REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION ON THE AFRICAN UNION-UNITED NATIONS JOINT REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 30 August 2017, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued Resolution 2372 (2017) requesting the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by 15 April 2018, working closely with the African Union and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), to take stock of the transition thus far including the development of Somali security institutions, and to make recommendations on the progressive transition from AMISOM to Somali security responsibility including over the electoral period, taking into account the capacities of the Somali security forces. The assessment of the Somali security forces, Somali security institutions and AMISOM would ascertain the Somali security forces readiness to implement the transition and propose how AMISOM would need to be properly configured to support the implementation, especially of the first phase of the Somalia Transition Plan, adopted by the 769th meeting of the PSC on 30 April 2018.

2. On 30 April 2018, in its Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCLIII)], Council emphasizes that the Somalia Transition Plan is a realistic and comprehensive document which forms the basis for channelling collective efforts and undertake further planning so as to consolidate AMISOM’s gains and make progress towards the take-over of primary security responsibilities by the FGS. Council stressed that the full implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan is dependent on fully addressing the challenges raised by the Operational Readiness Assessment of SNA, regional forces, completion of discussions on the Somali troop generation, training, integration, accommodation, equipment and logistical support for the tasks related to the transition.

3. The Joint Review made its findings, observations and recommendations. This report considers the key findings, observations and recommendations of AU-UN Joint Review (AU-UN JR) of AMISOM which was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 10 to 19 May 2018 and provides the Commissions observations and recommendations for the consideration of the Council on the way forward in terms of AMISOM’s support to Somalia.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE AU-UN JOINT REVIEW

4. This fourth AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, was aimed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of AMISOM and recommend options for effective and progressive transition of security from AMISOM to Somali National security forces and institutions (SNSF/I) in line with the Somali transition plan (2018 – 2021), in an orderly and responsible manner in order not to reverse the gains so far achieved. In this regard, the AU-UN JR: (i) assessed implementation of UNSCR 2372 mandated tasks by AMISOM in support of FGS and SNSF/I; (ii) discussed the modalities for the implementation of phase one of the STP with FGS lead, contribution of regional forces and support required support of AMISOM; and (iii) options for AMISOM reconfiguration and support, including funding for the SNSF/I, tied to the implementation of the transition plan.

III. METHODOLOGY

5. The team held consultations with FGS National Security Advisor, chiefs of the SNA and Somali Police Force (SPF) plus their senior officials. The review team met with the President of Somalia, H.E. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo on 17 May. The team was unable to have direct consultations with the Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia, due to the then on-going political developments,
including a meeting of the FMS at the 2nd Council of Interstate Cooperation (CIC), which was taking place concurrently with the visit of the joint review team. In Addis Ababa, the JR team debriefed representatives of AMISOM T/PCCs present in Addis Ababa and key partners, on the main outcomes of the Joint Review.

IV. KEY FINDINGS

i. Overall political context and associated risks

6. The AMISOM operational environment continues to be unique and cuts across the spectrum of peace enforcement, war fighting, asymmetrical warfare, counter terrorism and stabilization. Further, unlike contemporary peace support operations, the AMISOM forces, the international partners and supporting agencies are considered targets of Al Shabaab. Somalia situation therefore requires specific interventions and flexibility by AMISOM in exercising its mandate including the logistics support systems provided by UNSOS. Whilst Somalia has made considerable progress over the last ten years, with AMISOM creating the enabling environment for political processes, the progress achieved is still reversible, due to the fragility of the political situation. In particular, the slow pace of national reconciliation and a final constitution to ensure consensus among Somali stakeholders on the nature of a federal Somalia suggests the possibility of continued political instability. This situation is further compounded by Al-Shabaab’s continued ability to undertake deadly terrorist attacks against innocent civilians, Somali security forces and AMISOM. Beyond Al-Shabaab’s threat, continuing regional and clan divisions, coupled with the proliferation of arms and presence of Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) extremists in Puntland and South Central Somalia is also a major concern.

