin America towards Europe, passing through different countries of West and North Africa. In fact, most of the trafficking is now carried out by land and air. In addition, the representatives of UNODC highlighted the acts of intimidation committed by the military against investigators and the inability of the criminal justice system to present evidence in its possession, the lack of operational capacity and the absence of a witness protection system, to ensure the safety of those fearing for their lives if they were to collaborate with the judiciary. They also highlighted the need to enhance border control. Other interlocutors of the joint mission also affirmed that the scourge of drug trafficking had worsened.
32. For their part, the Bissau-Guinean authorities underlined the serious lack of resources facing them. Their country, they stressed, comprised 88 islands - of which only 22 were inhabited – leaving the others without any surveillance due to the absence of air and naval capacity. They further added that if the international community was truly committed to the fight against drug trafficking, it should provide Guinea-Bissau with the necessary means. Furthermore, the authorities criticized any selective approach that would make Guinea-Bissau alone bear the responsibility for the fight against a scourge that is truly transnational in nature, thus ignoring the countries of origin and destination. In any case, the Bissau-Guinean authorities disputed the image of a narco-state that some international actors want to attribute to it and denied that drug trafficking had assumed the proportions depicted by some international actors, including an increase in trafficking since the coup d’état. They gave as evidence the absence of any significant impact on the national economy, particularly in the construction sector. This is also the analysis of the representative of the Central Bank of the West African States, who held the view that drug trafficking had no visible impact on the economy of Guinea-Bissau. He affirmed that he did not notice any particular movement of funds, which would add to the normal payments. The banks, in fact, are facing liquidity problems and struggling to recover the loans made.
(vi) Illegal Fishing
33. With regard to illegal fishing, the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders denounced what they considered as an injustice against their country. While Guinea-Bissau is under constant pressure regarding the fight against drug trafficking, an activity that benefits only a handful of people, the international community is observing complete silence about illegal and unauthorized fishing carried out in Guinea Bissau’s territorial waters, thus undermining prospects for economic development in the country. In the recent past, even with their severely constrained capacity, the maritime safety authorities were able to board up to 65 boats. Despite the difficulties faced, the country tries to ensure the control of its coastline, thanks to its cooperation with The Gambia.
(vii) Socio-economic situation
34. The socio-economic situation is particularly dire. Many interlocutors consulted by the joint mission highlighted the worsening socio-economic conditions of the population, marked by abject poverty, unemployment, hunger, and the prevalence of epidemics such as cholera and AIDS. In addition, the suspension by the international partners of their economic assistance has resulted in the halt of many projects. In this respect, the Bissau-Guinean authorities regretted the suspension by the EU, since June 2012, of the fishing agreement with their country, on grounds of lack of a constitutional authority mandated to represent the State in negotiations of the agreement after the coup d’état. The civil society organizations strongly advocated the reengagement of the international community, noting that the civilian population, notably the most vulnerable sections, was the main victim of the disengagement of some international partners following the coup d’état of 12 April 2012.
35. Guinea-Bissau, which is a major producer of cashew nuts, also suffered from a crop failure in 2012. The export of cashew nuts provides more than 60% of the State budget and is the main source of foreign currency. Unfortunately, the price of cashew nuts plummeted, declining by 50% between 2011 and 2012. The harvest of cashew nuts, which usually begins in late March and continues until June, also fell below expectations, first because it coincided with the election campaign and the presidential election, and then because of the coup d’état. The crisis that ensued worsened the situation, causing the loss of contracts with Indian companies, which are the main customers of Bissau-Guinean producers. The banks that had financed the transactions up to $18 million were unable to recover their money, which created a liquidity problem. The transitional government, with the assistance of ECOWAS, Nigeria and the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA), endeavors to pay the salaries of the civil service. The payroll amounts to $6 million per month. Added to this, the mission was informed of the continued increase in the number of civil servants, due to patronage type recruitment.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMANDATIONS
36. All the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders warmly welcomed the joint mission. Eagerly anticipated, the joint mission was seen as a platform that allowed the Bissau-Guineans to express their diverse opinions, voice their concerns and call on the international community for assistance. Several political parties thus requested that a common agenda be developed by Guinea-Bissau and its external partners, while others advocated for the adoption of a national pact for the restoration of constitutional order, to be validated by the international partners. This request is indicative of a real desire for guidance and support. On their part, the authorities also expressed their willingness to work with all concerned international actors. All the interlocutors consulted the mission encouraged the Bissau-Guinean partners to speak with one voice, pointing out that the differences among them constituted an obstacle to the efforts to successfully end the crisis.
