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INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION

At its 97th meeting, held on 25 October 2007 and devoted to the consideration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), after having heard a report by the Deputy Minister of Interior of DRC on the presence of Mbororo nomadic pastoralists in the North-East of his country, Council urged the Commission to dispatch a fact-finding mission to DRC to examine together, with all the concerned actors, problems of security along the borders with the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Sudan, linked, among other aspects, to movements of populations and make recommendations.

As part of the follow-up on that decision, I asked Professor Abdoulaye Bathily, from Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar and a former Minister of Environment of the Republic of Senegal, to lead the fact-finding mission requested by Council. Between December 2007 and February 2008, the mission visited DRC, CAR, Sudan and Cameroon. The mission failed to visit Chad because of the events that occurred in that country, including in N'djamena, in late January and early February 2008.

During the various visits, the mission met with representatives of the Governments concerned, the local populations, the local authorities, members of Parliament, officials of United Nations missions and agencies active in the field, NGOs and other stakeholders. The meetings enabled the mission, beyond remarks on the history of the migrations of pastoralist nomads, in general, and those of the Mbororo, in particular, to make an overall assessment of the consequences of this phenomenon, including to the security plan. On this basis, the mission made a number of recommendations.

I concur with the recommendations of the mission, which, if implemented, will greatly facilitate the search for practical solutions to the problems of migrations of Mbororo nomadic pastoralists. Such an approach will be part of the AU conflict prevention effort; it will also contribute to the implementation of the AU border programme, which includes a far-reaching aspect devoted to cross-border cooperation.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Bathily for conducting this mission and for the work that has been accomplished. I would like, also, to express my thanks to the Governments of the visited countries and to the other actors met for their cooperation with the AU mission.

I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MISSION

1. In considering the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 97th meeting of the Council, held on 25 October 2007, received a report from the Congolese Vice-Minister of the Interior on the presence of Mbororo nomadic pastoralists in the North-East of the DRC. According to the report, the Mbororo pastoralists arrived with their herds, from neighbouring countries in large numbers posing a threat to peace and security in this region of the country. In the communique issued at the end of the meeting, Council, inter alia, called on the Chairperson of the Commission to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the DRC to enquire on the security problems at the borders with the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan, linked, among other things, to population movements; examine the problems that arise with all the stakeholders, and make recommendations.

2. As part of the implementation of the decision, the Chairperson of the Commission appointed Professor Abdoulaye Bathily from Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar as Special Envoy and Head of the Mission. The team also included the Political Adviser and the Military Adviser to the AU Liaison Office in Kinshasa, DRC, Mr. Daniel Ayite and Colonel Blaise Nikiema, respectively. The delegation to Cameroon benefited from the assistance of Mrs. Aissatou Hayatou Tall from the Commission’s Peace and Security Department, a native of Northern Cameroon who speaks the Mbororo language used in this region.

II. MISSION SCHEDULE AND FACT-FINDING METHODOLOGY

3. The mission was carried out in four stages:

   - 10-20 December 2007: DRC;
   - 21-23 January 2008: CAR;
   - 27 January-3 February: Republic of Sudan; and

4. Chad, which was initially on the mission’s schedule, could not be visited on account of the events that took place in that country on the eve of the mission’s departure (4 February 2008). Cameroon, which was not initially in the mission’s itinerary, was visited because of the mission’s findings in CAR.

5. The mission’s fact-finding methodology was built on meetings with the relevant actors at both national and local levels, according to available logistical means. Meetings were therefore held with:
   - Ministries of Foreign Affairs;
   - Ministries of Security and Defence;
   - members of Parliament;
   - religious authorities;
- Non-Government Organisations;
- Local leaders of the Mbororo populations (Bangui – CAR, Juba – Southern Sudan, Yaoundé and Bertoua - Cameroon);
- UN missions and agencies in the visited countries (MONUC, BONUCA, HCR, UNICEF, OMI, etc.).

6. The list of persons interviewed is annexed to this report. However, the mission could not visit Mbororo nomadic sites in the visited countries, due to logistical and security reasons.

7. In addition to information it collected from meetings with the above-mentioned actors, the mission benefited from documents made available to it by the above-mentioned organisations. The mission also benefited from an important survey on the Mbororo phenomenon in the DRC carried out by the Christian NGO "Pax Christi".

