Looking at the African landscape in 2013, the Golden Jubilee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU), two conflicting trends emerge. On the one hand, hopes of a revitalised democratic momentum for the African continent were rekindled by the so-called Arab spring, while narratives of groundbreaking economic growth and development abound, fuelled by recent technological advances that make viable the exploration of key strategic natural resources such as natural gas, oil and coal. From the Sahel to the south-eastern tip of the continent, from the shores of the Gulf of Guinea to the Great Lakes region, the economic growth fuelled by the exploration of these resources dominates the headlines, pronouncing this second decade of the new millennium as Africa’s.

And yet, with equal strength, violent conflict continues to plague many parts of our continent requiring from all concerned, and especially from the African Union (AU), constant vigilance and effective response for which the organisation, now in its tenth year, is better equipped than ever before to provide. Indeed, in the last decade, the far-reaching changes in the norms and institutions governing Africa’s inter-state relations have prompted a significant empowerment of the continental organisation particularly, but not exclusively, in the area of peace and security. With the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union during the years 1999 to 2002, Member States resolved to develop further the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (which was established in 1993) and implement and operationalize an ambitious, complex yet much needed African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This architecture rests on five pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) – the focus of this volume. The CEWS plays a vital role in this architecture tasked with providing the Chairperson of the AU Commission with information and analysis so that it can advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.

Operationalizing the CEWS has been, and still is, a challenge – first and foremost in terms of the technical requirements and institutional processes arising from the legal and normative texts guiding the transformation of the continental organization, in particular the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 10 July 2000 which was adopted at the 36th ordinary summit of the OAU held in Togo, Lomé. At the core of the new continental vision is the active promotion of peace, security and stability, understood as prerequisites for sustainable development. When the Assembly of the African Union held its inaugural meeting in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was adopted, elaborating the mandate and functions of the CEWS as an integral pillar of APSA. Established “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (PSC Protocol, § 12[1]), the CEWS was envisaged to consist of “an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as ‘The Situation Room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room” (PSC Protocol, § 12[2]).
The PSC Protocol furthermore laid the foundation for an emerging division of labour between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in the area of early warning and conflict prevention by stating that the Union “has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa”, that the “Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union … “, and that the AUC Chairperson shall “harmonize and coordinate” the activities of the RECs “to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union”. The “modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances” (PSC Protocol, §16 [1]). Finally, apart from the RECs/ RMs, the PSC Protocol also named the other partners with which CEWS was meant to coordinate, including the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights as well as civil society organisations.

Given the challenges arising from these terms of reference, significant progress has been made in the design and operationalization of CEWS, including policy coordination and harmonization of early warning systems in Africa through the African Union. This progress was emphasised in the 2010 assessment study of the APSA, which argued that the APSA at the African Union and the RECs/ RMs had achieved a certain level of operational readiness.

It is necessary to recap the most significant milestones in the design and implementation of CEWS to date. Starting on 30 to 31 October 2003 with a first experts’ workshop on the design of CEWS, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a Roadmap for the Implementation of CEWS was developed in 2005. Based on a consultative workshop with RECs and international partners, held from 27 to 29 July 2005, and against the background of a request by the PSC to hasten implementation of CEWS, it issued at its 57th meeting held on 21 June 2006, the principal design of CEWS, including the “Indicators’ Module”, was adopted at a meeting of governmental experts of Member States, held on 17 to 19 December 2006 at Kempton Park, South Africa. The Union’s Executive Council, at its 10th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, endorsed this decision on 26 January 2007 (EX. CL. / Dec. 330 [X]). Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa was signed in January 2008. In the “Progress Report of the Chairperson of the AUC on the Implementation of the Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace and on the Tripoli Plan of Action”, presented at the 250th PSC meeting held in Tripoli, Libya, on 30 November 2010, the Chairperson summarised that by than “most of the technical requirements having been put in place, emphasis is now on the recruitment of the required human resources to enhance the analytical capability of the Commission.”

The urgent need to operationalize the CEWS fully with regard to the provision of timeous early warning, analysis and policy and response options to AU decision-makers was demonstrated in 2011 during the popular uprisings in North Africa when such information was needed most, but not yet forthcoming. In a report on “Current challenges to peace and security on the continent and the AU’s efforts ‘Enhancing Africa’s Leadership, Promoting African Solutions’, which the than AUC Chairperson presented at an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, held on 25 to 26 May 2011 in Addis Ababa, he observed that “clearly, the AU, like other international players, did not anticipate these developments, and thus attracted criticisms that have not always been justified. The response in this regard should be to speed up the operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, even though there should be no illusions as to the capacity of such a System, whatever its performance, to anticipate such events, which are so difficult to predict. Fundamentally, however, the challenge is to generate the requisite political will so that these issues are frankly debated at the level of the relevant AU organs, and that the countries concerned extend the necessary cooperation to the relevant organs of our Union, as indeed is required of them under the PSC Protocol” (§ 9). The substantial human resources required to conduct analysis and
provide actionable policy recommendations – identified in the *Roadmap* – were finally recruited in 2012, representing a huge step forward to the full operationalization of CEWS.

At present, four challenges remain in the integration of CEWS, namely: (1) full integration of the data collection and monitoring functions on the one hand and the conflict and cooperation analysis functions on the other, (2) horizontal integration of early warning and conflict prevention between the different pillars of APSA and within the AU Commission, (3) vertical mainstreaming of early warning and conflict prevention between the African Union and the RECs/RMs, and (4) finally, harmonisation and collaboration of early warning activities and standards of the different RECs/RMs. The AU Commission is optimistic that most of these challenges will be dealt with successfully by 2015.

In order to share knowledge on the design and functioning of CEWS, the AU Peace and Security Department had published a volume documenting the design and operationalization of the CEWS up to 2008. This expanded second volume retains those key documents and updates African Union partners on more recent developments regarding the operationalization and institutionalisation of this pivotal pillar of the peace and security architecture, from 2008 to 2013. As stated in the Union’s “Strategic Plan 2009-2012” peace and security remains a key strategic objective for the African Union. “Africa seeks to create a conducive environment to enhance the quality of life of its people, a people living free of fear or want. To facilitate achievement of this aspiration, the Commission takes the broad view to peace and security as a multisectoral strategic issue.” At the same time, in her introductory remarks to the 339th PSC meeting held at ministerial level on 24 October 2012 in Addis Ababa, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, reminded us that Africa still has a very mixed peace and security landscape, with remarkable achievements made in Somalia and between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the continued consolidation of peace in a number of countries that have emerged from conflict. Since then, the Central African Republic and South Sudan have been added to the list of countries in conflict.

At the same time, we are faced with complex and worrying developments in northern Mali and the Sahel, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and remaining concerns in Guinea Bissau, in Darfur and other parts of the continent. To address these still existing challenges the African Union has convened a High-Level Retreat on the theme “Silencing Guns in Africa: Building a Roadmap to a Conflict Free Continent”, which was held in Durban (South Africa) on 28–29 April 2014. In the spirit of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2013 by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the High-Level Retreat was held to identify steps towards concretely living up to the commitments of the AU Assembly and silencing guns in Africa by 2020.

It is my firm belief that a fully operational and integrated CEWS will play a most crucial role in our collective pursuit of peace and security on the continent.

Addis Ababa, May 2014
ARTICLE 12

Continental Early Warning System

1 In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established.

2 The Early Warning System shall consist of:
   a an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “The Situation Room”, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and
   b observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

3 The Commission shall also collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System.

4 The Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action.

5 The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System timeously to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol.

6 The Member States shall commit themselves to facilitate early action by the Peace and Security Council and or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information.
7 The Chairperson of the Commission shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.

[...]
8 In order to strengthen coordination and cooperation, the Commission shall establish liaison offices to the Regional Mechanisms. The Regional Mechanisms shall be encouraged to establish liaison offices to the Commission.

9 On the basis of the above provisions, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation shall be concluded between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms.

ARTICLE 17

Relationship with the United Nations and other international Organizations

1 In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.

2 Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions’ activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

3 The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-General, including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and stability in Africa.

4 The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest, if the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities does so require.

ARTICLE 18

Relationship with the Pan African Parliament

1 The Mechanism shall maintain close working relations with the Pan-African Parliament in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

2 The Peace and Security Council shall, whenever so requested by the Pan African Parliament, submit, through the Chairperson of the Commission, reports to the Pan-African Parliament, in order to facilitate the discharge by the latter of its responsibilities relating to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

3 The Chairperson of the Commission shall present to the Pan-African Parliament an annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also take
all steps required to facilitate the exercise by the Pan-African Parliament of its powers, as stipulated in Article 11 (5) of the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, as well as in Article 11 (9) in so far as it relates to the objective of promoting peace, security and stability as spelt out in Article 3 (5) of the said Protocol.

ARTICLE 19

Relationship with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

The Peace and Security Council shall seek close cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in all matters relevant to its objectives and mandate. The Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any information relevant to the objectives and mandate of the Peace and Security Council.

ARTICLE 20

Relations with Civil Society Organizations

The Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.
REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE AU CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

30–31 October 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

SECTION I:

Introduction

1. The decision ASS/AU/Dec. 16 (II) on the Operationalization of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, that met in Maputo, Mozambique from 10–12 July 2003, invited the Commission to, inter alia, take the necessary steps for the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as provided for under Articles 2 and 12 of the Protocol.

2. In pursuance of that decision and within the purview of the overall efforts of the Commission to put in place the basic structures and mechanisms envisaged in the PSC Protocol, the Commission organized a workshop at the Headquarters in Addis Ababa, on 30th and 31st October 2003, bringing together academic and research experts, experts from Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, and from continental and international institutions dealing with different aspects of conflict prevention, management and resolution.¹

3. The purpose of the Workshop was to bring together a select number of experts to assist the Commission in determining a roadmap for the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System envisaged in the PSC Protocol. The main thrust of the Workshop was to brainstorm on the practical modalities and steps that the Commission could take to establish an effective continental early warning system, drawing lessons from existing regional and international experiences on the establishment and functioning of an early warning system.

4. The Workshop was chaired alternately by Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director, Peace and Security Directorate and Ambassador Ki-Doulaye, Head of the Conflict Management Center, a.i. This report is organized into nine sections according to the issues discussed at the Workshop.²

¹ See Annex III: list of participants.*
² See Annexes I & II: The Agenda and Programme of Work, respectively.*

* These documents are not reproduced in this documentation.
SECTION II:

Opening

5. The Workshop was officially opened by Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace and Security. The Commissioner began by expressing the gratitude of the Commission to welcome all the experts to the Headquarters, and particularly to the Workshop. He then situated the Workshop within a historical perspective and the current momentum to establish the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

6. Though recognizing that the prevention of conflicts has preoccupied African leaders for most of the continent’s post-independent history, the Commissioner highlighted the Cairo Declaration adopted in 1993, which provided for the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as constituting the hallmark or the turning point in continental efforts to establish an early warning system. He purported that the establishment of the Mechanism was to provide the OAU with a robust framework for anticipating and preventing conflicts and wars in Africa.

7. Overwhelmed by the number of conflicts on the continent in the 1990s, epitomized by the Rwandan genocide in 1994, new impetus were given to the need to furnish the Mechanism with the capacity to preempt conflict before they erupted. These concerns led to the establishment of the Situation Room within the Conflict Management Center. Increasingly, as the continent grappled with the multifaceted challenges of conflicts, it became clear that the Situation Room was not enough and that there was need for a full early warning system with built-in capacity for early action.

8. He told the participants, that it was against this background, particularly the new emphasis that was given to conflict prevention and the need to provide the continental Organization with a more proactive and robust mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution that the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council was adopted. The Protocol provides for an African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System and cooperation with Regional Mechanisms.

9. The Commissioner informed the experts that significant progress has been made to finalize the basic documents of these institutions but little has been made on the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System. In this light, the Commissioner noted that the Workshop was conceived as part of efforts of the Commission to give effect to the Assembly decision on the Operationalization of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, which urged the Commission to take the necessary steps for the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System.

10. In conclusion, Ambassador Djinnit drew the attention of the experts to the main objectives of the Workshop and the expectations of the Commission. He told the experts that the purpose of the Workshop was to assist the Commission develop a roadmap for the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System. He then invited them, to, among others, in the course of their two-day deliberations, examine existing experiences on early warning, how they are funded, how to reinforce the Situation Room of the CMC, and what practical models of early warning can the AU adopt. He concluded by wishing the experts success in their deliberations.
SECTION III:

General Exchange of Views

A  A Background to the Continental Efforts to Establish an Early Warning System

11. Ambassador Ibok took the floor and thanked the Commissioner for his opening remarks and particularly, for providing a comprehensive overview of the struggle at the continental level to establish an early warning system. The Director complemented the remarks made by the Commissioner by stressing that the Workshop should not be considered as if it were the first step or the ground zero of initiatives, but that the practical experience, particularly efforts undertaken in the past by the OAU should provide the point of departure for the Workshop.

12. In this context, he highlighted some of the initiatives that have been taken in the past by the OAU. Particular reference was made to the Seminar for the Establishment within the OAU, of an Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa, held in Addis Ababa from 15–18 January 1996. That Seminar made a series of recommendations which should be revisited in terms of what was feasible. He also made reference to the meeting of experts held in 1998, to discuss and identify indicators and possible modules that the AU could consider in the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System.

13. Ambassador Ibok also presented some historical reflections on the difficulties encountered to establish a continental early warning system. Among others, he pointed out the followings:

- the barrier of national sovereignty, which often hampered efforts to collect reliable data and information, as well as timely intervention;
- the issue of data ownership, which often created problems on the flexibility of the use and dissemination of data collected;
- the issue of defining early warning modules and their ownership by the OAU;
- lack of adequate technological infrastructure;
- limited financial and human resources;
- lack of political will on the part of Member States.

14. In conclusion, he added that a new dimension has been added to efforts to establish CEWS, which is the link with Regional Mechanisms. In this context, he noted that some RECS have made significant progress to establish EWS in their respective regions. Finally, the Director invited the experts from Regional Mechanisms to share their experiences and recommend a roadmap for the Commission, particularly with regard as to how to establish a better network with Regional Mechanisms. He also urged the experts to reflect on some of the abovementioned roadblocks to efforts to establish a continental early warning system and to propose strategies for overcoming them.

B  The Concept of Early Warning and its Relevance to Conflict Prevention: Theoretical Aspects
(presented by Dr. Doug Bond, Harvard University)

15. In his presentation on the theoretical aspects of the concept of early warning, Dr. Bond cautioned against a generic approach to the concept. He contended that in order for early warning to be effective, it must be premised on a concept that identifies clearly the specific issues that need early warning. In this
context, Dr. Bond recommended the following questions to be addressed before establishing an early warning system:

i) early warning on what? For example war, armed conflict, generalized violence, terrorism, pastoral raids, public protest/demonstrations/riots, state failure and coups d’état.
ii) there should also be clear analysis or diagnosis on the risk propensity of each type of conflict;
iii) what are the benchmarks for normal social, political, economic and cultural activities on which to measure change?
iv) what is the ultimate goal for early warning? The purpose for early warning must be clearly defined. For example, is it to protect individuals or groups, public asset or private asset, or to protect national or collective (inter-state) interest?

16. In setting up an early warning system, Dr. Bond further recommended the following consideration:

- Data ownership, control and access must be well defined. Ideally, data ownership should be in the public domain;
- The mechanism or protocol that should remain in the public domain to enable independent evaluation must be defined;
- What are the technological infrastructure to support operations and ongoing maintenance?
- What are the COTS tools for automated and interactive data development, analysis, visualization, etc?
- What system of backward compatibility will be used;
- The system should be based on manual and auto data entry;
- Coordination among various actors is crucial and should have a hub-spokes relationship;
- Need to align expectations with built-in measures for success and failures. The System should not only rely on success but should also expect failure.

17. With regard to the relevance of the concept of EWS to conflict prevention, Dr. Bond noted that the former serves as capacity building for the latter. He stressed that diagnostic linkages should be established between EWS and prevention, pre-emption and capacity building, management, resolution, peacekeeping, etc.

18. In conclusion the speaker recommended that the AU take an incremental process to establish EWS in the following steps: 1) define what you seek to accomplish, 2) define the scope and time you want to accomplish, 3) start data collection, 4) start analysis and 5) provide recommendations.

C Early Warning: Some Techniques and Other Thoughts (by Henri Boshof, ISS)

19. Mr. Boshof began by defining early warning as the ability to collect and analyze information in the interests of providing strategic options for preventive action or informed response. He observed that the concept of state sovereignty has often impeded efforts to establish vibrant early warning and early response mechanisms. In this context, he further observed that the rhetoric of sovereignty is increasingly losing its significance in our present world, where people have come to the realization that security is a concern transcending borders, and that domestic transgressions may result in threats to regional and even continental security. This new broader concept of security has also necessitated a broader concept of early warning beyond what it consisted in the Cold War years, as national intelligence systems concentrating upon the military threat, potential or actual, posed by other states.
20. Mr. Boshof purported that international organizations such as the AU should take cognizance of this new broader concept of early warning to include anticipation for drought, desertification or global warming or applied analysis of politico-economic developments that may lead to armed conflict or ethnic cleansing or genocide. He argued that information based solely on military intelligence or limited source could be misleading, and that detailed understanding of a situation based on information collected from multiple and credible sources is crucial for early warning.

21. According to the speaker, the rapid collection, analysis and dissemination of reliable information lies at the heart of an effective early warning of threats to human security. He provided four main activities, which he perceives as the essential elements of early warning. These include:

- the collection and verification of information relevant to the mitigation and prevention of violent conflicts;
- the analysis of that information;
- scenario building and optional responses; and
- communication of all the above to decision-makers.

22. The speaker then outlined some conceptual differences between early warning and other related concepts: (see Tables 1 & 2 below)

Table 1: Early Warning and Risk Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Warning</th>
<th>Risk Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anticipates possible outcomes</td>
<td>Predicts probabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Static</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context-sensitive</td>
<td>Generizable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly qualitative analysis</td>
<td>Mostly quantitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on particulars</td>
<td>Focuses on general indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traces narrative patterns</td>
<td>Analyses comparative patterns and trends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Differences between Early Warning and Traditional Intelligence Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Warning</th>
<th>Traditional Intelligence Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depends on the collection and analysis of information, scenario-building and the presentation of recommendations to decision-makers</td>
<td>Depends also on the collection and analysis of information, scenario-building and the presentation of recommendations to decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on human security</td>
<td>Seeks to serve state interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeks to serve the common good</td>
<td>Rely on secrecy, situation rooms and encrypted communications of classified information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>Traditional Intelligence Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on transparent methods and sharing of information</td>
<td>Closed system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency in information and analysis</td>
<td>Centralized and dependent on in-house information and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized and dependent upon other sources of information and analysis</td>
<td>Centralized and dependent on in-house information and analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV:

Practical Experiences

A. Regional Observation and Monitoring Units

23. In the discussion that followed, participants heard briefings from experts from Regional Mechanisms on the different experiences and progress made in the establishment of an early warning system in their respective regions. The following points were noted:

i) ECOWAS

24. ECOWAS has established a system of observation and monitoring in the 16-Member States. The Observation and Monitoring System is divided into four subregions with its Headquarters in Abuja, which operates in the form of hub-spokes relationship. In this context, the four subregions gather information from their focal area (usually through government authorities, locals, public media and other news agencies). Information gathered is communicated on daily basis to the Situation Room in Abuja, where further detailed analysis and recommendations are done and action anticipated. The system relies on the credibility of information as well as openness in information collection, analysis and dissemination. The main problem is lack of adequate and sensitive technological equipment to enhance and facilitate the process of data collection, processing and dissemination.

ii) SADC

25. SADC has made significant progress toward the establishment of an EWS. Given the history of conflict and insecurity in the region, the SADC region has adopted many security measures including the Treaty of Windhoek and the Mutual Defense Pact, which called for more robust measures to deal with security problems in the region. In was in this context, that the Strategic Plan called for the establishment of an early warning system to boost the capacity of the region for conflict prevention. There was already a strong conviction among many countries of the region that conflict can be responded to diplomatically or politically. This provided a good basis for the establishment of an early warning system.

26. The process of putting in place an effective and functioning early warning unit is at its final phase and the next level will be to define the modalities of linking the SADC early warning system to the con-
of the AU Continental Early Warning System

continental system. The main objective of the SADC EWS is to facilitate an early response. Its headquarters shall be in Gaborone, Botswana.

27. The main challenges in the process of establishing the SADC EWS include the need for infrastructural facilities, trained staff, and financial resources or funding. Other challenges include setting benchmarks, building trust and the political will among Member States. The concept of the SADC EWS is based on linkages with national early warning units as well as networking with the civil society organizations and other regional and international early warning systems.

iii) ECCAS

28. ECCAS is in process of establishing an EWS as envisaged in the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the Central African region (COPAX) adopted in 1999. The main challenges at the moment include, identifying the institutional design, funding, and infrastructural needs.

iv) IGAD

29. IGAD has established an early warning unit (CEWARN) with its Headquarters in Addis Ababa. He further informed the experts that CEWARN was conceived as a mechanism that will enable the IGAD countries to systematically anticipate and respond to various conflicts in the region. CEWARN is built on the existing interstate mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as the famine early warning system. that Many questions had to be answered in the initial process of establishing the CEWARN:

30. Given the experience of IGAD countries, cross-border pastoral conflicts were given priority for CEWARN. (see Table 3 below on the concept of CEWARN)

Table 3: The Concept of CEWARN

| CEWARN | Conceived as a mechanism for systematic anticipation and response to conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Some initial questions of concept included:
| Focus of CEWARN | Monitoring and anticipation of pastoral cross-border conflicts, particularly livestock rustling and the circulation of small arms.
| Institutional basis | IGAD provides the institutional basis at the regional level for early warning and early response. Main legal basis are:

- the Khartoum Declaration of November 2000;
- The Protocol Establishing the CEWARN.
How CEWARN Functions

- Functions at three main levels:
  - Subregional (within the IGAD region and through cooperation with other subregional organizations such as COMESA)
  - National (through CEWERUs or linkages with state mechanisms for early warning)
  - Regional (through the establishment of cooperation with AU and UN mechanisms for early warning)
  - Also emphasizes the need to work with civil society at different levels

CEWARN Model

- An open model involving actors other than states in data collection and analysis

Data Collection

- IGAD has identified local sources on the ground in each country, who are paid $100 for providing useful and current information. Other sources include the public domain of information.

CEWARN Funding

- CEWARN is funded by GTZ

B International Experiences

i) Experience of the United Nations (Dr. Kanninen Tapio)

31. In his presentation, Dr. Tapio began by examining the first phase of establishing an early warning system within the United Nations between 1988 and 1992. He described the first phase as a centralized system of Early Warning, that was characterized by the establishment of an Office for Research and Data Collection, and the publication of an Agenda for Peace by the then UN Secretary-General. He noted that the publication of the Agenda for Peace provided guidance on what should be the focus of the UN Early Warning System.

32. The Speaker described the second phase that began in 1998 as a period of comprehensive efforts towards the establishment of the UN Early Warning System. This phase was characterized by the establishment of a Policy Planning Unit within the Department of Political Affairs, the creation of a Conflict Prevention Team.

33. In conclusion, Dr. Tapio alluded to the General Assembly resolution 337 on Conflict Prevention, which provided the mandate for the development of a project on Early warning, as a turning point in efforts, particularly in the demonstration of political will by Member States on the need for the establishment of an Early warning System within the United Nations. He noted that information collected by the UN is conceived as privileged information, which makes the UN reluctant to share such information with other organizations.

ii) Experience of the European Union (by Mr. Javier Nino Perez)

34. At the outset of his presentation, Mr. Perez noted that the concept of early warning is still new to the European Union. He then delved into the practical experience of the concept by the EU. In this context, he informed the experts that the EU Early Warning System consists of a watch list or what is called the...
“Check List”, which monitors situations and developments in a number of countries. The list is managed by a desk officer, who follow-ups on the list by consulting intelligence officers in those countries.

35. The Check List features analysis of risk factors for different kinds of conflicts. The list is adopted and approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to intelligent officers to monitor the countries featured in the list. He also referred to the Crisis Room as an important component of the EU Early Warning System. The Crisis Room helps in data collection and analysis and keeps developments in different countries. It also helps to take action on early warning signals.

36. In conclusion, the speaker also pointed out some of the challenges confronting the EU Early Warning System or the Check List. He pointed out that one of the major challenges of the List is that it contains 96 countries, which poses major difficulties to meet the specific interests of different countries and the general interest of the EU.

iii) Experience of FAST (by Ms. Hannelore Wallner)

37. Ms. Wallner began with a brief historical review of FAST. She informed the experts that the Swisspeace foundation, in 1998, launched a political early warning project called FAST, funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. FAST conducts analysis of tension and fact-finding. Its main focus is to warn on flow of arms and armed conflicts. In this context, it conducts monitoring operations in countries in Africa and Europe.

38. Ms. Wallner also explained that FAST uses a combined methodology for data collection. The predominant source or method of data collection is through the use of local folks to collect information from the sources based on standardized criteria. Another source of information comes from the public domain or news agencies. Information collected is analyzed and coded (usually handcoding) based on 56 indicators. She pointed out that the end user of the analysis and recommendations is the Swiss Development Project.

39. With regard to the focus of FAST, the speaker noted that, FAST risk assessments, called “Updates,” is to anticipate armed conflicts, which often result in humanitarian disasters and genocide.

40. In conclusion she drew attention to the fact that the FAST model is adaptive and can easily be transformed or modified to meet different focuses. (see Table 4 below on the concept of FAST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: FAST Concept of Early Warning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAST</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Developed in 1998</strong></td>
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### Four vital issues for Early Warning

For any Early Warning mechanism it is essential to have a clear definition of the following:

1. **Focus** – what do we want to warn of? (What kind of conflicts are we looking at, where is the threshold)
2. **End-user of Products** – what are their needs?
3. **Timeframe** (intervals of releasing analysis/products/alerts and how to communicate these to decision makers)
4. **Establishing links to decision makers in order to engage in early action** (conflict prevention)

### Early Warning Components

Linked to the above we can establish four components that any Early Warning system is composed of:

- Information collection,
- Analysis thereof,
- Scenario building (recommendations and alerts), and
- Link to decision makers

### Special Characteristics of FAST

Combined methodology plus quantitative analysis which complement each other and are merged in our products—the quarterly risk assessment called FAST Update:

- Each FAST Update is a collection of app. 5 indicators (graphs depicting a trend, e.g., country stability or relative forceful actions) with a qualitative analysis that incorporates the quantitative data-set.

### Qualitative Analysis

FAST works with a network of experts, adding to the in-house knowledge of the FAST desk-officers; it is essential to draw from expert knowledge for every country analysis needs to be based on the special context of a given country.

### Quantitative / Events data analysis

We work with so-called Local information Networks (LINs) which are tasked with the collection of information:

- LINs consist of local staff (number of people involved depends on the size of the country as well as means of communication);
- Collect only open source information;
- Information is based on what is called "events data," meaning every day incidents that can either be conflictive or cooperative;
- The LIN of one country collects an average of 30 events weekly which are saved in our data base – thus our data-base is always up-to-date;
- Certain indicators can then be displayed in our graphs – e.g., along the distinction of actors (government/civil sector); or on the basis of Goldstein indicators that e.g., display the development of domestic or international conflict vs. cooperation.

### Crucial for Information Networks

Sources of Information must be:

- Transparent,
- Credible,
- Verifiable,
- Be aware of limitations – no one is completely objective!
FAST applies standardized coding criteria which enable us to draw from a comprehensive and comparable set of data; essential for the data collection and the quality thereof is:
- Completeness of information
- Balance of topics (cooperation/conflict)
- Frequency and consistency (amount of information over a period of time)
- Coding quality
- Up-to-dateness

| Local Information Networks | National staff collects information
|                           | Information independent from western newswires
|                           | Constant flow of information
|                           | High quality of information (salience of information)
|                           | Hand coding (quality control by FAST desk officers)
|                           | Reliability of information
|                           | Covering the whole country (as opposed to information from western newswires coming mainly from capitals)

| Unique Database | Only hand-coded information – in correlation with that standardized coding criteria;
|                | Hand-coding also allows FAST to track specific topics – which makes this kind of data collection very versatile

| Advantage of Hand Coding | No media hypes
|                         | Standardized coding criteria (initiator, recipient, plus information on location, data, damage, injuries, etc.)
|                         | Selection of salient events – balance of information collected (FAST is interested in cooperative as well as conflictual events)
|                         | Minimal error rate in coding (quality control)
|                         | Consistent frequency

| Versatile method/tool for Information Collection | The system FAST is using can be modified and adjusted to special needs of the clients – like is has been done with CEWARN

| Challenges in EW | Data collection in this form is difficult, esp. in the region we are working in frequent communication problems, also security concerns for staff;
|                 | The link to policy makers needs to be improved – link to early action (compare CEWARN approach)
|                 | Promoting the “political will” remains critical, esp. for an EW system run by the AU

| Improvements FAST is Working on | Constant, ongoing improvement in terms of:
|                                | Development of new indicators (incorporating gender, health, migration, development/humanitarian issues, etc.) FAST is at present working on indicator development which will be especially customized to the needs of FAST’s EW focus
|                                | Forecasting – FAST is currently engaged in developing a model for forecasting (quantitative forecasting).
iv. Experience of OSCE (By Mr. Timothy Isles, Head, Operations Planning Unit)

41. Mr. Isles began with an examination of the historical evolution of security concerns, particularly the issues of arms control and disarmament, human rights, election monitoring, economic and environmental conflicts, border control and monitoring as well as intrastate and interstate conflict within the 55 member States of the OSCE, which culminated in the adoption of the Helsinki Act in 1975 and the adoption of the Istanbul Charter for European Security in 1999. He noted that the OSCE took a comprehensive approach to security, which emphasizes the human dimension, politico-military aspects as well as the economic and environmental aspects.

42. With regard to early warning, the speaker underscored that the OSCE concept of early warning was an offspring of growing concerns and emphasis on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, which is enforced through OSCE field missions and activities in conflict zones. The speaker further observed that the OSCE is most effective in the early stages of crisis and flexibility in terms of response, is the main strength of the OSCE Early Warning System. (see Table 5 below)

Table 5: The OSCE Concept of Early Warning

| Early Warning | Defined as the act of alerting a competent authority about the threat of a new, or renewed, conflict sufficiently in advance for preventive action to be attempted |
| Early Warning System | Consists of:  
  - information gathering,  
  - processing and analysis, and  
  - translation and signaling |
| Early Warning Tools | Consist of six categories of tool:  
  - Field Missions,  
  - Delegations  
  - Institutions: Parliamentary Assembly, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Representative on Freedom of the Media, Office  
  - Personal Representative of the Chairperson in Office,  
  - Analysts / Researchers,  
  - Situation / Communication Room for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. |
| Situation / Communication Room | Functions 7 days / 24 hour,  
  - monitors news outlets / subscribes to many,  
  - produces daily news briefs for selected departments within the OSCE,  
  - uses search engines on the internet to look for relevant news in the OSCE region, and  
  - provides articles for Mission Programme Officers and the Analyst / Researcher. |
SECTION V:

EARLY WARNING MODULES
(Presented by Dr. Doug Bond)

i) System Design Guidelines

43. This proposal is anchored around Article 12 of the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The system shall:

1. Facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts;
2a. Support a Situation Room, responsible for data collection and analysis based on an EW “module;”
2b. Provide a direct linkage of regional mechanisms to the Situation Room and “process” their data and transmit it to the Situation Room;
3. Collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs;
4. Be based on political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators;
5. Provide the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC with information to assist them in taking action on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa.

44. By any interpretation the mandate outlined in Article 12 is quite ambitious, and user acceptance and training considerations would rule out an all-at-once, full-scale deployment under any condition. Thus, a fully extensible modular system that has the capacity to address the full set of mandates outlined above, while it supports incremental deployment, would seem to be recommended. Modularity and extensibility, therefore, are primary criteria for the proposed system design.

