PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
356TH MEETING
27 FEBRUARY 2013
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

PSC/PR/2(CCCLVI)

REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)
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THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The situation in Somalia has undergone a fundamental change with the transfer of power from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with the election of a new President in September 2012. The Transitional Roadmap would not have been successfully implemented, but for the huge commitment and enormous sacrifices made by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and their international partners, to enhance security. These significant developments in Somalia have made it necessary for the African Union and its international partners to undertake a strategic review of AMISOM.

2. The objective of the strategic review is to determine how best AMISOM can further contribute to the stabilization of Somalia and align its activities to the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia.

3. To undertake the Review, the AU Commission appointed a five-member team of experts chaired by Professor Ibrahim Gambari.1 The Review Team was supported by a secretariat made up of civilian, police and military officers from AMISOM and the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission. In addition, four senior officials from the Federal Government of Somalia participated in the Review.

4. The team consulted with the President of Somalia and key members of his cabinet in Mogadishu, with AMISOM troop and police contributing countries and with key regional and international partners in December 2012 and January 2013. It also consulted with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, notably the United States and the United Kingdom. (See Annex A).

II. BRIEF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA

5. Major security gains in Somalia over the last 18 months have created an enabling environment for the successful completion of the transitional period and the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. These developments presented a strategic opportunity for the international community to support, in creative and concrete ways, the Federal Government of Somalia to consolidate the peace process. The peaceful transfer of power to the

1 The other members of the team were Lt.Gen. (Rtd.) Louis M. Fisher, Mr. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, Dr. Cedric de Coning and Col. (Rtd.) Festus B. Aboagye.
Federal Government of Somalia in September 2012, brings a successful end to the 8 year transition period that began in 2004. The new political reality and the recent military gains against the Al Shabaab provided the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and the international community with a strategic opportunity to consolidate the political and security gains made thus far, by investing in the restoration and extension of state authority through effective governance, rule of law and the delivery of peace dividends.

6. The Review Team has noted that the Government has articulated a Six Pillar Policy Framework and that it is planning to review the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP).

Six Pillar Policy Framework

7. The Six Pillar strategy is a comprehensive policy framework outlined by the President of Somalia for the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, around which the AU and the international community should align its support. The six pillars are:

a. Full Stability - Supremacy of the law and good governance, that incorporates rule of law and security;

b. Economic Recovery - Livelihoods and economic infrastructure;

c. Peace building - Social reconciliation through building bridges of trust;

d. Service Delivery - Health, education and environment;

e. International Relations - Building collaborative relations and polishing the national image; and

f. The Unity and Integrity of the country - Striving together for a better future.

National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP)

8. The NSSP provides for immediate, medium and long-term priority actions to strengthen the security and justice sector institutions in Somalia. It outlines the national security vision of Somalia as follows:

“A Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule of law; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend its constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity”.

9. The strategic objectives of the NSSP are as follows:

a. To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and Coordination Mechanisms;
b. To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security, justice and Custodian Corps Agencies and Institutions;

c. To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies/institutions;

d. To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector development efforts;

e. To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of Somalia.

Security Situation

10. A significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the entire territory of the country still requires a significant sustained effort. The Federal Government of Somalia has outlined the recovery of remaining areas as a key priority. However, the Government recognizes that there has to be a balance between consolidation of gains made and further expansion of areas under its control.

11. The security situation in Somalia has significantly improved in those areas recovered to date, but it is still fragile and the gains can be reversed if not consolidated. The main risks are the absence of effective government institutions that are capable of delivering state services and managing inter-clan conflict. This is exacerbated by Al Shabaab exploiting the situation, as well as by piracy, banditry and lawlessness.

12. Al Shabaab is increasingly under pressure due to heavy losses, internal leadership wrangles as well as inability to pay its fighters as a result of loss of key revenue sources. This has resulted in the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM having to manage defectors and captives without a comprehensive plan.

Socio-economic Situation

13. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains critical. There is widespread poverty and malnutrition and large portions of the countryside remain very vulnerable to changing weather conditions. There are currently 1.1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia and 1 million refugees in neighbouring countries. The IDPs in Somalia face major protection challenges including abuse, crime, aid diversion and forced evictions.

14. However, safety and living conditions have improved in the recovered areas. Attacks on humanitarian workers have significantly declined. There is a noticeable increase in economic activities. Large numbers of people are returning to Mogadishu and other areas, and many are reconstructing their homes and are engaging in business activities.
International Cooperation and Partnerships

15. A large number of international and regional organizations, as well as bilateral partners, are supporting the peace process in Somalia. IGAD and the AU have been the leading regional partners and have been instrumental in the process that resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in 2004. The UN has played an important role in Somalia since the 1990s. More recently, the UN through its Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) has facilitated the transition.

16. AMISOM has been supported by the UN and the European Union (EU), as well as bilateral partners. However, these financing contributions only cover specified areas and periods; hence, funding for AMISOM remains unpredictable and unreliable. The international financial crisis that has negatively affected the AU’s partners has further compounded funding for AMISOM.

17. The Review Team has noted that there is need for enhanced coherence and predictability in the support provided by the international community to Somalia, including for AMISOM. The Federal Government of Somalia on its part has expressed frustration at the high transaction costs associated with having to deal with an incoherent and highly divergent set of multilateral and bilateral international partners.