7. Ongoing tensions between Somaliland and Puntland as well as continued challenges in the interim administration of Galmudug also continue to exacerbate internal dynamics and negatively impacting fragile FGS-FMS relations. The current standoff between the Gulf countries is also unfolding a proxy contestation in Somalia and negatively impacting fragile FGS-FMS relations as well as sowing seeds of further divisions among Somalis.

8. The joint review observed that Somalia is making progress towards debt relief and implementing fiscal reforms that would enable it to regain access to international financing, and efforts by the FGS to improve revenue generation and collection are yielding results. This offers the possibility for Somalia to facilitate the transition and financially sustain its security sector. Thus, AMISOM remains indispensable to providing security and creating the necessary space for the political process to unfold, until the time Somali security institutions are able to garner the required financial and force capabilities to shoulder this responsibility. However, limited alignment between the administration and leadership of key security sector institutions was noted. Additionally, it was noted that implementation of the transition will also require realistic costs assessments of each of the detailed plans’ tasks, and a framework for financing.

ii. AMISOM’s support to the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP)

9. Proposed reconfiguration of AMISOM military and police components in support of the Transition Plan: In line with resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM completed a reduction of 1,000 military personnel by 31 December 2017 and is expected to undertake further reduction of another 1,000 military personnel by October 2018. The joint review however recommended that this reduction be postponed until the implementation of the pilot phase expected to be implemented by December 2018/Feb 2019 in order to enable AMISOM reconfigure itself to commence its support to the FGS and prevent the creation of gaps in other important locations. AMISOM Police will reconfigure within the
current authorized strength of 1040 to support the first phase of the transition plan, and extend its activities to other population centres beyond Mogadishu and the FMS capitals.

10. **Implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan**: AMISOM is ready to support the STP starting with the priority tasks of Phase One, as spelt out in the STP. This includes handing over Mogadishu Stadium, supporting SNSF take over and consolidate itself in Leego, and secure the Mogadishu – Baidoa Main Supply route. However, it was noted that effective implementation of the STP is dependent on the contribution of regional forces, noting their higher level of readiness than SNA to conduct joint operations. Thus, their integration, into SNA with the fulfillment of necessary required conditions is critical, as this will qualify them to access the UN logistics Support Package to conduct joint operations alongside AMISOM, and ensure holding and securing of recovered areas. In this regard, the ORA of the regional forces should be completed as soon as possible to validate the various regional forces and special police unit (Darwish) in accordance with the STP.

11. **Enabling AMISOM to accomplish new tasks**: The need for AMISOM military and police to provide training and mentoring to the SNA and SPF respectively, including regional forces was evident. The training would include ensuring interoperability of SNA personnel for joint operations with AMISOM as well as SPF personnel engaged in providing security to various population centres. Additionally, AMISOM Police activities should be planned within a broader framework to complement the SPF and support Somali judiciary and corrections institutions. This should be coordinated within existing mechanisms including UNSOM, UNSOS, EU and other partners for optimum delivery. Thus, and with a view to rapidly generate the required personnel for implementation of the STP, there is need to clarify and strengthen the language of a future PSC Communiqué and UN Security Council Resolution on the expanded training and mentoring role of AMISOM to enhance the capacity of the SNSF to lead the implementation of the STP.

12. **Expansion of AMISOM Civilian Component**: It was noted that AMISOM military personnel in some instances are confronted with issues that go beyond their role and capacity. These include initiating and facilitating inter-clan and community dialogue as well as facilitating stabilisation activities, including Quick Impact Projects (QUIPs) which are expected to be carried out by civilian personnel. In this regard, and as implementation of the STP commences, deployment of civilian personnel in specific and key locations across AMISOM’s area of operation will guide and support military operations. Such deployment will enable AMISOM to provide support to inclusive political processes, training and monitoring of IHL, human rights and conduct and discipline compliance and accountability (including investigations of allegations) of AMISOM personnel and ensure the same for SNSF personnel conducting joint operations with AMISOM as well as enhancing and continuing to support stabilization and other related activities as provided for in the Somalia Transition Plan. In this regard, recruitment and deployment of additional civilian personnel is recommended to enable AMISOM facilitate these critical tasks and augment its contribution to supporting the State building process including those linked to enhancing FGS-FMS relationship to guarantee an effective federal system in Somalia. This is in line with the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) that will lead to the transfer of primary security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali Security Forces and Institutions.