8. The mission expresses its deep gratitude to the authorities of the countries that were visited and the organisations that were consulted for their cooperation and assistance in ensuring smooth conduct of the fact-finding mission. The AU offices in the DRC, Sudan and Cameroon, through the facilities they offered, also contributed to the undertaking of the fact-finding mission.

9. In a broad context, the importance and quality of the information collected enabled the mission to have a greater grasp of the main characteristics and consequences of the migrations of Mbororo pastoralists in the countries that were visited and, in particular, the relationship between these migrations and the security problems in this part of Central Africa.

III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE HISTORY OF PASTORALIST MIGRATIONS IN GENERAL AND MBORORO MIGRATIONS IN PARTICULAR

10. Since time immemorial, the migrations of nomadic pastoralists have shaped Africa’s human history and human geography. In all these regions, nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers have competed for natural resources. The competition, sometimes peaceful and sometimes violent, has kept pace with social dynamics. It provided the impetus to the emergence of several pre-colonial political formations (kingdoms and empires) in several regions (Sahel, Nile basin, savannahs of Central and Southern Africa, etc.).

11. Continuous mobility is the key feature of pastoralists, whether they belong to the Fulani group or to the general group of Bantu or Nilotic people. The seasonal search for pastures and water is their permanent motivation.

12. The Mbororos belong to the Fulani group, which, from the Sahara, have been spreading in migratory waves for thousands of years. As the Sahara became increasingly dry, these waves moved in all directions to occupy the best lands for their herds. The pace and the scope of their movements are often conditioned by two key factors: the variations in the environment and the population growth in the regions through which they cross. Environmental crises (drought, depleted pastures and water sources), on the one hand, and strong population density, which is a source of conflict with farmers, on the other hand, are factors that push pastoralists to continually move from one place to the other.
13. The Mbororos are part of a large clan-based confederation which was apparently established on the fringe of present Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. The three main factions making up this tribe (*Jafun*, *Akun* and *Wodabe*) spread over the years throughout Western Africa. The colonial conquest and the establishment of borders, as well as the subsequent accession to independences, did not put an end to their migrations. Like all nomadic pastoralists, the Mbororos have an approach to space that cannot live with frontiers. They consider themselves as mobile communities crossing territory, which provisionally provides pastures to their herds. This explains their presence today, in the form of more or less important groups, in the lands bordering the major waterways, including the Senegal, Niger, Nile and Congo rivers.

14. The colonial administrative and economic organizational set-up drove the Mbororo to the periphery of all states. They remained on the fringe of the settlement or economic and social dynamics (schooling) which affected other communities. Through their lifestyle, the Mbororos appear to symbolize the vestiges of the great pastoral migrations which marked the past of Africa.

IV. MBORORO MIGRATIONS IN THE DRC: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY CONSEQUENCES

15. Although the security concerns of the DRC were the first reason for the fact-finding mission, the information collected in the various countries (CAR, Sudan and Cameroon) fully show that Mbororo migrations constitute a very significant phenomenon for the whole sub-region, from several economic, social, security and humanitarian aspects.

Consequences of Mbororo migrations in DRC

16. The Mbororos settled in DRC only recently. After a first attempt immediately repressed by the army of Zaire in the 80s, Mbororo fractions from CAR, Sudan and Chad began crossing into the Eastern province of DRC in the 90s - 2000, during the heat of the politico-military situation in the country. The administrative vacuum in this Eastern region facilitated the incursion and establishment of Mbororo pastoralists in the districts of Lower and Upper Uele, bordering CAR, Sudan and Chad.

17. During the last decade, Mbororo settlements grew and extended to the whole province of North-Eastern DRC. The migratory movement has particularly amplified over the last five years under the impulse of several phenomena, including a deterioration of the security situation throughout Eastern Congo and politico-military problems in the neighbouring countries of DRC.

18. The repercussions of the crisis led the Mbororos of the concerned countries to seek peaceful refuge for themselves and for their herds. As they themselves say, "herd like bird avoids noise". The districts of Upper and Lower Uele, being thinly populated and relatively calm and, above all, rich in pasturelands, were considered ideal by the Mbororo pastoralists.

19. The data collected are insufficient to determine with accuracy the number of pastoralists and cattle that entered into the DRC as a result of Mbororo migrations. The number of Mbororos may vary between 10 000 and 20 000, and their herd between 100 000 and 160 000. These figures can be used only as an indication
because no reliable census has been carried out. The Mbororos live outside urban areas and are loath to any census of their people and cattle.