18. From its consultations with key stakeholders, the Review Team has observed the following challenges:

a. Unpredictable funding;

b. Inadequate logistic support in the newly recovered areas;

c. Uncoordinated partner funding and support;

d. Lack of transparency in the management of partners’ contributions,

e. Lack of funding for capacity building for Somalia defence and public safety institutions;

f. Inadequate funding for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that can support urgent projects, and contribute to tangible peace dividends, in newly recovered areas;

g. Inadequate and delayed deployment of approved personnel and resources, and;

h. Lack of air capability.
III. **ASSESSMENT OF AMISOM**

**Mandate**

19. AMISOM’s mandate was at the onset crafted to support Somalia’s TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conditions conducive for long term reconstruction and development. The mandate has been reviewed at regular intervals, for instance most recently to encompass support to the Federal Government of Somalia through UN Security Council resolution 2073 adopted on 7 November 2012, which extended AMISOM mandate up to 7 March 2013, pending this strategic review.

**Civilian Component**

20. AMISOM’s civilian component includes political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information, gender and mission analysis and planning capacities. The civilian staff performed their duties from Nairobi until the security situation improved and they were deployed in Mogadishu in 2009. The civilian component of AMISOM has contributed significantly to the successful completion of the transitional period through political advice, facilitation and capacity building, supporting governance both nationally and in Mogadishu, and by facilitating humanitarian assistance.

21. AMISOM’s civilian component will need to be enhanced to enable it support the mission’s consolidation and stabilization efforts in the new areas recovered from Al Shabaab, including in the areas of governance, reconciliation, human rights, gender and early recovery at local community level.

**Military Component**

22. AMISOM’s military component has had considerable operational success. However, with current force strength, and without critical multipliers and enablers such as a guard force and air assets, AMISOM will be constrained in its ability to expand its area of operations. Without these multipliers and enablers, AMISOM would require additional forces if it were to expand its area of operations. AMISOM will not be able to recover the remaining areas until such time that the SNSF has developed the necessary capacity to take over responsibility for the security of the recovered areas.

23. An important assumption thus is that the Federal Government of Somalia will receive the support necessary for it to significantly enhance the capacity of the SNSF so that they are able to take over responsibility for security from AMISOM. Simultaneously, AMISOM’s capacity to conduct training and to support the capacity building of the SNSF will need to be enhanced. Currently, AMISOM does not have a training team dedicated to this task.
24. The need for multipliers and enablers thus remains critical for AMISOM to complete its mandate. These assets and capabilities can be used to target Al Shabaab's strategic resources, provide air cover for supply convoys, and help the force to reach areas where AMISOM currently has little or no presence.

**Police Component**

25. The mandate of the AMISOM Police component is to develop and implement comprehensive strategies to support the Somalia Police Force (SPF) in order to build its operational, training, administrative and management capacity; to re-equip and rehabilitate its infrastructure; and to mobilize and manage its resources. The AMISOM Police is also required to enforce the maintenance of public order and to protect Somali citizens, especially the vulnerable groups.

26. It has a mandated strength of 1,680. Currently it has 362 deployed personnel consisting of two Formed Police Units (FPU) of 140 personnel each, 76 individual police officers and a senior leadership team of 6 officers. It is therefore imperative that the mandated strength be deployed to enable fully implement its mandate.

**Mission Support**

27. AMISOM has a complex mission support structure which includes a limited UN logistical support package delivered by UNSOA, bilateral support to the AU to cater for the operational overheads of all AMISOM personnel and bilateral support provided to police and troop contributing countries to AMISOM. Currently, the UN support package is being provided to 17,731 uniformed and 70 civilian personnel. The logistic support package provided by the UN has contributed significantly to the success achieved by AMISOM, but it is limited in the type of support it can provide. It would need to be enhanced if it is going to be able to support AMISOM operations at the scale, tempo and intensity needed to expand its operations across Somalia.

**IV. SUPPORT TO STATE INSTITUTIONS**

28. AMISOM’s End State is closely tied to the development of the institutional capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia, so that its key state institutions can ensure justice, rule of law, effective governance and the provision of basic public services.

29. To realize the critical goal of enhancing the capacity of the Defence and Public Safety institutions, there is need for:

   a. The Federal Government of Somalia to review the NSSP, and its implementation mechanisms, so that it can form a comprehensive roadmap for capacity building;
b. The establishment of training teams and training facilities in each sector. In addition, efforts to identify countries in the region with existing facilities that can offer specialised training should continue, and;

c. The Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of international partners to recruit and train additional personnel, and;

d. The Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of international partners to provide dedicated resources for equipment, uniforms, medical care and remuneration for the Somalia Defence and Public Safety institutions.

Management of Disengaged Fighters

30. There are two categories of disengaged fighters; those who have been arrested or captured in combat and those who have surrendered to AMISOM or SNSFs. The Federal Government of Somalia, in collaboration with AMISOM and other partners, has developed a plan that needs to be improved upon in order to develop a comprehensive strategy.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic Guidance

31. Based on the strategic analysis, the assessment of AMISOM and consultations with stakeholders, five key factors emerged that should be taken into account when considering the future support for the Somalia peace process and in particular the Federal Government of Somalia:

a. **Enhance coherence in support:** The Federal Government of Somalia, the AU, the UN and all the international partners called for enhanced coherence and predictability in the support provided by the international community and expressed frustration at the high transaction cost associated with having to deal with an incoherent and highly divergent set of multilateral and bilateral international partners.

b. **Predictable funding:** There is general frustration at the lack of predictable funding for AMISOM, which spills over into uncertainty and fragility for the consolidation of the peace process in Somalia. Any future mission should thus be organized in such a way that its funding arrangements are predictable enough so as to avoid a negative effect on the fragility of the Somali peace process.

c. **Consolidation of security:** The security situation in Somalia has improved in those areas recovered to date, but it is still fragile, and the gains can be reversed if not consolidated. The main risks are absence of effective government institutions that are capable of delivering state services and managing inter-clan conflict.
d. **Recovery of territory:** A significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the remaining territory of Somalia still requires a significant sustained effort. The Federal Government of Somalia has outlined the recovery of remaining areas as a key priority. However, the Government recognizes that there has to be a balance between consolidation of gains made and further expansion of areas under its control.

e. **Robust peace enforcement:** AMISOM needs a robust peace enforcement capacity to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to recover remaining areas under Al Shabaab control as well as consolidate the already recovered areas.