**iii. Review of AMISOM support concept**

13. It was noted that support implications for the transition remain difficult to accurately determine since the capacity of the SNSF to deploy and takeover security responsibilities from AMISOM in particular locations have not been confirmed. Thus, and alongside the reconfiguration of AMISOM, there is a need for a new comprehensive operational logistic support concept to address ongoing efforts to solving existing gaps and to support implementation of the STP. In this regard, a
joint support plan (SNSF/AMISOM/UNSOS/Partners) should be considered as part of the development of a new AMISOM CONOPs to facilitate execution of Phase One of the Somali Transition Plan. Additionally, the current support package for the SNSF should be reviewed and extended to facilitate implementation of the transition plan as well as ensure inclusion of the SPF and regional forces contributing to the STP implementation thereof. UNSOS, UNMAS and other relevant entities should also be provided with the required mandate to also adequately support activities of AMISOM Police and eligible Somali Police Forces.

iv. **Generation of force enablers and multipliers**

14. UNSCR 2036 (Feb 2012) authorized the deployment of 12 (twelve) military Helicopters, including three attack and nine utility. The generation of these force enablers and multipliers, to enhance mobility, resupply, rapid reaction and quick attack combat capability in support of the STP and implementation of other mandated tasks needs to be urgently expedited. Moreover, maximizing existing Mission Enabling Units (MEU), which support the movements of AMISOM logistics is critical for the implementation of the STP (in particular the clearance of key MSRs) including deployment of additional equipment in terms of force protection, engineering and logistics which needs to be expedited to enhance AMISOM operations. In view of the foregoing, 03 military utility helicopters are urgently required to support AMISOM operations. Additional Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) capability is also required to protect our personnel and enhance securing the MSRs.

V. **OBSERVATIONS**

15. While the Transition Plan provides the strategic direction for the process by which a gradual handover of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security institutions can take place, detailed planning and implementation is required to put all phases of the plan in motion. Additionally, effective implementation of the STP is dependent on fully addressing the challenges raised by the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) of the SNA and SPF, involvement and contribution of the FMS and regional forces, agreement on Somali troop generation, training and logistical support and resources for the tasks related to the transition as well as coordination and support of international partners. Additionally, a holistic approach is required, including much enhanced coordinated efforts on extending state authority, policing, establishing local administrations with rule of law, courts and mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights and the provision of basic services to the population.

16. The Commission wishes to note that in addressing the objectives for the assessment, four issues were clearly identified; the status of Somali Security Forces and their readiness to undertake the transition; the role of AMISOM in the political process in the transition; the capabilities required by AMISOM to enable it better support the transition and the requirement to undertake an orderly and responsible transition to avoid reversal of the gains.

i. **The status of Somali Security Forces (SNSF) and their readiness to undertake the Transition**

17. It may be recalled that during the AMISOM Police and Troop Contributing countries Summit held in Djibouti in Feb 2016, the African Union expressed its position, which was endorsed and supported by the TCCs, that as part of AMISOM exit strategy, AMISOM would initiate its withdrawal from Somalia by Oct 2018. Coincidentally, it may also be recalled that a perception was created in 2017, which indicated that the SNSF had developed the critical mass within its security Forces and institution, to enable SNSF start taking over security responsibilities from AMISOM. These events contributed to UNSCR 2372, initialising the recent transition plan. However, following an assessment of SNA undertaken in October-November 2017, the inability of Somali National Security Forces, in their
current form, to undertake any military moderate operations on their own, due to weak organisation, management, equipment deficiencies, including their inability to hold any Forward Operating Base (FOB) became evident. The review noted that no significant progress has been made to address the gaps that were identified during Operation Readiness Assessment (ORA) of SNA. Therefore capability challenges still exists in SNA, hence the inability to takeover security responsibilities in the immediate term. In the week ending 06 June 2018, the FGS National Security Council decided that a number of SNSF required for the Phase 1 would be mobilized from South Western State, and that a number of the equipment for the military still needed to be acquired. Despite the significant international support rendered to the SNSF, they lack the capacity, structures, institutional oversight and support to be able to take over security responsibility in the short to medium term.