37. The joint mission noted that, at the political level, the arrangement reached by the PAIGC and the other political parties having a parliamentary representation has enabled the ANP to resume its functioning. This is a step in the right direction. At the PRS, the withdrawal of Kumba Yala, an emblematic figure on the Bissau-Guinean political scene, from the chairmanship of the party during its 4th congress held in December 2012, is another development which could encourage the emergence of a new generation of political leaders. Moreover, it is hoped that the PAIGC, which was also preparing to convene its congress, will be able to close ranks and speak with one voice. It is worth pointing out here the differences in approach between the leadership of the PAIGC in Bissau, which views itself as the sole representative of the party, and the members of the party currently based in Lisbon, who travelled to Addis Ababa for the meeting that was contemplated between the Bissau-Guinean parties. With the revival of the parliamentary activity, especially the work of the parliamentary committee, one can expect a calmer political climate, given the political influence of the two major parties, namely the PAIGC and the PRS, in the political life of the country .
38. It is encouraging to note that civil society is also taking an active part in national reconstruction. It is in this context that the NGO "Voz di Paz", under the patronage of the Bishop of Bissau, made, on 16 November 2012, an appeal for a social contract, in order to identify a clear vision for the future of the country. Such a social contract would require the establishment of a climate of confidence that can promote the implementation of the expected reforms, a sine qua non for the country to regain what some Bissau-Guineans referred to "international citizenship". Other civil society actors also argue in favor of a new beginning. All these initiatives, if they are strongly supported, can be a powerful lever for the reform of the State and the establishment of a new social contract between the state and its citizens.
39. At the end of the interactions between the joint mission and the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders, a consensus was reached on two points. The first focuses on the need to deal, once and for all, with the structural problems facing Guinea-Bissau (in particular in the areas of governance, impunity, and defense, security and justice sector reform). The second relates to the strong demand for inclusiveness in the structures of the Transition. The PAIGC, which initially refrained from participating in the transitional government, is now willing to form part of it, albeit on a conditional basis. As far as it is concerned, the transitional government is open to negotiation on the possibility of inclusion of other stakeholders. The objective is not only to restructure the government, but also to promote broader inclusion, so as to give everybody a stake in the success of the Transition. The exact duration of the Transition is the subject of divergent views. For all stakeholders, ending the crisis lies in the organization of new elections and not in resuming the voting that was interrupted by the coup d’état.
40. With regard to the army, all stakeholders stressed that, despite its ubiquity in the conduct of public affairs, the military, did not have the pretensions of formally ruling the country. Many voices were raised to denounce the collusion between politicians and the military, especially the manipulation, in the form of corruption and promotion by politicians eager to fulfill their personal ambitions. As long as politicians continue to invite the military to their homes for unmentionable reasons and to visit the barracks, the same results will be produced and the dream of a republican army will remain an illusion. For the army to be republican, it will be necessary to inculcate into it a republican culture, which requires the military to be subordinated to civilian rule and to observe human rights. Equally important is the need to work towards a new mindset within the political class, so that they, together with the military, can truly contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of the rule of law.