32. On the basis of these key factors, the Review Team recommends that any future mission that aims to support the Federal Government of Somalia must be a joined up and fully supported mission with clear strategic direction, and that there has to be a mechanism that ensures effective coordination among the international partners and the Federal Government of Somalia at all levels.

**Main Effort**

33. The main effort for the consolidation of peace in Somalia lies in the provision of security, effective governance, rule of law and basic services. Effective governance would offer the people of Somalia a clear choice between extremism and lawlessness on the one hand, and safety and justice on the other.

**End State**

34. The role of any future peace support operation in Somalia would be to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to provide effective governance by contributing to conducive political and security environment that enables the enhancement of security, rule of law and the provision of basic services. The envisaged end state would be a significantly depleted military and related capacity of Al Shabaab and the threat it poses to Somalia and the sub-region; enhanced capacity and cohesion of the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions to assume primary responsibility for the security of the state and its citizens. This will then facilitate the expansion of the Federal Government of Somalia's authority across the country and enable the creation of a stable, secure Somalia whose citizens enjoy access to justice and the rule of law.

**Strategic Objectives**

35. On the basis of the Main Effort and the End State, the strategic objectives of any future peace support operations would be to:

a. Secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia;
b. Enhance the capacity of the defence and public safety institutions;

c. Support the establishment of effective governance, and;

d. Facilitate the conduct of general elections by 2016.

**Objective One: Secure the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Somalia:**

36. Support the Federal Government of Somalia’s efforts to neutralise and weaken Al Shabaab by gradually expanding the control of the Government throughout the territory of Somalia. The next logical step in a staged approach would be the recovery of the strategic areas on the Somalia coast by the end of 2013 or as conditions may dictate, in order to deny Al Shabaab access to commercial and criminal revenue as well as resupply. This could be followed by recovering the remaining key inland towns by end of 2014, and eventually to recover the entire territory of Somalia by end of 2015. This two year timeline is decisive but subject to periodic review, based on the prevailing conditions.

**Objective Two: Enhance the Capacity of Defence and Public Safety Institutions:**

37. Support the Federal Government of Somalia to enhance the capacity of its Defence and Public Safety Institutions. The peace support operation’s end state in this context would be to assist the SNSF to develop the capacity to eventually take full responsibility for its own security by 2020.

38. The Federal Government of Somalia, with support from the peace support operation and bilateral partners, should develop a national capacity building plan that builds on the NSSP, and that provides for a gradual handover of responsibility to the SNSF. Such a gradual enhancement of capacity should be linked to the peace support operation’s consolidation, handover, drawdown and withdrawal benchmarks. In this regard, a comprehensive strategy and plan of action for building the Somalia National Army (SNA) and the SPF should be developed.

**Objective Three: Support the Establishment of Effective Governance:**

39. Support the Federal Government of Somalia to enhance the functioning of existing institutions and establish new ones as necessary to oversee and implement the Government’s Six Pillar policy framework. Further to this would be support for the re-establishment of local administrations in the recovered areas, in close cooperation with the UN and other partners.

**Objective Four: Facilitate the Conduct of General Elections by 2016:**

41. Under the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia, appropriate benchmarks, timelines and responsibilities should be developed to guide the actualisation of these objectives.

Peace Support Operation Phases

42. Taking into account the Main Effort, End State and Objectives discussed above, a future peace support operation should consider a phased approach:


43. In this phase, the peace support operation supports the SNSF to recover territory from Al Shabaab, and supports the Federal Government of Somalia to establish effective governance in those areas already recovered. It is projected that the SNSF and the peace support operation will be in control of the entire territory of Somalia by end 2015, with a view to general elections being held by 2016. These dates are subject to review based on the prevailing conditions.

44. There is an overlap with Phase Two in that the peace support operation should start to handover security responsibility for certain areas to the SNSF as soon as the SNSF has developed the capacity to do so. The peace support operation should retain the capacity to support the SNSF, even once they have assumed responsibility, as necessary.

Phase Two: Handover and Drawdown (2016-2018)

45. In this phase, the handover of responsibility to the SNSF will be gradually increased in a staged and orderly manner, until the SNSF has assumed primary responsibility for the security of the entire territory of Somalia by 2018, or earlier, as conditions may dictate. The peace support operation will retain the capacity to support the SNSF throughout the country, so that it can respond should the SNSF come under pressure in any location. Efforts to support effective governance and to build the capacity of the SNSF are intensified.

46. As the SNSF assumes more responsibility the peace support operation could start to scale down its forces and adjust its capabilities.

Phase Three: Drawdown and Withdrawal (2017-2020)

47. In this phase, the scale down continues until eventually all forces exit Somalia by 2020, or earlier, as conditions may dictate.

Options for the configuration of a Future Mission

48. From the analysis of AMISOM, it has become clear that the mission faces many challenges despite the success it has achieved so far. Whilst the Federal Government of
Somalia, the AU and the UN agree that the coordination and cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU and various UN entities need to be significantly improved, the main constraint AMISOM faces is one of resources.