45. A second set of primary considerations that guide the present proposal is the recognition of the relative lack of infrastructure within the mandated area in general, but in particular among the designated user nodes or constituency (participating users) of the system beyond the African Union (AU), that is, “the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs.”

46. The present system proposal therefore is based on Internet or web channels of access for the users, as this approach requires a minimum infrastructural requirement on remote users. It is also recognized that a sole reliance on web access for remote users would not work at times, so simple, paper-based commu-
nications are also provided for in the proposed system, primarily via fax and manual processing of field reports to be done at the AU Situation Room.

47. A third set of considerations, and perhaps the most important in terms of the ultimate utility of the system deals with the willingness of intended users to participate. Some, but not all, parts of the system require the active participation of remote users, who will act as “eyes and ears” or remote observers and analysts on the ground around the region. The presently proposed system seeks to provide an incentive to all users to participate by leveraging their efforts with a return of relevant information and analyses well beyond that which they submitted. In addition, the system is designed to offer technical support for remote users information needs, directly from the Situation Room, to promote and encourage an active ongoing dialogue between the AU and its constituency.

48. A fourth set of considerations involves transparency of the system. The proposed system offers 100% transparency and user specifiability with respect to all parameters in the situation and incident reporting modules. In addition, the peer reviewed IDEA event framework (see www.vranet.com/IDEA proposed for use in the automated monitoring of news reports remains in the public domain. In this way, the operation of the system’s approach and methods can be independently tested and its results (to the extent that the data are published) verified.

ii) Proposed Modules:

■ Module One: An automated news “clipping” service

49. Similar to the “Early Bird” news clipping service, this proposed module is comprised of an automated daily search of the Internet for any and all open source news reports on each of the countries within the AU. This system would also support the automated archiving, indexing and distribution of these news reports, as well as their interactive search and retrieval.

50. The distribution system in this module would allow the specification of multiple lists of staff members within the AU, and users within its member states, the regional mechanisms, and others as deemed desirable. This automated system would allow remote (from anywhere on the web for authorized users) customized, interactive search and retrieval of both current news as well as the archives.

51. With respect to the proposed archives, certain intellectual property and copyright issues exist that need to be addressed before finalizing the design. It is also understood that a vendor (News Edge) is already providing some of these services for news retrieval; however, it does not appear that the service is utilized in a way that offers a maximum contribution to the overall mandate. We suggest, therefore, that a thorough assessment of the current contract be conducted, with an eye for either better utilization and integration into the larger mandate outlined in Article 12, or a replacement of the service with a module that does offer the same.

52. We also suggest that it is most important to recognize that most users, especially remote users, benefit from some technical assistance and support to customize their searches and help refine their individual profile used to guide the distribution of the daily news reports that were automatically “clipped.” Since the automated service is functionally equivalent to the current service currently provided by the Situation room staff, the proposed system would free the staff to help the users with tailoring their searches.
Module Two: An automated news “Early Warning” (EW) system

53. Module One addresses the first part of the mandate, to “collect” information, but does not address the “analysis” of the same. The presently proposed EW module monitors, analyzes and visualizes one or more international news service feeds.

54. A weekly update service is proposed for the initial deployment, using Reuters World Service and possibly Agence France Presse. As with Module One, all AU countries could be covered, and optionally, others could be added as well. Another option would be to add additional news agency feeds could be added as well, such as the Associated Press or the BBC.

55. This module also provides an interactive statistical analysis module that would “push” weekly updates and alters on selected indicators. The analysis provides a baseline measure of events reported in the news from which subtle inflections and anomalies in their incidence are visualized. In other words, the subtle inflections in the baseline of reported activities can be flagged prior to their escalation into a volatile situation and possible violence.

Module Three: An automated information exchange system service

56. This module is designed to support the exchange of unstructured information between the AU Situation Room and its remote constituency. This module would support automated archiving, indexing, distribution, search and retrieval of field reports (and any other text-based information) submitted. And like the automated news alert service in Module One, the distribution system would allow the specification of multiple lists of staff members within the AU, and the remote users and constituency as deemed desirable. In other words, this automated service is functionally equivalent to the “collection and processing” of information from the regional mechanisms as indicated in Article 12.

57. The deployment of this module, in particular, would require the cooperation of these remote users for the submission of their reports. The value provided by the AU to these remote locations would lie in the web-based automated archival, indexing, search and retrieval service provided to them with virtually no infrastructural burden. In addition, a remote user submitting to the AU Situation Room could be provided with an immediate contextualized assessment of the submission as well as those of its immediate surrounds.

Module Four: An automated Situation Reporting and Incident Management system

58. An enhanced version of Module Three would include the development of a common framework of indicators and incident parameters to be used as the core of a web-based Situation and Incident reporting procedure that would operate between field offices of the remote users and the AU Situation Room.

59. Such an interactive web-based system would support the exchange of common and comparable data systematically collect and analyzed in real-time with minimal infrastructural requirements and costs. This part of the system is the only part that needs to be customized. One (of several) operational example for this system is the CEWARN system, though its contents would be tailored to AU’s broader use and mandate for monitoring conflict in general as opposed to a particular type of conflict (pastoral conflict in the case of IGAD-CEWARN).
SECTION VI:

The Situation Room

60. Ambassador Ki-Doulaye gave a brief overview of the Situation Room of the Conflict Management Center. He pointed out that after the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution in 1993, with the Central Organ as its main decision-making body, there grew an increasing need to understand African conflicts better, in order to prevent them. It was commonsensical at that time that a thorough understanding of African conflicts required timely and reliable information and analysis, providing the decision-makers with actionable options. These growing concerns provided the impetus for convening, in 1998, of the meeting of experts to identify the political, economic, social, and military indicators, which could be considered to qualify a conflict.

61. The Acting Head of the CMC informed the experts that it was following the outcome of that meeting in 1998, that the Situation Room was established, to serve as an initial step to the establishment within the CMC of a full continental early warning unit, which would strengthen the capacity of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Situation Room is now serving as the center for the collection, processing and dissemination of data and information on crisis situations around the continent.

62. Ambassador Ki-Doulaye told the experts that with only 6 Situation Room Assistant, the Situation Room now has the capacity to function on 7-day/24-hour/week.

63. In addition, Ms. Coleman (Head of the Early Warning Unit), underscored the fact that the Situation Room is aiming at establishing focal points and linkages with Regional Mechanisms, and that, currently, it has established its own formal and informal networks with civil society organizations, academic and research institutions, the United Nations and other international organizations. She further explained that the Situation Room monitors developments in all 53 African countries, though much attention is given to zones of conflicts, post-conflicts and potential conflicts.

64. With regard to the methodology of collecting and processing data and information, Ms. Coleman noted that the main source of information comes from the public domain in hard and soft prints, including newspaper both private and public, satellite TV channels, electronic news sites, and from informal sources on the ground. She explained that the information gathered is processed and compiled in the form of “News Briefs,” which is forwarded to the authorities three times a day and are posted and circulated through the intranet for all staff of the Organization.

65. In conclusion, she pointed out some of the challenges facing the Situation Room and the Early Warning Unit as a whole. In terms of human resources, she drew attention to the fact that there are only two professional staff in the Early Warning Unit, which poses a serious challenge to meet the demands and workload of the Unit. She added that with only 6 assistants, it has been an extra challenge for the Situation Room to function as expected and that many of the staff and assistants are stretched to the limit to perform the vital tasks of the Unit. She also mentioned the need for technical equipment including enough computers for the staff and the software tool to facilitate data collection, processing and analysis.

66. With regard as to how to enhance the capacity of the Situation Room, the following recommendations were made:
of the AU Continental Early Warning System

- It was stressed that the Situation Room was the mitochondrion of the Early Warning Unit and that it was vital for the success of the latter,
- That the AU Situation Room should be linked to all the Regional Observation and Monitoring Units,
- That early warning should not be divorced from conflict prevention,
- That the tasks and assignments of early warning experts should be well defined, clear and precise,
- The need to separate the collection of data from analysis,
- Need to equip the Situation Room with adequate technological resources to enable access to available information,
- The Situation Room should have up-to-date facilities for communication and outreach,
- It should be staffed with trained experts,
- The need to develop and strengthen networks with other institutions and civil society,
- The main source of information should be in the public domain and should be credible and reliable,
- The system should have in-built chances to function even when power is not available,
- Regularly upgrade the Situation Room so that it has the capabilities to support the teams’ activities.

SECTION VII:

Early Warning / Early Action

67. Ambassador Ki-Doulaye opened the discussion on this subject with an overview of the experience of the AU. He began by examining the process of early action from the CMC to the Chairperson of the Commission. He stated that the process of early begins with analysis containing recommendations for actions, either from the Situation Room or from the Desk Officer or Analyst. These analysis and recommendations are submitted to the Head of the CMC. At this level, the Head of the CMC has two options: the first is to forward the report to the Director for Peace and Security, and the second option is to request for more information if there is need. From the Director, the report goes to the Commissioner, who will then define the level of action – either to request the Chairperson to act or perform the action himself depending on the level of action.

68. Ms Coleman added that the reports from the Situation Room are forwarded to the authorities containing recommendations on what possible actions the authorities can take to prevent a crisis. In this respect, she pointed out that the Chairperson of the Commission, for example, can take a number of actions. It could be a simple phone call to one of the actors, dispatch a special envoy / representative to deliver a special message or engage the parties, or designate a fact-finding mission to study a detail picture of the situation on the ground. Another action the Chairperson could take depending on the gravity of the crisis, is to bring the issue to the relevant policy organs of the AU, including the Central Organ, The Permanent Representative Committee, the Executive Council or even the Assembly, to take concrete action. (see Diagram 1 below on levels of Action)

69. She noted that one of the recurrent problems of early action is the issue of sovereignty, which Member States often use to keep the Commission away from their internal affairs.
70. In the discussion that transpired, the experts had a lengthy exchange of views as to whether early warning should be disjointed from conflict prevention. It was noted that, based on the language of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System was meant to enhance the capacity of the AU for conflict prevention. Thus, the CEWS was an integral part of conflict prevention efforts. In this regard, it was stressed that conflict prevention should not be divorced from conflict prevention.

71. Participants also shared the strong view that early warning without an in-built system for early action was meaningless. The following recommendations were made:

- the need to break down early warning activities,
- sources of information should be credible and transparent to eliminate mistrust and hurdles to early action,
- preventive diplomacy should be strengthened,
- early response should be anticipated in the analysis of risk propensity of each type of conflict,
- early action should include political, economic and military measures. In this context, it was stressed that the Situation Room should not only serve the CMC but should serve the whole Organization including the various policy organs.
SECTION VIII:

General Recommendations for a Roadmap for Establishing the AU Continental Early Warning System

72. The following general recommendations were made to guide the Commission in developing a Roadmap for the establishment of the CEWS envisaged in Article 12 of the PSC Protocol:

1. Before setting up an EWS, the AU should decide on the following:
   - clarity on the concept of early warning and the scope of the system it seeks to set up,
   - sources of funding,
   - what is the magnitude of events?
   - what approach/methodology it should take?
   - when it seeks to establish the early warning?
   - who will be involved and how?
   - Who is/are the end user(s)?

2. The establishment of an early warning system should be incremental or gradual in approach and operational language.

3. Focus of Early Warning System should be clearly defined and should begin modestly and build from there if it is successful. In this context, the AU should:
   - start with focusing on the threat of significant armed conflict or loss of life of all types such as coups d’état, wars, political instability, interstate and intrastate conflicts;
   - then expand to other areas for which early warning is needed;

4. Special consideration should be given to the followings:
   - data ownership,
   - infrastructural capability, that is simple and user friendly,
   - use commercial, off-the-shelf and customized tools, and avoid sophisticated high-tech equipment,
   - relevance to conflict prevention with diagnostic linkages between analysis and desired outcomes,
   - data sources must be multi-level, field-based, measurable, verifiable and standard,
   - realistic about the political will of Member States and the analytical capabilities of the EW unit,
   - need for feedbacks from end users,
   - institutional learning and institutional development,
   - need to establish a system of trust,
   - financial implications of data collection.

5. Employ teams that have expertise on countries or situations that combine early warning, conflict prevention, and if necessary, conflict management functions.
6. Identify and acquire early warning software to assist the teams in finding non-obvious future trouble spots.

7. Benchmarks for measurement of political, economic, military and social indicators must be established. A procedure should be set up to define appropriate indicators for different types of conflicts and standardized criteria for data collection must be established.

8. The risk propensity for each identified conflict must be established.

9. A separate unit should deal with data and information analysis. Such a unit should be staffed with experts or desk officers organized on regional basis.

10. Allow for users of early warning software to easily test alternative indicators or combinations of indicators.

11. Continue the use of hard and soft print news sources.

12. The system must be open, transparent and all-inclusive with capacity for collaboration with other systems. In this context, it was stressed that CEWS establish linkages or networks with regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society groups and other informal “on the ground” information sources. The AU should also provide support to those who work with and help the AU.

13. Practical lessons drawn from the experiences of regional mechanisms such as IGAD and ECOWAS and from international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE and other research and professional institutions with early warning units should inform and guide the AU in the establishment of CEWS.

14. When necessary, establish the AU’s own information sources if regional organizations cannot or will not do it.

15. The AU early warning module should be built on models and scenarios, which are flexible and can be modified through experience to improve predictive capacity.

16. The AU should develop its own capacity for training staff.

17. The AU CEWS should be structured in a flexible manner that uses but does not depend only on each of the five regions as a monitoring mechanism in the said region. The importance of RECs was stressed but it was also cautioned that RECs should not be the only actors or network partners with the AU both technically and operationally.

18. In order to render RECs more effective in supporting the AU CEWS, it was emphasized that the AU should create and enhance the capacity of RECs for responding to the special demands of the AU.

19. The AU should assist RECs to undertake programmes for sharing of experiences, best practices, and information.
20. The CEWS should be able to continually update risk assessment of each identified conflict. This update should include a short-term risk, that can assess temporary dynamics and structural conditions. The following were should consist some of the elements for risk assessment:

- get a profile of each country,
- establish the baselines or benchmarks for the political, economic, environmental, military and social conditions,
- then identify the possibility of day-today violence,
- establish clear and concise rules for analysis and action.

21. The AU should undertake on regular basis, field visits to RECs headquarters to encourage cooperation, exchange of information, and to discuss challenges and successes.

22. The need for the AU to establish its own database and information sources.

23. The AU should seek funding from both internal and external sources. Internal sources should include Member States, while external sources should include AU partners and international institutions. Getting national leaders to commit some of their resources to the AU CEWS will help provide the system with credibility required to overcome political inertia.

SECTION IX:

Conclusions And Observations

73. In the course of the two-day Workshop, participants had an interactive and intensive exchange of views on all aspects related to the establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System. In addition to the recommendations made, participants also expressed a number of views and observations, which could further guide the Commission in developing a Roadmap for the establishment of CEWS.

74. Firstly, it was felt that there is considerable variation in the explanations of intrastate and interstate conflicts and that, though much discussion was focused on the former, the latter could have serious implications for early warning narrowly focused on intrastate conflicts.

75. Secondly, there was a strong view among the participants that time is an important factor in thinking about early warning. Time constraints associated with early warning drive a) the policy implications, b) extent of the knowledge of the “causes” of a conflict, and c) prospects that an intervention will be successful. At the core, politicians will not invest in a solution if they think the probability of a successful effort is low. This gravitates toward developing a system with a long time horizon.

76. Thirdly, it was observed that there is an inherent tension between the short-term crisis management approach and the long-term structural approach to early warning. The short-term mechanism will approximate a crisis management system. At this level it will be pretty clear that a conflict is underway, but the ability of outside parties to effectively stop it will be greatly diminished. On the other hand, the long-term structural mechanisms will have a higher chance of success with regard to management, but because the source of the conflict will be less visible it will be less likely that anyone will be able to act. Successful outcomes, however, will be more likely. This gravitates toward setting up an early warning mechanism that focuses both on the long and short-term aspects of conflicts and their prevention.
77. Fourthly, many of the participants were convinced that success is not difficult to determine as it may first appears, and that success in crisis management is easier to observe while success in the long-term efforts is harder but increasingly visible over time. It was suggested that two possible indicators the Commission could consider could include: 1) the rate of indigenous or domestic capital flight and direct foreign investment, and 2) a decline in the number of the incidents of crisis management.

78. Fifthly, it was stressed that how an early warning is funded constitutes an important factor in deciding how and what kind of early warning should be set up. In the long-term, how early warning programmes are funded also determines the level of success.

79. Sixthly, some views were expressed that group dynamics can play an important part of evaluating the information generated by the early warning center, and the inferences that derive from that information. Group thinking, and homogeneity of group makeup can drive the way information is used. The early warning system that is in place should make clear the process for interpreting and acting on the information.

80. In a note of conclusion, Ambassador Sam Ibok expressed the sincere gratitude of the Commission for the quality and depth of the discussion that had taken place in the course of the two-day Workshop. He thanked the participants individually and collectively, and particularly representatives from Regional Mechanisms for their insightful contributions and recommendations to guide the Commission in developing a Roadmap. He closed the Workshop with the hope that the Commission will further follow up with the participants on how to take the process of establishing the AU Continental Early Warning System further.
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONTINENTAL PEACE
AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

57th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, PSC / PR / 3 (LVII), 21 June 2006

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 9th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 25 May 2004, and during which the Council was solemnly launched, the Commission provided an update on the status of establishment of the continental peace and security architecture, which is anchored on the two following pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, on the one hand, and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), on the other. In the statement of commitment to peace and security in Africa issued on the occasion, the Heads of State and Government of the PSC members indicated, inter alia, that “the continental peace and security architecture that we are putting in place needs to be nurtured and strengthened, to enable our Union meet the aspirations of our people for sustainable development. To this end, we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.”

2. At its 7th ordinary session held in Sirte, Libya, from 28 June to 2 July 2005, the Executive Council stressed the need for the effective operationalization of the various components of the continental peace and security architecture, including the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise and the African Standby Force (ASF), as well as the finalization of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), in order to enhance the exchange of information and the coordination of activities between the AU and the RECs.

3. The present report provides an update on the progress made in the establishment of the continental peace and security architecture, and highlights the challenges ahead.

II. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE PSC PROTOCOL

4. The following represents a summary on the operationalization of the PSC Protocol.

(i) Signature and ratification of the PSC Protocol

5. Council will recall that the PSC Protocol entered into force on 26 December 2003, after having been ratified by the required number of Member States, i.e. 27. At the time of finalizing this report, 50 Member States had signed the PSC Protocol, while 41 had ratified it. Three Member States are yet to sign the Protocol; these are Cape Verde, Eritrea and Tunisia. The following Member States have signed the Protocol but have not yet ratified it: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Seychelles and Somalia. More sustained efforts are
required to ensure that those Member States that have not yet done so do the necessary to become parties to the Protocol.

(ii) Election of the PSC Members and activities of the PSC

6. Following the entry into force of the Protocol, the Executive Council, in pursuance of the decision on the operationalization of the PSC Protocol adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, during its session in Maputo, in July 2003, adopted the Rules of Procedure of the Council and, during its 4th ordinary session held in Addis Ababa, in March 2004, elected its first members, as follows: Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa (for three-year term); and Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Togo (for a two-year term).

7. As the mandate of the members of the PSC elected for a term of two years, as noted above, was to expire in March 2006, the Executive Council, at its 7th ordinary session, held in Khartoum from 16 to 21 January 2006, elected the following countries as members of the PSC for a two-year term: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda. Consequently, starting March 2006, the updated alphabetical list of the members of the Council is as follows: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda.

8. Since its establishment, the PSC has held 56 meetings and several briefing sessions during which the various conflict situations raging on the continent were considered. The Council has taken important decisions on a number of conflict situations, including on Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, as well as on other peace and security related issues, such as the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) establishing Africa as a Nuclear-Free-Weapon Zone. The PSC also held a meeting in Addis Ababa with the United Nations Security Council in early June, to discuss various conflict situations on the continent and the cooperation between the two institutions.

9. Furthermore, steps have been taken to establish the PSC Secretariat, with a view to providing the PSC with the required support.

(iii) The Panel of the Wise

10. The PSC Protocol, in its article 11, provides for the establishment of a Panel of the Wise to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. The Panel is to be composed of five (5) highly respected African personalities from various segments of society, who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the Continent.

11. In order to facilitate the operationalization of the Panel, the Commission has prepared a document on the modalities for its functioning. Furthermore, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Protocol, consultations are underway to select members of the Panel on the basis of regional representation. They shall, subsequently, be appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years.
(iv) Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

12. One of the key provisions of the PSC Protocol is the establishment of a full-fledged CEWS, to enhance the conflict prevention mandate of the Council. As provided for in article 12 of the PSC Protocol, the Early Warning System shall consist of:

- an observation and monitoring centre to be known as the “Situation Room” located at the AU Peace and Security Department and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and
- observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, to be linked directly, through appropriate means of communication, to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

13. Prior to the entry into force of the PSC Protocol, the Commission organized a workshop on the establishment of the CEWS, from 30 to 31 October 2003, in Addis Ababa. The workshop made the following recommendations:

a. begin with significant threats of violence and loss of life as the entry point in the AU’s early warning system;

b. build a measurable, verifiable and standard database that is simple, user friendly, based on multi-levelled and field-based sources;

c. develop an analytical capacity and expertise within the AU on early warning, conflict prevention and conflict management; and

d. establish diagnostic linkages between analysis and desired outcomes so as to provide the AU with regular reports on conflict situations.

14. Based on the above recommendations, the Commission organized, from 27 to 29 July 2005, an experts meeting to develop a draft Roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS, a copy of which is herewith attached, for information. The purpose of the Roadmap is to propose an operational, cost-effective CEWS within the obligations stipulated by the PSC Protocol, as well as the associated key steps and requirements necessary for the implementation of the early warning system.

15. The draft Roadmap emphasises that the objective of the CEWS should be the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts. The Roadmap covers, among others, the following areas: a) data collection and development of an indicators module, b) strategic analysis of the data, c) early warning reports and engagement with decision-makers, and d) co-ordination and collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other key stakeholders. The Roadmap contains a tentative timeframe for the implementation and operationalization of CEWS.

16. From 25 to 27 April 2006, the Commission organized a consultative workshop on early warning, which included participants from the RECs, United Nations agencies and other key stakeholders. The workshop made, among others, the following recommendations:

(a) Strategic Analysis:

- develop a systematic framework of analysis;
• define a limited number of easy-to-monitor conflict- or case-specific indicators (through country-specific analyses);
• link indicators to the standards agreed upon in the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), as approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in July 2002;
• focus on both immediate threats to human security and on underlying structural causes of conflict;
• strengthen analytical capacities to re-contextualise and to adjust country-specific analyses;
• enhance capacity building to ensure quality control (tailored trainings for different levels of staff within the Early Warning Unit).

(b) Data collection:
• generate primary data beyond African Union and its Field Mission’s sources, including civil society, universities, and research institutions;
• develop a system of trend-tracking;
• make use of automatic public news clipping systems;
• develop a system of grading sources and reports to diminish information overflow and to increase work efficiency in the Early Warning Unit;
• make more efficient use of IT technology to foster the development of compressed products (briefs, reports, etc.) for end-users;
• rationalize the work of early warning systems focusing on different issues (conflict prevention, food security i.e.) to avoid duplications (especially in the establishment of data-bases).

(c) Comparative Indicators of the AU CEWS and the RECs:
• do not replace efforts already accomplished by the RECs in their conflict early warning initiatives;
• develop a continental framework of information gathering and analysis which is supplementary to the RECs.

(d) Coordination & Collaboration between the AU CEWS and the RECs:
• agree on a division of labor concerning sub-national data with RECs assisting in adding information on AU’s secure website;
• ensure regular and secure exchange of selected early warning briefs and reports;
• hold annual early warning meetings with rotating hosts (RECs), facilitated through AU Commission;
• continue the exchange of personnel with RECs and other early warning systems;
• initiate joint trainings/capacity building for RECs/AUC personnel;
• establish focal points on early warning systems within AUC, every REC and at national level;
• develop a system on how to treat classified information;
• integrate key workshop recommendations into the Memorandum of Understanding between the RECs and the AUC;
• ensure interaction of RECs and African Union with key partners in civil society, UN institutions, universities, research institutions, etc.

(e) Early Warning Reports, Engagement with decision-makers and response options:
• engage information gathering personnel with decision-makers;
• enhance the diversity of information provided to decision-makers: reports, personal briefings, etc;
17. The next steps towards the operationalization of the CEWS will involve a government experts meeting to finalize and adopt the draft Roadmap. Steps will also be taken for the development of the CEWS Indicators Module, which will include the formulation of a systematic framework of tools for data collection and analysis and the ICT infrastructure to support data collection, storage and analysis.

18. Alongside the steps reflected above, efforts are underway to enhance and strengthen the capacity of the Situation Room. This includes the procurement of new equipment and the provision of greater access to online information, to provide timely and up to date information and analysis on issues of relevance to the mandate of the Peace and Security Department. Steps have also been taken to enhance the human resource capacity of the Situation Room, including through training. The Situation Room is currently staffed by eight Situation Room assistants responsible for data collection and dissemination, a coordinator responsible for coordinating the overall activities of the Situation Room and a Communications Clerk responsible for dispatching official communications and building and maintaining a data base of the contact details of relevant organizations and institutions.

(v) African Standby Force (ASF)

19. Article 13 of the PSC Protocol deals with the ASF. In the article, it is stipulated that the ASF shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate time. Article 13 also addresses, among others, issues relating to the mandate, Chair of Command and training of the ASF.

20. In July 2004, the 3rd ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Addis Ababa, adopted the Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Council will recall that the Policy Framework provides for the establishment of the ASF in two phases, up to June 2010. Thereafter, the Commission and the RECs/Regions held a consultative meeting on 22–23 March 2005, during which a Roadmap for the Operationalization of Phase 1 of the ASF was formulated and adopted.

21. The Roadmap identified five areas of policy formulation in the 1st Phase of the development of the ASF, through the convening of workshops. These are: Doctrine, Training and Evaluation, Logistics, Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems (C3IS) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The Roadmap also envisaged a parallel process that included the need for the regions to identify and establish physical infrastructure and staff it with capable military operational planners. The implementation of the ASF Policy Framework has so far concentrated on the military component of the ASF. Initial work has been pursued in policy formulation on Doctrine, SOPs, C3IS Training and Evaluation and Logistics. The workshops were hosted by the designated RECs and Regions between 13 January and 28 April 2006. Significant progress occurred in the following aspects.
22. Regarding the Peace Support Operations Doctrine, a preliminary draft Doctrine was produced and subsequently discussed by representatives of the various regions. Pursuant to this, a pre-workshop meeting was organized from 6 to 10 February 2006 in Windhoek, Namibia, during which a second draft Doctrine was produced. This formed the basis for the Doctrine workshop, hosted in Gaborone, Botswana, from 27 February to 3 March 2006.

23. Regarding Training and Evaluation, a workshop was held in Luanda, Angola, from 7 to 13 March 2006. It reviewed the ASF training policy and the ASF training standards documents. These had been produced at a pre-workshop held between 30 January and 3 February 2006. The workshop also produced substantial drafts on evaluation and validation, centres of excellence, training publications and training costs that had not been fully addressed at the pre-workshop.

24. Furthermore, the first meeting between the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and the African Peace Support Training Centres Association (APSTA), was held in Luanda, on 13 March 2006. Representatives from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the National War College (NWC) of Nigeria, as well as a representative from ECOWAS, were in attendance at the meeting. The meeting was aimed at discussing the modalities for collaboration and cooperation between the AU PSOD and APSTA in training the ASF, sharing of information through the establishment of websites, accreditation of training centres of excellence and evaluation, validation and coordination of ASF training. In terms of the way forward, the KAIPTC has been mandated to conduct a training needs analysis for the ASF and a training costing meeting to be held later this year as a step towards the finalization of the training and evaluation policy end products.

25. With respect to Logistics, a workshop was held at Mombasa, Kenya, from 27 to 31 March 2006. The workshop adopted a draft logistics concept and manual for the ASF. There is however some outstanding work that still needs to be completed.

26. In the area of C\^IS, the workshop was held in Cairo, Egypt, from 5 to 12 April 2006. The workshop made changes to the framework document as deemed necessary. In terms of the way forward, expertise and dedicated staff will be required to build, align and manage the C\^IS environment for the future. The outsourcing of the many projects that will be required for completion thereof shall be considered.

27. The workshop on SOPs was held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 24 to 28 April 2006. The Workshop was a follow-up to a pre-workshop held in Abuja from 20 to 24 March 2006, which produced a first draft SOPs for discussion. Despite the significant progress made, some additional work is required to refine the second draft SOPs.

28. In general, the products that were realized by the workshops are about 85 % complete. All the ASF workshops were successfully conducted with each of them enjoying full cooperation from the RECs/Regions, as well as from the G8 and other partners within the framework of the Joint Africa/ G8 Plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations, adopted at Evian, France, in June 2003. What is left is mainly translation into AU official languages and formatting to meet common AU standards for documentation. More importantly, harmonization of the current draft documents is expected to take place later this year, beginning earliest in September 2006.

29. Regarding the establishment of the regional brigades, there is now clear and tangible progress made by most of the regions in the following aspects:
   - establishment of Planning Elements – PLANLEM(s) (South, East, Central, West);
30. However, the ASF North and Central regions require a sustained effort to assist them move ahead. The Commission must carry out an on-site verification in all the regions before they can be considered for deployment as regional brigades.

31. In terms of the way forward, efforts will be pursued with respect to the following:

- a harmonization meeting, which is expected to be convened in September 2006, to ensure the consistency/conformity of the end products of all the Workshops;
- policy formulation for three more critical areas that have been identified, namely finance, legal aspects and military medical aspects;
- the commencement of work on the civilian dimensions of the ASF (police and non-uniformed civilians), which is lacking in the Framework Document establishing the ASF.

32. The Commission intends to convene a series of meetings that will culminate in a meeting of the Ministers of Defense and Security, with a view to reviewing the progress made so far in the establishment of the ASF, ensuring greater harmonization of efforts in this respect, and charting the way forward.

(vi) Relations with the RECs

33. The PSC Protocol stipulates that the Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It further provides for the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms to enhance coordination and cooperation.

34. In order to facilitate the conclusion of such an MoU, the Commission dispatched consultative missions to six of the seven RECs. The first periodic meeting between the AU and the RECs in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution, was held in Addis Ababa on 22–23 March 2005, underlined the fact that the draft MoU constituted a viable basis for work and requested that necessary adjustments be made to ensure that the document is more focused and to ensure that it contributes effectively to the overall coherence of the continental peace and security architecture. The second periodic meeting, held on 24–25 October 2005, noted the progress made on the development of the MoU and the calendar drawn to finalize the drafting of the MoU in early 2006.

III. THE COMMON AFRICAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY (CADSP)

35. At the Durban Summit, the Assembly of the Union stressed the need for a Common African Defense and Security Policy, in the context of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol. Subsequently, at their Extraordinary Session held in Sirte, Libya, towards the end of February 2004, the Heads of State and Government adopted the Solemn Declaration on the CADSP. The CADSP, which is largely premised on the concept of human security, identifies the common
security threats to the continent; the principles and values underlining the CADSP; the objective and goals of such a Policy; as well as the implementing organs and mechanisms, and the building blocks of the CADSP. The CADSP provides a framework for a regular review and close monitoring of the implementation of all instruments relevant to Africa’s efforts to promote peace and security.