41. The signing, on 7 November 2012, of a Memorandum of Understanding between Guinea-Bissau and ECOWAS is an important step in the implementation of the DSSR. In addition, the readiness expressed by the military itself, and the high number of volunteers for demobilization, are likely to facilitate the rapid onset of the DSSR process. It is, therefore, urgent and important that the international community support this new dynamism to ensure the success of this reform, in particular by supporting the pension fund .
42. It should be noted that, due to the inefficiency of the judiciary, lack of political will and military interference, impunity has become the rule. On this point, some suggested the idea of a tabula rasa, which will consist in absolving all violent crimes committed in the past and starting afresh. On the other hand, for the great majority of the stakeholders met by the joint mission, light must be shed on those crimes, and justice done. Some did, nevertheless, recognize that impunity can only be tackled effectively through an international tribunal. Consequently, the joint mission appeals to the international community to assist Guinea-Bissau in the fight against impunity on the basis of the modalities that would be deemed most appropriate.
43. With regard to drug trafficking, all stakeholders stressed the urgent need to combat that scourge, because of the danger it poses to the stability of the country. This view is shared by the transitional government, which said it is one of the priorities of its programme of action. The Bissau-Guinean authorities must show strong political will in this regard. At the same time, it was pointed out that, to be effective, the fight against drug trafficking must be supported by the international community. Since it is commonly accepted that Guinea-Bissau is a gateway for a product originating from elsewhere and transported to another destination, some wonder how the issue could be addressed in the absence of cooperation between the countries of origin, transit and destination. Thus the fight against drug trafficking requires coordination among producing, transit and destination countries, through continuous exchange of information, including on potential money laundering arising from this traffic. This would entail the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to pool efforts together and ensure effective collaboration at international level. The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) launched by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs/United Nations Office for Africa West, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes and INTERPOL, is seen as a first step, since it relies on international cooperation and national capacity building.
44. Since 1994, Guinea-Bissau has organized elections generally considered to be satisfactory. However, for some stakeholders, who believe that the last presidential election was flawed, the organization of future elections requires the strong involvement of the international community. In so doing, the objective is to build the required degree of confidence and to prevent disputes likely to lead to new setbacks. As stated above, the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders differ on the sequence in which the elections and the reforms must be carried out: some argue for accelerated reforms within the framework of an inclusive Transition, before holding elections; others, a minority, stress the imperative need for the speedy holding of elections, as the only way to ensure that a legitimate and constitutional authority is established, recognized by the entire international community and capable of addressing the challenges at hand and embarking upon a programme of comprehensive reforms.
45. Several representatives of the Bissau-Guinean authorities highlighted the important role played by the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB). Some members of the diplomatic community also made the same point. Other stakeholders, particularly civil society organizations, called for the strengthening of ECOMIB, so as to enable it to contribute more actively to confidence-building, the holding of free, fair and credible elections, and to support the reform of the defense, security and justice sectors.
46. Finally, it is important to recall that the lack of economic opportunities for a population that is growing, the deterioration of the social situation and the struggle for the acquisition of Guinea-Bissau precious resources, are all factors that increase the risk of instability in the country.
47. In light of the foregoing, the joint mission would like to recommend the following:
For the transitional government:
a) the need to work with all the national stakeholders to ensure an inclusive Transition, notably the establishment of an inclusive Transitional Government with the participation of the PAIGC, in order to create conditions conducive for the holding of free, fair and credible presidential and legislative elections;
b) support for the work of the parliamentary committee and the civil society towards the elaboration of a Pacte de régime and a social contract to contribute to the resolution of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and to address the underlying short, medium and long-term issues. To this end, the elaboration of a roadmap comprising the elements to end the crisis, together with a timetable for its implementation, should be one of the priorities of the transitional government. This roadmap should articulate priority actions, including the organization of elections and the acceleration of global reforms, and specify the ways and means to tackle impunity and illegal trafficking; and
c) the articulation, by the current authorities, in consultation with the international community, of a plan of action, with clear targets and a timetable, for DSSR, the reform of justice, public administration and the political sectors, as well as the fight against impunity, accompanied by a gradual resumption of international assistance, conditional on progress made. In this context, it is important to encourage the Bissau-Guinean authorities to take advantage of the assistance offered by ECOWAS to achieve concrete results in terms of DSSR, which are likely to facilitate the mobilization of support from the rest of the international community.