49. The resources currently available to AMISOM through the limited UN support arrangement and international partners will not allow the significant expansion into new areas of operations. The Federal Government of Somalia needs AMISOM to assist the SNSF to recover the entire territory of Somalia by 2015, in time for the general elections by 2016.

50. The Review Team has thus come to the conclusion that the status quo is not an option. The Team has examined various additional options and has decided to present three options to the AUC for consideration, namely:

Option 1: Handover AMISOM to the UN.

Option 2: Enhance AMISOM.

Option 3: Establish a new joint AU-UN mission.

Option 1: Handover AMISOM to the UN

51. As the AU is not able to generate predictable funding for AMISOM, it has on several occasions in the past requested the UN to take over responsibility for the peace operations in Somalia. The UN has in-principle agreed to take over responsibility for peace operations in Somalia, but it has indicated that the prevailing conditions are not yet conducive for a UN peacekeeping operation. As Al Shabaab still controls considerable territory in south central Somalia, any peace operation that is mandated to support the SNSF to extend its control over the entire territory will require a peace enforcement mandate, robust rules of engagement and offensive capabilities.

Option 2: Enhance AMISOM

52. As highlighted above, the current situation is that AMISOM is unable to significantly expand its area of operations because of resource constraints. There is thus a serious gap between the support that AMISOM can provide and the scale, tempo and intensity of operations that the Federal Government of Somalia would like to see. In order to assist the Federal Government of Somalia to expand its control over the entire territory of Somalia, AMISOM would require additional personnel as well as multipliers and enablers.

53. If the UN Security Council approves an enhanced support package that enables AMISOM to increase and sustain the scale, tempo and intensity of its operations, the mission would be able to expand its area of operations. However, an absolute prerequisite for this option is that the AU’s international partners are willing to provide a comprehensive support package
including uniformed personnel reimbursements and logistics equal to the support provided to a UN mission, but with enhanced scales and standards for peace enforcement that will enable it to achieve its mandate in a reasonable time-frame. *(See Annex B - Proposed structure for the enhanced AMISOM).*

**Option 3: Establish a new joint AU - UN mission**

54. Under this option an AU peace support operation (AMISOM) could be joined up with a UN peace building office in a structural arrangement that:

a. Ensures joint AU-UN political direction and leadership,

b. Ensures AMISOM has the necessary resources from the UN to pursue its mandate, and;

c. Ensures that AMISOM retains its multidimensional character, and a mandate that allows it to use the levels of force necessary to support the Federal Government of Somalia to recover and secure those areas still under the control of Al Shabaab. *(See Annex C - Proposed structure for a joint AU-UN Mission).*

**Recommended Option**

55. As the status quo is not an option, and as option 1 (UN peacekeeping) is not feasible at this stage, the two remaining options are option 2 (enhanced AMISOM) and option 3 (a new joint AU-UN mission). As option 2 does not address the concern over predictable funding for AMISOM, the Review Team recommends option 3.

56. The Review Team however, envisages option 2 serving as an interim arrangement that will facilitate a transition towards the realization of the joint AU-UN mission including undertaking technical assessment and agreeing its relevant management and operational modalities. The transition period will also allow for the necessary enhancement of AMISOM including a new mandate, enhancing its multi-dimensional character and provision of the required human and technical resources such as multipliers and enablers. In the mean-time the Federal Government of Somalia will require support to maintain the pressure on Al Shabaab, otherwise the gains reached to date may start to erode. As the requirements are known and the support modalities are in place, an enhanced AMISOM would be able to step up its tempo relatively soon after such additional assets, multipliers and enablers have arrived in the mission.

57. The Review Team therefore recommends that a new joint AU-UN mission be established. Such a mission should bring together an African Union peace support operation (AMISOM), a UN peace building office and a joint mission support.
58. The joint mission needs to be led by a Joint AU-UN Special Representative who is appointed by, and reports to both the AU and the UN. The Joint Special Representative (JSR) needs to be supported by a joint coordination mechanism that ensures strategic coherence between the AU Commission and UN Secretariat.

59. The Office of the Joint Special Representative should have the capacity to integrate and coordinate AMISOM, the UN peace building support office and the joint mission support. In addition, the Joint Special Representative should chair a mechanism that brings together all senior AU and UN leadership functions. The Joint Special Representative should also co-chair, together with an appropriate Federal Government of Somalia representative, a mechanism that coordinates the support that all international partners provide to the Federal Government of Somalia.

60. A Deputy Special Representative, appointed by the AU should lead AMISOM. The AMISOM part of the joint mission will be a multidimensional peace support operation that consists of a civilian, police, military and two support components, one for administration and one for finance. The AU has invested considerable resources over the last decade in developing military, police and civilian capabilities as part of its efforts to develop a multidimensional African Standby Force capacity. In this regard, the Review Team has noted that considerable expertise has been developed in AMISOM to date, and it recommends that steps should be taken to ensure that the AU’s multidimensional peace support operations capacity not be eroded in the transition to a joint AU-UN mission.

61. The Review Team envisages a clear division of labour between the AU peace support operation and the UN peace building office. The peace building office can be responsible for supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in the areas of peace building, governance and Rule of Law. AMISOM will pursue the four objectives discussed earlier. The AU multidimensional peace support operation will require, amongst others, the ability to do mission analysis and planning; to provide political analysis and reporting; to represent the mission at the sub-national level to local authorities; to generate public information, to promote gender mainstreaming, to ensure conduct and discipline is maintained and to manage a strategy for the protection of civilians. Such a clear division of tasks, based on the respective mandates of the two entities, should avoid the risk of duplication and overlap between the peace support operation and the peace building office. The joint coordination mechanism overseen by the Office of the Joint Special Representative, should further be able to manage any areas of potential overlap that may arise.