ii. The role of AMISOM in the political process in the Transition

18. As part of the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, enshrined in the “Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhancing Partnership on Peace and Security”, signed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General in April 2017, the United Nations is obliged to support its partner in making progress towards its aspiration to establish the required capacity to plan, deploy and manage multi-dimensional peace operations. This is also in the strategic interest of the United Nations, with a view to the principle that Africans are first and foremost responsible for maintaining peace and security in Africa. AMISOM serves as a pilot in this regard, and is already looked at as a case study for future operations. Denying AMISOM the recognition for its political role impedes AU on this path. The need for political support in Somalia is vast, and there is sufficient political space for UNSOM and AMISOM (with their limited personnel). It will be important to define roles and responsibilities and geographical coverage, and to establish effective cooperation and coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication, or incoherence in the political engagement of both organizations.

19. The Commission strongly re-iterates that AMISOM has a role to play, in support of the political and stabilisation processes in close cooperation with UNSOM and relevant member states, including those based in Mogadishu. To optimally contribute to these processes, it is recommended that AMISOM undertakes a mapping of the current deployment of its civilian personnel; identification of gaps of presence in key areas complementing that of UNSOM and preparation of a summary of these results to be considered moving forward. Additionally, it is recommended that Member States consider supporting the Commission and AMISOM in generating resources for the recruitment of additional required civilian personnel to ensure that AMISOM enhances its multidimensional character. This will enable the mission to contribute to early recovery activities, including self-sustaining community-owned and resilient processes as well as broader stabilization activities, which includes medium to long-term governance and institution building processes.

iii. The requirement to undertake an orderly and responsible transition in order to avoid reversal of the gains achieved

20. AMISOM role to contribute to security and stability in Somalia is critical to continue creating the space for political and other activities of the FGS. However it lacks inherent capabilities and needs to utilize its current capabilities as optimally as possible. Additionally, the current mandated task of joint operations against Al Shaabab is not sufficiently supported with the required multipliers and enablers, such as additional attack and support helicopters, mission enabling units, a quick react force (QRF) for AMISOM FHQs, and adequate intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Moreover, the possible reduction and collapse of some of the FOBs needs to be matched with
additional ISR and air assets to allow for greater mobility insertion, extraction and firepower to counter Al Shabaab.

21. The Commission agrees with the joint review observation that there is need to undertake an orderly and responsible transition. It noted that in the process, AMISOM would have to re-organise and reconfigure itself. During the re-organisation, some locations outside Mogadishu deemed to be very sensitive (from a political and security point of view) may not to be vacated by AMISOM. Secondly, after fully realising the current inadequacies of SNSF, AMISOM cannot draw down concurrently from the areas outside Mogadishu, an act that would undermine the political success for FGS and security success for SNSF. It may be recalled that AMISOM will still be undertaking security operations in other areas of responsibility. Further reduction of AMISOM troops and personnel during this delicate period of transition, will have negative consequences on the security situation in Somalia and may lead to a reversal of the gains achieved over the years, particularly if the capacity and capabilities of the SNSF and integration of regional forces is not expedited. In this regard, the Commission agrees with the joint review that the 1000 troop reduction due in October, be postponement and undertaken in February 2019 following an assessment of the progress of the implementation of the STP. The assessment would give a clearer picture on how the implementation of pilot phase 1 of the Transition Plan is proceeding. It is further recommended that further reduction of AMISOM troops be dependent on a comprehensive review of AMISOM capabilities and resources across its areas of operation to confirm existing capabilities, key challenges and threats to better inform a reconfiguration of AMISOM.