20. Be that as it may, the consequences of their presence in North-Eastern DRC are to be taken seriously. Such consequences are evolving in several areas of the local population's life.

Economic impact

21. The crossing of herds in large numbers has a negative impact on the economy of the area, which is based essentially on subsistence. The people interviewed spoke of several cases of devastated crops.

22. Freshwater points supplying the populations are used and polluted by the passing cattle. Harvest activities are also hampered by the competing herds and pastoralists. In order to save their cattle, the Mbororos destroy all traps laid by the local population for hunting game animals. They destroy bee nests, depriving villagers of honey collection, which constitutes an income-generating activity. Some nomadic pastoralists would even engage in illegal exploitation of minerals (gold and diamonds) near a locality called Milinda. Others would collect and trade a much-appreciated variety of wild pepper (Ketchou) in the sub-region.

23. The practices of Mbororo pastoralists constitute a source of tension with the potential to degenerate into conflict with the local populations. The threat is all the more real as certain Mbororo groups seem to have decided to settle on a permanent basis in a number of localities with certain local people aiding and abetting them.

Social and cultural impact

24. The recent settlement of Mbororos in Eastern DRC poses a problem of co-habitation between them and the local populations. The difference in their lifestyles, cultures and religious beliefs (the Mbororos are Moslems) generate distrust and rejection on both sides. The Mbororos are rejected on the basis of prejudices of all kinds. This rejection is exacerbated by the belief that the pastoralists are privileged people in a poor environment. By selling some herds of cattle on the local market, the Mbororos get cash, which enables them to pay for their passage or their residence. This position exposes them to popular anger.

Political and security impact

25. Indisputably, Mbororo migrations in Eastern DRC constitute a source of conflict in this territory. Their arrival in the area is first accounted for by the deterioration in the security situation in DRC, Chad, Darfur and Southern Sudan. The pastoralists have paid a heavy price to the various belligerents to whom they continue to pay ransoms. Politico-military groups obtain supplies from the Mbororos, at no cost. Over the last few years, organized crime (highway armed robber attacks, illegal hunting) has developed in all the sub-region with the Mbororos being the main target. Armed bands follow the livestock, posing as protectors and demanding payment in return. In cases of refusal, children are taken hostage and are freed only with the payment of a ransom. Consequently, it is not surprising that some Mbororos arm themselves to protect their people and goods. The flow of light weapons into this
area is obvious. This cannot be blamed on the Mbororos, as such, but on the overall situation prevailing in the sub-region.

26. Some sources speak of collusion between Mbororo elements and some politico-military groups in the crises that affected the DRC, but no substantial report could confirm this speculation. However, because of the tensions generated by their presence in a hostile social environment and the incursions of “highway armed robbers” against them, the Mbororos contribute, against their will, to the deterioration of the security situation in the districts of Upper and Lower Uele. Unless something is done to calm the situation, this zone may rapidly turn into a rallying centre for the various uncontrolled armed groups and individuals who come from all parts of the sub-region, and constitute the birthplace of a new conflict.

V. MBORORO MIGRATIONS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - MANIFESTATIONS AND IMPACT ON SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY

27. Before the major politico-military crisis, which shook CAR in 2005-2006, the country appeared to be the main platform of the Mbororo migratory movements. In particular, since the colonial era, the territory’s authorities have pursued a policy conducive to the settlement of Mbororos in the savannah areas in the East and the North of the country. Through successive waves from North-Eastern Cameroon and Eastern Chad, they came to occupy the whole of Northern and Eastern CAR. The objective pursued by the colonial Government and later by the independent State was to make Ubangi Chari the main meat and animal products supplier of other territories of Central Africa (Gabon, Congo Brazzaville).

28. This Mbororo pastoralist settlement policy does not seem to have had negative consequences at that time, due to under-population in the area. Encouraged by the authorities after independence and enabling conditions for their activities, the Mbororos organized under the leadership of their migration chief (Ardo), and the Government, which facilitated the creation of the Cattle Breeders Association of the Central African Republic (FENEC). This organisation continues to play a leadership role in the meat distribution channel in CAR.