62. The joint AU-UN mission should be supported by a mission support structure that provides support to the Office of the Joint Special Representative, AMISOM and the UN special political mission or peace building office.
63. The Review Team noted that past experiences have shown that such joint structural arrangements come with their own challenges and high transaction costs for both the AU and the UN. In this regard, the Review Team is of the opinion that these challenges should be addressed and the transaction costs absorbed by the AU and the UN.

64. However, in the interim, the Review Team recommends that the AU and UN should explore modalities for an enhanced support package for AMISOM. The Review Team visualizes a graduated transition within a timeframe of 12 months with effect from the date of the next mandate. During this transition period, an enhanced AMISOM will continue with peace enforcement operations with a robust mandate. Modalities for the transition to the enhanced AMISOM and a future joint AU-UN mission should include:

a. Multipliers and enablers for the mission to facilitate continued territorial recovery and domination of areas under the control of Al Shabaab.

b. Special training teams that can build the capacity of Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions.

c. Enhanced civilian capacity to facilitate and support the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to restore effective governance, human rights, rule of law, and justice in the recovered areas.

d. Funding of uniformed personnel reimbursements from UN assessed contributions.

e. Taking into account the need for coherence and predictability in the support provided to the SNSF, the Review Team recommends that the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) co-chairs, together with an appropriate Federal Government of Somalia representative, a mechanism that coordinates the support all international partners provide to the SNSF.

65. During this period, the AUC should create the necessary synergies between the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Africa Governance Architecture (AGA). This would broaden the AU’s engagement in Somalia beyond peace and security interventions to include the necessary governance interventions in line with the Six Pillar policy framework of the Federal Government of Somalia. In this respect, the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security should coordinate their efforts accordingly.

66. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the joint SNSF-AMISOM operations, the AU should request the UN Security Council to:

a. Suspend those provisions of the arms embargo on Somalia that will enable the Federal Government of Somalia to re-equip and re-supply with the required category of arms, and;
b. To authorize the provision of logistical support, from assessed contributions, to the SNSF by UNSOA.

Annexures

A. List of Stakeholders Consulted
B. Proposed Structure for the enhancement of AMISOM
C. Proposed Structure of a Joint AU-UN Mission
D. Assessment of AMISOM and Findings
E. List of Reference Documents
LIST OF CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS

1. Somalia
2. AMISOM troop and police contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda)
3. Australia
4. China
5. Czech Republic
6. Denmark
7. Egypt
8. Ethiopia
9. France
10. Germany
11. India
12. Italy
13. Japan
14. Netherlands
15. Russia
16. Spain
17. Sweden
18. Turkey
19. United Arab emirates
20. United Kingdom
21. United States
22. European Union (EU)
23. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
24. UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU)
25. UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)
26. UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)
PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF AMISOM

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA

AUPSC

AU COMMISSION

AU SRCC

AU PSO

COORDINATING MECHANISM

MISSION SUPPORT

UNSC

UN SECRETARIAT

UN SRSRG

UNCT

UN PEACE BUILDING OFFICE

CIVILIAN

MILITARY

POLICE

ADMIN

FINANCE
ASSESSMENT OF AMISOM AND FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

1. As part of the strategic review, reports were received from the three components of the mission. These reports covered operations, challenges and recommendations for the way forward. These detailed reports were presented by representatives of each component, discussed and issues relevant to the strategic review the drawn out. In addition, representatives from all relevant AU departments were engaged to draw their views on the mission and assess the extent of their involvement, consultations were held to seek the views of AMISOM police/troop contributing countries (P/TCCs) as well as bilateral and multilateral partners regarding AMISOMs performance to date, including failures, constraints and challenges perceived, recommendations and any other information relevant for the review. The following is a summary of the outcome of this process.

AMISOM Civilian Component

2. The AMISOM civilian component of AMISOM includes political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information and mission analysis. Overall administrative control is provided by the Mission Management, supported by the office of the CAO. Most of the civilian staff performed their duties remotely from Nairobi until the security situation improved and they were deployed in Mogadishu in 2009. The political affairs and other civilian sections of AMISOM contributed significantly to the successful completion of the transitional period. In addition to supporting the peace process, the political affairs section has undertaken capacity building programmes for the government including the training of civil servants, facilitating their on-the-job mentoring in other AU member states, and improved office accommodation for the government.

3. Since the deployment of a civil affairs capacity, the mission has contributed in the reinvigoration of local governance institutions, especially in Mogadishu. AMISOM’s mandate includes the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and the mission has contributed to enhanced coordination with humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the FGS. In addition, AMISOM has, through its Humanitarian Affairs section and the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) branch of the Force (as a last resort) provided access to free medical care, free potable water supply and, in some instances, basic food items to civilians.

4. In the area of gender, AMISOM is working with the FGS and its partners to mobilise resources for programmes and projects so as to ensure the promotion of the role of women in the peace process, the promotion of women’s rights, and enhancement of the protection of civilians against all forms of sexual and gender-based violence.
5. AMISOM has made deliberate efforts to guarantee the safety and security of its personnel and property. The AMISOM mandate has inherent risks, especially for its unarmed personnel. These risks emanate from exposure to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombing, mortar fires, sniper fire and targeted assassinations. In mitigating these risks, the requisite resources including policy guidance, qualified personnel, equipment and training have to be availed to the mission.