22. The Commission agrees that there is a need to ensure interoperability of SNA personnel for joint operations with AMISOM as well as for AMISOM police to expand its training and mentoring activities with a view to extending Somali police presence to other population centres, notably locations on the Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR such as Leego, Buur Hakaba and Wanlaweyn. Thus, it is recommended that the language of a future PSC Communiqué and UN Security Council Resolution includes an expanded mentoring and training role of AMISOM to enhance and augment the capacity of the SNSF to lead the implementation of the STP as part of efforts for the transfer of primary security responsibility from AMISOM to the SNSF.

23. The joint review confirmed that a good level of progress was achieved in implementing the recommendations of the matrix annexed to the 2017 report of the AU-UN Joint Review on the enhancement of AMISOM civilian component to improve AMISOM compliance with IHL and human rights. The recommendations were aimed at strengthening mechanisms and measures to prevent and address human rights and international humanitarian law violations by AMISOM. With the anticipated operations during the transition and the joint operations with or the use of Regional Forces, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are likely to increase. In this regard, AMISOM compliance measures and capacity need to be stepped up alongside the measures for the Somali Security forces, particularly those linked to Identification (including numbers, locations, minimum vetting), Command and Control and internal oversight, measures to avoid the use of children, measures to prevent the perpetration of sexual exploitation and abuse and timely response to allegations, including investigations.

24. In light of developments since the previous joint review, Communiqué of the 700th meeting of the PSC held on 12 July 2017 and resolution 2372 (2017), notably the creation and endorsement of the Transition Plan and the proposition for a strategic direction for AMISOM transformation in its support, the Commission agrees with the joint review recommendation, with the aim of promoting effective AMISOM reconfiguration in support of the Transition Plan, that AMISOM mandate be renewed for one year, with a technical assessment in six months’ time, followed by the usual joint review prior to the expiry of the mandate. The technical assessment would review the state and effectiveness of AMISOM
reconfiguration in support of the transition and progress on operations being carried out under the Transition Plan, and provide observations on AMISOM trajectory and any reductions. The projected drawdown of 1,000 military personnel by 30 October 2018 be put on hold until after the technical assessment which would provide the modalities for the reduction, in Feb 2019. The technical assessment would also enable assessing the pace of the implementation of the Transition Plan and provide an updated understanding of the state and readiness of Somali security forces.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

25. In considerations of the recommendations of the joint review, and positions and strategy of the AU in Somalia, the wish to have an orderly transition of security in Somalia, the Commission wishes to make the following recommendations for consideration of the Council:

a. That Somalia faces a complex combination of new and old threats to its stability and progress. Alongside the threat of Al-Shabaab, its affiliates and other non-state armed groups, political contestation between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, exacerbated by external influence and interference and the impact mainly of the Gulf crisis, presents itself as major obstacle to the formation of a federal Somalia. The joint review participants were until recently optimistic about reaching compromises in resolving local, clan-based conflicts and relations between the federal government and federated states over time. The ongoing intensive interventions by protagonists of the Gulf crisis, using the soft power of their substantial financial resources can make a considerable impact in a country such as Somalia suffering from 28 years of political instability, high poverty level, and absence of organised security institutions. A high-level intervention may be needed in the near future, aimed at protecting Somalia from the impact of external rivalries and the unfolding proxy contest that have nothing to do with the country and preserving the gains achieved so far. Several options or sequencing could be considered including for the African Union to endorse a special committee to pursue a resolution or a joint Chairperson and Secretary-General initiative.

b. That the development of the Transition Plan is a welcome step and a sign of the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States towards assuming responsibility for security. And strongly recommends that political differences, with or without external interference, should not be allowed to prevent implementation of the Transition Plan. The lives and future of twelve million Somalis are at stake. As Somalis continue on the path towards resolving the key federalism questions to be enshrined in the Constitution, including power- and resource-sharing, the FGS and FMS line ministries and security institutions must continue to work closely together on implementation of the National Security Architecture and the Transition Plan, including the accelerated integration of regional forces into national and state security institutions. All key partners including T/PCCs should contribute in building the SNSF/I capacity to successfully implement the STP. All efforts should be made to ensure Somali ownership and unity of purpose at the federal and state levels, as well as wider buy-in across the Somali society, towards the successful implementation of the Plan. The joint review considers failure of successful implementation of the first priorities will be devastating to the credibility of the Plan among other likely negative impressions.