29. However, the Mbororos have remained at the fringes of national life in CAR. Living in isolation from the other communities, they are perceived as foreigners by the majority of the people in the country. Differences in religion (Islam), language and other cultural features specific to their nomadic lifestyle make them distrustful of the other segments of the population, both rural and urban, when they come to the livestock market. As in neighbouring Congo, the Mbororos in CAR are victims of prejudice of all kinds. Their situation has worsened, especially with the advent of the politico-military events of 2005-2006. The demobilized combatants in CAR, who failed to be integrated into the new army, engaged in operations of banditry in pastoral areas.

30. All data collected confirm this. Much of the CAR territory remains vulnerable to the criminal activities of the various armed groups, rebels, highway armed robbers (zaranguina) and poachers who keep the population under their grip. The livestock-owning Mbororos naturally fall victims to such widespread vandalism. Children and women are kidnapped and only released after payment of ransom, which can amount to several herds of cattle or hundreds of thousands of CFA Francs. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the Mbororos acquire themselves firearms to ensure their own safety and to protect their herds.

31. A comparison of reports from several sources shows that there are probable links between the large influx of Mbororo people to Eastern DRC and the deteriorating security situation in CAR. This is also the case in Cameroon, as discussed below. As long as the security problem is not resolved in that country, it would be unrealistic to expect to stabilize migrations in neighbouring countries, particularly in the DRC and Cameroon.

VI. MBORORO MIGRATIONS IN THE SUDAN

32. According to testimony gathered from various stakeholders in Southern Sudan (Juba), the Mbororo problem in the region arises in identical terms as those found in the DRC. While they are apparently tolerated in the State of Blue Nile, where they have lived for a long time, the Mbororo migrating waves are rejected by the local populations in Western Bahr el-Ghazal and in the Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria regions, neighbouring CAR, DRC and Uganda on the grounds that they cause damage to traditional agricultural activities. Their religion, Islam, and their clear complexion are all charges levelled against them by the local populations.

33. During the consultations, it was also mentioned that a punitive operation directed against them in the province of Western Equatoria might have turned into a massacre. At the time the mission visit to Juba, a joint effort by several UN agencies on the ground (IOM, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR) was being developed, with the support of the Government of Southern Sudan, to provide humanitarian assistance to 2,100 Mbororos in a vulnerable situation.

34. The peace achieved in Southern Sudan is attracting more and more Mbororo groups from Darfur, CAR and Chad, Eastern DRC and Northern Uganda, where the LRA militia violence continues. The influx of Mbororos to Southern Sudan has been the source of tension with local farmers in the province of Equatoria, but also with the peoples of the relatively-populous northern areas where the Livestock and Traditional Farming Association does not leave room for newcomers. In short, there is an urgent need to address the Mbororo problem in Southern Sudan, in order to develop a policy aimed at achieving lasting stability throughout the region.

VII. MBORORO MIGRATIONS IN CAMEROON

35. During the course of the fact-finding mission, it soon emerged that a review of the Mbororo phenomenon in Cameroon was necessary to better understand the phenomenon in the DRC and CAR, in particular. Indeed, Northern and Eastern Cameroon have been, for centuries, territories used by Fulani nomadic pastoralists from various clans, including the Mbororo clan. The latter participated in the development of the various Fulani hegemonies which emerged along the axis that runs from Middle Niger (Fulah empire of Massina, Hausa / Fulani States in Nigeria) to Adamawa Plateau.

36. According to the information collected, the Mbororos left the territory for CAR, from where they eventually spread. Family links still exist between groups in the two countries. In all seasons and socio-political events, groups move with their livestock
from one country to another. In recent years, Cameroon has witnessed a large influx of Mbororo fleeing the politico-military crisis in CAR.

37. The census carried out by UNHCR and WFP in January 2008 shows that 45,539 refugees have been registered, identified and supported by these two UN agencies in Cameroon. The information obtained during this operation show that over 90% of these refugees came from CAR. The mission received confirmation of the information from the Mbororo leaders of the refugee camp of Bertoua (Eastern Cameroon) and members of the Mbororo Social and Cultural Association (BOSCUDA), when it visited the town on 8 February 2008.

38. The situation in Eastern Cameroon reflects the gravity of the humanitarian crisis as well as the fragility of the security situation in the CAR. Indeed, the refugees have settled in Cameroon to escape from the atrocities of politico-military groups active in CAR. To these should be added the Zaranguinas or highway armed robbers specializing in the kidnapping of Mbororo children. According to some sources, the Zaranguinas, or sometimes called Zaghawa (ethnic group in northern Chad), are soldiers of fortune who came from Chad during the incidents related to the overthrow of President Ange-Felix Patasse, which took place in March 2003. After the overthrow of President Patasse, the Zaranguinas eventually decided to stay in CAR, making a living by raiding livestock. Some elements among them continue to distinguish themselves by frequent incursions into Mbororo refugee camps in Cameroon, where they abduct children, demanding payment of a ransom for their release.