36. The elaboration and subsequent adoption by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in Abuja in January 2005, of a Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact is to be situated within that context. The Pact has already been signed by 19 Member States and ratified by one Member State (Senegal). Fifteen (15) ratifications are required for its entry into force. Over the coming years, efforts will focus on identifying other areas of action, with the view of enhancing confidence among Member States and advancing the concept of human security.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

37. Over the past years, significant progress has been made in the establishment of the African peace and security architecture. However, many challenges lie ahead. More concerted and sustained efforts are required to ensure that all the elements of the peace and security architecture are put in place and function effectively.
1. Within the framework of the efforts to operationalise the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), as provided for by article 12 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a meeting on early warning and conflict prevention, bringing together governmental experts from AU Member States and representatives of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), namely the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 17 to 19 December 2006. The meeting was also attended by representatives of African research centres and academic institutions, NGOs, as well as international organizations, including the United Nations, as observers. The meeting was a follow up to the decision of the PSC taken at its 57th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 21 June 2006, which requested the AU Commission to hasten the operationalization of the continental peace and security architecture, including the CEWS.

2. The meeting, which was opened by H.E. Mr. Ronnie Kasrils, Minister for Intelligence Services of the Republic of South Africa, in the presence of the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Ambassador Saïd Djinnit, had the following objectives:
   - to take stock of the progress made so far towards the operationalisation of the CEWS and challenges encountered in this process;
   - to examine international experiences on early warning and their relevance to Africa’s efforts to fully operationalise the CEWS;
   - to agree on the key steps that should be taken for the full operationalisation of the CEWS, including (i) the collection of data, (ii) strategic analysis of the data collected, through an appropriate indicators module, (iii) early warning reports and engagement with decision makers, and (iv) the coordination and collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms for conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and other stakeholders on conflict prevention and early warning in Africa; and
   - to adopt a Roadmap that would clearly spell out the steps to be taken towards the operationalisation of the CEWS and the role of each of the stakeholders, as well as the timelines for implementation.

3. During the general debate, the meeting acknowledged the progress made in developing the overall African peace and security architecture and noted the increasing close collaboration between the AU, its Member States and the RECs on early warning and conflict prevention.

4. The meeting acknowledged the efforts of the AU and the RECs, in the context of the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol and other relevant instruments, to strengthen their conflict prevention capacity, and welcomed the progress made toward the operationalisation of the CEWS.
5. The meeting commended the AU Commission for the preparation of the relevant documentation in support of its deliberations, namely the Draft Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS, the Draft Proposal for an Indicators Module, and the document entitled “Civil Society Participation in Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Agenda for Action”; as well as Background Papers.

A) ON THE STATUS OF THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CEWS

6. The meeting noted the progress made in operationalising the CEWS, including the two workshops on early warning held in Addis Ababa on 30 and 31 October 2003 and 25 to 27 April 2006, respectively. The meeting further acknowledged the critical role of these workshops in enabling the development of a shared framework for the implementation of the CEWS and called for the continued collaboration of all stakeholders in the operationalisation of the CEWS.

7. The meeting was briefed on the status of implementation of early warning systems in the AU Commission and the RECs, as well as their collaborative efforts to accelerate the establishment of the CEWS. In this context, the meeting noted the increasing need for analytical and conflict prevention capacity within the continent, and welcomed the approach within the AU and the RECs to consider early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction and development as interdependent issues.

8. The meeting also noted that the RECs were at various levels of development of their respective early warning systems. In this respect, it stressed the need to speed up the ongoing efforts at regional level, especially in those RECs that are still at the initial stages of developing their early warning systems, and urged their completion by 2008. The meeting welcomed the steps taken within the framework of the Africa Peace Facility (APF), established by the European Union (EU) at the request of the AU, to enhance the early warning and preventive capacity of the RECs.

B) ON THE KEY ELEMENTS FOR THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CEWS

9. The meeting emphasised that the purpose of the CEWS is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts in Africa. It is, therefore, essential that the CEWS be designed to meet the requirements of the continent. The CEWS should be need-based, and all efforts should be made to mobilise the resources required.

In particular, the meeting made recommendations on the following issues.

(i) **Data collection, analysis, and indicators module**

10. The meeting recognised the need to adopt a pragmatic approach towards early warning that would allow the AU to undertake preventive diplomacy within the framework of the relevant principles enshrined in the PSC Protocol. In this regard, the meeting recalled that the collection and analysis of data relevant to the prevention of violent conflict is a major task of the relevant AU structures, in particular the Conflict Management Division and its Situation Room. The meeting reiterated that the collection and analysis of data should be done in a systematic manner, using a specific framework in accordance with the provisions contained in the PSC Protocol. The meeting discussed the need for institutional linkages between the AU and the RECs to ensure complementarity of their early warning systems, as well as the
possibility of incorporating inputs from existing early warning systems, whether on conflict or other issues.

11. The meeting further recalled the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol that call for collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research institutes, academic institutions and NGOs. The meeting recognised that the effective functioning of the CEWS requires that data be obtained from multiple sources, with emphasis on African sources, including the AU, the RECs, Member States, research centres, including the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, academic institutions, NGOs, the media, as well as the United Nations and its agencies, and other relevant international organizations, as provided for by the PSC Protocol. The meeting underlined the need to ensure accuracy, reliability, transparency and objectivity in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data. At the same time, the meeting stressed that sensitive information should be treated with the appropriate level of confidentiality, and should be transmitted through secure channels.

13. The meeting welcomed the development of the module of generic indicators in line with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol, which call for a common framework of political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators. It noted that the module was based on existing OAU/AU documents adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and other organs of the AU, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Framework Document, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) process, the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, and other relevant AU instruments, taking into account best practices and lessons learned in conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.

14. The meeting requested that the indicators module and subsequent analysis and generation of response options be gender-mainstreamed, in accordance with the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The meeting also recommended that the generic indicators be clustered according to the categories under article 12(4) of the PSC Protocol, and that other categories, such as environmental indicators, be considered when relevant to conflict prevention.

15. The meeting observed that, while the immediate focus of information gathering and analysis should be on significant threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators’ module should also focus on the root causes of conflicts.

16. The meeting stressed that early warning required continuous monitoring, not only to prevent the outbreak of conflict but also to warn of escalation or resurgence of conflict. The meeting further stressed that policy options can only be developed based on strategic analysis of trends and dynamics, and their significance in specific contexts. The meeting recognised that the indicators’ module, while not comprehensive or exhaustive, could be adapted to particular conflict situations for which specific and easy-to-monitor thresholds can be developed. The meeting recommended the adoption of a realistic approach that will focus attention, in the short-run, on a limited number of cases, namely: (i) situations likely to escalate into violent conflict in the immediate future, (ii) situations of ongoing crises or conflicts, (iii), and post-conflict situations.

17. The meeting emphasized the importance of ensuring that the staff tasked with early warning functions (data collection, verification, analysis and the provision of policy options) possess the requisite analytical capability, expertise, and experience. The meeting also recognized that the efficient management
of data and information should include adequate collection, compilation, management and distribution systems, and that some level of automation may be required in light of the complexity involved in dealing with considerable amounts of information. The meeting agreed that all efforts should be made to strengthen the relevant capacities (human, financial and technical) at the AU and the RECs, to ensure the effective functioning of the CEWS.

(ii) On Early Action and Engagement with Decision Makers

18. The true test of the CEWS will be its ability to generate not only timely analysis but also effective response options – an inextricable link to early action is a core principle of an effective early warning system.

19. Consequently, there is need to tailor the CEWS to the requirements and specific needs of its end-users, and decision-makers, in particular the Chairperson of the Commission and the Chair of the PSC, as well as other organs and structures such as the Panel of the Wise, the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Moreover, and in view of the wide range of stakeholders involved and the information that should be communicated, the meeting stressed the need to ensure the provision of appropriate reports for the various categories of AU decision-makers.

20. Assuring quality (comprehensiveness, accuracy, reliability and relevance), efficiency (timeliness), objectivity, diversity and appropriate formatting in the presentation of analysis and options for response by the CEWS are critical. The meeting recognized that the full implementation of the CEWS would entail improving the quality of existing products and the development of new ones such as Early Warning Reports, which would be the subject of appropriate consultations between the Commission and the country (ies) concerned, drawing on lessons learnt from the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism.

21. The meeting stressed that the development of means of engagement with all decision-makers is a priority, and fully endorsed the recommendations put forward in the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS in this regard. These include, inter alia, the production of regular Reports of the Chairperson to the PSC on the overall peace and security situation in the five regions of the continent, with a strong early warning component; the inclusion, where appropriate, of early warning focused sections in the regular Reports of the Chairperson to the PSC; the strengthening of the PSC and the Chairperson’s bi-annual reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the state of peace and security in Africa. The meeting agreed that these reports should identify different response options, including preventive diplomacy, appropriate sanctions and intervention, if necessary, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act. In this regard, the meeting called upon the RECs/Regions to accelerate the operationalisation of their regional standby brigades.

22. The meeting noted that the full operationalisation of the CEWS would strengthen the engagement of the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC in conflict prevention, as provided for in the PSC Protocol. The meeting underlined the need for the above-mentioned organs to address the PSC on a regular basis.

23. The meeting underlined the critical role that should be played by the Panel of the Wise in conflict prevention. In this regard, the meeting urged the Chairperson of the Commission to swiftly operationalise the Panel.
(iii) On Co-ordination and Collaboration

24. Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are important components of the overall peace and security architecture of the AU. Synchronisation, coordination, collaboration and harmonisation between the AU and the RECs are essential for the effective functioning of the CEWS. The meeting noted the considerable progress that the AU and the RECs had achieved in coordinating their activities and collaborating on matters of peace and security in Africa.

25. However, in light of the varying levels of development and implementation of regional early warning systems, there is need to support the RECs through financial and technical assistance, to finalize the process of developing their respective systems. This is especially important in view of the requirement of the PSC Protocol for observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly, through appropriate means of communication, to the AU Situation Room for the purposes of transmission of data, information and analysis.

26. The meeting endorsed the various recommendations contained in the Roadmap for strengthening the relationship between the AU and the RECs, including: a system of regular exchange of information and the establishment of secure website to that end; the convening of periodic meetings on early warning; exchange of experiences; joint training and capacity building actions; the systematic participation of RECs and other relevant regional mechanisms in discussions on issues brought before the PSC and of interest to them the establishment of liaison offices; and the commencement of joint activities in early warning and conflict prevention as soon as possible. The meeting further recommended that guidelines and benchmarks be developed in consultation with the Regional Mechanisms, to enable the harmonization of systems in the short term and enhance synergies and complementarity.

27. The meeting called for the swift conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, which would help to streamline the relationship and establish a framework for the effective flow of information.

28. The meeting also welcomed the recommendation in the Roadmap to strengthen the cooperation and continued interaction with the United Nations and its agencies, and, in particular, the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General. In particular, the recommendations regarding the exchange of information, the holding of periodic meetings and consultations on peace and security, and the possibility for organizations of the UN system to address the PSC were regarded as critical. The meeting equally welcomed the recommendations for collaboration with other relevant international organisations.

29. The meeting stressed the importance of involving and closely collaborating with civil society organisations, including community-based organisations, women's and youth organisations, the academia, think-tanks and research centres, whose active participation in providing relevant information, making recommendations for the development of specific policy options and addressing the various AU organs, particularly the PSC, as well as contributing, where appropriate, to early response, owing to their proximity and/or presence in affected areas, is essential in order to ensure the effective functioning of the CEWS, as called for by the PSC Protocol. In this regard, the meeting welcomed the proposal by the Commission for an accreditation mechanism for CSOs and relevant private sector actors, specifically tailored to the purposes of the CEWS and based on transparency.

30. The meeting underlined the importance of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) in complementing the CEWS, particularly in the process of data collection and verification.
C) THE WAY FORWARD

31. The meeting urged the AU Commission and the RECs, working together with the stakeholders identified in the PSC Protocol, to take all necessary steps to implement all of the above-mentioned observations and recommendations, within a timeframe of three (3) years, to ensure that the CEWS is fully operational by 2009. In this regard, the meeting requested the Commission to submit regular reports on progress made and challenges faced to the relevant AU organs (the PSC, the Executive Council and the Assembly).

32. The meeting urged all Member States, as stipulated in article 7(4) of the PSC Protocol, to “extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the PSC for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts”.

33. The meeting further urged Member States, as well as AU partners, to provide the necessary assistance to facilitate the timely operationalisation of the CEWS.

34. The meeting recommended that the AU Commission convene another meeting of Governmental Experts, within two years, to review the progress made and chart the best way forward.
Meeting the Challenge of Conflict Prevention in Africa – Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System

CONCEPT PAPER

Meeting of governmental experts on early warning and conflict prevention,
Kempton Park, South Africa, PSD / EW / EXP / 2 (I), 17–19 December 2006

1. One of the core objectives of the African Union (AU) is the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the Continent, as spelt out in article 3 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act. To strengthen the AU’s capacity in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, Member States adopted, in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which entered into force in December 2003. The Protocol, in article 2 (1), defines the PSC as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.

Provisions of the PSC Protocol and subsequent efforts by the AU to establish the Continental Early Warning System

2. Article 12 of the PSC Protocol provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. As stipulated in article 12 (2) of the Protocol, the CEWS shall consist of:

   (i) an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “the Situation Room”, which is located at the Conflict Management Division of the African Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis;

   and

   (ii) the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (hereunder the Regional Mechanisms), which shall be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

3. In addition, article 12 (3) of the Protocol requires the Commission to also collaborate with the United Nations and its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to facilitate the effective functioning of the CEWS, while article 12 (4) calls for the development of an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action (article 12). Article 12 (5) stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System timeously to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action; he shall also use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the Protocol. The Member States shall
commit themselves to facilitate early action by the PSC and/or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information (Art. 12 [6]). Finally, article 12 (7) stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, shall work out the practical details for the establishment of the CEWS and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.

4. At its session held in Maputo, in July 2003, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government adopted decision Assembly/AU/Dec.16(ii) on the Operationalization of the PSC Protocol, inviting the Commission to, inter alia, take the necessary steps for the establishment of the CEWS. It was as a follow-up to this decision that the Commission organized a workshop on the establishment of the CEWS, from 30 to 31 October 2003, in Addis Ababa. The workshop made the following recommendations:

a) begin with significant threats of violence and loss of life as the entry point for the AU’s early warning system;
b) build a measurable, verifiable and standard database that is simple, user friendly, based on multi-level and field-based sources;
c) develop an analytical capacity and expertise within the AU on early warning, conflict prevention and conflict management;
and
d) establish diagnostic linkages between analysis and desired outcomes so as to provide the AU with regular reports on conflict situations.

5. Based on the above recommendations, the Commission developed, in July 2005, a draft Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS. The purpose of the Roadmap is to propose an operational, cost-effective CEWS within the obligations stipulated by the PSC Protocol, as well as the associated key steps and requirements necessary for the implementation of the early warning system.

6. The draft Roadmap emphasises that the objective of the CEWS should be the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts. The Roadmap covers, among others, the following areas: a) data collection, b) strategic analysis of the data and development of an indicators module, c) early warning reports and engagement with decision-makers, and d) co-ordination and collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other key stakeholders. The Roadmap contains a tentative timeframe for the implementation and operationalization of the CEWS.

7. As indicated above, the Situation Room is a key element of the CEWS. Its tasks include monitoring situations of potential and actual conflicts, as well as post-conflict situations on the continent and other relevant developments, from both primary sources (AU field missions) and internet based media sources; producing several kinds of reports either on a regular or ad hoc basis; serving as a point of contact between the AU Headquarters, on the one hand, the field missions, Member States and other organizations and entities; storing and disseminating information. The Situation Room is manned on a 24 hours basis during weekdays and functions until 9 p.m. during the weekends.

8. Efforts have been made and continue to be made to enhance and strengthen the capacity of the Situation Room. This includes the procurement of new equipment and a greater access to online information, to provide timely and up to date information and analysis on issues of relevance to the mandate of the Peace and Security Department. Steps have also been taken to enhance the human resource capacity
of the Situation Room, including through on-the-job training and staff exchange programmes with the RECs and the United Nations. The Situation Room is currently staffed by eight Situation Room assistants responsible for data collection and dissemination, a coordinator responsible for coordinating the overall activities of the Situation Room and a communications clerk responsible for dispatching official communications and building and maintaining a database of the contact details of Member States and other relevant entities.

Efforts by the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

9. The Regional Mechanisms have also taken steps to develop early warning systems, though they are at different stages in their efforts, as shown below:

(i) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

10. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Observation System was established by the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted in 1999. The system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), which is based at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, as well as of four Zonal Offices, which, gathering information from their focal areas on a daily basis, report to the OMC. The OMC collects and processes data and analysis, and compiles reports, which are submitted to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. Currently, ECOWAS is in the process of operationalizing its early warning system both in terms of technical issues and human resources. The political will to implement the EWS has been affirmed by the Heads of State. ECOWAS has established key partnership with the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP) in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). It has identified 15 Member States monitors and 15 civil society monitors for each country.

11. In its efforts to enhance the capacity of the four Zonal Offices, the Secretariat plans to acquire appropriate equipments and to establish a satellite communication system connecting the Executive Secretary, the Zonal Offices, and ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank (EBID / BIDC) based in Lomé, Togo. It has also plans to acquire a Geographic Information System (GIS) to be integrated into the ECOWAS early warning system.

(ii) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

12. ECCAS is in the process of establishing a comprehensive early warning system, which is the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC). MARAC (Mécanisme d’Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale) has been created on the basis of a Protocol relating to the structure and functioning of the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa. As outlined in the Protocol, MARAC “shall be responsible for data collection and analysis in order to prevent crises and conflicts”. ECCAS will establish a national network of offices that will form an integral part of MARAC. The system, when fully operational, will have a staff of 24 with inter-disciplinary experts covering thematic areas. MARAC will have a Situation Room, and operating procedures and standards that are being developed to support the Mechanism.
(iii) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

13. IGAD has established a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN’s mandate is “to receive and share information concerning potential violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD sub-region.” Since June 2003, CEWARN has been monitoring and tracking cross-border pastoral and related conflicts in the two pilot areas of the Karamoja and Somali Clusters; these pilot areas are now being expanded. CEWARN has an information gathering and analysis tool known as the CEWARN Reporter, used for coding, graphing and analysis of data. The tasks of CEWARN include collecting data and producing reports, which are eventually discussed by Member States. CEWARN produces Country Updates, from Situation and Incident Reports, four times a year. The reports provide response recommendations. IGAD is planning to expand the Mechanism to cover other potential areas, and is developing a new strategy for CEWARN. Currently, CEWARN is in the process of mobilising funds to support the increased activities envisaged under the new strategy.

(iv) East African Community (EAC)

14. The EAC has not yet put into practice an early warning system, but has developed a draft Protocol on Early Warning and Response Mechanism. The Protocol seeks to address issues that cut across inter-state security, inter-state defence and intra-state conflicts that emanate from cattle rustling, smuggling and illegal trade; poverty and economic inequalities; human rights violations in partner states; sharing of cross-border and intra-state natural resources and land, among others. The Draft Protocol establishes an institutional mechanism through which the protocol shall be implemented, including policy arm, administrative arm, the technical arm, the Regional Centre for Early Warning, the Early Warning Units situated within the Partner States. It is envisaged that the Early Warning Centre will be situated at the EAC Hqs fully equipped with a situation Room and human capacity and linked with the national Early Warning Units.

15. The development of the early warning mechanism calls for the convening of workshops for national and regional stakeholders for validation of the Protocol to be completed by 2007. In order to put in place its EWS, EAC plans to recruit analysts, early warning specialists, national focal points, as well as the acquisition of ICT infrastructure. The framework for Conflict early warning will work hand in hand with the proposed mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution.

(v) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

16. COMESA has not yet put in place an early warning system, but is in the process of conceptualizing one. COMESA has the mandate to deal with conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy and implicit in this is the role of conflict early warning and response. Taking into consideration the conflict issues in the sub-region, COMESA core competence COMESA proposes to mainly focuses on economic-related issues to ensure that the region benefits from the trade of its natural resources. The organization has already put in place structures through which its early warning system will be able to operate. These structures include a rigorous process of enhancing the role of civil society and the private sector in its program on peace and security. In its efforts to put in place a functioning early warning system, COMESA has plans to recruit analysts, Situation Room staff, Member Country desk officers, and plans to open regional centres/offices. COMESA is also in the process of acquiring ICT infrastructure that will link to Member states together and to COMESA, which will also benefit Early Warning.
(vi) Community of Sahelo Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

17. CEN-SAD does not have an operating early warning system so far, but the Secretariat is preparing a framework for the eventual establishment of an Early Warning Mechanism. The organization has developed a Protocol on a Mechanism of Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict. Under the Protocol, there is provision for the establishment of a Regional Peace and Security Observation System, which will have a Situation Centre. In order to put in place its early warning system, CEN-SAD plans to hold several seminars involving the Secretariat staff, senior officers drawn from External Affairs and Defense and Security establishments, as well as civil society groups, including women and religious leaders.

(vii) Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

18. SADC is developing a system for early warning, which is integrated in the intelligence community and based on classified information. The SADC system is based on the establishment of the National Early Warning Centres (NECW) in each of the Member States and a Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC), based in Gaborone, Botswana. A Senior Strategic Analyst for the REWC has been recruited and the process of developing conflict indicators was completed and is awaiting approval by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The organization tries to address threats and conflicts of a socio-economic nature. SADC is in the process of establishing a Situation Room and recruiting Analysts.

Consultative Workshop on Early Warning

19. In order to take stock of the initiatives taken both at continental and regional level, the Commission organized, from 25 to 27 April 2006, a consultative workshop on early warning, which included participants from the RECs, United Nations agencies and other key stakeholders. The workshop made, among others, the following recommendations:

(a) Data collection:
- generate primary data beyond African Union and its Field Mission's sources, including civil society, universities, and research institutions;
- develop a system of trend-tracking;
- make use of automatic public news clipping systems;
- develop a system of grading sources and reports to diminish information overflow and to increase work efficiency in the Early Warning Unit;
- make more efficient use of IT technology to foster the development of compressed products (briefs, reports, etc.) for end-users;
- rationalize the work of early warning systems focusing on different issues (conflict prevention, food security i.e.) to avoid duplications (especially in the establishment of data-bases).

(b) Strategic Analysis:
- develop a systematic framework of analysis;
- define a limited number of easy-to-monitor conflict- or case-specific indicators (through country-specific analyses);
- link indicators to the standards agreed upon in the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), as approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in July 2002;
- focus on both immediate threats to human security and on underlying structural causes of conflict;
- strengthen analytical capacities to re-contextualise and to adjust country-specific analyses;
- enhance capacity building to ensure quality control (tailored trainings for different levels of staff within the Early Warning Unit).

(c) Comparative Indicators of the AU CEWS and the RECs:
- do not replace efforts already accomplished by the RECs in their conflict early warning initiatives;
- develop a continental framework of information gathering and analysis which is supplementary to the RECs.

(d) Coordination & Collaboration between the AU CEWS and the RECs:
- agree on a division of labor concerning sub-national data with RECs assisting in adding information on AU’s secure website;
- ensure regular and secure exchange of selected early warning briefs and reports;
- hold annual early warning meetings with rotating hosts (RECs), facilitated through AU Commission;
- continue the exchange of personnel with RECs and other early warning systems;
- initiate joint trainings/capacity building for RECs/AUC personnel;
- establish focal points on early warning systems within AUC, every REC and at national level;
- develop a system on how to treat classified information;
- integrate key workshop recommendations into the Memorandum of Understanding between the RECs and the AUC;
- ensure interaction of RECs and African Union with key partners in civil society, UN institutions, universities, research institutions, etc.

(e) Early Warning Reports, Engagement with decision-makers and response options:
- engage information gathering personnel with decision-makers;
- enhance the diversity of information provided to decision-makers: reports, personal briefings, etc;
- broaden the process of engagement with decision makers to include other groups such as civil society and research institutions, to raise critical points otherwise too sensitive to be brought in;
- in addition to country reports, provide reports on security situations in the five regions (this will make it possible to include situations of potential conflict, which are not yet visible, as well as related issues);
- develop a generic list of policy options;

20. The 57th meeting of the PSC, held on 21 June 2006, reviewed the status of the establishment of the continental peace and security architecture. On that occasion, the PSC urged the Commission to hasten the process of implementation towards the full realization of the continental peace and security architecture, including the CEWS.
Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning

21. It is against this background that the Commission is organizing the present meeting of governmental experts on early warning and conflict prevention. The objectives of the meeting are as follows: a) to take stock of the progress made so far towards the establishment of the CEWS and the difficulties encountered; b) to examine international experiences on early warning and their relevance to Africa’s efforts to fully operationalize the CEWS; c) to agree on the key steps that should be taken for the full operationalization of the CEWS, including the collection of data, strategic analysis of the data collected, through an appropriate CEWS indicators module, early warning reports and engagement with decision-makers, and the coordination and collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms and other stakeholders on conflict prevention and early warning in Africa; d) and to adopt a roadmap that will clearly spell out the steps to be taken by each of the stakeholders, as well as the timelines for implementation towards the operationalization of the CEWS.

22. In addition to Member States, the meeting includes participants from the RECs, African research centers, academic institutions, and NGOs. A number of international organizations have also been invited to participate as observers.

23. Several documents have been prepared for this meeting. They are of two types: first, background documents, which do not necessarily reflect AU views and are intended to provide the participants with general information pertaining to early warning; second, issue documents containing proposals by the Commission on the steps to be taken for the establishment of the CEWS, and that will serve as a basis for the decisions to be taken during the meeting.

24. The agenda of the meeting is divided into five session covering the following issues:
   - Update on the status of the establishment of the CEWS;
   - Overview of international experiences on Early Warning and their relevance to Africa;
   - Elements of the Roadmap towards the effective operationalization of the CEWS.

Conclusion

The promise and need for a continental early warning system (CEWS) in Africa is considerable. The main interest in early warning is to identify situations with sufficient advance timing that preventative measures can be adopted by the AU, the RECs, and other key stakeholders which can reduce the likelihood or the severity of impending humanitarian disasters. In sum, the primary aim of the CEWS is preventative rather than simple forecasting. In this regard, the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention is a critical step in the eventual operationalisation of the CEWS.
ROADMAP ON THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

Meeting of governmental experts on early warning and conflict prevention, Kempton Park, South Africa, PSD / EW / EXP / 3 (I), 17–19 December 2006

I. INTRODUCTION

1. A core objective of the African Union (AU) is the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, as spelt out in Article 3 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act. To strengthen the African Union’s capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted, in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU”, which entered into force in December 2003. Article 2 (1) of the Protocol defines the PSC as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.

2. In conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC shall, inter alia, anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, undertake peace-making and peace-building functions and authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support missions (Articles 3 [a] and [b] and 7 of the PSC Protocol). In these, the PSC shall be supported by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund (Article 2 [2] of the PSC Protocol).

3. The establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a requisite of the PSC Protocol as detailed in Article 12 (1) which states that, “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be know as the Early Warning System shall be established”. The information and analysis gathered through the Early Warning System shall be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to “advise the PSC on potential threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action” (Article 12 [5] of the PSC Protocol). The Chairperson is also called “to use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol” (ibid). Member states too are urged to “commit themselves to facilitate early action by the PSC and/or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information” (Article 12 [6]).

4. According to Article 12 (2) of the PSC Protocol, the CEWS shall consist of:

- (a) an observation and monitoring centre – the “Situation Room” – which shall be located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the African Union. The Situation Room shall be responsible for data collection and analysis “on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module”;
- (b) observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which shall “be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.”
5. In order to analyse developments and recommend appropriate courses of action, the CEWS shall “develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators” (Article 12 [4]). In addition, to facilitate the effective functioning of the CEWS, Article 12 (3) of the PSC Protocol requires the AU Commission to “collaborate with the United Nations and its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)”, and Article 12(7) stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission “shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning”.

6. During the July 2003 Summit of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique, the Heads of State and Government mandated the AU Commission to take the necessary steps for the establishment of the CEWS. The series of activities set in motion by the Commission since then are detailed in the Concept Paper prepared for this meeting.

II. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CEWS

7. The purpose of the CEWS is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflict. Thus, there is a strong link between information, analysis and action. In order to fulfil its purpose effectively, the following four key elements are essential to the operationalization of the CEWS:

- data collection;
- strategic analysis;
- reports and engagement with decision-makers; and
- co-ordination and collaboration.

8. Although early warning systems do require an information technology (IT) enabled data collection and analysis infrastructure, this should not be regarded as the main component of such systems. The essential component is the analytical capability of staff tasked with early warning functions – data collection, analysis and the provision of policy options. The Conflict Management Division (CMD) already has some of these capabilities and resources, but not all – as will be discussed at length in the sections below.

9. It is essential that the early warning system is tailored to the requirements of the end-users, and fits within the existing and expected institutional resources. For the CEWS, the priority end-users are the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and other Departments within the Commission. Others include various organs and structures of the AU, namely the Pan-African Parliament, the Panel of the Wise and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. The relationship between the CEWS and these various end-users is detailed in the section titled “Reports and engagament with decision-makers”.

Data collection

10. It is the task of the CEWS to collect and analyse data in a systematised way, using an explicit framework. Pursuant to the provisions contained in the PSC Protocol, data collection and analysis shall be undertaken on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators’ module to be developed with clearly
defined and accepted political, social, military and humanitarian indicators (Article 12[2] and [4] of the PSC Protocol). Although items 14, 15 and 16 below discuss the indicators module in more detail, a comprehensive description of the module is developed in the issue paper titled “Issue Paper No.2, Proposal for an Indicators Module”.

11. The CEWS is envisaged as an open-source system where data is gathered from a variety of different sources, including, inter alia, governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organisations, the media, academia and think-thanks. While key sources of data include those generated by the AU itself (Commission, AU field missions and liaison offices), as well as that generated at the level of the RECs and Member States, collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs is clearly requested by the PSC Protocol. In fact, the Protocol urges the Commission to undertake this collaboration in order to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System as a whole (Article 12[3]). Additional relevant provisions, to be discussed below, include Article 16 (Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution), Article 17 (Relationship with the United Nations and other International Organisations), Article 18 (Relationship with the Pan-African Parliament), Article 19 (Relationship with the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights) and, finally, Article 20 (Relationship with Civil Society Organisations).

12. Efficient management of data and information must include adequate collection, compilation, management and distribution systems. At present, and on a daily basis, the Situation Room (an integral part of the Early Warning Unit located in the Conflict Management Division) solicits, collates, screens and disseminates relevant information to a variety of stakeholders (such as the Bureau of the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC, other Departments, Liaison Offices and Field Missions, as well as external stakeholders, including Member States). In addition to undertaking information sourcing on potential, actual and post-conflict situations as well as other relevant developments (elections, human rights and humanitarian situations), the Situation Room is responsible for producing various daily reports (News Highlights, Daily Reports, Flash Reports and other ad-hoc compiled reports). In order to accomplish these tasks, the Situation Room uses a wide variety of sources, including primary sources (from within the AU system such as from field missions) as well as internet-based sources from within and outside the African continent, including media, the UN system, international organisations, think thanks, etc. Although significant progress has been made with regards to strengthening of the capacity of the Situation Room during the year 2005-2006, with improvements in its staffing and infrastructure, giving it some capacity for an effective data and information system, current processes require optimisation and some level of automation in light of the complexity involved in the collection, compilation and management of considerable amounts of information relating to a large number of countries and topics.

13. In order to optimise and systematise existing products and processes (i.e. News Highlights, Daily Reports, Flash Reports, Country profiles) and following the implementation of the CEWS, enable the creation of new ones (i.e. Early Warning Reports, etc.), this roadmap recommends the following: the introduction of an automated data gathering and processing system (including but not limited to news clippings); the introduction of an internal news trends tracking service; the development of a system of grading sources and reports to diminish information overflow and to increase efficiency; greater use of African information sources, particularly in indigenous languages; and, finally, the strengthening of the existing system of internal country profiles through the introduction of sub-national detail.
Strategic analysis

14. Systematic information collection must be subjected to multiple levels of analysis in order to enable the development of policy options for the management, mitigation and prevention of violent conflict. As noted above, the PSC Protocol stipulates that the information and analysis gathered through the Early Warning System shall be used by the Chairperson to recommend best courses of action (Article 12 [5]). This requires the existing strategic analytical capacities of the CMD (particularly the number, quality and seniority of its existing pool of desk officers and analysts) to be strengthened (see Annex B on human resources requirements).