6. Unfortunately, AMISOM lacks a fully functional multi-dimensional headquarters. This shortcoming has negatively affected the ability of the mission to ensure full complementarity and coherence of efforts in the implementation of its mandate. The structure and capacity of the civilian component needs to be addressed, including; (a) activation of the Senior Leadership Team and related mission coordination structures, (b) increased staffing to enable civilian support for the military consolidation and stabilisation efforts in areas recovered from Al Shabaab, addressing governance, reconciliation and socio-economic recovery at local community level.

7. With regards to conduct and discipline, there is a need to formulate policy guidelines, and procedures for dealing with alleged misconduct. In addition AMISOM HQ needs staff specifically dedicated to advising mission leadership regarding conduct, investigating and dealing with alleged cases of misconduct such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), fraud, abuse of authority, theft and sexual harassment, to mitigate the natural tendency of P/TCCs to avoid embarrassment.

AMISOM Police

8. The AMISOM Police Component currently consists of 2 Formed Police Units and 76 police officers, including a leadership team of 6 officers. The police component supports the Somalia Police Force (SPF) by contributing to the enhancement of its operational, training, administrative and management capacity; and assisting with re-equipping and rehabilitating its infrastructure in accordance with the police-related tasks in the National Security and Stabilisation plan (NSSP). The police component also assists with the maintenance of public order and the protection of civilians, especially vulnerable groups. The police component requires more personnel and enhanced logistical resources. Four FPUs should be deployed in Mogadishu, 2 FPUs in Kismayo, and 1 FPU each deployed in Baidoa and Belet Weyne respectively. In addition 540 individual police officers are needed to support capacity building programmes through training, mentoring and providing advisory services to SPF across the country. In terms of logistical support, office and residential accommodation for police officers are required in all the sectors and team sites are critical. They also require appropriate transport and communication.

9. The strength of SPF currently stands at about 6,000 personnel. A significant portion of this figure comprises officers with long service, many of whom are overdue for retirement. The SPF would need to recruit train and equip 1,000 new officers a year over the next four years, to
achieve the NSSP target of 10,000 personnel by 2016. Specialised training courses for new officers, as well as refresher courses for existing officers can be conducted at the existing police training facilities, but they need to be rehabilitated, equipped and staffed. AMISOM’s police trainers should co-locate with the SPF to provide planning and delivery of short, medium and long term training at all levels and in all aspects of the police profession. Again, in relation to SPF capacity-building, there is urgent need for extensive infrastructure rehabilitation and equipment, as well as sustainable logistic support.

**AMISOM Military**

10. AMISOM’s military component has had considerable operational success in including the following:

a. Al Shabaab has been degraded and made to revert from the ‘open offensive’ phase of insurgency to the ‘guerrilla’ phase;

b. The provision of a secure and stable environment to enable the political process to progress unhindered;

c. The continuous reorganising, restructuring and training of the Somali National Forces in line with the NSSP. As of now, there are two Somali infantry brigades which have been formed and are operational;

d. The protection of key personnel in government, the protection of personnel of international agencies and missions, and protection of facilities;

e. Facilitating within capability, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, by land, sea and air; and

f. Initiation of a program for the management of voluntary disengaged fighters, in coordination with FGS and other agencies.

11. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab is yet to be fully subdued and there is need to demonstrate resolve to eradicating Al Shabaab both physically and psychologically. However, military operations have virtually culminated and AMISOM military component now has overextended lines of communication that commit big numbers of troops for regular picketing of roads to enable movement. Any further expansion operations will lengthen communication lines and make logistical support more difficult to sustain. Furthermore, maritime crime must be curbed and the exploitation of Somalia’s long coastline by AS fully contained. This demands the recovery of remaining key port cities and towns. AMISOM military also requires maritime capability, at least to assist in the development of the Somalia Coast Guard/Marine Police through training and mentoring.
12. The force faces the following additional challenges: (a) AS change of tactics from conventional to asymmetric, which strains the Force as more troops are required in counter insurgency operations (COIN) Ops. (b) Inadequate troops to carry out the expansion and domination of the remaining areas. (c) Lack of dedicated air and maritime assets. (d) Lack of an integral signal communication company to provide communication within the Force. (e) Lack of personnel to man certain logistic support equipment provided, as well as insufficient and unserviceable Infantry Fighting Vehicles-IFVs and other equipment. (f) A small Guard Force with no equipment to carry out its tasks. (g) Overstretched lines of communication due to the requirement for logistic capability to meet the operational tempo. (h) Lack of administrative structures in liberated areas, to support the military gains. (i) Lack of a comprehensive support strategy for the development of SNF to eventually take over security of Somalia. In essence, AMISOM expansion has culminated.

13. Under the circumstances, three options emerge on the way forward for conduct of military operations:

(a) **Force levels remain at 17,731.** Under this option, FGS/AMISOM Forces will consolidate the gains made so far (Status Quo) with no further expansion operations, while continuing to develop SNSF capacity.

(b) **Partial Force Increase.** Under this option, a modest increase in force levels should be factored to man force assets and to recover only identified strategic areas.

(c) **Consolidation and full expansion.** Under this option, additional forces should be availed to expand into the entire AOR.

14. Irrespective of the option adopted, the need for force multipliers remains critical to mission success as these can target Al Shabaab strategic resources/materiel as well as provide air cover to convoys (Force Multipliers), air reconnaissance and logistics support. Attack helicopters can help the force reach areas where AMISOM has little or no presence. 10 attack, 5 utility helicopters and two (2) fixed wing aircrafts are proposed.