39. The insecurity maintained by these politico-military groups and bandits has led the Government of Cameroon to create a special unit to secure the border with CAR. Consisting of about one thousand well-equipped and trained men, this special gendarmerie unit called BIR (High-Readiness Brigade) so far appears to have won the bet to secure the refugee camps and even the border area.

40. While some Mbororos managed to save part of their livestock in their race to Cameroon, others say that they have lost everything. With the support of the Cameroonian authorities and a BOSCUDA initiative backed by UN agencies and NGOs, these Mbororos are trying hard to fit into integrated development projects.

41. While efforts by bilateral and multilateral partners began to organize and facilitate the mobilization of assistance to thousands of Mbororo refugees in Cameroon, the events of February 2008 in Chad drew the attention of the humanitarian organizations to Kousseri, a Cameroonian locality on the border with Chad. The humanitarian and security situation on the borders of Cameroon and the CAR is likely to worsen in the future unless efforts are deployed to consolidate the process started in previous months.

VIII. GENERAL COMMENTS AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

42. In addressing the problem of Mbororo pastoralist migrations in Eastern DRC and in the neighbouring countries, at least five general considerations emerge:

(i) such migrations raise deep concern from Governments and local populations because of their negative impact on the economy and social stability, as well as on the security situation in the affected areas.
The tensions, which are already reflected by sporadic clashes occurring separately and collectively, may ultimately trigger off localized and even sub-regional conflicts, which could result in massacres against the Mbororos;

(ii) the pastoralists' presence tend to destabilize the local subsistence economy with damage to the environment, especially in Eastern DRC and part of Southern Sudan, where pastoralism was traditionally unknown;

(iii) the deteriorating security situation in the region caused by various conflicts in the sub-region (Eastern DRC, Northern Uganda, CAR, Chad, Darfur) and the presence of roaming armed groups, Mbororo migrations have compounded the situation. This phenomenon is manifested in the tensions between the Mbororos and the local population, on the one hand, and the covetousness that the livestock create among armed groups and bandits operating in the sub-region, on the other hand. In short, the Mbororos are tossed into a cycle in which they are both victims and propagators of violence.

43. Mbororo pastoralists have been operating throughout an unstable sub-regional area where the central government authority (army, administration, security services, immigration, etc.) remains weak. All the countries concerned are still suffering from the consequences of ongoing-armed conflicts. The border areas of these countries are turning into a real no man's land. Owing to a number of complex factors, the sub-region is exposed to a potentially major humanitarian crisis, as evidenced by the situation in the refugee camps of Eastern and Northern Cameroon.

44. Finally, the overall findings show that the crisis caused by the migration of Mbororo pastoralists is a complex one, with a sub-regional dimension. Any lasting solution should be based on a comprehensive and peaceful approach that connects local and national solutions to a sub-regional settlement, with a resolute commitment to human security.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

45. The need for a pre-emptive approach calls for two types of recommendations.

46. At a global level, a meeting of the countries concerned (DRC, CAR, Sudan, Chad, Cameroon), under the aegis of the AU, should be convened as soon as possible, and should bring together representatives of Ministries of the Interior and Animal Husbandry, with the participation of:

- representatives of the communities involved (Mbororo and local populations);
- NGOs operating in the areas of migration;
- UN agencies already in the field, such as UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, IMO, and other partners;
- representatives of the media in the various countries concerned; and
- peacekeeping missions in the areas concerned.
47. The purpose of the meeting would be to map out a concerted strategy and devise actions to be undertaken on the basis of a precise timetable. The holding of such a meeting and the decisions emanating from there may help reduce tension in the most sensitive areas (Eastern DRC, Southern Sudan, and North-Eastern Cameroon), where people are eager to see the authorities give a strong signal to meet their concerns. The establishment of a Committee to follow up on the resolutions and recommendations of the meeting will be necessary.