15. Strategic analysis and the timely development of policy options requires the continuous monitoring of political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators (Article 12 [4]). As required by the PSC Protocol, a core component of the CEWS is an early warning indicator’s module – priority has therefore been given to the design and specification of such module. The indicators module has been developed bearing in mind a limited number of flexible easy-to-monitor indicators and easy-to-control thresholds, based on an inductive approach and bearing in mind financial and institutional constraints. Attention will be focused on a limited number of cases at first which either (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their more recent past (for a detailed description of the module refer to Issue Paper No. 2 titled “Draft Proposal for An Indicators Module”). The implementation of the indicators module will allow the CEWS to undertake the systematic monitoring of risk indicators, including the analysis of trends and dynamics and their significance in their specific, structural contexts. While the immediate focus must be on significant threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators module must also focus on underlying structural causes of conflict.

16. The CEWS indicators module must be based on a common framework of indicators which has to be accepted by Member States (Article 12 [4]). By incorporating a series of automation measures and taking into account existing standards (such as, for example, those of the APRM and CSSDCA), this framework must ensure a degree of objectivity in the selection of cases to be brought on the political agenda and in front of the PSC. Easy-to-monitor indicators, easy-to-control thresholds, as well as the possibility of scaling and readjustment, guarantee that the indicators module adequately fulfils its functions.

Reports and engagement with decision-makers

17. In order to support the African Union in the management of acute situations of conflict and instability, disruptions and disasters, as well as systematise the engagement of the PSC with potential situations, the CEWS must have the ability to engage decision-makers appropriately. As highlighted in items 3 and 9 above, the CEWS is tasked with generating timely and effective policy options for a select number of key decision-makers, including the Bureau of the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and other stakeholders. The presentation of analysis and options for response is therefore critical and must be tailored to the specific requirements of these key AU structures. Enhancing diversity in the format of information and analysis provided, building in a level of flexibility to meet decision-makers requirements and enabling feedback from decision-makers to strengthen the system have been built into the design of the CEWS.

18. In the sections above, this roadmap identified a series of processes for improving the quality, efficiency and utility of existing report types, in particular News Highlights, Daily Reports, Mission Reports, Flash Reports, etc. Some of these processes are currently under implementation as noted in item 12. In addition, this roadmap proposes a key additional report type, which will be possible as the CEWS (and in
particular the indicators’ module) is implemented: the Early Warning Report. Based on perceived potential and/or developing conflict situations, these reports will be triggered when a combination of composite key indicators cross a predetermined threshold.

19. Improved existing reports (News Highlights, Situation Reports, Mission Reports, Flash Reports) as well as new types of reports (Early Warning Reports) will serve as the primary tool for engagement with decision-makers. In order to ensure effective and timely engagement by decision-makers, the production, use and distribution of these reports will be guided by regularity, appropriate timing, standard formats and appropriate storage and retrieval systems. Assuring quality (comprehensiveness, reliability and relevance), efficiency (timeliness) and objectivity require dedicated staff tasked with the production and distribution of CEWS reports.

20. The strategic development of appropriate modes of engagement with the Chairperson of the Commission is a primary concern in this roadmap. The central role assigned to the Chairperson of the Commission specifically as regards efforts and initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts is clear in the PSC Protocol (Article 10). The Chairperson of the Commission is urged to "bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the Continent" (Article 10 [2, a]). The Chairperson of the Commission is given a considerable mandate as he/she "may, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security Council, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction" (Article 10 [2, b]). Equally important are the responsibilities entrusted to the Chairperson of the Commission as regards implementation and follow-up of the decision of the PSC, including mounting and deploying peace support missions and keeping the PSC informed of development herein. (Article 10 [3, b]).

21. It is therefore critical that the CEWS strengthens existing modalities of engagement with the Chairperson of the Commission, building on current strengths and tested practices, as well as developing areas which require it – particularly in the provision of early warning information and policy options. An example of this engagement regards Chairperson's Reports to the Peace and Security Council. Article 10 (3, c) requires the Chairperson of the Commission to "prepare comprehensive and periodic reports and documents, as required, to enable the Peace and Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their functions effectively". Since the establishment of the PSC in March 2004, close to 50 Chairperson's Reports have been issued, often dealing with on-going conflicts or crises (Darfur, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Burundi, DRC) and often containing a level of unstructured early warning information. The purpose of the Chairperson's Reports to the PSC is to allow for early and preventative action if required, on-going monitoring and management of situations/events/issues, the tabling of initiatives and strategic planning.

22. With regard to the item above, this roadmap recommends the following. Firstly, the production by the Chairperson of the Commission of regular reports to the PSC (two or three a year) addressing the overall peace and security situation in the five regions of the Continent (West, Central, South, North and East). By covering all relevant developments within concerned regions (rather than focusing on a specific conflict situation), and extensively using the information generated by the CEWS and in particular the Early Warning Reports, these region-specific reports will bring to light potential threats to peace and security and therefore strengthen the Chairperson's prevention mandate. Secondly, and once the CEWS is fully operational, this roadmap recommends the inclusion where appropriate of structured early warning focused sections in the regular Chairperson's Reports to the PSC. Although many of the issued Chairperson's reports have included a level of early warning information and analysis (particularly
in sections dealing with the “Security Situation”, “Humanitarian Situation” and “Human Rights Situation” of cases), the introduction of structured early warning information and analysis generated by the CEWS itself (again, where appropriate) should strengthen the development of appropriate policy and response options.

23. At the level of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union, as per Article 7 (1, q) of the PSC Protocol, the Peace and Security Council shall, in conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, “submit regular reports to the Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa”. At the moment, these reports are submitted twice a year to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. By enabling the systematic identification of trends and potential conflict situations, the implementation and further development of the early warning processes and products detailed in this roadmap, can be used to strengthen the section of these reports that deals with the state of peace and security in Africa.

24. As mentioned above, conflict prevention is a fundamental priority of the African Union – a priority that requires the engagement of several of the organisation’s bodies and institutions, in particular the Commission and its Chairperson, the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise. As noted in several of the sections above, in addition to being a core objective of the PSC (Article 3, b), the prevention of conflicts is a principle which underlies the action of the PSC. As stated in Article 3 (b), the Peace and Security Council shall be guided, inter alia, by “early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them for developing into full blown conflicts”. Several activities are central to this prevention function, in particular early warning, the intrinsically related function of preventive diplomacy (which the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission are given as specific functions under Article 6 [b]) as well as other types of early action (both at a direct as well as indirect structural level). With regard to preventive diplomacy (good offices, mediation, conciliation), the Panel of the Wise is specifically tasked with supporting the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission (Article 11). The role of the CEWS in providing timely, comprehensive, reliable and objective advice as well as a structured environment for the development of policy options and response strategies by these decision-makers is critical.

25. This roadmap also prioritises other types of interaction with decision-makers such as on-demand briefings and unstructured interaction. In this regard, the Situation Room, in its role as “Point-of-Contact”, plays a critical role. The Situation Room provides a point of contact service between the AU and its various field missions, Member States as well as other Organisations; replies to requests for information and inquiries from a wide variety of stakeholders relating to the Peace and Security Department as a whole; and serves as the main contact point between the CMD and UNDPKO.

26. The implementation of additional strategies for engaging decision-makers, and in particular the development of an effective outreach strategy in support of key AU structures as well as other stakeholders outside the AU is a critical priority. In this regard, the ability to simultaneously reach as well as integrate the views, policy initiatives and recommendations of a number of key AU institutions is critical (systematic feedback loop). Article 18 (1) of the PSC Protocol clearly states that “close working relations with the Pan-African Parliament in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa” must be maintained. The presentation of an annual report to the Pan-African Parliament on peace and security in the continent (Article 18 [2]) and the ability of the PSC to submit reports upon request by the Pan-African Parliament through the Bureau of the Chairperson of the Commission (Article 10 [3]) will require the implementation of the CEWS according to this roadmap. A similar type of relationship is called for as regards the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (Article 19), while particular focus is given in the PSC Protocol to the relationship with the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management
Operationalization of the CEWS and Resolution (Article 7 (j) and Article 16) developed in item 19 below, with the United Nations and other international organisations (Article 17) and with Civil Society Organisations (Article 20) – developed in item 19 below. As regards the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, this roadmap recommends that these bodies address the PSC at least twice a year on issues pertaining to peace and security in the Continent.

27. As noted in item 4 above, Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are a constituent part of the overall security architecture of the Union (Article 16[1]) and the CEWS (Article 12[2]). While this roadmap will deal in detail with issues and strategies of coordination with the RECs in the section below, it is necessary to refer to the modalities of engagement with RECs for the purposes of reporting and decision-making. The PSC Protocol is clear in this regard: it calls for a close working relationship with Regional Mechanisms (Article 16[1]) where “Regional Mechanisms concerned shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, keep the Peace and Security Council informed of their activities” (Article 16[3]). To this end, and following close consultation with RECs, this roadmap calls for the implementation of a system of regular exchange of information, the convening of periodic meetings (at least once a year) and the systematic participation of Regional Mechanisms “in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a Regional Mechanism” (Article 16[6]). For a more detailed discussion on strategies of coordination and collaboration with RECs see section below.

28. Close cooperation and continued interaction with the United Nations and its agencies, but in particular the Security Council (as the institution with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security) and the Office of the Secretary-General, are highlighted in Article 17 of the PSC Protocol. The holding of periodic meetings and regular consultations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa as well as the invitation of UN system organisations to address the PSC on issues of common interest are called for in the PSC Protocol (Article 17[3] and [4]). Because of the critical importance of the United Nations System (as a key decision and policy-maker with a considerable implementation presence at regional, national and sub-national levels in Africa), the ability of the CEWS as an open-source based system to adequately reach as well as integrate the analysis, policy initiatives and recommendations of the United Nations and other international organisations has been provided for in the current roadmap (i.e. an example of this regards the need to integrate early warning information/analysis concerning emerging natural and humanitarian disasters and situations of conflict produced by OCHA).

Co-ordination and collaboration

29. Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are a constituent part of the overall security architecture of the Union (Article 16[1]) and the CEWS (Article 12[2]). The section above, dealt with the modalities of engagement between the CEWS and the RECs for the purposes of reporting and decision-making. This section will discuss issues of coordination and harmonisation and propose workable implementation strategies.

30. As integral components of the overall security architecture of the Union, and as a result of their activities in the fields of peace, security and stability, Regional Mechanisms are given an important and specific role in the development and implementation of the CEWS. The PSC Protocol recognises that aspects of harmonisation and coordination are important as a means to assuring that their “activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union” and calls for an effective partnership between the Regional Mechanisms and the PSC (Article 16). And, as noted in item 27 above, Regional Mechanisms...
are urged to continuously inform the PSC on their activities and when necessary brief the PSC – a request that is based on reciprocity as detailed in Article 16 (3), which states that “the Peace and Security Council shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, also keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities”. Also noted above, and as regards practical modalities of collaboration, Article 16 (4) of the Protocol states that, “in order to ensure close harmonisation and co-ordination and facilitate regular exchange of information, the Chairperson of the Commission shall convene periodic meetings”. Furthermore, Article 16(8) states that, “in order to ensure co-ordination and co-operation the Commission shall establish liaison offices to the RECs”.

31. Issues of harmonisation and co-ordination of existing early warning systems with a view to the establishment of the CEWS are central to this roadmap. In this regard, consultations with the Regional Mechanisms brought to light the varying levels of development and implementation of regional early warning systems. The PSC Protocol allows for considerable latitude in this regard as it simply states that the “observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms (are) to be linked directly through the appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room” (Article 12 [2 b]). Rather than attempt to create a single, unified system applicable to all early warning systems involved, and following closely the recommendations of the RECs, this roadmap proposes the development of a “continental framework” of information and analysis sharing able to build and supplement the efforts already developed by Regional Mechanisms. The need to optimise existing systems will require further elaboration and consultation between the AU and the RECs on some level of ‘division of labour’ (i.e. where because of their proximity, RECs would be comparatively stronger on sub-national data). A framework Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution is currently being finalised, which will provide additional clarity on this issue. Nevertheless, this roadmap proposes a series of practical steps in item 23 below.

32. In order to achieve the required harmonisation and coordination of all early warning systems components of the CEWS, as well as build and supplement on their specific strengths and experience, this roadmap proposes a number of practical strategies. First and foremost, this roadmap calls for the continuation of efforts to nurture a closer working relationship with regional mechanisms: including, but not limited to, regular exchange of information, convening of periodic meetings (at least once a year and specifically on early warning), strengthening of existing personnel exchange programmes and joint training and capacity building activities, and, finally, the establishment of liaison offices in both the AU and the RECs (some of these strategies are called for in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol). The establishment of a secure website for the exchange of information between the Situation Room and the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms is a critical priority. The series of consultations undertaken with the RECs has already advanced the development of a “continental framework” of information and analysis sharing – but more is required in the form of additional consultations and discussions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the holding of periodic meetings between the AU and the RECs specifically on peace and security issues – such as the meetings of 22–23 March 2005 and 24–25 October 2005, where valuable information on on-going conflicts and efforts to address them was shared by all participants – have strengthened a closer working relationship between the institutions concerned. Finally, the AU and the RECs must join efforts to adequately address the challenges posed by the need for investment and capacity-building on early warning at all levels.

33. Several of the items above highlighted the importance of collaboration with a wide variety of stakeholders beyond AU structures and governmental/intergovernmental actors – a function of the open-source nature of the CEWS. International organisations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs
are considered integral to the adequate functioning of the CEWS – in fact, as noted, the PSC Protocol urges the Commission to undertake this collaboration in order to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System as a whole (Article 12[3]). The call for a “strong partnership for peace and security” with relevant international organisations beyond the UN and its agencies (Article 7[k]), as well as the encouragement of “non-governmental organisations, community-based and other civil society organisations, particularly women’s organisations”, to actively participate in efforts towards peace in Africa (Article 20) are further evidence of their importance. Specific strategies of Civil Society participation in the CEWS are detailed in Issue Paper No. 3 titled “Civil Society Participation in Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Agenda for Action”. The proposal for the development of an accreditation policy specifically tailored to the active participation of Civil Society in the CEWS (over and above the accreditation policy currently in place by ECOSOC) is in this regard critical.

34. In defining the Rules of Procedure of the PSC, the PSC Protocol allows for “any Regional Mechanism, international organisation or civil society organisation involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the PSC, to be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion” (Article 8[10, c]). The CEWS recognises that international organisations, NGOs, the media, human rights groups, academia, community-based organisations, think-thanks are simultaneously primary sources of information as well as basic response partners – as a result, the identification of key civil society partners and their involvement in the development and implementation of the CEWS has been a strategy prioritised. Their continued contribution as the CEWS is implemented (as sources of information, partners on the ground and policy options’ formulatoes) will be essential.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEWS

35. The sections above dealt in detail with the specific responsibilities that several of the African Union’s organs have in the establishment and future functioning of the CEWS-Items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 described in detail the responsibilities and roles of the RECs (as constituent parts of the overall security architecture of the Union) in the design, implementation and functioning of the CEWS.

37. The role of Member States of the Union is critical as evident from several provisions of the PSC Protocol. First and foremost, Member State shall “extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the PSC for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts”(Article 7[4]). In fact, as detailed in Article 12 (7), “the Chairperson of the Commission shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.”

38. On a practical level, while Member States agree that the PSC acts on their behalf in carrying out its duties under the Protocol (Article 7[2]): they also agree to accept and implement its decisions (Article 7[3]). Although Member States do not have the power to oppose the inclusion of items in the PSC’s agenda, they can submit agenda proposals to the PSC (Article 8[7]) and may be invited to participate in PSC meetings whenever they consider that their interests may be affected (Article 8[10, b]). Finally, Member States “shall commit themselves to facilitate early action by the Peace and Security Council and or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information” (Article 12[6]).

39. On a more practical level, and in order to enable the Chairperson of the Commission to make well-informed judgements about potential conflict, Member States could give him access to information that in
sensitive in terms of content and sources. It goes without saying that the Commission will need to develop appropriate procedures for handling such information.

40. Finally the United Nations may be called “to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter”. (Article 8 [10, b]).

IV. Objectives, Outputs and Main Activities

41. This section outlines the outputs and main activities in accordance with five key objectives to achieve a fully functional and operational CEWS. These key objectives are to:

- Collect, compile, archive, manage and distribute information;
- Continuously monitor the socio, political, economic and other situations across the continent, to analyze data and to articulate policy and preventive response options in real-time;
- Support AU’s management of acute situations of conflict and instability, disruptions and disasters;
- Systematise the engagement of the PSC with potential conflict situations and issues; and
- Develop strategies for engaging decision makers on the effective use of specific reports.

OBJECTIVE 1: Collect, compile, archive, manage and distribute information

42. Outputs

- Daily Situation Reports (Improved)
- Daily News Highlights (Improved)
- Country Profile Resource

43. Main Activities

- The production of situation reports with structured and scaled measures;
- The provision of public news clipping service, with automated compilation and indexing;
- The provision of internal news trends service, with graphic presentation;
- The linkage to more African and multi-lingual media sources;
- The support of internal information exchange and tasking requirements; and
- The production of internal country profiles, with sub-national detail, updated annually.

OBJECTIVE 2: To continuously monitor the socio, political, economic and other situations across the continent, to analyze data and to articulate policy and preventive response options in real-time

44. Outputs

- Flash Reports derived from regular monitoring (Improved)
- Early Warning Reports derived from regular monitoring
- Situation Room functioning as “Point-of-Contact“ (Improved)

45. Main Activities

- The design, specification and continuing evaluation of an indicator based early warning module;
- The EW monitoring of situations and incidents pursuant to the Protocol;
- The analysis of trends and dynamics in their structural context;
- The articulation of policy and preventive options;
- The harmonization and coordination of a continental framework;
- The establishment and coordination of partnerships for EW as recommended by the Protocol.

**OBJECTIVE 3: To support AU’s management of acute situations of conflict and instability, disruptions and disasters**

Better information on conflict situations and on the strategic environment and improved reporting system and information management will allow for:

46. Outputs
- Mission Reports (Improved)
- Chairperson’s Reports to the PSC
- Inclusion, where appropriate, of structured early warning information, analysis and policy options in the Chairperson’s Reports to the PSC

47. Main Activities
- The monitoring and analysis of developments and dynamics in crisis situations;
- The monitoring and assessment of AU and other interventions;
- The coordination of crisis information among AU field missions including feedback between field missions and desk officers;
- The support of logistics for AU field missions;
- The articulation of policy and crisis response options and assessment criteria.

**OBJECTIVE 4: Systematise the engagement of the PSC with potential conflict situations and issues**

48. Outputs
- Early Warning Reports tabled for discussion in the PSC;
- Chairperson’s Reports to the PSC addressing the overall peace and security situation in the five regions of the Continent (two per year);
- Strengthened PSC+Chairperson’s Reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government – the section that deals with the state of peace and security in Africa (two per year);
- PSC Report to the Pan-African Parliament on peace and security in Africa (once a year);
- Strengthened link between early warning and preventive diplomacy through appropriate support and closer engagement with the Chairperson, the Panel of the Wise and other relevant actors.

49. Main Activities
- Facilitate the inclusion of specific reports as a regular agenda Item of the PSC. Most critical in this regard is the Early Warning Report;
- Support the reporting process in the PSC (through the Chairperson’s Bureau);
- Support the work of structures such as the Panel of the Wise to undertake special missions on behalf of the Commission as tasked by the Chairperson of the Commission;
- Engage, as directed, with the Pan-African Parliament, ECOSOCC the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and other AU Structures.
OBJECTIVE 5: Create informal channels for AU Chairperson’s engagement with PSC members and other critical actors

50. Outputs: More effective action by the AU and PSC

51. Main Activities:

- Work with Bureau of the Chairperson to facilitate and systematise Special Off-the-Record meetings with concerned PSC members and other critical actors such as expert groups or civil society actors – to galvanize action by the whole of the PSC;
- Schedule periodic meetings between the Panel of the Wise and the PSC;
- Work with outside institutions to take up/research on specific issue e.g. academics, other experts, and civil society actors;
- Commission and undertake strategic research to inform Council processes and decisions;
- Develop communications and outreach strategies to support the Panel of the Wise and to promote special missions.

ANNEX

Human Resources

1. At the Maputo Summit, the Heads of State and Government approved a new staff structure complement for the Commission of the African Union that provides for a staffing complement of 56 persons for the Peace and Security Department. Subsequent decisions provide for internal adjustments within the staffing structure of the AU up to the level approved by the Maputo Summit.
2. The regular staffing structure for the AU, and subsequent discussions, have not taken fully into account the detailed requirements for the operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Clearly the AU cannot succeed in implementing its obligations as stipulated the Protocol of the PSC on conflict prevention and early warning into reality if it does not provide for sufficient senior and capable staff for the CEWS as part of the regular staffing structure of the AU.

3. The African Union’s Partners have committed significant resources to the AU Peace and Security Department to enhance its human resource capability. The Commission intends to utilize the extra-budgetary resources from the partners, to the staff required for the operationalization of the CEWS. Ideally, the structure and staffing for CEWS should be as outlined in the (table below).

**Recommended Staff Requirements and Responsibilities for CEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
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| Senior Officer Early Warning     | P5    | - Overall coordination of staff Analysts, designated desk officers and other staff; and management of CEWS  
|                                  |       | - Overall responsibility for preparation of Early Warning Report to be presented to the PSC  
|                                  |       | - Preparation of periodic analysis  
|                                  |       | - Coordinate all CEWS reports  
|                                  |       | - Review and provide quality control for reports and analysis  
|                                  |       | - Oversee strategic initiatives  
|                                  |       | - Lead the development of outreach strategy for CEWS  
| Senior Analysts (5) (1 per region) | P4    | - Prepare Early Warning Reports  
|                                  |       | - Prepare Special Reports  
|                                  |       | - Liaise with RECs  
|                                  |       | - Provide training to staff on early warning indicators module workshop and annual review/refresher training  
|                                  |       | - Oversee workshops with the RECs  
| Liaison Officers (1)             | P4    | - Coordinating and harmonizing with the RECs, UN, academic institutions, NGOs, etc.  
| Analysts (10) (2 per region)     | P3    | - Engage in systematic trend tracking to supplement daily narratives  
|                                  |       | - Analyze daily news highlights to prepare short analytical briefings  
|                                  |       | - Work closely with Situation Room to generate initial analysis when threshold is crossed  
|                                  |       | - Work with Desk Officers to prepare Chairperson’s Reports following special events and incidents  

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editor (1)</td>
<td>P3</td>
<td>■ Editing of all reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator(^1)</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>■ Coordinate the daily activities of the AU Situation Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator (Situation Room)</td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Supervisors the Sit room assistants</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Responsible for data collection for CEWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants(^2) (4 Additional) for the Situation Room</td>
<td>GSA5</td>
<td>■ Monitor events and news highlights from Situation Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Provide relevant data to analysts for development of Early Warning Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Report production and dissemination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Acts as the point of contact between the PSD, member states and other relevant stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Assistants(^3) (1 Additional)</td>
<td>GSA5</td>
<td>■ Assists the Situation Room in incoming and outgoing communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>■ Are responsible for maintaining the updated list of contacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The position of Situation Room Coordinator currently extra-budgetary needs to be integrated in the AU structure and upgraded to P2
2 There are already four (6) Situation Room assistants in the AU Budget and two (2) in extra-budgetary support. There is need for an additional four (4) Sit Room assistants
3 There is an extra-budgetary provision for one (1) communication assistant, and there is need for an additional one (1) more.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Within the overall framework of the article 12 of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the recommendations contained in this document for the development of an Indicators Module of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) are based on a framework of generic indicators derived ex negativo from documents adopted by the African Heads of State and Government (both within the OAU and the AU). The document details the three basic early warning roles to be conducted...
by the Commission, through the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) – information gathering, information analysis and the production of outcomes – with a view to sketching a workable Indicators Module of the CEWS.

Once a situation matches a limited number of generic indicators, a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) will be undertaken in order to identify case-specific indicator-building information. On this basis, thresholds will then be defined through analysis by the CMD staff. The generation of this indicator-serving information will allow for a monitoring of the situation. Based on established procedures and standards, the CMD will then report to its end-users to alarm them to up-coming potential of/or violent conflict and enable them to take the appropriate political action.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. One of the core objectives of the African Union is the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the Continent, as spelt out in article 3 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act. To strengthen the African Union’s capacity in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, Member States adopted, in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which entered into force in December 2003. The Protocol, in article 2 (1), defines the PSC as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.

2. Article 12 of the PSC Protocol provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. As stipulated in article 12 (2) of the Protocol, the CEWS shall consist of:

   (i) an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “the Situation Room”, which is located at the Conflict Management Division of the African Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis; and

   (ii) the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (hereunder the Regional Mechanisms), which shall be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

3. In addition, article 12 (3) of the Protocol requires the Commission to also collaborate with the United Nations and its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to facilitate the effective functioning of the CEWS, while article 12 (4) calls for the development of an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action. Finally, article 12 (7) stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, shall work out the practical details for the establishment of the CEWS and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.

4. On the basis of the above, in particular article 12 (4) of the PSC Protocol, this document provides elements and a methodological framework that could form the basis of the indicators module referred to in the PSC Protocol, taking into account the Organization of African Unity/African Union’s initiatives
that are relevant in indicator development. The objective is, inter alia, to enable Member States to agree on the key steps that should be taken to ensure strategic analysis of the data collected, through an appropriate CEWS indicators module.

5. This document firstly deals with some methodological considerations, and then proceeds to describe the various steps of the early warning functions to be performed by the Commission. It concludes with some observations.

II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. The provisions of the PSC Protocol outlined above are unambiguous: the objective is to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts – both internal (intra-state) and external (inter-state). The CEWS should provide the Chairperson of the Commission and, through him, the PSC and the Panel of the Wise with information necessary to assist them in taking action on potential violent conflicts.

7. Time, financial and institutional constraints prohibit an approach where early warning information is gathered in advance for all Member States, irrespective of their mid- to long-term potential of violent conflict in these countries. Rather, attention has to be on a limited number of countries which either (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in their immediate future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their more recent past. Up to now, the type of conflicts regularly addressed by the PSC are conflicts which have already escalated to some extent. Attention has been given to a very limited number of potential violent conflicts. This situation is unlikely to change in the short-term, and any CEWS has to address this initial situation. Bearing in mind this combination of constraints, the following proposal attempts to reconcile state-of-the-art reasoning from conflict prevention and peace-building in academia with the practical needs of practitioners in the African Union.

8. There is a rich body of literature on violent conflicts, peace-building and related analytical tools. However, key questions have not been resolved both by social science and practitioners alike. The most severe question is constituted by the dual problem of causation and attribution. How do we know that action A will directly cause violent outcome B? And why does action A – under similar structural conditions – causes violent outcome B in country K and not in country L? These are questions where social science has not yet come up with a consensus. How do we know that intervention X directly causes impact Z? This is a question where practitioners have not yet established sound best practice. Existing theory and practice simply does not provide robust causation/attribution knowledge.

9. Although there is considerable experience with Early Warning Systems (EWS) in different areas – violent conflict, natural disaster, floods, agricultural production, etc. –, this experience is based on imperfect data and often cannot be transferred to other fields. For instance, available data on conflict, by and large, is based on inter-state violent conflicts, while most of the violent conflicts confronting the continent are of an intra-state nature. There is no comprehensive list of intra-state violent conflicts (i.e. a list with small subsets of all conflicts), so it is not possible to generate an inclusive and limited list of universal early warning indicators. In addition, no sound categorization system for violent conflicts exists, i.e. it is easier to find indicators for a specific type or a cluster of violent conflicts (such as so-called ethnic conflicts or pre-electoral conflicts, etc.). Empirical research would suggest that every violent conflict is embedded in a very specific socio-cultural field, and that common patterns between different cases can be identified to a certain extent only.
10. There are a number of serious efforts undertaken. The most sophisticated EWSs operate with very different and often contradictory sets of indicators. The problem is, as argued by one observer, “that there is no strong evidence that any of the indicators they propose are truly conflict early warning indicators”. Partially, this can be explained by the fact that, in most cases, the important distinction is not made between the data that will help us to figure out the best EWS indicators (i.e. to evaluate and test theories), and the data that is gathered to serve as those indicators. Often, theory testing or evaluative data has been by-passed in the quest for indicator-building data. Social scientists involved in the development of conflict prevention tools and the design of EWS have not established common analytical ground. There are debates between those favouring quantitative approaches and those preferring qualitative methods. But there are also fierce debates among scholars working with seemingly similar tools.

11. In principle, there are three different methodological approaches to operationalize EWSs, so-called correlational, sequential and conjunctural models. The first approach is based on the assumption that certain indicators or measures of the political, economic and social situation in a country (independent variables) covary with a measure of the level of violence in that country (dependent variable). The relative weight of indicators which are believed to contribute to the likelihood of violent conflict is tested (mainly through regression analysis). The second approach is working with a sequence of triggers and accelerators, i.e. events. It describes how changes in an environment bring about a specific event or a change in some specified variable. And, finally, the third approach works with combinations of conditions and events. The basic assumption is that different combinations of a polity’s circumstances lead to different outcomes. This approach is trying to identify particular configurations or conditions that consistently precede the outbreak of violent conflicts and that do not occur in places that do not experience violent conflict.

12. Against this background, best practice seems to suggest an approach which abstains from making bold claims towards a universal explanation for violent conflict and, thus, a single list with a limited number of indicators valid for all African countries. Rather, an inductive approach is favoured which operates within the parameters of a generic framework of indicators. At this initial level, the approach is plausibility and probability driven. Only once indicator-building information has been verified (through SCAs), a method is favoured which is as close to a causational model as one will probably get. A combination of two out of the three EWS models – sequential plus conjunctural – will help to achieve this effort.

III. ELEMENTS OF THE EARLY WARNING MODULE AND ‘ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

13. As indicated above, the process of early warning, as proposed, is made up of four steps: matching conflict information against a framework of conflict early warning indicators, information gathering, information analysis, and production of outcomes and reporting.

a) Step 1: Matching conflict information against a framework of conflict early warning indicators

14. The African Heads of State and Government have adopted a great number of decisions on political, economic, social, military and humanitarian issues – either in the framework of the African Union or its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity. *Inter alia*, this includes:
Towards the Operationalization of the AU CEWS

- the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981);
- all the documents which are part of the NEPAD agenda, such as the Framework Document (2001) and, most importantly, the Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators of the African Peer Review Mechanism (2003);
- the Solemn Declaration (2000) as well as the Memorandum of Understanding (2002) of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); and
- a number of declarations and conventions on issues such as unconstitutional changes of government (2002), illicit drug trafficking and abuse (2002) or corruption (2003).