15. **Challenges.** Based on the information from the three components, it is clear that AMISOM is faced with the following challenges: (a) Al Shabaab change of tactics from conventional to asymmetric strains the Force as more troops are required in counter insurgency operations. (b) Fledgling Statutory Institutions. Weak administrative structures in liberated areas, to support the military gains. (c) Slow pace of deployment of approved personnel, assets and resources. Insufficient mission enablers and multipliers. (d) Lack of policy directive for implementation of community support programmes. (e) Lack of a comprehensive programme for the management of Disengaged Fighters that is relevant to Somalia. Unpredictable and unreliable funding. (f) Lack of de-confliction between AMISOM activities with those of other actors in Somalia (particularly AMISOM Civilian component activities). (g) Inadequacies of UN logistical support package in relation to AMISOM peculiarities. (h) The general lack of sustainable funding and support from AMISOM partners as well as the lack of coordination to synergise the support available.
Capacity Building of State Institutions

16. AMISOM End State is tied to the development of the FGS in all sectors from political, military, police, justice and correctional services in line with mission mandate. Following decades of collapsed state in Somalia, FGS capacity in all these sectors remains low.

17. Emphasis should therefore be placed on building the institutional capacity of those key statutory institutions necessary to facilitate justice, rule of law, effective governance especially through public service delivery. This will contribute also to enhanced public confidence in the FGS. Based on the priorities already outlined by the FGS, a detailed capacity building Plan of Action for the civil service should be developed and implemented by the Political Affairs and Civil Affairs units including the training of civil servants, facilitating their on-the-job mentoring in other AU member states, provision of requisite working tools and improved office accommodation.

18. Similarly a clear road-map for SNF growth akin to the recently concluded political End of Transition Roadmap, clearly articulating timelines, and defining benchmarks for progress and success in order to facilitate eventual AMISOM drawdown, is required. This should be negotiated with the FGS Government. There is urgent need for: (a) A fully fledged Joint and integrated EU/AMISOM/SNF Training Mission at Aljazeera Training Centre as well as Mobile Training Teams (MTT) in each Sector. (b) The integration the clan militias at the national level will help gives the SNSF a national outlook. Training facilities within the Sectors may be a challenge. (c) Efforts to identify regional countries with existing facilities that can be used should be explored. (d) A dedicated budget line (possibly under UNSOA, AU or a peace fund) supplemented by on-going interventions by partners and FGS friends, to meet SNF pay, equipment, clothing and medicare. (e) Thorough evaluation criteria to assess the soldier qualities and usefulness of individuals in the forces is necessary.

19. A team of 15 EASF and IGAD Officers involved in SNSF training were rotated out of the mission in 2012. It would be useful for AMISOM to be augmented by a team of similar size to focus on the mentoring of SNSF as well as the formulation and implementation of a road map for the SNSF capacity building. AMISOM Police has a relatively robust training capacity among its ranks. What is remaining for them is their own dependable logistic support and infrastructural and logistical build-up of the SPF alongside their training activity.

Mission Support

20. It is clear that AMISOMs complex mission support architecture, including the UNSOA package and bilateral support to the AU, and bilateral support provided to police and troop contributing countries to AMISOM is inadequate to cater for the operational overheads for AMISOM going forward. Although the UN support package has been very effective in enabling AMISOM to achieve success in its military objectives, the significant challenges of: (a) the support package’s failure to not fully recognised the multi-dimensional nature of AMISOM (it is
not available to the full complement of AMISOM personnel). (b need for alignment of scales and standards being applied in the delivery of the logistical support package are better suited to traditional UN PKO and do not allow for flexibility and timeliness which the operational realities of AMISOM demand. This is particularly affecting the tempo of AMISOM operations and ability to effectively establish presence in the sectors. (c) (e) The support package only covers 9 areas of logistic support. It therefore excludes key support requirements notably reimbursements for troop allowances and support of QIPs. (f) Unlike other bilateral and multilateral support to AMISOM, the UN support package excludes the transfer of funds to the AU despite the AMISOM having demonstrated the required capacity to plan, disburse and account for donor funds.

21. Going forward, it is critical to adjust the UN logistical support package to make it more versatile and responsive to the needs of AMISOM. Broadly speaking, the package needs to be reviewed and implemented taking full cognizance of the multi-dimensional nature of AMISOM; allow for the transfer of funds to the AU to cater for troop allowances, reimbursements for ammunition and other related items as specified in the UN COE Manual; take cognizance of the operational uniqueness of the theatre of operations and therefore allow for flexibility in order to match the operational tempo and needs of AMISOM and, authorize the provision of support to stabilization activities in the recovered areas.

**FUNDING SUPPORT AND PARTNER COORDINATION**

22. AMISOM is financed mainly through the European Union’s Africa Peace Facility (APF) and bilateral financial support from a wide range of partners. Overall, given that all of these financing contributions only govern specified periods, funding for AMISOM remains unpredictable and unreliable. This is even now compounded given the prevailing economic challenges facing the traditional AU partners whose financial support to AMISOM is beginning to reduce, occasioning uncertainties to AMISOM.

23. In order to address this uncertainty, there is need for a strategy for sustainable funding of the AU’s peace support operations. Besides funding from the UN Assessed Contributions, the AU needs to give considerations to other practical modalities including tapping into on-going efforts such as the Obasanjo Panel on Resource Mobilization.

24. Closely related to the issue of funding is the need for a more effective, AU-led, partner coordination especially as it relates to bilateral funding support to the Mission and the police and troop contributing countries. This will enhance transparency and avoid duplication and waste. There is need to co-ordinate the bilateral resources with the actual Mission needs.