For the political parties:
d) the commitment never again to resort to the practice of using the military to attain political objectives, and the commitment to put the national interest above partisan concerns; and
e) support for the work of the parliamentary committee.
For the parliamentary committee:
f) consultation with all national stakeholders, including parties not represented in the ANP, the military and the civil society, to ensure the success of its mission within the agreed timeline; and
g) the adoption, as soon as possible, of the transition roadmap.
For the People’s National Assembly:
h) support for the work of the parliamentary committee and adoption of the document to end the crisis (Pacte de régime), which will be elaborated to govern the Transition and ensure the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process; and
i) the choice, as soon as possible, of the type of election (biometric or manual) to be organized for the restoration of constitutional order. It is important that the ANP, as well as all national stakeholders, bear in mind that the use of the biometric system will not necessarily guarantee successful elections if political actors do not trust each other.
For the military:
j) a solemn and final commitment of the military hierarchy to stop interfering in the political life and the management of the State, including the judiciary;
k) the commitment to contribute to the fight against drug trafficking and other illegal trafficking and comply with the rule of law;
l) support for the work of the parliamentary committee; and
m) the demonstration, through concrete actions, of its commitment to implement the DSSR and respect civilian rule and human rights.
For the civil society and religious groups
n) the pursuit of their initiatives to establish a social contract; and
o) the support for the efforts to adopt a revised and consensual roadmap
For the people of Guinea-Bissau :
p) support for the political and global reforms processes
For the international community:
q) the need for the partners of Guinea-Bissau to contribute actively to the efforts aimed at ending the crisis. It is important that the international community re-engage in Guinea-Bissau to help this country emerge from its current difficulties and address the daunting challenges facing it, once the national stakeholders have adopted, in an inclusive and consensual manner, the documents of the Transition, such as the "Pacte de régime” and a national roadmap. In this regard, the partners of Guinea-Bissau must harmonize their views and act in a coordinated fashion. The lack of effective, coherent and coordinated involvement of all the members of the international community will only complicate the process of ending the crisis and increase the suffering of the people of Guinea-Bissau. The partners of Guinea-Bissau must thus agree on their respective roles and possibilities of assistance;
r) support to the efforts aimed at making the Transition as inclusive as possible, to enable the people of Guinea-Bissau to address the problems being faced on the basis of a broad national consensus. Consequently, it is important to provide political, financial and technical support to the efforts to adopt Pacte de régime and a new social contract, and to encourage all political actors to demonstrate the spirit of compromise and flexibility required by the situation;
s) the evaluation by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, which has suspended its financial contribution to the pension fund following the coup d’état, of the situation, in order to review its position if necessary. Furthermore, part of the funding allocated by ECOWAS to implement the DSSR could be used to support the launch of the pension fund over the proposed five-year period, if the necessary conditions are met;
t) support to the preparation, by the current authorities, of a plan of action on the fight against drug trafficking. Such a plan should include the provision to Guinea-Bissau of the support it needs both in terms of expertise and logistics, including through the ECOWAS Plan of Action against Drug Trafficking and WACI. Similarly, the provision by UNODC of data on the impact of drug trafficking in the country would make it possible to have a better assessment of the phenomenon and the solutions required. The support for the implementation of the national justice policy is also necessary to contribute to the fight against impunity;
u) support for the holding of free, fair and credible elections, as soon as possible, given that the present timetable cannot be adhered to. In this respect, Guinea-Bissau’s partners should send an electoral assessment mission as soon as possible, to assess the situation and the needs, and facilitate the mobilization of the necessary resources and technical support for the holding of elections under the required conditions of transparency and regularity. This mission should also make recommendations on mechanisms to ensure the credibility of the elections;
v) the sensitization of the international community to the scourge of illegal fishing in Guinea-Bissau and the provision by Guinea-Bissau’s partners of the necessary support to facilitate the protection of its maritime domain;
w) the strengthening of the mandate of ECOMIB, according to modalities to be determined, to enable it to contribute more effectively to building the necessary confidence in the country; and
x) support for capacity building and strengthening of national institutions and the mobilization of resources for the elections, the fight against drug trafficking and the promotion of employment.