15. These documents represent a consolidated framework of commonly accepted norms and principles, which is reflective of a universal understanding of human rights, as laid down in the United Nations Charter and other related legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). These documents do not a priori provide conflict prevention relevant indicators. But they easily translate into such a framework when they are interpreted ex negativo, i.e. when they are translated into a list of attitudes/behaviour which the African leaders disapprove of. This list of generic indicators can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU</th>
<th>Generic early warning indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-state conflicts</td>
<td>Cairo Declaration on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution AHG / Decl. 3 (XXIX), 1993</td>
<td>horizontal (intra-state) or vertical (inter-state) escalation of violent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunis Declaration on Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, 1994</td>
<td>increase in human rights violations in a polity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1994</td>
<td>sessionist agendas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yaoundé Declaration on Drug Control, Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking in Africa, 1996</td>
<td>proliferation of small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 1996</td>
<td>armed insurrections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000</td>
<td>territorial disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NEPAD Framework Document, 2001</td>
<td>border conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 2000</td>
<td>cross-border movements of small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>border skirmishes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>occasional or regular cross-border raids</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>preparation of an insurgency from a neighbouring country</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>expulsion of identity groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU</td>
<td>Generic early warning indicators</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen rights and supremacy of the Constitution | - Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), OAU/Civil Society.3 (II), Annex, 2002  
- Decision on the CSSDCA, AHG/Dec. 175 (XXXVIII), 2002  
- AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002  
- Durban Declaration on the Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking and Abuse, 2002  
- Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003  
- Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004  
- The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, 2005  
- Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 2000  
- Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000  
- NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance AHG/235 (XXXVIII), Annex I, 2002 | - gross human rights violations by state or non-state actors  
- coup d'etats  
- suspension of a constitution  
- limitation of constitutional rights  
- cancellation or rigging of elections  
- public or private hate talk in or by the media |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU</th>
<th>Generic early warning indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Towards the Operationalization of the AU CEWS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights as enshrined in African and international human rights instruments</td>
<td>African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981</td>
<td>restrictions of individual or collective economic, social and cultural rights by the state or non-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Charter of Popular Participation in Development, 1990</td>
<td>policies of economic, social and cultural exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000</td>
<td>major changes of the ecological balance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NEPAD Framework Document, 2001</td>
<td>environmental stress (e.g. through natural disaster or climate change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective legislature</td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000</td>
<td>violations of the separation of powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NEPAD Framework Document 2001</td>
<td>passing over the judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004</td>
<td>intruding into parliament’s rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants</td>
<td>NEPAD Framework Document, 2001</td>
<td>active steps to prevent accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003</td>
<td>widespread corruption in the public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU</td>
<td>Generic early warning indicators</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Fighting corruption in the political sphere | - NEPAD Framework Document, 2001  
- Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003  
- Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004 | - widespread corruption among the political class  
- misappropriation of funds |
| Promotion and protection of the rights of women | - African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981  
| Promotion and protection of the rights of children and young persons | - African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981  
- Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003 | - violations of children’s and young person’s rights |
Objectives | Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU | Generic early warning indicators
--- | --- | ---
Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons and refugees | • Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969  
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981  
• Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003 | • violations of the rights of IDPs and refugees  
• forced displacement (IDPs and refugees)

b) Step 2: Information gathering – Conducting modified Strategic Conflict Assessments

16. Once there is sufficient match between the list and current developments in a given Member State, the CMD has probable cause to start analysing the situation and to proceed to STEP 2. A Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) of the situation in a Member State will be conducted in order to generate information which will allow the CMD to build more specific indicators consistent with the framework of generic early warning indicators mentioned above (in another step, this type A-data or indicator-building information will enable the CMD to define thresholds for monitoring, see below).

17. The international debate on crisis prevention and conflict management among practitioners, international advocacy NGOs and academics has produced a rich experience with different analytical approaches. Drawn from this experience, some common ground has been established. Among conflict prevention researchers and practitioners, the SCA has proven to be a very reliable and robust analytical instrument.

18. The major aim of the SCA is to generate an overview on the background and dynamics of a violent conflict unfolding. For the purpose of the Indicators Module, the SCA has been slightly modified to address more comprehensively problems of causation, action and dynamics (this refers to the recognition of structural root causes, more emphasis on the resources of conflict actors, and a more explicit discussion of conflict aggravating vs. inhibiting factors).\(^1\) The SCA is carried out in three stages:

\(^1\) Here, the language used in Background Paper 2 on IT differs slightly. Essentially “Strategic Conflict Assessment” equates “Risk Assessment” and “aggravators/triggers” equates “event indicators”.
### Strategic Conflict Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage A</th>
<th>Stage B</th>
<th>Stage C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Analysis</td>
<td>Analysis of dynamics</td>
<td>Determining conflict balance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Stage A: Conflict Analysis**
  - analysis of:
    - structures
    - actors

- **Stage B: Analysis of dynamics**
  - analysis of:
    - aggravators
    - triggers
    - responses
    - inhibitors

- **Stage C: Determining conflict balance**
  - assessment of conflict
    - driving vs. conflict
    - inhibiting factors

19. During “Stage A: Conflict analysis”, the analyst is looking at the political culture, issues of inadequate governance, imbalance of opportunities for identity groups (such as youth, women, ethnic etc.) and matters of inequality to determine the structural causes of conflict, sometimes also referred to as root causes. The analyst will also carry out an analysis of the actor constellation and describe their interests, relations, capacities (i.e. capacities to influence conflict either negatively or positively) and resources as well as strategies. He will also look into existing peace agendas and consider incentives, which might work against an escalation of potential violent conflict.

20. During “Stage B: Analysis of dynamics”, the emphasis is on identifying those factors of a potential conflict which could either contribute to a horizontal (spread to other regions) or vertical (increase of the number of actors or conflict parties involved) conflict escalation or which would mitigate the potential for violent conflict:

   (i) mid-term aggravating factors (to name but a very few: promoting ethnic identity discourses with an exclusive undertone, limiting resources for clientelistic distribution, the influx of small arms and light weapons, imminent elections or any other event with a likelihood to change the perceived balance of power, etc.);

   (ii) exit options (what are the strategies of groups/people to avoid becoming part of the conflict, like migrating-out etc.?)

   (iii) voice options (how can/do people voice their grievances);

   (iv) existing conflict prevention and mediation mechanisms (institutions or processes which can mitigate or manage the potential of violent conflict – do they work?);

   (v) government policies (is the government willing and capable to work against conflict, or is it part of the conflict?);

   (vi) policies of international actors and the donor community (how do international interests affect the interests of the conflict parties? are there incentives of disincentives to work against conflict);
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(vii) short-term triggering factors (what could cause an immediate escalation of conflict?) and inhibiting factors (what could possibly work strongly against such an escalation?).

21. During “Stage C: Determining conflict balance”, the information gathered in Stages A and B needs to be reconciled. (In the case of information on the potential of trans-border or inter-state violent conflict, further analysis beyond the Member State in question is called for. Clearly, many current conflicts go beyond the state and call for a transgressing of the state as the unit of analysis.).

22. The information necessary to feed this type of analysis is strictly open source based. The CMD should look at five different “baskets” of information as provided for by the PSC Protocol and summarized in the relevant paragraphs of the Roadmap on the Operationalization of the CEWS:

- Basket 1: African Union field mission reports and field monitor reports;
- Basket 2: information coming from the Member States and the RECs;
- Basket 3: news agency/services reports;
- Basket 4: submissions from NGOs, academics, civil society, etc;
- Basket 5: online newspaper articles.

23. Based on sound SCAs, case study specific information will be gathered which is both relevant in terms of the indicators framework, i.e. the commonly adopted policy of the African Union and its Member States, and which will enable the analysts to identify case specific indicators for the potential of violent conflict (such as calls for ethnic mobilisation, hate speeches, the deployment of armed or rebel forces, etc.).

c) **Step 3: Information analysis – Monitoring**

24. On the basis of a SCA, the information analysis role of the CMD will be activated. If a SCA produces information on the existence of a potential for violent conflict, the situation has to be monitored.

25. For this purpose, the indicator-building information has to be transformed by the CMD analysts into type B-data, i.e. indicator-serving information. This includes defining thresholds (for instance, what type and measurable intensity of government response will trigger violent responses? what type and measurable intensity of “popular resistance” will trigger violent government responses?).

26. Translating indicator-building information into indicator-serving information is the most challenging aspect of this proposal. It calls for experienced analysts with a good understanding of trend-tracking and a variety of conflict dynamics.

d) **Step 4: Producing outcomes – Reporting**

27. Once certain thresholds have been passed, the CMD will assume its producing outcomes role, usually by way of reporting. Based on established procedures and standards, the CMD reports to its end-users to alarm them to up-coming potential of/or violent conflict and enable them to take the appropriate political action.
28. The reports currently generated by the CMD (News Highlights, Mission Reports, Chairperson’s Reports, etc.) will continue to serve as a primary tool for engaging decision-makers. These reports need to be complemented by, among others, special Early Warning Reports. In order to ensure effective and timely engagement by decision-makers, regular reporting mechanisms, appropriate timing, standard formats and appropriate storage and retrieval systems will have be introduced in the production, use and distribution of CEWS reports.

IV. MOVING FORWARD

29. As the design of CEWS is finalized and the analytic framework is integrated with the technological tools that will support it, it is important to remember that the tools support and should not drive the early warning process. It is the analytic capacity of the Situation Room and Early Warning Unit staff members that will lead to data-driven assessments and recommendations that can prevent, management and mitigate conflict.

30. The Indicators Module as proposed provides for an extensible and amendable mechanism. Indicator-building and indicator-serving information constantly needs to be checked and, if necessary, adjusted. The interactive analytical process will thus produce an in-built control mechanism. This can be assisted by regular evaluations, which should also focus on the specific needs of the different end-users (Chairperson of the Commission, PSC, Panel of the Wise). By the same token, this process easily allows for capacity-building, infrastructural development and the support of individual strengths in analytical skills.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The involvement of civil society in continental peace and security agenda predates the birth of the African Union (AU). However, under the Organization of African Unity, the predecessor of the AU, such involvement remained limited. The Constitutive Act of the AU provides space for effective citizens’ participation in the activities of the AU, including in the critical area of peace and security. The Act, through the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union, provides an entry point for the participation of a wide spectrum of citizens of Member States in the activities of the AU – a sort of African peoples’ parliament. The transformation process of the OAU into the AU also created the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) process that culminated in the establishment of the African Citizens Directorate (CIDO), a new Department of the AU Commission that was charged with mainstreaming civil society and diaspora participation in the affairs of the African Union.

2. Concurrently, the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its associated Rules of Procedure also envisage a greater role for African civil societies in the area of peace and security. Specifically, Article 20 of the Protocol states that civil society organizations interested in or involved in a conflict situation may be invited to participate in discussions relating to that conflict. Importantly also, the transformation from the OAU to the AU has involved a shift in the continental body’s peace and security agenda – from a focus on conflict management to a broader and arguably more challenging mandate, embracing complex issues of conflict prevention. The enormity of the challenges involved in conflict prevention, particularly its early warning dimensions, together with the limited capacity of the AU, imply that more stakeholders be involved in this new peace and security agenda. Civil societies are strategic stakeholders in the actualization of this agenda because of their proximity to the grassroots (from where they can provide first hand information on conflict situations), and their expertise in conflict analysis.

3. Significantly also, Article 12 (3) of the PSC Protocol states that the Commission “shall collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System”. This provision gives room for the wide spectrum of non-state actors captured by civil society to make effective contributions. The challenge in this regard is to define the method and process through which civil society activities would be coordinated and harnessed to ensure the success of the Continental Early Warning System for conflict prevention. The objective of this paper is to identify and briefly discuss the areas of strength of civil society in conflict prevention and how these can be properly channeled to support the
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), in particular, and the continent’s peace and security agenda in general. Our natural starting point is to identify the current challenges in the AU’s peace and security agenda – focusing on its conflict prevention programme.

Challenges in Current AU Approach to Conflict Management and Prevention

4. Until recently, the AU’s approach to peace and security, inherited from the OAU, focused largely on conflict management. However, this approach has been found to be reactive rather than proactive. Furthermore, it has been found to be very costly both in terms of human and financial resources. The approach does not lend itself to predictable and guaranteed positive outcomes. On the other hand, the conflict prevention approach has been found to be less expensive in terms of saving on financial resources, cutting down on the loss of human lives and protecting the sources of livelihood of those involved in conflict. It, however, requires vigilance, constant monitoring and, above all, in-depth understanding of the dynamics of conflict (including identifying potential conflict spots and preventing the possibility of relapse into conflict after an initial settlement). As mentioned earlier, these tasks are better performed by CSOs due to their closeness to the grassroots. CSOs can, therefore, assist in redressing the balance between conflict prevention and management in the activities of the AU. However, for civil society to effectively play this bridging role, there is need to identify and fill gaps in the current approach to conflict prevention.

Filling Gaps and Possible Responses

5. The Commission has to improve on its current capacity to undertake in-depth analyses of conflicts that could provide it with a basis for informed decisions on intervention. This is understandably so, because limited research goes into the current conflict prevention and management work of the AU. One of the critical gaps in the work of the organization in this regard is the lack of African-sponsored and African-owned research and analysis. There are also other organisational constraints. For instance, the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) lack adequate capacity to manage and cope with the continent’s numerous conflicts. Managing conflict demands a huge amount of human, material and financial resources. None of these is currently available in sufficient quantity and quality at the AU and its RECs.

6. There are also additional requirements in terms of the ability and capacity to monitor post-conflict situations to prevent the possibility of relapse into conflict. These resource gaps have received wide acknowledgement and considerable donor attention. Ironically, though, increased donor attention, in terms especially of higher resource flows, has often been hampered by AU human resource capability constraints that have tended to limit the organisation’s absorptive capacity.

7. The AU would also need to develop frameworks that would allow for independent analytical briefings to its relevant organs on the situations in conflict zones. The absence of regular and informed briefings adversely affects decisions and ultimately the effectiveness of AU actions. The work of relevant CSOs engaged in analytical studies and that are active on the ground would be invaluable in this respect.

8. The AU must also improve on mechanisms for disseminating information about the decisions and operations of the Organisation, a problem that is also shared by the RECs. Exposure to, and knowledge of, the work of the AU, NEPAD and the RECs seem limited even among educated African publics, and
current training and related research on these structures seems low in academic institutions. This responsibility must also be shared by the larger civil society community. CSOs should place premium on the activities of their regional and continental organisations and familiarise themselves with these activities and decisions that have implications for their life and well-being.

9. Ultimately, overcoming these gaps and challenges would require commitment from both the AU and civil society. The AU should make better use of the wealth of resources, in terms of expertise, talent/experience and data that some African CSOs and NGOs working in the fields of peace and security possess. In turn, CSOs have to make a conscious effort to take advantage of the opportunities and challenges of the framework of engagement offered by the AU. They must do so with a sense of duty and commitment that goes beyond self-interest and opportunism.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN AFRICA: IMPLICATION FOR CEWS

10. African civil society organizations are active in two broad areas of conflict prevention that could be useful to the CEWS, namely conceptual and analytical research and peace building activities.

Conceptual and Analytical Research

11. A number of African CSOs are active in the areas of analysis, research, publication and advocacy, with a huge potential to contribute in the conceptualization and designing of a new security architecture for the continent. Their analyses of conflicts deriving from indigenous sources would be valuable tools for in-depth analysis of such conflicts and the development of appropriate response mechanisms. They could also alert the regional body to the likelihood of incipient conflicts, the factors that encourage their escalation and the trigger mechanisms that provoke the deterioration into violence.

12. Active collaboration with such CSOs would also assist the process of profiling and database. Some progress has already been made in this regard because a number of indigenous think-tanks have actually made positive and practical contributions to policy development at both the regional and sub-regional levels, through active collaboration with the AU (and OAU before it) and other sub-regional bodies. Several African CSOs and think-tanks are building considerable capacity in this area. Such think-tanks can be mobilized to conduct research for, and on behalf of, the AU in current and potential conflict zones. Importantly also, they can help to disseminate the work of the AU among key constituencies through their publications and other outreach activities.

Peace-building Activities

13. A number of African civil society organizations, particularly those working at the grassroots, continue to play important roles in promoting and building peace. In Sudan, civil society groups have spearheaded some of the most significant advances towards peace, in particular at the local level. In Sierra Leone, CSOs have also played an important role in the peace process and the formulation of the country’s security sector reform policies. One can also cite the role of CSOs in the negotiations leading to the transitional government in the DRC, as well as in the peace negotiations in Somalia. The role of women’s groups in conflict mediation in South Africa, Somalia, Mozambique and the Mano River Union (where
the Mano River Women's Network has played a pivotal role in spearheading peace efforts) deserves particular mention. CSOs have also played more diffuse roles in peace education, curriculum development, early warning, delivery of relief, and disarmament activities.

14. African CSO’s and NGO’s have demonstrated their commitment and ability to contribute to peace building in the continent. It is in recognition of this reality that the AU and RECs have, in the past couple of years, made conscious efforts to incorporate CSOs in some of their conflict prevention and peace building efforts. One example of this is the ECOWAS Civil Society Forum and its involvement in ECOWAS missions in the sub-region and its role in the development and operations of the regional early warning mechanism. Such initiatives need to be refined, deepened and applied at the continental level.

**An Agenda for Action**

15. Coordinating and harnessing the expertise of civil society in the challenging task of preventing conflict in the continent is definitely a priority agenda. It is encouraging to observe that the AU is committed to developing a concrete framework for systematic and meaningful engagement with the African civil society in this regard. The undertaking, which began with the convening of two OAU/AU-CSO Conferences in December 2001 and June 2002, respectively, is now far advanced and has more recently focused on the specific area of peace and security through the assistance of the Danish Peace Programme for Africa. This involves a number of processes initiated through the joint efforts of CIDO and the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU. Since 2005, the two Departments have been collaborating to bring together various CSOs working in the field of peace and security across the five regions of the continent, to discuss the modalities for ensuring their effective participation in the continental peace and security agenda, including the Early Warning System. Three consultative workshops organized by these Departments in different parts of the continent have identified key areas in which civil society could be useful in the AU’s conflict prevention work along with a work programme and an agenda for action that would facilitate concrete action in this area.

**Establishing a Focal Point for Civil Society Relations with the AU**

16. The first critical step for the involvement of civil society in the AU’s conflict prevention strategy is the establishment of a focal point within the AU Commission, to coordinate civil society inputs into AU’s Early Warning System, in particular, and the larger AU’s peace and security agenda in general. The Situation Room is already operational, gathering and collating data to meet some of the needs of the early warning mechanism. As indicated earlier, CIDO has been very active as the focal point for civil society activities within the Commission. CIDO and the PSD could, therefore, further strengthen their collaboration to ensure that credible CSOs Non-Governmental Organizations, Community-based Organizations and other non state actors are given the opportunity to brief, address or make submissions to the PSC within the framework of Article 20 of the PSC Protocol on urgent and demanding continental issues.

17. In this regard, both CIDO and PSD should work out the details of Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct that will guide CSOs’ contributions to the PSC, including procedures for making requests for submissions to the PSC, how these inputs can be processed, the format of presentation and recommendations for processing outcomes.
18. Article 8 (10-c) of the PSC Protocol, which states that “any regional mechanism, international organisation or civil society organisation involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation”, would be a useful entry point for this process. Moreover, ECOSOCC provides another window for structured engagement of civil society with the PSC through the prerogative of offering advisory opinions to all organs of the African Union. CIDO and PSD could, through further collaboration, make use of this ECOSOCC channel to evolve a subsidiary or complementary methodology for receiving and utilizing inputs from CSOs to specifically serve the needs of the CEWS and broader issues of peace and security issues.

Need to build CSOs capacity in conflict prevention

19. Several CSOs engaged in conflict prevention activities lack the requisite skills. There is, therefore, the need for the AU to assist in building the capacities of these organizations in areas where these gaps are noticed and especially in areas that will enhance the CSOs’ ability to contribute to the effectiveness of the CEWS for conflict prevention. In this regard, the AU has to do a “needs assessment exercise” to determine the needs of the different end users of its Early Warning System in order to identify the key areas in which it requires support from CSOs. Data gathering is a major area in which the CSOs have a comparative advantage given their proximity to sources of potential conflict, therefore training and other forms of support should be provided to them in this critical area to increase their proficiency. Ultimately, there will be a need to establish a database of CSOs and experts in the area of conflict prevention that would provide easy access to credible experts and CSOs that could support AU’s work in this area from time to time. Such a database will be invaluable to the Early Warning System.

Encourage the formation of regional networks for Early Warning

20. The AU should encourage the formation of regional CSOs networks for early warning. Member organizations of these networks would be encouraged to undertake impact assessment studies on ongoing conflicts, including comparative analysis in order to provide input into peace negotiations and decision-making. In this connection, support in the area of IT for proper networking will be invaluable to the efforts of the CSOs. A number of CSOs already have informal and formal networks of country and regional experts to gather ideas and provide information and analysis that could assist the AU decision-making in peace and security.

Advisory Council of CSO Experts to Support on Peace and Security Agenda

21. One of the key recommendations of the AU-CSO regional consultative workshops conducted under the aegis of the Danish Peace Programme for Africa is that the AU Commission should set up an Advisory Council of Experts from CSOs working in the area of peace and security to support its peace and security agenda in general and its conflict prevention work in particular. The experts would provide informed analysis of data gathered on a regular basis as part of the Early Warning System and serve as a broader part of the wider mechanism of regional alert and warnings on incipient and developing conflicts. Members of the Advisory Council should be drawn mainly from among CSOs regional networks in the area of peace and security, individual CSOs with distinguishable track records in the same area, prominent research and academic institutions, as well as other relevant CSOs. This advisory group will also support the use of research and analysis for decision-making processes.
Use of Research and Analysis for Decision-making

22. It is important to make use of the expertise of civil society in this critical area. In this regard, the South African Parliament has been experimenting with this approach for some time now – reputable research and academic institutions are called upon to prepare and present papers on critical national and foreign policy issues with concrete policy recommendations. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) has also tried this practice. Outside the continent, a good example of such practice is the periodic reports prepared and presented by the International Peace Academy (IPA) to the United Nations on critical international issues. Beyond this, however, it would be useful for the Commission, with the support of the Advisory Council, to explore the possibility of setting up a Journal of Peace and Security that will solicit articles from the general public on major security issues and present different scenarios associated with their development and attendant consequences as advise for policy makers. In addition, the use of research and analysis can also extend to the provision of policy briefs and advises for meetings of the PSC as appropriate. In particular, there is also a need to establish a forum for policy seminars by experts to engage in periodic or annual reviews of the Continental Early Warning System in order to improve its operations.

III. CONCLUSION

23. A major shortcoming of the OAU’s peace and security architecture was that it emphasized conflict management as opposed to conflict prevention. More importantly, it focused on the state as the player in conflict management almost to the exclusion of other actors, including civil society. However, over time and with the transformation of the OAU into the AU, increasing emphasis has been placed on the participation of non-state actors, particularly in civil society. Nonetheless, much remains to be done and the outcome of this meeting will play critical role in ensuring the successful development of this process. There would be need for some CSOs to change mindsets from one that emphasises criticisms and an adversarial relationship with states and regional organizations to a cooperative model that assumes that all Africans are part of the same stakeholder society. Such transition would not be easy but it is nonetheless imperative if the interest of African citizens are to be met. In turn, the AU must strengthen and adequately resource its focal point for civil society engagement to enhance the process of coordination with the African civil society community.

24. In the final analysis, African civil societies are partners with the African Union and other stakeholders in the efforts to address Africa’s devastating conflicts. And this battle will only be won if various stakeholders recognize and make good use of each others’ comparative advantage. The African Union has recognized the comparative advantage of the continent’s civil society. The African civil society, in turn, must recognise the value of the African Union, its structures, obligations, responsibilities and onerous duties. This sense of mutual recognition and mutual purpose will lead to result-oriented outcomes, with clear dividends for peace, security and development on the African continent.
DECISION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF
GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON EARLY WARNING AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:

1. TAKES NOTE of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the outcome of the meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 17 to 19 December 2006, and the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System;

2. ENDORSES the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System and the timeframe for its implementation, as adopted by the meeting of Governmental Experts and recommended by the PRC;

3. REQUESTS the Commission to take all the necessary steps for the timely and full implementation of the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, including the mobilization of the financial and technical resources required from both AU Member States and partners, the speedy recruitment of the human resources needed and other relevant steps;

4. FURTHER REQUESTS the Commission to report on the progress made in the implementation of the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System every six months.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF PEACE AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION, THE REGIONAL
ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES AND THE COORDINATING
MECHANISMS OF THE REGIONAL STANDBY BRIGADES
OF EASTERN AFRICA AND NORTHERN AFRICA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 2008

PREAMBLE

The African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa,

Considering the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and of other similar instruments of the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, as well as all other continental and regional instruments relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution;

Further considering the provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in particular Article 16, which states that the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are part of the overall security architecture of the African Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa;

Reaffirming their commitment to the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international instruments;

Bearing in mind that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between African States;

Recognizing the need for closer collaboration between the African Union and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in order to address effectively the problems posed by the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, the scourge of landmines and the threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime, as well as the importance of promoting arms control and disarmament on the basis of relevant African and international instruments;
Aware of the fact that the development of strong democratic institutions and culture, the respect of human rights and the rule of law, the promotion of good governance and, more generally, of measures geared towards the structural prevention of conflicts, as well as the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and development policies are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability in the continent;

Acknowledging the contribution of the African Union and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa and the increasing cooperation and collaboration between them in the implementation of the continent's peace and security agenda;

Desirous of strengthening and deepening their relations and enhancing their capacity to collectively address the scourge of conflicts and ensure the maintenance of peace, security and stability, through the conclusion of the present Memorandum of Understanding, in accordance with the authority conferred by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union;

Hereby agree on the following:

ARTICLE I

Definitions

1. For the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding:
   i) “Assembly” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;
   ii) “Commission” means the Commission of the African Union;
   iii) “Constitutive Act” means the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
   iv) “Coordinating Mechanisms” means the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa’;
   v) “Council” means the Peace and Security Council of the African Union;
   vi) “Memorandum” means the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa;
   vii) “Parties” means the African Union (AU), the Arab Magreb Union (UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC), which are not managed by Regional Economic Communities;
   ix) “RECs” means the eight Regional Economic Communities recognized by the African Union;
   x) “Union” means the African Union.
ARTICLE II

Scope

Pursuant to the PSC Protocol, the Memorandum is a binding legal instrument consisting of principles, rights and obligations to be applied in the relationship between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms, in matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, subject to their respective competences.

ARTICLE III

Objectives

1. The Parties shall institutionalize and strengthen their cooperation and closely coordinate their activities towards their shared goal of ridding the continent of the scourge of conflicts and laying the foundation for sustainable peace, security and stability.

2. The objectives of the Memorandum shall be to:
   (i) contribute to the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
   (ii) ensure the regular exchange of information between the Parties on all their activities pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
   (iii) foster closer partnership between the Parties in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent, as well as to enhance coordination between their activities;
   (iv) develop and implement joint programmes and activities in the area of peace, security and stability in Africa;
   (v) ensure that the activities of the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union;
   (vi) facilitate coordination and enhance partnership between the Parties, on the one hand, and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as other relevant international organizations, on the other hand;
   (vii) contribute to ensuring that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the objectives and principles of the Union; and
   (viii) build and strengthen the capacity of the Parties in the areas covered by the Memorandum.

ARTICLE IV

Principles

The implementation of the Memorandum shall be guided by the following:

   (i) scrupulous observance of the principles and provisions of the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol, as well as other relevant instruments agreed to at continental level;
(ii) recognition of, and respect for, the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol;

(iii) acknowledgment of the role and responsibilities of the RECs and, where appropriate, of the Coordinating Mechanisms in their areas of jurisdiction, as well as the contribution they can make towards the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in other regions of the continent; and

(iv) adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

ARTICLE V

Areas of cooperation

In order to achieve the objectives listed in Article III (2) of the Memorandum, the Parties shall cooperate in all areas relevant for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, including:

(i) the operationalization and functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture, as provided for by the PSC Protocol and other relevant instruments;
(ii) the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts;
(iii) humanitarian action and disaster response;
(iv) post-conflict reconstruction and development;
(v) arms control and disarmament;
(vi) counter-terrorism and the prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime;
(vii) border management;
(viii) capacity building, training and knowledge sharing;
(ix) resource mobilization;
(x) any other areas of shared priorities and common interest as may be agreed to by the Parties.

ARTICLE VI

Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture

Subject to the provisions of Article IV (iii) and (iv) of this Memorandum:

1. The Parties shall work towards the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

2. The Parties shall work together to make the Continental Early Warning System, as provided for by Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, fully operational, on the basis of the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System.

3. The Parties shall work together to make the African Standby Force, as provided for in Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, fully operational, on the basis of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the
Memorandum of Understanding

African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee, which, among other things, provides for the establishment of five regional brigades to constitute the African Standby Force.

4. The Parties shall, where appropriate and within the framework of their conflict prevention strategies, establish structures similar to the Panel of the Wise, as provided for by Article 11 of the PSC Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

1. The Parties shall intensify their efforts towards the prevention of conflicts through, among other things, fostering policies aimed at promoting democratic principles and practices, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law.


3. The Parties shall cooperate to enhance their capacity to anticipate and prevent conflicts and actions that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity.

4. Where conflicts have occurred, the Parties shall cooperate in peace-making and peace-building activities to resolve these conflicts and prevent their recurrence, including through good offices, mediation, conciliation, enquiry and deployment of peace support missions, as provided for in the PSC Protocol and other relevant regional instruments.

ARTICLE VIII

Humanitarian Action and Disaster Management

The Parties shall cooperate and support each other in humanitarian action and in addressing major disasters, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol.
ARTICLE IX

*Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development*

1. The Parties shall combine their efforts to support post-conflict reconstruction and development, with a view to consolidating peace, promoting sustainable development and paving the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from and/or affected by conflicts.

2. The Parties shall cooperate to facilitate the effective implementation of the Continental Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

ARTICLE X

*Arms Control and Disarmament*

1. The Parties shall work together to promote and encourage the implementation of continental, regional and other relevant instruments pertaining to arms control and disarmament.

2. The Parties shall, through collaborative efforts, work to address effectively the scourge of landmines, the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, issues related to chemical weapons and denuclearization, based on the relevant regional, continental and international instruments.

ARTICLE XI

*Counter-terrorism, Prevention and Combating of trans-national organized crime*

1. The Parties shall promote closer cooperation in the prevention and combating of terrorism, based on the Union's Convention, Protocol, and Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, as well as on other relevant regional and international instruments.

2. The Parties shall promote closer cooperation in the prevention and combating of trans-national organized crime.

ARTICLE XII

*Border Management*

The Parties shall work together on issues relating to border management on the basis of the Declaration on the Union's Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities.
ARTICLE XIII

Capacity building, training and knowledge sharing

1. The Parties shall work together to develop and enhance their capacities in a mutually reinforcing way to facilitate the effective implementation of the Memorandum and the achievement of its objectives.

2. The Parties shall engage in staff exchange and secondment programmes, as well as sharing of best practices and lessons learnt.

ARTICLE XIV

Resource mobilization

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the mobilization of resources through a coherent and coordinated strategy to be elaborated under the auspices of the AU, including with respect to the relations with their partners within the international community.

2. Nothing in the Memorandum shall preclude the right of the Parties to seek individual assistance and resources in matters covered by the Memorandum, consistent with the strategy.

ARTICLE XV

Arrangements for cooperation

Arrangements for cooperation shall include:

(i) Exchange of information;
(ii) Meetings and other mechanisms for enhancing cooperation;
(iii) Institutional presence; and
(iv) Joint activities and field coordination.

ARTICLE XVI

Exchange of information

1. The Parties shall regularly exchange information, analysis and assessments on the issues covered by the Memorandum.

2. The RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall submit, whenever required and at least every six (6) months, a comprehensive report on their activities in the area of peace and security to the Chairperson of the Commission and, through him, to Council. The Commission shall also, whenever required and at least every six (6) months, provide the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms with an update on its activities and those of Council in the area of peace and security.
3. Without prejudice to the formally established channels of communication, the Parties shall encourage networking, including through the establishment of desk-to-desk consultation, and, to that end, shall exchange names of their desk officers dealing with issues covered by the Memorandum.

4. The Parties shall treat sensitive information with the appropriate level of confidentiality and shall transmit the same through secure channels.