**Contributions by the Police/Troop contributing countries**

25. P/TCCs agree that AMISOM is meeting its mandate as the situation in Somalia has improved significantly. They are however concerned about the widespread perception that
Somalia is no longer at war. P/TCCs stressed the fact that that the gains in Somalia are reversible if steps are not taken to consolidate them. Citing a number of operational challenges such as the serviceability of equipment, they emphasized the need to fast-track the deployment of force multipliers and enablers, including air reconnaissance and maritime assets and requesting an increase in troop numbers. In addition, the observations below were made.

26. **Funding and Support.** Funding for AMISOM is unsustainable. Furthermore, the bureaucratic requirements attached to support from some AU Partners place cumbersome administrative burdens on P/TCCs, some of which do not have the capacity to meet these requirements. Also, there is ambiguity regarding partners’ bilateral relationships with AMISOM vis-à-vis their direct bilateral relationships with the P/TCCs emerged. Particularly, the responsibilities and support to be expected directly or through AMISOM and the conditions associated need to be better delineated. Moreover, there is a perception of preferential treatment towards one or the other P/TCC.

27. **Logistics.** Logistical support received from UNSOA is inconsistent and untimely. Moreover, AU has no influence over this logistical support as UNSOA is only accountable to the UN and does not report to the AU. UNSOA support to AMISOM is not clearly delineated from the institution’s support to other UN entities in Somalia, and the scales and standards applied are benchmarked on traditional UN peacekeeping requirements (whereas the intervention in Somalia is peace enforcement and requires much greater support).

28. **DDR and Capacity Building of SNSF.** A comprehensive plan for the demobilisation of disengaged fighters is lacking in Somalia. Moreover, there is need for a comprehensive system to manage recovered arms. Considering that much of the human resource for empowering the SNSF will come through the demobilisation and reintegration process, there is need for well thought out and carefully implemented vetting and training of Somalia Security Forces in order to prevent infiltration by the Al Shabaab.

29. **Specialised Medical Care.** The P/TCCs face serious challenges in relation to specialised medical care for troops injured in combat (particularly for casualties suffering post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and those requiring complex follow-on surgery).

30. **Recommendations.** Based on their observations, P/TCCs proposed; (1) diversification in sources of funding and simplifying of the processes associated, (2) streamlining of partners’ relationships with P/TCCs through an appropriate AU mechanism, (3) A review of UNSOA’s mandate and an MOU with the AU, with the aim of clarifying the full modalities of UNSOA’s support to AMISOM, including adjustment of the scales and standards to meet the demands of peace enforcement in Somalia.
Contributions by the Partners

31. The partners generally agree that AMISOM has done a commendable job in Somalia, especially in recovering Mogadishu, Kismayo, Afgoye and other areas. AMISOM engagement in capacity building of FGS, the growth of AMISOM civilian presence in Mogadishu and the improvement of the humanitarian support facilitation are also recognised.

32. Challenges. AMISOM challenges noted by the partners include; (a) unpredictable funding, (b) inadequate logistic support in new sectors, (c) uncoordinated partner funding and support, (d) lack of transparency on the management of partners’ contributions, (e) inadequacy of the SNSF, (f) inadequate civilian capacity to enhance the implementation of QIPs to augment military progress, (g) inadequate and delayed deployment of approved personnel and resources, and (h) lack of air and maritime capacity.

33. Other Observations and Recommendations. The following observations and recommendations were also made: (a) Partner engagement with AMISOM should not only be viewed from the financial standpoint. I.e, the AU should also note other forms of support to Somalia, such as the EUTM, OP ATALANTA, support to coastal communities and other forms of support to development in the country. Moreover, in addition to the multi-lateral support for the mission, there is significant support is available bi-laterally P/TCCs, Mission HQ, and AU PSOD, particularly to facilitate the transition from offensive operations to stability operations. (In line with this the willingness to fill already identified capability gaps and limitations was expressed); (b) Funds made available for peace support in Africa, e.g. the 140 million Euros currently available under the EU Africa Peace Facility (APF), are not targeted solely at AMISOM; (c) There is need for division of labour among partners within the mission (A recommendation was made to nominate lead nations for sectorial engagement in Somalia. Moreover, the need to delineate the responsibilities of FGS, UN, and AU in implementing the FGS security reform was mentioned); (d) The AU should lead the mission and coordinate partner support; (e) The AU should adopt a two-track approach, dealing with immediate and long-term issues; (f) As the military continues to recover more ground, the AMISOM civilian component should expand in tandem, increasing its presence in liberated areas especially in the political, civil affairs and humanitarian sectors; (g) There is need to improve on the information sharing process. (The need for information regarding AMISOM capacity gaps and the results of its review was of particular interest); (h) There is need to improve logistics and training support to AMISOM; (i) There is a need for sustainable funding for SNSF capacity-building.

CONCLUSION

34. The interactions with AMISOMs partners and the Police and troop contributing countries added value to the review process, giving fresh expression to observations already made by the review team and drawing attention to areas of particular interest to them. Issues with coordination of partner activity and support, the need for division of labour and AU leadership in partner coordination, the inadequacy of the mission’s logistics setup, the urgent
need for FGS institutional capacity building (and in line with this, the expansion of the civilian AMISOM civilian component as well as the need for a military training capacity), and the untimely mobilisation and deployment of personnel were repeatedly brought up and must be addressed. Partners’ concerns relating to how the AU views support packages offered, constraints and the conditions associated should also be borne in mind. This will enrich the outcome of the AMISOM strategic review and eventually lead to a more effective intervention in Somalia.
ANNEX E TO
AMISOM STRATEGIC REVIEW
DATED 16 JANUARY 2013

LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

8. Communiqué of the 245th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (15 October 2010)
10. Somalia National Security and Stabilisation Plan (2011)
13. Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for AMISOM (2012)
15. Progress Reports of the Chairperson on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012)