c. That the implementation of the Transition Plan is not possible without the participation, coordination and support of the Somali leadership and security institutions, AMISOM and its T/PCCs as well as key security partners in the detailed planning and operationalization of the Plan through existing mechanisms including CAS and the Transition Implementation Team.
Implementation of Phase One and its pilot priorities will be a test case for the AMISOM-Somali security institutions nexus. A test that must score success.

d. That progress on other tasks and priorities of Phase One of the Transition Plan should continue in parallel with securing and handover of the three pilot locations. This includes plans of reconfiguration of AMISOM, clear delineation between locations that should not be affected by any consecutive drawdowns and further detailing of the conditions that would be created at the end of Phase One, including appropriate modalities. Implementation must be carried out in a flexible manner, adjusted to specific locations and situations, and with the participation and practicable agreement of major stakeholders. Future priorities should be consulted with AMISOM and Somali security institutions before adoption. The close involvement of UNSOS in all stages of planning is an absolute necessity.

e. That transferring security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security institutions under a holistic approach will require a much enhanced coordinated efforts on extending state authority, policing, establishing local administrations with rule of law, courts and mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights and the provision of basic services to the population. Coordination structures under the CAS dealing with such matters should prevail, even at the expense of reduced activity in other stands of the CAS. AMISOM, UN and other partners should be guided by existing Somali federal and state frameworks on stabilization and reconciliation.

f. That while the strategic objectives and priority tasks for AMISOM remain as provided in resolution UNSCR 2372 (2017), they should now be incorporated into the implementation phases of the Transition Plan. AMISOM reconfiguration should commence in earnest consistent with the implementation of the Plan including the gradual formation of multinational sectors to enhance command and control and inter-operability. This includes improving the capabilities of the Force Headquarters, cohesion and coordination among AMISOM TCCs, as well as between AMISOM, Somalis and bilateral partners. The reconfiguration of AMISOM should aim at multiple TCCs in various new sectors, to be further examined in the CONOPS including the requisite enabling units totaling 1,845 uniformed personnel, as outlined in the letter of the Secretary-General S/2013/606 (2013).

g. That a coordination platform such as “fusion cell” or Joint Intelligence cell at Mission Headquarters should be established, as a centre for intelligence sharing from different multi agencies including external experts (whose forces are operating in AMISOM area of operation US, UK and EU) in intelligence and analysis. The cell will integrate various functions (Intelligence, ISR, C-IED and Political intelligence and other SNA intelligence agencies) and have a common strategic and operational picture and analysis of intelligence for the consumption of MHQ and FHQ. This platform would complement the MHQs, but more so the FHQs, and empowering the Force Commander in planning and executing operations.

h. That the AMISOM military mandate should include mentoring SNA for joint operations and training in-theatre to generate a critical mass of SNA/Regional Forces to defend local populations centres. The Commission strongly recommends an approach through which SNA troops identified to take part in specific operations jointly with AMISOM should be gathered and be mentored in combat readiness by AMISOM Military Component before the operations. Joint exercises with AMISOM Military Component are also recommended to take place in secure areas before commencing Military operations. AMISOM’s role in police training should continue to be recognized in the mandate by the Council, following the positive results of the pilot project.
undertaken in Kismayo and Baidoa, under the Joint Police Programme and in line with the New Policing Model and FMS police plans already approved by the Somali National Security Council.

i. That a comprehensive joint AU-UN review of capacities and readiness or ORA of AMISOM should be concluded as soon as possible, within three months, to identify additional capacities and needs to support the implementation of the Transition Plan and provide the baseline for an AMISOM reconfiguration that would result in any troop reductions. The assessment will also inform additional requests for enabling capacities to support AMISOM’s role, to justify the provision of key enablers and multipliers to support the quick reaction force (QRF) concept under the command of the Force Commander should be actively pursued. AMISOM will institute the mechanisms of the operationalizing the QRF.