48. Finally, the joint mission stresses the need for Guinea-Bissau’s partners to work in a coherent and coordinated manner and to harmonize, as much as possible, their positions in support of Guinea-Bissau and its people, it being understood that the primary responsibility for a lasting solution to the multidimensional crisis facing Guinea-Bissau lies primarily with the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders. In this regard, the mission recommends that the five organizations set up a coordination and support structure that would meet regularly at different levels, with a local chapter in Bissau, to ensure permanent liaison with the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders, facilitate the support of the various international partners and assist in a coordinated manner the process to end the crisis, including the priority programmes. The five organizations should agree on the form and modalities of a consultative framework involving the different international partners, to mobilize their support with a view to facilitating the resolution of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the promotion of lasting stability in the country.
ANNEX I
JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF
WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS), THE COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES (CPLP), THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU), THE AFRICAN UNION (AU)
AND THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) TO GUINEA-BISSAU
TERMS OF REFERENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. As part of their commitment to work effectively together in order to assist Guinea-Bissau overcome the many challenges it is facing, ECOWAS, the CPLP, the EU, the AU and the UN have agreed to undertake a joint mission to Guinea-Bissau, building on the outcome of the meeting between the Bissau-Guinean Parties, held in New York, on 29 September 2012.
2. By undertaking this mission, the partner organizations, acting within the framework of the relevant decisions of their respective policy organs, pledge to promote the widest possible consensus among themselves. In so doing, they will contribute more effectively towards addressing the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau and assisting in the stabilization of the country.
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION
3. The mission will have the following objectives:
a. to assess the political and security situation on the ground in order to gain a better understanding of the local dynamics and prospects for addressing the multifaceted challenges facing Guinea-Bissau;
b. to examine the underlying causes of the recurring crises in Guinea-Bissau, with a view to facilitating a more effective international response in support of the efforts of the Bissau-Guinean stakeholders;
c. to explore avenues for building consensus among the partner organisations on the way forward;
d. to facilitate the formulation of a set of recommendations on how best the partner organisations can work together to assist Guinea-Bissau overcome the short, medium and long term challenges facing it (organisation of elections to enable the people of Guinea-Bissau freely and democratically to elect their leaders, security and defence sector reform, reform of the political system and constitutional review, justice and impunity, drug trafficking and illegal fishing underlying development and other issues), including encouraging the broadest possible consensus among the Bissau-Guineans; and
e. to make recommendations on the establishment of an appropriate follow-up mechanism.
III. MODALITIES
4. In order to achieve the above objectives, the mission will meet with all Bissau-Guinean actors, civil society, religious leaders and other stakeholders.
5. The mission will also meet with members of the international community in Guinea-Bissau.
6. At the end of the mission, the partner organisations will convene a meeting to review the outcome of the mission, consider and adopt its report, including recommendations on the next steps.