ARTICLE XVII

Meetings and other mechanisms for enhancing cooperation

1. The Parties shall regularly consult each other, both at political and technical levels, on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

2. The RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be invited to the discussion of any question brought before Council whenever that question is being addressed by a REC or a Coordinating Mechanism or is of special interest to that REC or Coordinating Mechanism, in accordance with Article 16 (6) of the PSC Protocol.

3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be invited to the meetings and deliberations of the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms, in accordance with Article 16(7) of the PSC Protocol.

4. The Parties shall invite each other to all other meetings relevant to their partnership for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability, and shall share reports of those meetings.

5. A meeting between the Chairperson of the Commission and the Chief Executives of the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be held at least once a year to discuss matters of peace and security and agree on a programme of work.

6. A meeting of Senior Officials shall be held at least once a year to review and monitor progress in the priority areas of cooperation identified in the programme of work and to discuss policy, technical and operational issues relating to the furtherance of the objectives of the Memorandum.

7. Ad hoc consultations at political or technical levels may also be convened to address specific issues relevant to the objectives of the Memorandum.

ARTICLE XVIII

Institutional presence

1. The Commission shall establish Liaison Offices to the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms, with a view to strengthening coordination and cooperation. The RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to establish Liaison Offices to the Commission.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the establishment of these Liaison Offices by providing, to the extent possible, the necessary support, including office space, communications, and other administrative and logistical support.

ARTICLE XIX

Joint Activities and Field Coordination

1. The Parties shall, as required, develop and implement joint activities in the areas covered by the Memorandum, including through the convening of workshops and seminars.

2. The Parties shall also enhance the coordination of their operational activities, including through regular consultations and coordination between their representatives in a given area or country.

3. The Parties shall undertake joint activities related to capacity building, including through joint training, exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, exchange of staff, and development of comprehensive and well-coordinated strategies in that regard.

ARTICLE XX

Modalities for Interaction

1. Without prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs and, where appropriate, the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States and, where conflicts do occur, to undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts to resolve them, including through the deployment of peace support missions.

2. In undertaking these activities, the RECs and, where appropriate, the Coordinating Mechanisms shall keep the Chairperson of the Commission and, through him, Council fully and continuously informed and ensure that their activities are in conformity with the objectives of the PSC Protocol.

3. The RECs managing regional brigades within the framework of the African Standby Force and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall, upon decision by Council, make available their assets and capabilities, including planning, to other RECs and Coordinating Mechanisms or the Union, in order to facilitate the deployment of peace support operations outside their areas of jurisdiction.

4. The RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms shall, upon decision by Council, make their regional brigades available for deployment as part of a peace support operation undertaken outside their areas of jurisdiction.

5. Nothing in this Memorandum shall prevent the Union from taking measures necessary to maintain or restore peace and security anywhere in the continent.

6. Intervention as provided for by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act shall be authorized by the Assembly upon recommendation by Council.
7. Intervention by the Union, at the request of Member States, as provided for by Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act, shall be authorized by the Assembly and the modalities therefor shall be approved by Council.

ARTICLE XXI

Relations with the United Nations and other International Actors

1. The Parties shall harmonize their views in relevant international forums, including the United Nations. The Union shall coordinate such efforts to ensure that African interests and positions as defined at continental level are effectively pursued.

2. The Parties shall work together to mobilize the support of the United Nations, other relevant actors and the international community, in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the Memorandum. The Union shall coordinate such efforts.

3. The Commission shall ensure that the United Nations Security Council is kept informed of the activities undertaken by the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

ARTICLE XXII

Relations with civil society and private sector

The parties commit themselves to harmonize and coordinate their efforts with respect to their interaction with civil society organizations and the private sector in furtherance of the continental peace and security agenda.

ARTICLE XXIII

Supplementary Agreements

The Parties may enter into supplementary, inter-organizational, or other agreements for the effective implementation of the Memorandum.

ARTICLE XXIV

Dispute Resolution

1. Any misunderstanding or difference(s) arising among the Parties from or regarding the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Memorandum shall be resolved amicably through negotiation.

2. Any misunderstanding or difference(s) that cannot be resolved amicably shall be referred to Council, whose decision shall be binding on the Parties and shall be final.
ARTICLE XXV

Amendments

The Parties shall regularly review the implementation of the Memorandum and shall, when necessary, amend its provisions, by consensus.

ARTICLE XXVI

Commencement of the Memorandum

The Memorandum shall enter into force upon signature by five of the Parties, including the Commission.
CHAPTER III
The Continental Early Warning System

Introduction and Background

83. The Continental Early Warning System is established as one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture within Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. Article 12 specifies that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) should consist of an observation and monitoring centre (to be known as the 'Situation Room'). The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.

Progress and Challenges in the Operationalization of the CEWS

84. Significant progress has been achieved in the operationalization of CEWS since the adoption of the Framework for the Operationalization of CEWS in December 2006. Since then the system has been able to provide reliable and up-to-date information on potential, actual and post-conflict situations. The CEWS have registered important outputs and achievements, which among others include:

- Successful development of the CEWS methodology through a consultative process with all involved stakeholders;
- Development of data collection and analysis tools and the elaboration of a software licensing agreement between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs.
- Strengthened coordination and collaboration between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs.
- Refurbishment of the Situation Room. Infrastructure upgrade and installment of the necessary equipments, including the live monitoring software (i.e. LIVEMON in the office of the AUC Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Director for Peace and Security).
- Increased expertise and analytical skills of the CEWS and the early warning systems of most RECs. This includes putting in place some Early Warning Officers, Analysts and Situation Room staff.
Information collection and monitoring tools are operational and data can be accessed through a specifically developed CEWS information portal.

85. Full operationalization of CEWS so that it effectively supports conflict prevention, mediation and preventive diplomacy is still to be realized. Moreover, uneven development and in some cases, slow development of early warning systems in RECs ultimately hinders higher level operation.

86. The 2010 APSA assessment found that automated data collection and reporting are relatively advanced at the level of CEWS. This is also the case at ECOWARN and CEWARN. In most other RECs, progress has been achieved in establishing policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to early warning. Data collection and reporting for early warning is yet to be effective in CEN-SAD, EAC and COMESA.

87. Continuous news monitoring, summarised in the Africa News Brief and Daily News Highlights, are circulated by the AUC to a wider network of subscribers including all RECs by email. Collection of data from stakeholders is progressing but still needs substantial efforts to be completed.

88. Conflict analysis and development of response options are at an incipient level in some regions. Together with the need for sharing information with stakeholders, analysis and response options are the biggest challenges. Only IGAD is building up an integrated response mechanism at this stage. The CEWARN response includes elements of mediation at local level. Processes and templates for Early Warning Reports that include policy options are in place at the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. Substantial efforts are needed to strengthen the way in which policy makers' access, use and decide upon the response options developed by analysts.

89. As part of efforts to enhance the data collection and information gathering capacity of the Situation Room and Monitoring Units, the AU and RECs are in the process of developing various software modules to facilitate the collection, sharing and distribution of information within the AU (including PSOs and field offices) and with the RECs. In order to put in place the overall IT requirements of the CEWS, the following items need to be put in place.

IT Equipment and Software

90. To enhance the data collection and analysis capacity of the CEWS, the Conflict Management Division (CMD) in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EC have developed a new tool called the Africa Media Monitor (AMM). The AMM is an automated tool for data collection and distribution. This software is currently hosted at the JRC and is accessible to the African Union via the internet.

Connectivity between AU the RECs

91. The PSC requires that the monitoring and observation centres of the RECs shall be directly linked to the AU Situation Room. As a follow-up to this decision an AU team carried out a site assessment mission to all RECs and submitted recommendations (technical and financial) on how to ensure and facilitate the connectivity of the early warning systems of the RECs to the Situation Room through the AU VSAT, which includes:
i. Current bandwidth enhancement (at least 4GB)
ii. Acquisition of hardware equipments

The AU Commission’s management information systems (MIS) needs the necessary infrastructure and capacity to effectively support CEWS.

**Human Resources at CEWS and early warning systems of the RECs**

92. The Situation Room is responsible for monitoring situations of potential, actual and post-conflict situations in Africa. In order to accomplish this task currently there are 10 Situation Room Assistants working on a 24/7 shift basis. As the number of staff is not adequate to cover all regions in Africa, additional staff is required.

93. A shortage of staff can also be detected within the early warning systems of the RECs. Without substantial staff reinforcement it is questionable whether the monitoring units in certain RECs will be established.

94. Timelines and resources for recruitment at the AUC have improved over time but must be further improved. In 2006, an attempt at recruitment had to be deferred indefinitely. The present recruitment (5 analysts) was launched in August 2009, approved in December and should see analysts in place by October 2010. The other required staff spelled out in the CEWS roadmap should be contracted as soon as possible. Recruitment has generally been affected negatively by external project transitions and funding cycles. New pooled funds should give greater consistency and sustainability.

**Training**

95. The CEWS intends to further strengthen relations with the early warning systems of the RECs by undertaking joint trainings and staff exchange programmes in particular to enhance the analytic capacity of staff. Development and delivery of specialised and customized trainings for staff dealing with CEWS and early warning systems in the RECs should be given priority in the coming years. Sustained skills training and capacity building for staff dealing with early warning in the AUC and RECs are required for effective operationalisation of CEWS and the early warning systems in the RECs.

**Engagement with Decision Makers**

96. Efforts to strengthen engagement with senior management and political decision makers in some of the RECs remain embryonic, a situation that should be addressed.

**Coordination and Collaboration with the AUC/RECs:**

97. Technical meetings between the CEWS and the early warning systems of RECs are taking place 3 times a year. Continued prioritisation of these quarterly technical meetings (hosted by the RECs) is required to strengthen expertise and promote coordination and collaboration.
98. An incremental, pragmatic approach is needed to gradually build functional and result-oriented partnerships with relevant international organizations. Coordination and collaboration with the UN, its agencies and other international organizations should be continued.

Coordination and collaboration with stakeholders as mentioned in the PSC Protocol

99. The consultation between CEWS and CSOs foreseen for September 2009 has never happened. The AU is willing to engage but has problems knowing who to engage with because of the diversity of civil society and the very different level of development in different states and regions. The very different attitude towards CSOs and think tanks across regions and within African countries cause challenges for the AUC and RECs.

100. As part of efforts to strengthen the capacity of CEWS to gather data and successfully operationalise APSA, it is imperative that the AU / RECs reach out to stakeholders as mentioned in the PSC Protocol. Such stakeholders can provide valuable information, expertise and increase awareness of CEWS and the work carried out by AUC and the RECs. Such cooperation can contribute to better use of available information and early warning by decision-makers and should be considered a strategic priority in the coming years.

Partner Support

101. Different kinds of support for the CEWS were drawn from a relatively small number of donors. Programmed / budget funding is provided by EU, UNDP, GTZ and DANIDA. Flexible, ad-hoc funding is also provided by UNDP, UK GTZ and USAID.

102. In general donor support has been forthcoming with adequate timing and at sufficient levels. In particular at the level of the AUC and to a lesser extent in regional organisations. The AUC has been quite selective in establishing partnerships and in mobilizing resources. This has proven more difficult for the regional organisations. The major gaps are linked to the reliance on external support. Delays and non disbursement of pledged partner support have caused substantial problems, in particular during 2010. Moreover, most partners tend to prioritise one or two organisations rather than continent-wide CEWS support based on a pragmatic approach which match the advancement of the individual organisations.

103. Financial sustainability is a challenge at this stage of CEWS operationalisation. The large majority of the Continental and Regional Organisations advance due to availability of external partner support. Managerial and political sustainability and commitment from the AU / RECs and member states are not in question but it needs to be nurtured and possibly reinforced.

104. All in all, the collaboration between CEWS and the Early warning systems of the RECs and donor partners to build capacity for the operationalization of CEWS has been by and large successful. The critical success factors were: A relatively clear definition of goals, i.e. the specifications of the system (steered by AUC through a consultative process), Ownership and capacity within AUC to align support to its own strategies and processes, a diversity of resources (programmed and flexible funds, partnerships, expertise), donor partners were able to engage CEWS at the operational level for discussions on CEWS requirements and multi-year commitments of key donors.

[...]

2010 Assessment Study
THE CEWS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE RECS

223. **Ensure Connectivity between AUC and RECs**: The AU should work with the RECs to improve and ensure connectivity at all levels including transfer of information from all RECs to the AU Situation Room. While there is some level of information exchange between the AU and some RECs, more needs to be done to broaden this information as a way of increasing synergy between the continental and regional early warning systems. There is a strong imperative to improve the existing information technology infrastructure.

224. **Provide Additional Analysts for the CEWS**: The AU should increase the number of analysts, in qualitative and quantitative terms. The number of analysts in the AU early warning is not adequate and they are overstretched. In the same breadth, special attention should be given to strengthening the analytical capacities especially of those RECs that are still in the process of establishing their early warning systems. Addressing this gap would help to improve the quality of the analysis and the policy options presented to decision-makers. Finally, it is critical to enhance support to the less developed early warning systems of the RECs.

225. **Broaden the Recipient of Early Warning Reports**: The AU and RECs should institutionalize and broaden the recipients of its reports and policy options. In this vein, where that practice is not already in place, early warning reports should be shared with a range of actors including, the ASF PLANELM, the Peace Support Operations Division, the PSC Secretariat, Members of Panel of the Wise and its Secretariat, AU / REC mediators, special representatives, and ongoing peace support operations.

226. **Increase and Strengthen Collaboration with Other Actors**: The AU and the RECs should increase and where it exist their engagement with other actors such as the United Nations agencies and civil society in Africa and beyond. To date there is no actual collaboration and coordination with the UN and its specialized agencies, other international organizations, this is a gap that needs to be filled. Moreover, collaboration with civil society should be improved. ECOWAS’ partnership with civil society in this area provides a useful model for the AU and other RECs that are yet to establish such partnerships. Overall, it is important to continuously aim towards strong complementarities between RECs horizontally and value addition to CEWS vertically.

227. **Improve Documentation of Lessons Learned**: The AU and RECs should improve and strengthen the lessons learned and documentation process. To date, there has been limited effort in this direction especially at the level of some RECs. However, capturing lessons and best practices would go a long way in enhancing the efficacy of the CEWS and similar structures in the RECs.
TRIPOLI DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA AND THE PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), meeting in Tripoli, Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 31st August 2009, on the occasion of the Special Session on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, as agreed in Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.252 (XIII), have reviewed the state of peace and security on our continent and the steps we need to take to hasten the attainment of our common objective of a conflict-free Africa.

2. The decision to convene this Special Session reflects our growing concern at the persistence of conflict and crisis situations on the continent, despite the many efforts deployed thus far to resolve them. It also bears testimony to our renewed determination to give further impetus to the implementation of relevant AU decisions and promote lasting peace, security and stability on the continent, for without such an environment our vision of the political and economic integration and development of Africa will not materialize.

3. Our meeting is taking place at a time when significant efforts are being made to end conflict and promote peace and security on the continent. We have come a long way since we launched the AU in Durban, in July 2002, and inaugurated the Peace and Security Council (PSC), in Addis Ababa, in May 2004. Today, we have the necessary institutional and normative framework to address the scourge of conflicts, and the AU has demonstrated a renewed dynamism in dealing with issues of peace and security on the continent.

4. We note that the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as articulated in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, is well on course, as shown by the effective functioning of the PSC, the launching of the Panel of the Wise and the establishment of key components of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

5. We also note that, consistent with the spirit and letter of the AU Constitutive Act, we have, over the years, adopted a number of instruments on human rights, governance, democracy, disarmament, terrorism, and good neighbourliness, which represent a consolidated framework of norms and principles, whose observance would reduce considerably the risk of conflict and violence on the continent and consolidate peace where it has been achieved.

6. Finally, significant strides have been made in the resolution of conflicts in Africa, as evidenced by the remarkable achievements in countries such as Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and the Sudan (South Sudan), as well as the advances recorded in the search for peace...
in a number of other countries and regions. These developments have brought hope and enhanced the prospects for development and renewal, which now need to be enhanced through sustained efforts at peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

7. While we take pride in these achievements, we remain, nevertheless, deeply concerned at the continued prevalence of conflict, insecurity and instability in large parts of the continent, with its attendant humanitarian consequences and socio-economic impact. Indeed, armed conflicts in Africa kill thousands of people every year; create humanitarian disasters; wipe out livelihoods and wealth that ordinary people have worked hard to accumulate over their lifetimes; and make sustainable economic development impossible. There is also a more profound loss: the destruction of hope for a better future.

8. In addition, we note with concern the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of Government, which constitutes a serious setback to the democratization process, as well as the emerging trend of election-related violence and conflicts; the threats posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, piracy, and illicit exploitation of natural resources to fuel conflicts; and the persistence of the border disputes and conflicts. We reiterate our commitment, in conformity with the decision adopted in Sirte, in July 2009, to cut off the sources of funding for terrorism, in particular those originating from the payment of ransom in situations of hostage taking. Of equal concern are the implications of climate change and its resulting consequences (food insecurity, scarce water resources, damage to coastal infrastructure and cities, reduced agricultural yields and environmentally-induced migration) for our quest for peace and the efforts being made in this respect.

9. Against this background, we are determined to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflicts and violence on our continent, acknowledging our shortcomings and errors, committing our resources and our best people, and missing no opportunity to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. We, as leaders, simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans.

10. To this end, we recommit ourselves to accelerate the full operationalization of the APSA, including the further refinement of existing provisions, where necessary, to facilitate their implementation. In this respect, we agree to increase our contributions, both financial and technical, in support of the APSA. We request the Chairperson of the Commission to take all steps necessary to strengthen the Commission’s capacity to better address the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent, including through the speedy recruitment of necessary additional staff, bearing in mind that additional resources are needed.

11. We undertake to make renewed efforts to address the root causes of conflicts in a holistic and systematic manner, including through implementing existing instruments in the areas of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, elections, good governance, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and good neighborliness. This requires that all Member States that have not yet done so speedily sign and/or ratify those instruments and that the Commission actively monitor their implementation. We request the Commission to take all necessary steps to sensitize the Member States concerned and to undertake a thorough and systematic review of the status of implementation of these instruments and to submit to the Assembly concrete proposals on how to improve compliance.

12. In particular, we reiterate our total rejection of unconstitutional changes of Government and undertake to enhance both prevention of, and response to, this phenomenon. In this vein, we reiterate the need for Member States to promote good governance, to abide by the rule of law and to respect their
own Constitutions, especially when it comes to introducing constitutional reforms, bearing in mind that failure to do so can lead to situations of tension, which could, in turn, precipitate political crisis. Equally, we shall take all necessary measures, including the condemnation of, and imposition of sanctions against any African country that would encourage, support or host armed groups whose objective is to destabilize another state. We commit ourselves to abide by the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of our external relations.

13. We reiterate our determination to ensure that, at all times, Africa moves first and in a timely manner to deal with the scourge of conflicts in our continent. We also reiterate our commitment to exercise utmost restraint, to systematically resort to peaceful means to settle all disputes, and to be responsive to mediation and other preventive diplomacy endeavors.

14. We are resolved to ensure that sufficient troops and observers are made available for rapid deployment when and where they are required.

15. Driven by our determination to transform the geo-political landscape of Africa for the benefit of all its peoples, by promoting the development and integration of the continent, we shall take a series of concrete and effective measures to accelerate the implementation of solutions already agreed to for the settlement of a number of conflicts, and the promotion of fair and equitable solutions to situations for which no agreement has yet been reached by the parties concerned, as well as for post-conflict reconstruction, to provide the peoples concerned with peace dividends.

16. We reiterate our full support to all ongoing peace efforts on the continent and urge all concerned parties to leave no stone unturned to end the conflicts they are party to, bring hope to their people and build sustainable peace. In line with the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, as well as the PSC Protocol, we commit ourselves, where parties to a conflict stubbornly refuse to live up to their obligations and cooperate towards the promotion of peace, to impose sanctions and ensure their scrupulous implementation throughout the continent, while seeking the support of our partners within the international community, including the UN Security Council.

17. We commit ourselves, within the framework of the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), to show the required solidarity with the African countries emerging from conflicts, to assist them in consolidating their hard-won peace and avoiding relapse into violence.

18. We stress the need for all Member States to extend full cooperation and support to the PSC, bearing in mind that, in carrying out its duties under the Protocol, the PSC acts on behalf of the entire membership of the AU. Equally, we commit ourselves to increase substantially our contribution to the Peace Fund, for Africa to truly own the ongoing efforts to promote peace, security and stability on the continent. In this respect, we request the Commission to take the necessary preparatory steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 to 12%. We also encourage all Member States in a position to do so, to make voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund. We request the Commission to submit to the Assembly, in June 2010, a comprehensive report on how best to mobilize increased resources from within the continent to support our peace efforts.

19. Making and sustaining peace and security is also an intellectual challenge. We therefore undertake to build the capacity of our universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what succeeds and what fails in conflict resolution efforts, and to arrive at African-centered solutions, drawing from our own distinctive and unique experience.
20. To achieve our objective of an African continent that is not only at peace with itself but is also at peace with the rest of the world, we need to continue to strengthen our relations with our major partners. We value the support provided by our bilateral and multilateral partners in the Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East, and call on them to continue working closely with us in achieving our goals, understanding that peace and security are indivisible.

21. At the same time, we reiterate our determination to ensure that these partnerships are fully based on Africa’s leadership, because without such leadership, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better than those who come from far away; because we know which solutions will work, and how we can get there; and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and we will live with their consequences.

22. We call on the African civil society to continue to play its role in promoting peace, security and stability as partners of Government, as we seek to ensure that the AU, as called for in its Constitutive Act, respect the principle of participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.

23. We declare the year 2010 as *Year of Peace and Security on the Continent*. In this regard, we request the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare a detailed programme which would identify concrete steps that could be taken to promote peace, security and stability on the continent, and to submit it to the next ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union.

24. We solemnly adopt the Tripoli Declaration, and pledge our full commitment to its effective implementation so as to open a new chapter in our collective action in favor of peace, security, stability and shared prosperity throughout Africa and the rest of the world.
TRIPOLI PLAN OF ACTION

Special Session of the AU Assembly on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, 
Tripoli, Libya, SP / ASSEMBLY / PS / PLAN (I), 31 August 2009

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), meeting in Tripoli, Great 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 31st August 2009, on the occasion of the Special Session 
on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, as agreed in Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.252 
(XIII), have reviewed the state of peace and security on our continent and agreed on the measures that 
need to be taken to accelerate the resolution of conflict and crisis situations, as well as consolidate peace 
where it has been achieved.

2. These measures, taken on the basis of earlier AU decisions, which we are reconfirming, are to be 
implemented in the short term and are as follows:

3. On Somalia:

(i) To deploy, by the end of 2009, the three remaining battalions of the AU Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), thereby enabling AMISOM to reach its authorized strength;

(ii) To request Member States that have already pledged troops to AMISOM, to make them 
available as soon as possible. Also request Member States to provide all necessary support to 
AMISOM and to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, including funding, 
troops, equipment, logistics and training;

(iii) To further efforts towards the early elaboration of an integrated and well coordinated training 
plan for the Somali Security Forces and Police; In this respect, the Special Session requests the 
Commission to take the required steps, in coordination with the TFG and member States and 
partners, to enhance the efficiency of the training and facilitate the effective insertion of the 
trained personnel into the TFG’s Security Forces;

(iv) To acknowledge the contribution and sacrifices that have been made by the neighbouring 
countries and to request them to continue with their consultations with the Commission and 
support for AMISOM in every way possible;

(v) To request the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to review the mandate of AMISOM, in par-
ticular with regard to its authorized strength, and the logistical support, to enable it to provide 
increased assistance to the TFG and facilitate the extension of its authority, including outside of 
the capital city, over its airspace and territorial waters and over those strategic locations whose 
control is likely to accelerate the achievement of peace, security and stability in Somalia;

(vi) To encourage the TFG to intensify its efforts to promote reconciliation and an all-inclusive 
political process. In this respect, the Special Session demands that all Somali parties that have 
not yet joined the peace process, to do so immediately and without any precondition. To 
this end, result-oriented negotiations need to be engaged between the TFG and the armed 
opposition groups which would be willing to renounce violence and seek peaceful solutions 
to their grievances;

(vii) To impose targeted and mandatory sanctions against the leaders and other members of Soma-
li armed groups engaged in destabilization activities against the TFG, as well as other actors
engaged in criminal activities that fuel the conflict and undermine the peace and reconciliation efforts. The individuals concerned will be held personally accountable for their subversive actions. In this regard, close collaboration needs to be developed with the UN Monitoring Group to ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented;

(viii) To strengthen the political and humanitarian components of AMISOM, including through the enhancement of its political presence on the ground in Mogadishu, with the view of facilitating engagement with all stakeholders, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of the local administration and infrastructure, and the implementation of community-based Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes;

(ix) To work towards the early disbursement by all the countries and institutions that made pledges during the Brussels Conference of the funds committed in order to avoid delays in the implementation of crucial activities, including the training of the Somali Security Forces;

(x) To develop closer collaboration and coordination between the AU and its partners, including the United Nations, for the speedy implementation of sanctions against spoilers, the imposition of a no-fly zone and naval blockade to prevent the flow of arms and other forms of material support to the insurgents in Somalia, as well as the protection of Somalia’s coastline and fight against piracy, illicit dumping and illegal exploitation of marine resources, in line with relevant AU and IGAD decisions;

(xi) To convene an international conference to discuss the adoption of an international convention on the phenomenon of maritime piracy and its underlying causes, as well as the promotion of effective international cooperation, which, in conformity with the Convention on the Law of the Sea, ensures the freedom of maritime navigation and preserves the right of States on their Exclusive Economic Zone and their territorial waters, as well as that of local populations to benefit from the resources therein;

(xii) To mobilize resources for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali state institutions, using existing mechanisms.

4. On Darfur (Sudan):

(i) To ensure speedy progress in the search for peace, security, justice and reconciliation in Darfur, with the aim of significantly moving the process forward by the end of 2009, building on the improvement of the security situation. In this respect, the Special Session calls on all the Sudanese parties to demonstrate the necessary political will and engage in dialogue without preconditions, it being understood that targeted sanctions could be imposed on those parties that would refuse to take part in the negotiations or reject their outcome;

(ii) Commitment of the Sudanese parties to an immediate ceasefire, in order to create conditions conducive to the successful conclusion of the political process, and support to the current efforts aimed at unifying the armed groups so as to facilitate the negotiations, in line with the programme of work of the AU-UN Joint Mediator;

(iii) To request the Sudanese parties and the international community to extend full cooperation to the implementation of the report of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), whose recommendations are expected to provide a clear roadmap on how best to achieve peace, justice, reconciliation and healing in Darfur, thereby contributing to the overall objective of sustainable peace and stability in the Sudan as a whole;

(iv) Commitment by the AU Member States that have pledged troops and police personnel for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to ensure their timely deployment, so
as to facilitate the achievement of the full deployment of the Mission by the end of this year, and request to the international partners to provide the necessary equipment to the African Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) and appropriate enablers to the UNAMID;

(v) To request the Sudanese Government to continue taking concrete steps to investigate the abuses committed in Darfur and bring their perpetrators to justice;

(vi) To reiterate the AU’s earlier decision regarding the non-cooperation of its Member States with the arrest and surrender of President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, following the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC);

(vii) To urge the international community to move from emergency humanitarian assistance towards development support, in order to facilitate the return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs;

(viii) To establish a flexible and effective mechanism to monitor the implementation of the above-mentioned measures and to enhance Africa’s role in the strategic leadership of the peace process in Darfur, in light of the recommendations of the AUPD and other relevant factors.

5. **On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA):**

(i) Commitment by the parties to the CPA to resolve the outstanding issues in its implementation, in particular as they relate to the demarcation of the North-South border, the enactment of the remaining legislation for the elections, the full redeployment of forces, the disarmament of militias and the operationalization of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), and to work towards finding an agreement on the results of the census;

(ii) To request the Commission to dispatch, without delay, a pre-election assessment team to the Sudan to meet with the Sudanese officials, as well as other stakeholders involved in the preparations for the Sudanese elections, in order to assess the readiness of the Sudanese electoral process and review the status of the implementation of the CPA;

(iii) To revitalize the activities of the AU Ministerial Committee on the Post-Conflict Reconstruction of the Sudan and increase support of Member States to peacebuilding in the Sudan. In this respect, the Special Session requests the Commission to convene a Conference to support postconflict reconstruction in the Sudan, in the 1st quarter of the 2010.

6. **On the relations between Chad and the Sudan:**

(i) The two countries to commit themselves to comply fully with the various Agreements they have signed towards the normalization of their relations, in particular by refraining from providing any kind of support or hosting armed opposition groups hostile to the other;

(ii) To reactivate the efforts to deploy a peace and security force along the border between the Sudan and Chad to monitor the situation on the ground. In this respect, the Special Session requests the co-chairs (Republic of Congo and Libya) of the Contact Group established by the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008, to immediately resume its work;

(iii) To request the Chairperson of the Union to continue his efforts in support of the implementation of the Sirte Agreement;

(iv) To request the concerned armed groups to engage in political processes aimed at finding solutions to any grievance they may have, bearing in mind the need to respect constitutional order and legality. Should they refuse to embark on such processes, targeted sanctions will be imposed against them.
7. **On the situation in the Horn of Africa:**

To request the Commission, in pursuance of the relevant paragraphs of decision Assembly/AU/Dec.252(XIII) and other relevant AU and IGAD decisions, in support of IGAD and in collaboration with the UN, the League of Arab States and other stakeholders, to continue with efforts of peacebuilding and reconciliation, in order to foster peace, security, cooperation and development in the Horn of Africa. These efforts will be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the countries of the region concerned with respect to their bilateral disputes and actions falling under the purview of the UN Security Council or any other measure that the Security Council may take in response to relevant AU and IGAD decisions.

8. **On the Great Lakes Region:**

(i) To mobilize greater support from Member States and the international community for the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development;

(ii) To encourage and support the efforts to harmonize activities for the promotion of security within the concerned Regional Economic Communities (IGAD, SADC, EAC, ECCAS), as well as CEPGL;

(iii) To increase the efforts to promote regional economic integration, in particular within the framework of the CEPGL, as well as relevant projects undertaken by other regional organizations;

(iv) To mobilize greater support from Member States towards post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, and request the Commission to organize a pledging conference which would enable African countries to express their solidarity with these two countries, in accordance with the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). This Conference will aim at mobilizing political, financial and technical support for postconflict reconstruction activities, including in the areas of good governance, security sector reform and economic development, as well as institutional capacity building;

(v) To support the electoral process in Burundi, including through the deployment of an AU mission to observe all stages of the electoral process;

(vi) To adopt concrete steps to address the issue of the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC, in particular by those multinational corporations and other foreign entities whose activities create conditions for negative practices, including the exchanging of raw materials for weapons, thereby fuelling conflict and undermining the long-term development of the DRC. This could involve developing a scheme similar to the Kimberley Process for the certification of other mineral resources and the convening of a conference that will bring together all key stakeholders;

(vii) To request the Commission to initiate concrete steps, to better support the efforts made by the countries of the region to resolve once and for all the problem of the FDLR, including the implementation of appropriate military, judicial and political measures and other steps to curb the propaganda and any activity that the FDLR could undertake in other countries;

(viii) To implement concrete steps to better protect the vulnerable civilian population in Eastern DRC, in particular women and children, against violence perpetrated by the FDLR and other armed groups;

(ix) To renew efforts, including military efforts, to neutralize the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and bring to an end its atrocities and destabilizing activities in DRC, Southern Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR);
(x) To take immediate and concrete steps to support the DRC for the full implementation of the 23 March 2009 Agreements between the Government of the DRC and Congolese armed groups, secured with the assistance of a special mediation mechanism established in 2008 under the stewardship of former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa.