48. More specifically, the following is proposed:

i) assist the Government of DRC, along with partners such as MONUC, UNHCR, OCHA, carry out a census programme on the identification and humanitarian assistance to the Mbororos of Upper and Lower Uele, in following the example of Cameroon and the Government of Southern Sudan;

ii) support the Governments of DRC (North Eastern Province) and Sudan (Southern Sudan) to set up an emergency program on the delimitation of livestock corridors to be used by pastoralists (similar initiatives exist in West Africa);

iii) establish an inter-state outreach programme on the specific problem of pastoralism in the countries of the sub-region (based on the model of a similar program developed by OCHA and Radio Okapi of MONUC) and education on good neighbourliness and tolerance between peoples condemned by historical events to co-exist;

iv) introduce and promote the humanitarian issue of the Mbororos to UN agencies for a concerted inter-agency program (UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, IMO, etc.); and

v) encourage the countries concerned to promote national projects on Mbororo integration in the socio-economic (health, education) systems, taking into account their lifestyle (mobile schools and health structures). Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Nigeria, among others, have experiences to share in this area.
ANNEXES

A. References

Democratic Republic of Congo

- The trans-border migrations of the Mbororo in North-Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – Upper and Lower Uele Case Study - April 2007
- Focus on Mbororos in Ango Territory, in Eastern Province – OCHA Working Paper
- Memorandum of non-governmental organisation for the development of Upper Uélé, concerning the presence of Mbororo pastoralists, 12 December 2007

Republic of Cameroon

- New Office opens to protect and care for Mbororo Central Africans UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency) on 27 March 2007/UNHCR - Briefing Notes

Republic of Sudan

- Inter-Agency Assistance to the Mbororo Group in Mundri Country (Western Equatoria), Health Report (1st to 10th December 2007)
- Sudan Repatriation Operation 2008 - Weekly statistics - UNHCR presence in Sudan, 8 January 2008
• South Sudan Repatriation MAP, 29 January 2008

• Distribution of organized refugee returnees to Sudan and Blue Nile States, 27 January 2008

• Health Report compiled by the International Organization for Migration, Inter-Agency Assistance to the Mbororo Group in Mundri Country (Western Equatoria) of South Sudan

Central African Republic


B. Authorities met by the mission

Authorities met in Cameroon

• Mr. Adoum Gargoum, Minister Delegate to the Minister of External Relations, in charge of Relations with the Islamic World

• Mr. Jacques Franquin, the UNHCR Representative in the Republic of Cameroon

• Ms. Hawe Bouba, National Vice-President of MBOSCUDA, Association for Social and Cultural Development of the Mbororos

• Mrs. Hajara Haman, MBOSCUDA member and former head of Pastoralist Communication Unit / OCHA, Addis Ababa

• Mr. Hassoumi Aboudalaye, Secretary-General of MBOSCUDA

• Mr. Lélé Lafrique, Governor of the Eastern Province in Bertoua

• Yaoundé and Bertoua Province UNHCR representatives

• President of the Mbororo community in Bertoua Province and a significant number of MBOSCUDA bureau members

Authorities met in Kinshasa and Kisangani, Democratic Republic of Congo

• Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

• Ministry of the Interior

• Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs

• Mr. Swing Willian Larcy, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in DRC (MONUC)

• Brigadier General Babacar Gueye, ComForce of MONUC

• Director of Political Affairs of MONUC
• Governor of the Eastern Province (Acting)
• Members of Parliament in session in Eastern Province
• MONUC Bureau Chief, Kisangani
• Interview with Radio Okapi, Kisangani (MONUC)
• OCHA Representative
• Isiro District Commander
• Representatives of Isiro civil society and NGOs
• Directors and Heads of Service of Isiro District
• Monsignor Mosengo Pasinya of Kisangani

Authorities met in Sudan

• Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Lt. General Dr Riek Machar
• Honorable Daniel Deng Monydit, in charge of the Order and Security Commission of the National Assembly of Southern Sudan
• UNHCR Representative, Mr. Chrysantus Ache
• Mrs. Mary Guidice, IOM South Sudan
• Mr. Bhairaja Panday, Deputy Representative (South)
• Honorable Bol. Gatkuoth Kol, Member of Parliament

Authorities met in Bangui, Central African Republic

• His Excellency Zoumara Côme, Foreign Minister in charge of Regional Integration and Francophonie
• Dr. Komonda, Secretary-General of the National Federation of Central African Breeders
• President and Vice-President of the Cattle Breeders Federation of the Central African Republic (FENEC)
• Officials of the United Nations Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)