IV. COMPOSITION AND COORDINATION
7. The mission will comprise senior officials (2 each) from the following organisations: ECOWAS, CPLP, EU, AU and UN.
8. The AU will coordinate the planning and conduct of the mission.
V. DATE
9. The mission will, in principle, take place from 16 to 21 December 2012.
ANNEX II
COMPOSITION OF THE AU/ECOWAS/CPLP/EU/UN JOINT ASSESSMENT
MISSION TO GUINEA-BISSAU
AFRICAN UNION
Mr. El Ghassim Wane
Director, Peace and Security
Peace and Security Department
Coordinator of the Joint Mission
Mr. Mathieu Kinouani
Political Analyst
ECOWAS
Mr. Abdel-Fatau Musah
Director, Political Affairs
Mr. Ansumana E. Ceesay,
Special Representative of the Chairman of ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau
Mr. Campaoré
Security Adviser
Mr. Kehinde Bolaji
Programme Officer
COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES (CPLP)
Mr. António Pedro ALVES LOPES
Political and Diplomatic Adviser
Mr. Philip BAVERSTOCK
Legal Adviser
EUROPEAN UNION
Mr. Sean Doyle
Head of Division, External Action Service-West Africa
Mr. Hannes Hauser
Head of Political Section, EU Delegation in Guinea-Bissau
UNITED NATIONS
Mr. Gana Fofang
Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General,
Resident Coordinator of the operational activities of the UN system and UNDP Resident Representative
Mrs. Marlène S. Nzengou
Political Affairs Officer
Africa II Division/Department of Political Affairs
ANNEXE III
Joint ECOWAS/CPLP/EU/UN/AU Assessment Mission in Guinea-Bissau
Bissau, 16 - 21 December 2012
Officials, Institutions and Organisations met by the Mission
1. Government authorities
President of the Transition
Speaker of the People’s National Assembly (ANP)
ANP Bureau and Permanent Commission
Prime Minister
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Justice
Minister of Defense
Minister of Interior
2. Other national institutions
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of National Police
Commander of “Guarda civil”
President of the Supreme Court
Attorney General
President of the Military Tribunal
President of the National Electoral Commission
Parliamentary Commission for the Amendment of the Transitional Charter
3. International partners
Ambassadors of AU Member States
ECOWAS Special Representative
UN Special Representative/UNDP Resident Coordinator/Heads of UN Agencies
EU Representative/Ambassadors of EU Member States
Ambassadors of CPLP Member States
Representatives of International Economic and Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank, BOAD, UEMOA…)
Representatives of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
4. Political parties and civil society
Leaders of political parties represented in the Parliament (PAIGC, PRS, PRID, AD, PND)
Leaders of political parties not represented in the Parliament (ASG, CD, FCGSD, FD, FDS, FLIG, LGPE, MDG, PADEC, PALOP, PDCP, PCD, PDG, PDS, PDSSG, PMP, PNV, PP, PPD, PPG, PRN, PRP, PS-GB, PSD, PST, PT,PUN, PYSD, RGB, UM, UNDP, UDS, UPG)
President of the civil society Movement
President of women’s organisations (REMAM0P, CNPN, RENLUV, SINIM MIRA NASSIQUE, BRINFOR, CNJI, NADEL, OMELOEDRUCA, CIMDS, CNMT, RNMJ, WIPNET, MPP, AMAE, AMARIF, OMGB)
President of youth organisations
Religious leaders (Bishop of Bissau, Imam of Bissau, President of Protestant Church)
President of the Human Rights League
Traditional leaders (62 present)
President of the Bar Association
Public and private media representatives
5. Socio-economic actors
President of Trade Unions (UNTG, PPM, AMAE, MINSCPDD, SINAMAR)
President of Employers Association
Directors of commercial banks: Ecobank, BRS, BAO, BDU
President of the Chamber of Commerce
NGOs active in the health and social sectors (ENDA, IMVF, IPHD, Plan GB, SNV, Swissaid, SOS, Voz di Paz)
Editors-in-chief of newspapers: (No Pintcha, ANG, Bantaba di Nobas, Baloba, Radio Jovem, Radio Voz de Quelele, Radio Sol Mansi, TGB, RTP Africa, Bissau Media, Voz de Antula, Radio Bombolom, Radio Pinjigiti, Radio Nossa)
Posted by Selamawit Tadele
Last updated by Tchioffo Kodjo
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