j. That UNSOS support should be enhanced in line with demands emerging during the AMISOM reconfiguration. A system of logistical support to Somali forces that take over security responsibilities from AMISOM is required to facilitate the sustainment of handovers. The UNSOS comprehensive review could explore support modalities for SNSF involved in transition tasks, including an assessment of its comparative advantage and the existing UNSOS supply network, as well as requisite mandate and resources, including voluntary contributions channelled through the SNA Trust Fund. As previously noted, assurances on issues related to accountability in the use of resources and compliance underpin any enhanced UN support and such support either to AMISOM by virtue of its reconfiguration or to Somali force can only be undertaken in strict compliance with HRDDP.

k. That AMISOM should play its role in the political process, in close cooperation with UNSOM and relevant member states based in Mogadishu, and consistent with the AU – UN Framework of Cooperation. It further recognizes that AMISOM’s potential to optimally contribute to the political process requires the undertaking of organizational and other preparatory steps to ensure a significant added value to the process. These steps include mapping of the current deployment of AMISOM civilians; identification of gaps of presence in key areas complementing that of UNSOM and preparation of a summary of these results to be considered moving forward.

l. That AMISOM Sector 6 should be closed and subsumed into Sector 2. Sector 6 (in Kismayo city) was created to address a particular situation that existed in Kismayo Seaport. It was also decided the sector would become multinational with the inclusion of a Kenyan contingent. With the gradual degrading of Al-Shabaab in Kismayo and over time, Jubaland security forces have increased their capacity, resulting in AMISOM handing over security responsibilities of the airport and seaport. With the diminishing of the “particular situation” in Kismayo, the activities of AMISOM Sector 6 forces consisting of approximately 1,600 troops from Ethiopia, Burundi and Kenya contingents have since diminished, while Jubaland security forces’ capacity has increased. The decommissioning of Sector 6 will provide flexibility for better utilisation of that force, and enhance the reconfiguration of AMISOM military in regards to operations, logistical support and infrastructure for optimal use elsewhere in the mission.

m. And finally that in light of developments since the previous joint review and resolution 2372 (2017), notably the creation and endorsement of the Transition Plan and the proposition for a strategic direction for AMISOM transformation in its support, the commission recommends, with the aim of promoting effective AMISOM reconfiguration in support of the Transition Plan, that AMISOM mandate is renewed for one year, followed by the development of a new Concept of Operations (CONOPs) aligned to support the implementation of the STP and concurrent activities, with a technical assessment in six months’ time, and the usual joint review prior to
the expiry of the mandate. The technical assessment would review the state and effectiveness of AMISOM reconfiguration in support of the transition and progress on operations being carried out under the Transition Plan, and provide observations on AMISOM trajectory and reductions. The projected drawdown of 1,000 military personnel by 30 October 2018 would be on hold until after the technical assessment by Feb 2019, which would provide the modalities for the reduction. The technical assessment would also enable assessing the pace of the implementation of the Transition Plan and provide an updated understanding of the state and readiness of Somali security forces.

VII. CONCLUSION

26. The Commission notes the direction and objective of the Somalia Transition Plan 2018-2020, which is underpinned by the framework on the comprehensive approach to security. In this regard, the emphasis is now on accelerating enhancement of Somalia national security forces and institutions, consolidation of the successes and the extension of state authority to recovered areas. Thus, AMISOM’s support to the FGS should be underpinned by political primacy and should primarily be focused on the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan, ensuring momentum on the Roadmap on inclusive politics, ratification of the Constitution that should clarify roles and responsibilities between the FGS and FMS and integration of regional forces into the SNSF, in line with Somali National Security Architecture. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that AMISOM enjoys greater access to recovered areas than any other actor, including the UN, which gives AMISOM comparative advantage in security stabilization, initiating and supporting confidence building and reconciliation initiatives, civilian stabilization and other efforts aimed at extending state authority in Somalia. Thus, the African Union should capitalize on this and assert its role, in co-ordination with key stakeholders, and contribution to assist Somalia move from conflict to sustainable peace.