9. On Guinea Bissau:

(i) To ensure the early deployment in Guinea Bissau, with the support of the UN, the EU and other AU partners, of a joint AU-ECOWAS stabilization mission to consolidate peace and stability, lend the necessary support to the new Government in its attempts to reform the security sector, postconflict reconstruction and development and to assist in the fight against drug trafficking, and request the PSC and the Commission to take the necessary follow-up measures;
(ii) To request the Commission to finalize its consultations with the Bissau Guinean authorities and ECOWAS on how to create conducive conditions for the conduct of a credible investigation into the political assassinations committed in the country in 2009, in particular that of President João Bernardo de Vieira, and acceleration of the process to establish an international commission of inquiry comprising Guinea Bissau, AU, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD;
(iii) To request the Commission and ECOWAS to convene, before the end of 2009, a regional conference on post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, security sector reform and drug trafficking, with a view to articulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated strategy to deal with these issues, bearing in mind relevant AU and ECOWAS decisions.

10. On the Republic of Guinea:

(i) To demand that the de facto authorities fully comply with their commitments and ensure that the elections are held within the new timeframe recently agreed upon, i.e. January 2010 for presidential election and March 2010 for legislative election;
(ii) to demand that the authorities take the necessary steps to improve the security and human rights situation in the country, as well as address effectively the issue of drug trafficking.

11. On Madagascar:

To request the Malagasy parties to redouble their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues and restore legality through credible, transparent and fair elections, and enable their country to overcome the current crisis, building on the Agreements reached following the meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 5 to 10 August 2009, under the auspices of the AU and facilitated by the International Joint Mediation led by former President Joaquim Chissano, the SADC-appointed Mediator;

12. On Côte d’Ivoire:

(i) To request the Ivorian parties to continue to show the necessary political will, in order to create a favorable atmosphere for the holding of the presidential election, including overcoming the difficulties being encountered in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement;
(ii) To encourage the international community, including AU Member States, to mobilize the necessary financial resources, particularly for the demobilization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and militia.

13. **On Liberia:**

To reiterate AU’s support to the ongoing efforts at peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia, and to call for increased efforts by Member States and the international community as a whole to this end.

14. **On the Central African Republic:**

To call for continued and increased support by the international community for peace-building efforts in CAR, acknowledging the contribution of the countries of the region to this end. The Special Session further calls on the partners to honour the pledges they have made in relation to CAR.

15. **On the Comoros:**

To reaffirm the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros, in line with relevant OAU/AU decisions on the Comorian Island of Mayotte. The Special Session calls for the reactivation of the AU Committee of Seven on Mayotte, which should meet on the margins of the UN General Assembly. More generally, the Special Session reaffirms that the territorial integrity of Africa cannot be legally affected by referendums conducted by foreign powers on an African territory.

16. **On Western Sahara:**

To support the ongoing UN efforts to overcome the current impasse and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which call for direct negotiations between the two parties without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, the Special Session calls for the intensification of efforts towards the holding of a referendum to enable the people of the Territory to choose between the option of independence and that of integration into the Kingdom of Morocco.

An update on the Achievements to date and the Challenges ahead

I. INTRODUCTION

1. During the Special Session on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, held in Tripoli, Libya, on 31 August 2009, the Assembly of the Union, having reviewed the state of peace and security on the continent, adopted two key documents: the Tripoli Declaration and Plan of Action.

2. This report provides an update on the status of implementation of these two documents, which falls within the framework of the Year of Peace and Security in Africa nearly 15 months after their adoption. The report concludes with recommendations on the challenges that lie ahead and the measures that should be taken in this regard.

II. TRIPOLI DECLARATION

3. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to redouble efforts to promote sustainable peace, security and stability on the continent. Significantly, in paragraph 9 of the Declaration, they stated their “… determination to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflicts and violence on our continent, acknowledging our shortcomings and errors, committing our resources and our best people, and making no opportunity to push forward the agenda of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. We, as leaders, simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans”.

4. More specifically, the Declaration covers a number of aspects relating to both the institutional capacity of the AU, as well as the structural prevention of conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development, terrorism, strengthening of the capacity of African universities, the role of civil society, resource mobilization in support of AU peace efforts, partnership and Africa’s leadership. The Declaration concludes with the decision to declare 2010 the Year of Peace and Security in Africa. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of progress made and difficulties encountered in the implementation of each of the components of the Tripoli Declaration.
Progress Report

(a) Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

5. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government recommitted themselves to accelerate the full operationalization of the APSA, including the further refinement of existing provisions, where necessary, to facilitate their implementation. Since then, the Commission has continued to make efforts towards the achievement of this objective. Among the major developments in this respect, mention should be made of the following:

(i) the Command Post Exercise AMANI Africa, conducted in Addis Ababa from 13 to 29 October 2010. The objectives of the Exercise were to rehearse AU procedures for mandate development and evaluate the capacity of the Commission to plan, deploy and manage multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSOs);

(ii) the strengthening of the Panel of the Wise, which has a key role to play, particularly in conflict prevention. The 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Kampala, Uganda, from 25 to 27 July 2010, endorsed the recommendations made by the Commission to enhance the capacity of the Panel to more effectively engage in operational prevention, through the establishment of a team of “Friends of the Panel of the Wise” (Assembly/ AU/ Dec. 310 [XV]);

(iii) the initiation, by the Commission, of the steps required towards the establishment of AU Liaison Offices to the Regional Economic Communities / Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs / RMs), as provided for by the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the RECs / RMs. So far, 7 RECs / RMs have established Liaison Offices to the AU. The Commission conducted a study earlier this year, and intends to start the implementation process in April 2011; and

(iv) the conduct, as part of the Africa-European Union (EU) partnership, of an assessment study on the APSA to review progress made and the challenges ahead. On the basis of the assessment, the AU and the RECs / RMs, as well as the EU, have agreed on an indicative roadmap that would serve as a basis for further support by the EU, within the framework of the Africa Peace Facility (APF), and by other partners.

6. Efforts have continued to be made with respect to the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Most of the technical requirements having been put in place, emphasis is now on the recruitment of the required human resources to enhance the analytical capability of the Commission.

7. The full operationalization of the APSA requires that the Commission substantially enhance its human resources. As part of the ongoing restructuring exercise of the Commission, proposals have been made in this respect. In reviewing these proposals, it is important that Member States keep in mind the commitment made by the Assembly in Tripoli. More generally, it is necessary to enhance the capacity of the Peace and Security Department through delegation of administrative and financial authority to enable it deal with the flexibility and speed required with the conflict and crisis situations facing the continent.

(b) Structural prevention of conflicts

8. As indicated in my report to the Tripoli Special Session, the AU has, over the past two decades, adopted several instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. These instruments relate to human rights, governance and the fight against corruption, democratization, disarmament, ter-
rorism, and the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts. They represent a consolidated framework of commonly accepted norms and principles, whose observance would considerably reduce the risk of conflict and violence on the continent and consolidate peace where it has been achieved. In their Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government undertook to make renewed efforts to address the root causes of conflicts in a holistic and systematic manner, including through implementing existing instruments.

9. Clearly, progress has been made in the signature and ratification of the above-mentioned instruments. The entry into force of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, on 18 December 2009, as well as the subsequent convening, in Addis Ababa, on 27 October 2010, of the 1st meeting of the State Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, which entered into force on 15 July 2010, represented a milestone in the overall efforts for the prevention and reduction of interstate conflicts and the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa. However, I note with concern that key AU instruments are yet to enter into force. This is the case of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted on 30 January 2007 and which, so far, has been ratified by only seven Member States, while fifteen ratifications are required for its entry into force. Also worth noting is the status of signature and ratification of the 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, ratified so far by 10 Member States. I cannot but echo the call made by the Tripoli Special Session for all Member States that have not yet done so to speedily sign and/or ratify those instruments. Equally important is the need for Member States to comply with the commitments they enter into, for lack of follow-up and implementation undermines the credibility of the processes our continent has embarked upon. Significantly, in its decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 269 (XIV) Rev.1 on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacity of the AU to Manage such Situations, the 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, from 31 January to 2 February 2010, reiterated the need for Member States to uphold the rule of law and abide by their own Constitutions, especially with regard to constitutional reforms, bearing in mind that failure to respect these provisions could lead to situations of tension which, in turn, could trigger off political crisis. I earnestly hope that the forthcoming Ordinary Session of the Assembly devoted to the theme of shared values will mark a watershed in our overall efforts to turn into action the many instruments we have adopted over the years.

10. On its part, the Commission will enhance its capacity to actively monitor the implementation of these instruments, as well as take all necessary steps to sensitize the Member States concerned. I also intend, as requested by Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.269(XIV) Rev.1, to speedily appoint an independent Rapporteur, who will prepare a report on the progress made in the democratization processes on the continent, for consideration by Council, as part of the powers entrusted to it by Article 7(m) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.

(c) Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)

11. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government committed themselves, within the framework of the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), to show the required solidarity with the African countries emerging from conflicts, and to assist them in consolidating their hard-won peace and avoiding relapse into violence. In the coming months, the Commission intends to organize Solidarity Conferences with a number of African countries emerging from conflicts, in particular Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as a follow-up to the multi-disciplinary assessment mission that visited those two countries from 21st January to 22 February 2010, as well as the Sudan, which received a delegation of the AU Ministerial Committee on Post-conflict Reconstruction
and Development, from 23 to 26 October 2010. I appeal to Member States, in line with the pledge made, to seize the opportunity of the planned Conferences to contribute to post-conflict endeavors in those countries. Other steps are planned by the Commission, including the sharing of experiences in the area of governance among countries emerging from conflicts, building on the outcome of the workshop organized by the Commission on the lessons learnt from Liberia’s Governance, Economic and Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 16 to 19 August 2010.

(d) Prevention and combating of Terrorism

12. Since the Tripoli Special Session, the Commission has taken a number of steps to address the issue of terrorism. Among others, mention should be made of the submission to the 249th meeting of Council held on 22 November 2010, in pursuance of decision Assembly / AU / Dec. 311 (XV) adopted by the 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, of a report outlining measures that could be taken to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation and the adoption by that meeting of a decision on this matter, the appointment of an AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, and the finalization of a draft anti-terrorism model law. Efforts continue also to be made to cut off the sources of funding for terrorism, in particular those originating from the payment of ransom in situations of hostage taking.

(e) Enhancement of the capacity of African Universities and Research Institutes

13. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government, having stressed that making and sustaining peace and security is also an intellectual challenge, undertook to build the capacity of African universities and research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what succeeds and what fails in conflict resolution efforts, and to arrive at African-centered solutions. It is within this context that the Commission extended support to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of the Addis Ababa University, to offer extensive training and undertake research in the field of peace and security. Steps are also underway for the establishment, within the Addis Ababa University, of an AU Endowed Chair, whose major objective will be to provide a distinctive African scholarly perspective on pressing issues in peace and security, socio-economic integration and other relevant matters. It is also within this context that the Assembly of the Union, at its Kampala Session, in decision Assembly / AU / Dec. 295 (XV) on my progress report on the Year of Peace and Security, welcomed the initiative by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), to contribute to the launching of a Peace Academy, an important tool for the enhancement of Africa’s capacity in the area of peace and security. Furthermore, the Commission is working with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) on training in mediation. These efforts will be intensified in order to engage other stakeholders on the continent.

(f) Role of Civil Society

14. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government called on the African civil society to continue to play its role in promoting peace, security and stability as partner of Governments. In the context of the Year of Peace and Security, the Commission endeavored to mobilize the African civil society and to build a strong partnership with it. I am pleased to note that a number of African civil society organizations have responded to this call for partnership, including ACCORD, Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), IPSS, ISS and the Cairo Regional Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. Next year, the Commission intends to convene a Conference that will bring together African civil society or-
ganizations working on peace and security issues to facilitate networking among them, cooperation with the AU and the enhancement of their capacity.

(g) Mobilizing resources for AU’s Peace efforts, partnerships and Africa’s leadership

15. In Tripoli, the Heads of State and Government committed themselves to increase substantially Member States’ contribution to the Peace Fund, for Africa to truly own the ongoing efforts to promote peace, security and stability on the continent. In this respect, they requested the Commission to take the necessary preparatory steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 to 12%. They also encouraged all Member States in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund. Subsequently, the relevant AU policy organs decided to gradually implement this increase over a period of three years, starting from 2011 (Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 287 127[XIV] on the budget of the African Union for the 2010 Financial Year, adopted by the 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union). At the same time, the Commission has pursued its efforts aimed at securing United Nations support, through assessed contributions, for AU operations undertaken with the consent of the UN, while continuing to rely on the support provided by the EU, under the APF, as well as by other bilateral and multilateral partners.

16. Yet, Africa cannot continue to endlessly and overwhelmingly rely on external support for the promotion of peace and security on the continent, as this situation undermines the effectiveness of AU’s efforts, due to the lack of predictability and flexibility inherent to voluntarily contributions, and the true ownership of our initiatives. It is worth recalling here that, in the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government, while stressing the need to continue to strengthen AU’s relations with its major partners, also reiterated “… our determination to ensure that these partnerships are fully based on Africa’s leadership, because without such leadership, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better than those who come from far away; because we know which solutions will work, and how we can get there; and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and we will live with their consequences”. Clearly, more is required from Member States. I will, in due course, submit to the Assembly a comprehensive report on how best to mobilize increased resources from within the continent to support our peace efforts.

(h) Year of Peace and Security

17. In the Tripoli Declaration, the Heads of State and Government declared the Year 2010, to be the Year of Peace and Security (YoPS) in Africa. In Kampala, in July 2010, I submitted a progress report on the implementation of this initiative. Suffice to mention here that the YoPS provided a unique opportunity in terms of outreach, building of partnerships with a variety of stakeholders, and encouraging Member States to organize specific events in commemoration of the YoPS and to rededicate themselves to the objective of a conflict-free Africa. In addition, efforts were made towards the consolidation of the AU normative and institutional framework for addressing the challenges of peace, as well as for the resolution of existing conflicts and the consolidation of peace where it has been achieved.

18. 21st September, the International Day of Peace, marked the culmination of the YoPS, making it possible to further mobilize Member States and African organizations, but also ordinary women and men, civil society and private sector. It was a unique opportunity to bring the call for peace out of the chambers of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, and give voice to the most vulnerable,
those who bear the brunt of violence and are often left scarred physically and emotionally, with the hope that, in turn, their cry for peace will echo back to those august Councils, and demand that the highest decision-makers make peace and security a reality, not only a slogan. The Commission is working on a follow-up and sustainability programme, which will be submitted to the Assembly of the Union, next January.

III. TRIPOLI PLAN OF ACTION

19. In the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Heads of State and Government have identified practical steps for resolving the various crises facing the continent and consolidating peace where it has been achieved. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the progress made and the challenges that lie ahead.

Conflict and crisis situations

(a) The Comoros

20. In the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Special Session reaffirmed the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros, in conformity with the decisions of the OAU / AU on the Comorian Island of Mayotte, calling for the re-launching of the Committee of Seven on Mayotte. In this regard, it should be recalled that, in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, on 24 September 2010, President Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi stressed that there cannot be lasting stability in the Comoros without a definitive solution to the question of Mayotte; he renewed his proposal of “one country, two systems”, which would guarantee the respect for international law, while allowing France to continue to administer the Comorian Island of Mayotte in a legitimate manner, for a period to be determined on the basis of a common agreement.

21. Significant progress has been made in promoting national reconciliation and stability in the Comoros. Under the auspices of the AU, the Comorian parties signed in Moroni, on 16 June 2010, an Agreement on the Management of the Interim Period, which made it possible to overcome the crisis resulting from the implementation of the institutional reforms introduced by the new Union Constitution, adopted by the referendum on 17 May 2009, at the initiative of President Sambi, whose term of office was due to expire on 26 May 2010. This Agreement provides for the completion of the electoral process leading to the election, no later than mid-January 2011, of a new President, who should originate from the Island of Moheli, in accordance with the principle of rotating presidency enshrined in the Constitution of the Union of the Comoros.

22. On 7 November 2010, and pursuant to this Agreement, the primary elections for the presidency of the Union, which took place in the Autonomous Island of Moheli, and the first round of elections for governors of the Autonomous Islands, were held under conditions deemed satisfactory by the international observation mission, including the AU. It is important that the Comorian parties make every effort to ensure the smooth holding, at national level, on 26 December 2010, of the second round of the presidential election that will oppose the three top candidates from the primary elections, as well as the gubernatorial elections in the Autonomous Islands.
23. The overall security situation in Somalia remains highly volatile and dangerous. The Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), led by al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, have not relented in their attacks against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Somali population and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At political level, while some positive developments are to be noted, in particular the fact that the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) continue to operate from Mogadishu and the efforts by the TFG to reach out to Somalis outside the peace process, resulting notably in the signing of an Agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), on 15 March 2010, in Addis Ababa, the political process continues to be challenged by recurrent and intermittent wrangling within the TFIs. This state of affairs has eroded the cohesion within the TFIs and seriously undermined their ability to effectively implement their obligations under the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the Djibouti peace process. It is against this background that, on 21 September 2010, Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke decided to resign from his position. He has, since, been replaced by Mohammed Abudllah Mohamed “Farmajo” who formed a new cabinet on 12 November 2010. The TFP is yet to endorse this cabinet. Against this background, it is imperative that the TFIs demonstrate the leadership and the unity of purpose required to meet the challenges at hand.

24. In line with the Tripoli Declaration and Plan of Action, the Commission has intensified its efforts towards the full deployment of AMISOM. I am pleased to report that the troop strength of AMISOM has increased to 8,000, comprising a total of 9 battalions: 4 from Burundi and 5 from Uganda. The strength of the police component of AMISOM is now 50. On the ground, AMISOM forces have consolidated and expanded their areas of control in Mogadishu, while providing limited humanitarian support to the civilian population. Furthermore, AMISOM and other members of the international community, in support of priorities identified by the TFG, continue to assist in the rebuilding of the Somali Security Forces.

25. In the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Assembly requested Council to review the mandate and strength of AMISOM, to enable it to provide increased assistance to the TFG. On 15 October 2010, and as a follow-up to the IGAD and AU Summits decisions of July 2010, Council endorsed a new force strength of 20,000 for AMISOM, as well as an enhanced police and civilian component, as proposed in my report. The objective is to better support the peace and reconciliation process including the achievement of the remaining transitional tasks, improve the security situation, to enable the TFIs discharge their responsibilities, assist in the establishment of effective governmental institutions, and facilitate peace building, recovery and humanitarian efforts.

26. Council called on the Security Council to take the decisions now required of it, in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, by endorsing the revised concept of operations and the newly-authorized strength of AMISOM and authorizing an enhanced support package for the Mission, funded through UN assessed contributions. Council further called on the Security Council to impose a naval blockade and a no-fly zone over Somalia to prevent the entry of foreign elements into the country, as well as flights and shipments carrying weapons and ammunitions to armed groups inside Somalia; ensure the effective implementation of sanctions against all those impeding the peace and reconciliation process; and reaffirm its commitment to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. At the time of finalizing this report, the UN Security Council was yet to respond to the request made by the AU. Needless to stress that time is not on our side, and that any further delay in the provision, by the United Nations, of the support required for the strengthening of AMISOM will further complicate the situation and undermine the prospects for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. It is important that Council strongly urge the Security Council to play the role expected of it. The 16th
Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 23 November 2010, expressed this very concern and made a strong call on the UN Security Council to assume its responsibilities in this regard.

27. Equally important is the need for Member States to provide the required military and other personnel, for AMISOM to reach its newly-authorized strength, bearing in mind the pledge made in Tripoli “… to ensure that sufficient troops and observers are made available for rapid deployment when and where they are required”, as well as to contribute to the mobilization of the necessary logistical and financial resources. While reiterating our appreciation to Burundi and Uganda, it is clear that these two countries cannot endlessly shoulder what is, in actual fact, a continental responsibility. It is imperative that other Member States step in and share the burden of Africa’s collective responsibility in Somalia.

28. During the period under review, the Commission has continued to monitor the efforts being made towards combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. In all its interactions with the international partners, the Commission has drawn attention to the relevant provisions of the Tripoli Plan of Action of 31st August 2009, stressing the need for the international community to promote a comprehensive approach to the scourge of piracy.

(c) The Sudan

29. A separate report is submitted on the situation in the Sudan, covering both Darfur and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). One of the major events of the period under review was the peaceful holding of the April 2010 General Elections. As Council is aware, the CPA implementation process will culminate with the self-determination referendum for Southern Sudan to be held on 9 January 2010. In June 2010, the Sudanese Parliament approved the appointment of the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). Following initial difficulties, the SSRC commenced its work. There are, however, a number of outstanding issues in the CPA implementation process relating, inter alia, to the question of Abyei, the North-South border, Popular Consultations in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, and security arrangements.

30. From 7 to 15 November 2010, and in pursuance of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in Mekelle, in June 2010, the Parties to the CPA, under the auspices of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on the Sudan, met to negotiate on the outstanding issues in the implementation of the CPA and the post-referendum arrangements. On 13 November 2010, they agreed to a seminal document entitled “Framework for Resolving Outstanding Issues Relating to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Future Relations of North and South Sudan”. The Parties agreed that the negotiations on the future of Abyei will continue at the level of the Political Principals, with the participation of the AUHIP.

31. The security situation in Darfur continues to be of concern, with the occurrence of a number of incidents which have led to a considerable loss of human life and new displacements. As for the peace negotiations on Darfur conducted, under the auspices of the State of Qatar, by the AU-UN Joint Mediation, they continue to face serious challenges. At the second meeting of the Sudan Consultative Forum, co-chaired by the AU and the UN and held in Addis Ababa on 6 November 2010, it was agreed that the Doha negotiations should result in an Outcome Document to be completed no later than December 2010, in accordance with the timetable agreed to by the Parties. The Doha outcome will be the point of departure for the initial launching of the Darfur Political Process, which is planned to take place in Darfur,
in mid-December, under the auspices of the AUHIP and UNAMID and in partnership with the State of Qatar. This meeting will set the agenda for the Darfur Political Process, which will lead to a Darfur-Darfur Conference to be convened in early 2011, with the objective of concluding an inclusive political settlement. As a follow-up to the SCF meeting, the Joint Mediation will shortly undertake a series of consultations with a broad range of stakeholders in the Sudan, in order to solicit inputs from civil society on the pending issues in the negotiations, as well as to generate popular awareness and support for the peace process.

(d) Horn of Africa – regional approach

32. In Tripoli, and in view of the need to develop a regional approach to the challenges of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the Commission recommended the launching by the AU, in collaboration with IGAD, the UN and other stakeholders, of a process leading to a Conference on Peace, Security, Cooperation and Development in the Horn of Africa. On its part, the Special Session requested the Commission, in pursuance of relevant AU and IGAD decisions, and in collaboration with concerned international actors, to continue with efforts of peace-building and reconciliation, in order to foster peace, security, cooperation and development in the Horn of Africa.

33. Accordingly, the Commission will intensify its consultations with IGAD and its Member States in order to determine the best way forward, both in terms of process and content for the proposed regional approach. Consultations will also be undertaken with AU partners, in particular the United Nations, the European Union and the League of Arab States. On this basis, the Commission will submit detailed recommendations to Council.

(e) Relations between Chad and the Sudan

34. The Tripoli Plan of Action identified a number of steps to facilitate the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad. In fact, the normalization of relations between the two countries, which began in October 2009 and culminated in the signing, on 15 January 2010, of a peace agreement (“the Peace Agreement on Normalization of Relations between Chad and the Sudan, and the “Additional Protocol on Border Security”), has continued in a satisfactory manner. Officials from both countries have since made multiple gestures of good will that have strengthened their relationship. In this regard, President Idriss Déby Itno, on 8 February 2010, undertook an official visit to Khartoum, where he held talks with his Sudanese counterpart, Omar Hassan Al Bashir. He again visited Khartoum, on 26 May, to attend the swearing-in-ceremony of President Bashir. In turn, President Omar Al Bashir visited N’Djamena, on 21 July 2010, on the occasion of the 12th Summit of CEN-SAD.

35. The implementation of the N’Djamena Agreement made it possible to address the problems which embittered relations between the two countries, namely: securing the common border and the recurrent problem of incursions of politico-military groups into Chad. The Protocol on Securing the Common Border addressed the first concern through the establishment of the Joint Observation and Security Force and the effective commencement of its patrols along the common border. Regarding the second point, the two countries have taken appropriate measures to prevent groups or rebel movements from launching hostile activities from either country. Council should congratulate Presidents Idriss Déby Itno and Omar Al Bashir for their courageous political decision to normalize relations between their countries and encourage them again to persevere in the path of dialogue and consultation.
(f) Central African Republic (CAR)

36. During the Special Session of the Assembly of the Union, the Heads of State and Government, regarding the Central African Republic (CAR), called for continued and increased support from the international community, in order to consolidate peace in that country. In this context, it should be noted that a number of bilateral and multilateral partners have contributed financial and technical support towards the holding of the presidential and legislative elections planned, after several postponements, for January and March 2011. The AU has also provided financial support, and seconded an election expert to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). However, a number of problems still persist, and their early resolution will facilitate the proper conduct of the elections. These difficulties include inadequate funding for the functioning of the IEC and the putting in place of mechanisms to ensure the transparency of electoral operations. Beyond the elections, renewed efforts are needed to complete the disarmament, demobilization programme and reintegration of members of the armed groups and promote sustainable socio-economic development of the country. Increased support from the international community is required in this regard, singularly in view of the consequences of the complete withdrawal of MINURCAT at the end of the current year.

(g) Great Lakes Region

i) Burundi

37. As a follow-up to the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Commission dispatched, from 13 to 22 February 2010, a multidisciplinary mission to assess the situation in Burundi and make recommendations on areas where the Commission and Member States could provide support to the post-conflict reconstruction and peace building processes in Burundi. The conclusions and recommendations of the mission were submitted to the 230th meeting of the Council, held on 27 and 31 May 2010. The next step will be the organization of an African Solidarity Conference, and the formulation as well as the implementation of a post-conflict support program to consolidate peace in Burundi.

38. It should also be noted that the period under review was marked by the holding a series of polls, which began, on 23 May, with local council elections, followed by presidential elections, on 28 June, parliamentary elections, on 23 July, senatorial elections, on 28 July, and the hills or neighborhoods elections, on 7 September 2010. The AU contributed to this electoral process, including through the observation of the various elections and the granting of financial assistance.

ii) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

39. The Tripoli Plan of Action called for the mobilization of greater support from Member States for post-conflict reconstruction and development in DRC. It is within this framework that the Commission sent a multidisciplinary assessment mission to the country, from 21 January to 13 February 2010. The mission made important recommendations that the Council considered at its 230th meeting. The Commission is working towards the convening of an African Solidarity Conference and the implementation of a post-conflict support program. Also, steps will be initiated to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Plan of Action on the illegal exploitation of DRC’s natural resources. Meanwhile, the Commission took part in the Summit organized by the Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes on this issue.
40. Regarding the other components of the Tripoli Plan of Action, it should be noted that the operations of the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), supported by the United Nations, against foreign armed groups (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – FDLR and Lord's Resistance Army – LRA) have enabled the Congolese Government to neutralize a substantial number of the elements of the negative forces. In this regard, and as discussed below, the Commission has taken steps to facilitate a more coordinated regional action to neutralize the LRA and bring to an end its destabilizing activities and atrocities in the DRC, Southern Sudan and RCA. On its part, the Panel of the Wise held its eighth meeting in Kinshasa, in May 2010, to discuss the issue of women and children in armed conflict, which has been the subject of a specific provision in the Plan of Action in relation to the situation in eastern DRC. Finally, the Commission convened in Addis Ababa, on 20 September 2010, a meeting on the issue of nomadic pastoralists Mbororos, brought to its attention by the Congolese Government. The Council will be informed in due course of the steps taken to follow-up on the conclusions of this meeting.

41. The Congolese Government has continued efforts to implement the Agreements of 23 March 2009 signed with Congolese armed groups. The Commission supports this process through its Liaison Office in the DRC. The Commission also actively participated in the consultations initiated in connection with the renewal of MONUC’s mandate, in the context of the request made by the Congolese Government for the adoption of a plan for the withdrawal of the Mission. On 28 May 2010, the Security Council adopted a resolution which provides for a drawdown of MONUC, the changing of its name to United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Congo (MONUSCO) effective from 1 July 2010, and the redefinition of its mandate.

42. The DRC has made remarkable progress in the consolidation of peace and post-conflict recovery. In this context, the general elections scheduled for 2011 are of particular importance. It is imperative that the international community continues to support the ongoing efforts.

iii) Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

43. The Tripoli Plan of Action underscored the need to redouble efforts, including military ones, to neutralize the LRA. In pursuance of this provision, the Commission held a Consultative Ministerial Meeting on the activities of LRA in Bangui, CAR, on 13 and 14 October 2010. The Ministers responsible for Defence and Security of the CAR, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, the Sudan, including the Government of Southern Sudan, the UN and other partners attended the meeting. The Conference took a number of steps, including the creation of a Joint Operations Center and consideration of the establishment of a joint brigade to track the LRA to end its criminal activities. A meeting of Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Security Services of the concerned countries is scheduled on 5 December, in Addis Ababa, to follow-up on the recommendations of the meeting. In line with the conclusions of the Bangui meeting, I intend to appoint a Special Envoy on the LRA issues to strengthen cooperation among the concerned African countries, facilitate the involvement and support of the international community, and engage in other related-peace missions.

(h) Côte d’Ivoire

44. The process of ending the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire reached a major milestone on 31 October 2010, with the holding of the first round of the presidential elections that were conducted in good conditions of security and transparency, and with a massive participation of the populations in the polls (more than 80%). Provisional results, announced on 3 November 2010 by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),
placed the three main political actors on the Ivorian conducted scene in the following order: Laurent Gbagbo (outgoing President) with 38.04%, Alassane Ouattara (President of RDR party) with 32.07%, and Henri Konan Bedie (President of the PDCI-RDA) with 25.24%. The 11 other candidates together accounted for less than 5% of the vote. The second round has been fixed for 28 November 2010 between the two leading candidates of the first round.

45. This progress has been made possible thanks to the spirit of dialogue and consultation, which, in the context of the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), notably led to the adoption by consensus, on 6 September 2010, of the final voters’ list by members of the Permanent Consultation Framework. On the other hand, in accordance with the provisions of the OPA, President Laurent Gbagbo, on 9 September 2010, signed a presidential decree authorizing the issuance of national identity cards to those on the final voters’ list. It is also worth noting the significant role played by different components of Ivorian society, the facilitation by President Blaise Compaoré, and the contribution of a number of other partners, including the United Nations.

(i) Liberia and Sierra Leone

46. Liberia and Sierra Leone have continued to make sustained progress towards peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, focusing both on the strengthening of national institutions and socio-economic recovery and development. Furthermore, preparations are ongoing in Liberia for the smooth holding of general elections next year. Needless to stress the need for continued support from Africa and the larger international community to help Liberia and Sierra Leone consolidate the remarkable achievements made over the past few years.

(j) Guinea Bissau

47. The Tripoli Special Session took a number of decisions on Guinea Bissau, among which mention should be made of the early deployment of a joint AU-ECOWAS stabilization mission; the conduct of a credible investigation into political killings committed in the country in 2009; and the implementation of security sector reform. In line with these decisions, the Commission has intensified its efforts to support the stabilization process in Guinea Bissau. In this regard, a joint AU/ECOWAS assessment mission visited Guinea Bissau from 30 October to 10 November 2009. In addition, and in anticipation of the subsequent deployment of the stabilization mission, the Commission has operationalized the AU Liaison Office in Guinea Bissau, headed by a Special Representative in the person of Professor Sebastião da Silva Isata, former Vice Minister of External Relations of Angola.

48. On the spot, my Special Representative, upon taking office on 4 October 2010, launched several initiatives to strengthen the cohesion at the head of the State apparatus, with the improvement of relations between the President of the Republic, Malam Bacai Sanha, and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., and create the required political conditions for the deployment of the stabilization mission and acceleration of the reform of the security sector. Furthermore, Bissau-Guinean Parliament has accepted the AU proposal aimed, on the one hand, at the adoption of legislation criminalizing the possession, transfer, processing and trafficking of drugs and, on the other, the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Finally, the judicial authorities of Guinea-Bissau have shown a renewed determination to carry out criminal investigations into the killings of March and June 2009. Council may wish to encourage the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to continue the efforts that they have so far engaged.
(k) Western Sahara

49. In the Tripoli Plan of Action, the Heads of State and Government expressed AU’s support to the UN efforts to overcome the current impasse and to relevant Security Council resolutions. To this end, they called for the intensification of efforts towards the holding of a referendum to enable the people of the Territory to choose between the option of independence and that of integration into the Kingdom of Morocco.

50. Over the past year, the UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, continued his efforts through the mechanism of “informal” talks, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1871. Ambassador Ross recently launched his 4th consultation tour of the region and secured the agreement of the Parties, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, and that of the neighboring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, for the holding of a third “informal” meeting in New York, in November 2010. The informal talks are intended to prepare the ground for the 5th round of the Manhasset talks. The third informal talks convened in New York on 8 and 9 November 2010. However, no progress was made due to Morocco’s pre-conditions that its autonomy proposal be the sole basis of discussion, excluding the Frente POLISARIO’s referendum proposal that includes the option of independence as well. The Parties have agreed to continue with the informal talks, and meetings in that respect are envisaged in December or early next year. In September, the UN Special Representative for Western Sahara visited Addis Ababa for consultations with the AU Commission on the issue.

51. The tragic events that have unfolded in Laayoune, Western Sahara, on 8 November 2010, as a result of the assault by Moroccan forces against the peaceful encampment of Sahrawis in the outskirts of the city, highlight the need for renewed efforts to find a solution to the conflict, consistent with the AU position and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT

(a) Republic of Guinea

52. In line with the Tripoli Plan of Action, the AU and ECOWAS, in particular through the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), which is co-chaired by my Special Envoy for Guinea and the President of the ECOWAS Commission, have continued their efforts to facilitate the successful conclusion of the transition and the smooth conduct of elections, in close coordination with the Mediator in the Guinean crisis, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, and with the support of the UN, through its Special Representative for West Africa. It is within this framework that the two candidates who emerged as the winners of the first round, which took place on 4 June 2010, Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 3 September 2010, in Ouagadougou, under the aegis of President Blaise Compaoré. Subsequently, following consultations initiated by the ICG-G at its 17th meeting held in Conakry on 5 November 2010, the two candidates also signed a Joint Declaration in which they reiterated their commitment to work towards peaceful, free and democratic polls throughout the national territory, in accordance with the Ouagadougou Memorandum of Understanding.

53. The process of restoring constitutional order in Guinea reached a milestone with the holding, on the 7 November 2010, of the second round of the presidential elections, following several postponements. According to the provisional results announced by INEC, Alpha Conde was elected with 52.52% of votes
against 47.48% for Cellou Dalein Diallo. The latter has filed complaints with the Supreme Court, which has the competency to decide on the matter within the timeframe legally provided for. To end clashes between supporters of the unsuccessful candidate and law enforcement forces, the President of the Transition, on 17 November 2010, declared a state of emergency throughout the national territory.

54. In this context it is important that the political actors in Guinea demonstrate a high sense of responsibility. They must work to strengthen national unity to enable their country to be in a better position to address the many daunting challenges facing it, including by ensuring its economic recovery and deepening the democratic process on the basis of lessons that have been learned from the transition. Clearly, the vote that just took place must be seen as a promising chance for Guinea and not as a source of fratricidal strife.

(b) Niger

55. The Tripoli Special Session took place in a context marked by rising tension in Niger, as a result of the decision of President Mamadou Tandja to revise the country's Constitution, in violation of the provisions of Niger's basic law and its commitments to ECOWAS. The mediation efforts initiated by ECOWAS, with the support of AU, did not yield the expected results, as the then Government of Niger rejected the draft agreement presented to it. It was against this backdrop that the Armed Forces of Niger overthrew the Government of President Mamadou Tandja, on 18 February 2010, and set up a Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD). In accordance with its relevant instruments, which systematically condemn unconstitutional changes of Government, the AU condemned this seizure of power by force.

56. Since then, significant progress has been made towards the restoration of constitutional order. On 11 March 2010, General Salou Djibo, President of the CSRD, signed a decree by which members of this organ and the transition Government undertook not to stand in the presidential election. In the same vein, on 7 April 2010, the de facto authorities set up a National Advisory Council with the responsibility to organize the transition. This Council has established a one-year transition programme. The Constitutional Referendum was successfully held on 31st October 2010. The presidential elections are scheduled to take place on 31st January 2011. Council may wish to reiterate its deep appreciation to the people of Niger, as well as to General Salou Djibo, for his commitment to abide by the agreed schedule for the return to constitutional order. Council may also wish to urge the political parties and all actors involved in the Transition process to put the supreme interest of Niger above partisan and other considerations, in order to facilitate the timely conclusion of the process of return to constitutional order.

(c) Madagascar

57. No real progress has been made in the process of finding a consensual solution to the crisis in Madagascar since the unconstitutional change occurred on 17 March 2009. The de facto authorities have rejected the Maputo Agreement of 6 August 2009 and the Addis Ababa Additional Act of 6 November 2010, whose implementation would lead to the restoration of constitutional order, as the culmination of a consensual and inclusive transition. They have since embarked on a unilateral approach, marked in particular by the holding of a constitutional referendum, on 17 November 2010, which should be followed by parliamentary elections, on 16 March 2011, and the first round of the presidential elections, on 4 May 2011. A coup attempt took place on the day of the referendum on the new Constitution, thus indicating the precarity of the situation in the country and the absence of a consensus on the current process.
58. The situation in Madagascar is a real challenge to SADC and the AU, as well as to the entire international community. No effort should be spared to ensure that this challenge is addressed and the current impasse broken, through a consensual solution. In this context, it is important to further mobilize the international community, in particular the AU partners, for the scrupulous implementation of the sanctions decided by Council in February and March 2010.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

59. The holding of the Special Session and the adoption of the Tripoli Declaration and Plan of Action marked a watershed in the overall efforts of our continent to address the existing conflict and crisis situations and promote sustainable peace. On that occasion, the Heads of State and Government made a far-reaching pledge regarding their determination to deal once and for all with the scourge of conflict and the steps to be taken in this respect. This pledge has raised high expectations; no effort should be spared to ensure that those expectations are met and that our common promise of a conflict-free Africa is fulfilled.

60. Undoubtedly, significant progress has been made in the implementation of those two landmark documents, over the past fifteen months. We have recorded significant gains in strengthening our normative framework, operationalizing the various components of APSA and, more importantly, in addressing existing conflicts and consolidating peace where it has been achieved, while, at the same time, stepping up our engagement in both the critical, yet often invisible, work of preventing the occurrence of conflicts in the first place and long-term efforts to address the underlying causes of violence and conflicts. The AU has demonstrated dynamism and leadership, and is today a key player in the overall efforts aimed at ending conflicts and sustaining peace on the continent.

61. Yet, we have a long way to go to fulfill the promises made in Tripoli. A number of critical AU instruments are yet to be ratified by most of our Member States, while the level of implementation of, and compliance with, the commitments made remain uneven. The most significant of these is the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which is so critical in the efforts being made to entrench democracy and enhance governance. Conflict is painful reality in different parts of the continent, while a number of countries that have emerged from violence remain in a state of fragility. In addition, we have to grapple with the threats posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, piracy and other associated scourges, such as illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes, and the long-term challenges arising from climate change and enduring poverty. The operationalization of the APSA is yet to be completed, and we remain over dependent on external support for the implementation of our peace and security agenda.

62. Against this background, the need for continued efforts cannot be overemphasized. The way forward is clear: we need to speed up the signature and ratification of relevant AU instruments and ensure their effective implementation; expedite the full operationalization of the APSA, in particular by improving coordination among its various components, both vertically and horizontally, enhancing sustainability in terms of financial and human resources, and making the Architecture more coherent; and decisively deal with the remaining conflicts, while intensifying our efforts towards the prevention of conflicts and peace building, for, as Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the respected Indian diplomat, once stated: “the more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war”.

63. Equally important is the need to mobilize increased resources from within the continent to support the implementation of the AU peace and security agenda. Clearly, the current state of affairs is far from
being desirable. AU’s leadership and ownership cannot be guaranteed when an overwhelming part of the resources required for the achievement of the goal of freeing our continent from the scourge of conflict comes from outside Africa. Not only are the resources provided insufficient, but they also lack the flexibility and predictability required to sustain our efforts and respond in a timely manner to situations as they emerge. While we should continue to call on our partners to extend support to our efforts, based on the principle of the indivisibility of peace, we ought to do more in terms of financing. Failure to act swiftly and decisively on this issue will have a far-reaching impact on the sustainability of the achievements made and the credibility of our determination to play a leading role in the promotion of peace and security on the continent. The many pledges that have been made in this respect need to be followed by concrete action.

64. Finally, I cannot conclude without stressing that, although the commitment of political leaders is important, the pursuit of peace should not only be the preserve of national governments and international organizations. It must also be built from below, by the efforts of ordinary women and men, civil society and private sector: indeed, we all have a responsibility in achieving peace, and we all stand to gain from the achievement of peace. I welcome the efforts made by civil society organizations and African individuals in the pursuit of our common objective of Making Peace Happen in Africa in 2010 and beyond, and urge them to persevere in their efforts.

ANNEXES:

i. Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace *

ii. Tripoli Plan of Action*

* The Tripoli Declaration is reproduced on p. 113 and the Plan of Action is reproduced on p. 117 in this publication.
THE CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH


Introduction

This chapter documents and reflects on the development, operationalization and institutionalization of a pivotal pillar of the peace and security architecture, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). This structure is core to the fulfillment of the Union’s conflict prevention, management and resolution mandates as without the capacity to monitor, analyze and develop tailored and timely response and policy options to threats to peace and security on the Continent, the African Union (AU) would be severely limited in its ability to address these appropriately.

As discussed at length in the chapters above, the PSC Protocol defines the PSC as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. In conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC shall, inter alia, anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, undertake peace-making and peace-building functions and authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions (African Union 2002, § 3[a], [b], and § 7). In these activities, the PSC shall be supported by among others, a Continental Early Warning System (African Union 2002, § 2[2]).

The PSC Protocol gives the CEWS a fundamental responsibility for which a carefully developed methodology and process are required: that of anticipating and preventing the occurrence of conflict through the provision of information and analysis to the Chairperson of the Commission. In the fulfillment of his responsibility to advise the PSC on potential threats to peace and security in Africa, as well as recommend best courses of action, the Chairperson relies therefore on a well-functioning, comprehensive and AU specific early warning system. Consequently, the CEWS assumes a critical role as regards the ability of key institutions of the Union and other pillars of the peace and security architecture to perform their responsibilities, particularly the PSC, other Departments within the Commission, the Panel of the Wise and the Pan-African Parliament among others.

Beginning with an overview of the legal rationale and operationalization of the CEWS to date, this chapter will document and reflect on the development of a conflict analysis and early warning methodology tailored to the specific needs of the AU. Although led by the AU’s Conflict Management Division (CMD), this methodology, fully detailed in the CEWS Handbook (African Union 2008b), is the result of an extensive process of consultation with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the United Nations and other International Organizations, African Civil Society Organizations (including academia and research centers) as well as international experts. The chapter will conclude by reflecting on existing and future challenges to the functioning of the CEWS.
The Continental Early Warning System: Legal rationale and operationalization

The establishment of the CEWS is a requisite of the PSC Protocol as detailed in Article 12 which states that, “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established”. The PSC Protocol notes that the information and analysis gathered through the EWS shall be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to “advise the PSC on potential threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action” (African Union 2002, § 12 [5]). The Chairperson is also called “to use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol” (ibid.).

The purpose of this continental early warning system is therefore the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to principle decision-makers at the AU: the Chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and other Departments within the Commission. Others include various organs and structures of the AU, namely the Pan-African Parliament, the Panel of the Wise and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

According to the PSC Protocol, the CEWS is to consist of (1) an observation and monitoring center – the Situation Room – located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AU; and (2) observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which shall “be linked directly” to the Situation Room (African Union 2002, § 12 [2]). As will be elaborated below, this requirement clearly denotes the true continental nature of the CEWS in both structure but perhaps more importantly in operational terms – regarded as integral to the CEWS structure and functioning, Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) within the RECs play a vital role in the operationalization and functioning of this pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

In order to analyze developments and recommend appropriate courses of action, the CEWS shall “develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators” (African Union 2002, § 12 [4]) In addition, to facilitate the effective functioning of the CEWS, Article 12 (3) of the PSC Protocol requires the AU Commission to “collaborate with the United Nations and its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)”, and Article 12 (7) stipulates that the Chairperson of the Commission “shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning”.

On sources of information, the CEWS is envisaged as an open-source system where information is gathered from a variety of different sources, including, inter alia, governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organizations, the media, academia and think-tanks. While key sources of data include those generated by the AU itself (Commission, AU Field Missions and liaison offices), as well as that generated at the level of the RECs/RMs and Member States or in collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs is clearly requested by the PSC Protocol. In fact, it urges the Commission to undertake this collaboration in order to facilitate the effective functioning of the EWS as a whole (African Union 2002, § 12 [3]). Additional relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol, to be discussed below, include Article 16 (Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution), Article 17 (Relationship with the United Nations and other International Organizations), Article 18 (Relationship with the Pan-African Parliament), Article 19 (Relationship with the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights) and, finally, Article 20 (Relationship with Civil Society Organizations).

During the July 2003 Summit of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique, the Heads of State and Government mandated the AU Commission to take the necessary steps for the establishment of the
CEWS. Since then, the Commission has set in motion a series of activities with the aim of fulfilling this mandate, beginning with a series of workshops on the establishment of the CEWS with officials from the RECs, the United Nations (UN) and UN system organizations, civil society representatives and academic institutions, international organizations and African think tanks. In July 2005, and based on the series of recommendations which resulted from these consultations, the AU Commission developed a draft *Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS* with the purpose of developing an operational, cost-effective structure and determine the key steps and requirements necessary for the implementation of the early warning system. This draft roadmap contained a tentative concept and timeframe for the implementation and operationalization of the CEWS, covering the following areas: (1) information collection, (2) strategic analysis of the data collected and development of an indicators module, (3) early warning reports and engagement with decision-makers, and (4) co-ordination and collaboration between the AU, the RECs and other key stakeholders.

During the last three years, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and African civil society and research institutions, the Commission has put in place a process to explore the modalities for the development and operationalization of the CEWS. When on 21 June 2006, at its 57th meeting held in Addis Ababa, the PSC requested the AU Commission to hasten the operationalization of the continental peace and security architecture, including the CEWS, the Commission intensified its efforts to develop the relevant technical documentation in support of the draft *Roadmap* for consideration by representatives of Member States, RECs and other partners. In addition to an updated version of the draft *Roadmap* itself, the Commission prepared two issue papers of a technical nature – on the *Indicators Module* and on the *Participation of Civil Society* – and three background papers – on Development of IT Technology, on Conceptual and Methodological Issues in the Development of Early Warning Indicators, and on Status of Implementation of Early Warning Systems in the RECs (African Union 2008a).

From 17 to 19 December 2006, the Commission convened a meeting of Governmental Experts on early warning and conflict prevention, bringing together experts from AU Member States and representatives of the RECs. Held in Kempton Park, South Africa, the meeting was also attended by representatives of African research centers and academic institutions, NGOs, as well as international organizations, including the United Nations, as observers. The meeting urged the AU Commission and the RECs, working together with the stakeholders identified in the *PSC Protocol*, to take all necessary steps to implement the observations and recommendations made in the draft *Roadmap* within a timeframe of three years, to ensure that the CEWS is fully operational by 2009. The meeting further urged Member States, as well as AU partners, to provide the necessary assistance to facilitate the timely operationalization of the CEWS. The *Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System* and the timeframe for its implementation were then endorsed by the AU Executive Council who, including the mobilization of the financial and technical resources required from both AU Member States and partners, the speedy recruitment of the human resources needed and other relevant steps”.

With the support expressed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, at its 8th Ordinary Session held on 29-30 January 2007 in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the CEWS began in earnest.

**Early Warning and Conflict Analysis: Overview and synthesis**

Every Early Warning System (EWS) requires an underlying methodology through which data and information are analyzed with the purpose of, if required, issuing warnings which enable decision-makers to take early action. In fact, the quality of the warning itself depends on soundness of the analytical process. After all, early warning is a function rather than a method in and of itself. Underlying every EWS – whether designed to deal with refugee flows, human rights violations, ethno-political conflict,
The Continental Early Warning System: genocides, armed conflict, famine and food insecurity, minorities, terrorism etc. is therefore a form of conflict analysis. The challenge for CEWS was precisely to devise a systematic approach to conflict analysis and early warning suited for the entire African continent. Following the approval of the Roadmap at the end of 2006, CMD staff began a process of exploring different early warning experiences as well as conflict analysis frameworks with the aim of developing the CEWS specific methodology – this methodology in encapsulated in what has become known as the CEWS Handbook (African Union 2008b).

In the last decade, our understanding and use of so-called “early warning systems” has deepened considerably through both theoretical and methodological development as well as the proliferation of EWS in a wide variety of fields. While these systems had their origins in national military and intelligence establishments, over the last three decades early warning has become increasingly associated with humanitarian action – particularly in the fields of food security and refugee flows. From a focus on the prevention of surprise nuclear attacks and other military incidents during the Cold War, today, early warning is used in a wide range of phenomena ranging from natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods and drought, to the outbreak of epidemics and famines.

In the field of violent conflict, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali call in the 1992 Agenda for Peace for more systematic efforts directed at the prevention of conflict (specifically the adoption of EWS) gave initial impetus to the development and adoption of conflict early warning systems by an increasingly larger number of international organizations (governmental and non-governmental), academic and research institutes and national governments. The increase in the number, intensity and scope of violent internal conflict following the end of the Cold War, and the dramatic events in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda led to the realization of the need for strengthened mechanisms of conflict prevention, in particular preventive diplomacy but not exclusively so. As Lund noted at the time, preventive diplomacy must be “concerned with efforts taken at the low end and incipient stages of a conflict and should be distinguished from action taken with regard to conflicts at higher levels of violence” (Lund 1994). The international community was beginning to realize that it had to address problems before they erupted as the costs of inaction in the face of large scale violence were too high in both human and material terms.

Early warning of conflict gradually became – or was seen to have the potential to become – the instrument of choice for the development of preventive options and the deployment of preventive action. Nevertheless, as a result of the variety of actors involved as well as the wide range of issues covered, the theoretical and practical evolution of EWS has resulted in a variety of definitions and methodologies. This is not surprising as “the development of a framework for operational conflict and policy assessment first and foremost asks for (theoretical) knowledge on the causes and dynamics of conflict” (van de Goor and Verstegen 1999, 4). And if there is an issue which divides academics and practitioners it is the causes (aetiology) of violent conflict.

For instance, FEWER (1999, 3) suggests that early warning is “the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of: (1) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; (2) development of strategic response to these crises; and (3) the presentation of options to critical actors (national, regional and international) for the purposes of decision-making and preventive action.” In one way or another, definitions of early warning attach considerable importance to the quality and timeliness of analysis, the identification of entry points for actions and the provision of sufficient time for the effective planning and implementation of a response as well the potential inherent in these systems to generate awareness and political will necessary for the mobilization of effective responses.

While the mainstreaming of early warning as an integral part of conflict prevention is widely recognized, two related issues remain contentious. The first relates to debates around methodologies and resulting operational methods to be applied. Many different methodologies are used in early warning systems, ranging from purely quantitative to purely qualitative systems, to a profusion of hybrid systems in between. The early warning “field” is characterized by the existence of a great variety of disparate tools and often incompatible approaches. Yet, virtually no conflict or humanitarian EWS has operated in a sus-
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In a sustainable manner over the time required to identify cyclical patterns of turmoil, conflict and disruptions. With the exception of a few data development projects that focus on a particular type of problem (for example, armed conflict or human rights abuses), no project has enjoyed sustained institutional support required to build a sustainable capacity for early warning.

The second contentious issue regards “the manner in which early responses are produced”, in particular the link between early warning and early action (see, for example, WANEP and International Alert 2000). As emphasized by Adelman, “the major point of early warning information gathering and analysis is not the information and analysis in itself of the crisis area, but the use of that information and analysis to gain the trust of the decision-makers and to provide them with effective options” (Adelman 1996). In fact, as an essential element of conflict prevention, early response must include timely and targeted actions undertaken by actors on the basis of early warning. Such timely and targeted action should prevent the (re) emergence of violent conflicts and embrace “response measures to deal with root causes and risk factors in politically tense situations” (ibid.). This approach to distinguishing root causes and risk factors pointing to “structural long-term and direct short-term preventive actions” is equally advocated by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) and adopted by the European Commission (1996, and reiterated 2001). Trying to define conflict prevention, Wallensteen and Möller consider that:

There are two ways of understanding conflict prevention. One concerns the direct preventive actions: a crisis is judged to be in a dangerous phase of military escalation, intensification or diffusion. Thus, there is a need to act to prevent increasing dangers… A second concern is the structural prevention, where the idea is to create such conditions that conflicts and disputes hardly arise or do not threaten to escalate into militarized action… These two types of prevention are called light, direct or operational prevention on the one hand, and deep or structural, on the other hand, depending on the scholar. (2003, 6)

Moreover, optimizing the linkage between early warning and early action has been a primary concern of scholars and practitioners engaged in the development and implementation of these systems. An often cited criticism of EWS points to the fact that, although there is a profusion of ever more sophisticated and timely warnings, there is a lack of political will, ability or capacity of actors to act in a preventative manner, rendering these systems’ utility null. Nevertheless, the recognition that, although intimately linked, early warning and early action “have distinctively different dynamics” has been an important contribution which has enabled the further development of both.

In addition, we should note that a wide number of processes and activities are part of an early warning system. In fact, the term is often used to describe a variety of activities that are not strictly early warning. These include conflict analysis and monitoring, data analysis, risk assessment and advocacy (Austin 2004). While early warning requires the on-going and near real-time assessment of events that in a high risk situation are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict (Gurr 1996), analysis of these events in their specific context is critical as without it the response options developed may be unsuited to the situation and/or unrealistic as regards availability of means. A detailed understanding of the issue and its context is absolutely critical. This is why several authors have considered that purely quantitative systems are unable to identify the causes of conflict as they rely on “empirical causal relationships” – ultimately, as noted by Austin (2004, 21), “conflict analysis is where the researcher must draw the line himself”. The importance of sound analytical tools is also emphasized by Carment and Schnabel (2003, 15) who posit that “a key concern in ensuring effective conflict prevention is how to ensure that the practitioner is equipped with the best available analytical skills to ensure valid and reliable evaluations of potential problems”. More importantly, these authors note that “while some systems may rely on the monitoring of background factors and enabling conditions that are associated with the risk of conflict,
others only provide information on the probability of specific events leading to conflict … ideally, both approaches should be pursued simultaneously” (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 16).

In their review of existing theory and practice, the AU’s CMD looked at several conflict analysis frameworks used by organizations operating in and/or around conflict. Within these, special attention was given to so-called conflict assessment frameworks widely used by operational agencies in an effort to minimize any potentially negative impacts of humanitarian assistance, post-conflict peace-building and, ultimately, development assistance (Gomes Porto 2008, 48). These conflict assessment frameworks aim at minimizing possible and unintended negative impacts by “understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflicts, as well as the dynamics supporting or undermining peace efforts” – “conflict sensitivity” or “do no harm” (Anderson 1999).

Moreover, the development of conflict assessment frameworks has benefited significantly from the contributions of at least three very different fields: on the one hand, the contributions of conflict research and peace studies as regards our understanding of conflict, its prevention, management and resolution; secondly, the contributions of strategic studies and in particular those of strategic intelligence; and finally, the contributions from management science and organizational development – as regards a number of tools that have formed part of the “arsenal” of tools at the disposal of organizations to measure the impacts (positive as well as negative) of development policies and practices – conventional risk assessment methodologies or management-related tools such as program log frames.

Conflict assessment in international development assistance has advanced to levels that allow for a transfer of approaches and tools to other policy sectors, including conflict early warning. Four frameworks were reviewed in detail during the development of the CEWS methodology: the German Development Agency (GTZ)’s Conflict Analysis Framework, DFID’s Conflict Assessment Framework, the World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), and the United Nation’s Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. Several of the methodologies currently in use share a very similar approach to the stages or steps of conflict analysis. For example, both DFID’s Conflict Assessments and the UN system’s Common Framework are based on three analytical stages, combining the analysis of conflict causes with a scrutiny of responses, before going into the development of strategic options. Also, these approaches share considerable common ground in terms of what they conceive to be the essential units of analysis. These four conflict analysis frameworks tend to emphasize that, because of the unique nature of each conflict situation, the design and conduct of conflict assessments will vary from case to case as regards the recommended method. One important recommendation stems from the UN’s inter-agency framework (2004: 4): that “the intention in applying this framework should therefore not be to ‘fill in the boxes’ but, in view of the specificities of each transition situation, to organize a process, which will help arrive at some common understanding of the key analytical components.” Equally, DFID (2002, 7) warns that the methodology should not be seen as a formula and that it should (1) adapt according to the needs and objectives of the end-user; (2) develop according to the nature and phase of the conflict; (3) develop dynamic forms of analysis and, finally, (4) encourage “joined-up” analysis.

The CEWS: Methodology and approach

During the various methodological working sessions held at AU CMD in 2007, the team concluded that a specifically tailored – or hybrid – Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology could be a viable method underlying the CEWS early warning function. Yet, as practiced by development agencies, SCAs have been conducted to produce stand-alone analyses (usually in the form of SCA reports) which tend not to be part of a larger and regular cycle of reporting, assessment and policy/response options formulation. Usually, this type of SCA is carried out once a crisis situation has already arisen and the policy advice derived from such an exercise is singular in the sense that there are no systematic follow-up assessments.
CEWS requirements require that some degree of customization be undertaken as it must per force focus on on-going monitoring of a large number of countries, issues and themes and aim at producing regular reports (with the associated feedback loops which link reporting to decision-making on emerging violent conflict). The specific challenge for CEWS was therefore how to integrate the processes of producing regular assessments based on a continuous process of data collection, on the basis of which early warnings could be generated.

The result of this review of best practice as regards early warning systems and conflict assessment frameworks resulted in a hybrid methodology, developed at length in the CEWS Handbook (African Union 2008b). This methodology includes three iterative and concurrent phases which can be seen in the diagram below (Figure 6.1). The three processes of (1) information collection and monitoring, (2) conflict and cooperation analysis and (3) the formulation of response options are continuous, iterative and interactive. They are also integrated in the sense that each feeds into or may be triggered by the others. Because a detailed discussion of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that inform the various tasks and procedures to be undertaken by CMD staff (situation room staff, early warning officers and desk officers) is outside of this chapter, a summary of each step of the CEWS methodology is provided below. For a more detailed elaboration of each step, the reader should refer to the CEWS Handbook (African Union 2008b, Appendixes).

### Summary of the CEWS Framework

#### Data Collection and Monitoring
- **alerts**
- **context**
- **actors**
- **events**

#### Conflict and Cooperation Analysis
- **early warnings**
- **structural analysis**
- **actor analysis**
- **dynamic analysis**

#### Formulation of Options
- **recommendations**
- **scenario-building**
- **response options**
- **validation**

#### Responses
- **action**
- **decision-making**
- **implementation**

### Information Collection and Monitoring

The first activity focuses on the continuous (and semi-automated) information gathering process which assures that CEWS fulfils the requirement of continuous monitoring of political, economic, humanitarian, social and military developments across the continent. As noted above, the Roadmap refers to the CEWS as an “an open-source system where information is gathered from a variety of different sources,
including, *inter alia*, governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organisations, the media, academia and think-thanks*" (African Union 2008a). In addition to monitoring news data, the CEWS information gathering function must include key sources of data such as the AU itself (Commission, AU Field Missions and Liaison Offices), as well as that generated at the level of the RECs and Member States, collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs.

Appropriate information collection, compilation, management and distribution systems are therefore critical for the functioning of the CEWS. Furthermore, several key recommendations of the participants at the various workshops that resulted in the *Roadmap* contributed to the design of this particular set of processes. These recommendations included: the introduction of an automated data gathering and processing system (including but not limited to news clippings); the introduction of an internal news trends tracking service; the development of a system of grading sources and reports to diminish information overflow and to increase efficiency; greater use of African information sources, particularly in indigenous languages; and, finally, the strengthening of the existing system of internal country profiles through the introduction of sub-national detail.

Yet, the continuous monitoring of political, economic, social, environmental, military and humanitarian indicators at multiple levels of analysis and for a large number of countries and regions is a complex undertaking. To enable this, the specification of the framework of variables, indicators and parameters guiding these activities was conducted jointly by CEWS staff (the Situation Room, Early Warning Unit and the Desk Officers). This range of parameters established for the entire continent have allowed for regular information collection, monitoring and management around three generic clusters: Context and Structural Information on Countries and Regions; Actor Attribute Information on key Individuals and Groups; and, Information on Behaviors and Events as they evolve over time. In order to assure that the CEWS methodology is anchored upon data driven analysis, the information collection and monitoring function is designed to enable the development of base line information (including country and actor profiles, vulnerabilities propensities and baselines upon which alerts are initiated). The results of data driven analysis are presented in a baseline or time series measure of the indicators as they evolve. These data driven baselines represent both the slowly changing structural indicators of countries and the more rapidly changing dynamic indicators of human action and behavior.

Data driven analysis begins with the specification of indicators followed by continuous monitoring for changes over time. As noted in the pages above, the PSC Protocol underlies that the collection and analysis of data should be based on the development of an early warning module with clearly defined and accepted political, social, military and humanitarian indicators. International best practice as well as African experiences on structural indicator development were taken into account in the development by the CEWS of a structural indicator module – the result was a further elaboration on each of these indicator “baskets” resulting on a detailed list of indicators of structural conditions.

The CEWS has begun the compilation of three data sets of structural indicators (the expectation being that these indicators required updating annually). First, many Member States offer their own datasets across a number of domains – this public data is surveyed annually and compiled by CEWS as an official data source for structural indicators. Second, various time series data based on numerous indicators are publicly available from a wide range of international organizations (IGO) such as the United Nations or the World Bank. These time series data are also surveyed annually and compiled by CEWS; they are most useful for analyses where cross-national, temporal data is required. Third, certain supplemental data, typically based on a smaller but focused set of indicators, are also surveyed periodically; the supplemental data collected on these supplemental indicators are compiled by both IGOs and NGOs. They focus on human rights, governance and other indicators that may not be as well established as the global structural indicators compiled by IGOs on a regular basis, and are used to supplement analyses as appropriate.
Methodology and Approach

Complementing the structural indicators, dynamic or behavioral indicators embody the basic event parameters of who did what to/with whom, when where, why and how. Behavior baselines are extremely useful due to their short-term, rapidly changing character, representing the interaction of dynamic events. They may be generated from field or news reports, with a typical temporal interval ranging from daily to weekly. The CEWS methodology has been developed to enable the continuous monitoring of a set of behavioral indicators.

Field reporting is carried out by AU Missions and regional offices, but the bulk of the burden for field data collection is likely to be carried by the RMs at the RECs. As noted above, both IGAD and ECOWAS have already developed operational frameworks for indicators relevant to their respective mandates and/ or areas of interest. These include pastoral conflict, the media and peace-building, state collapse, elections, forced migration, human rights and judicial reform, small arms proliferation and environmental degradation. Furthermore, these two RECs are already operational in their field reporting, with field data streams that extend four and two years respectively.

In addition to Incident Reports, or “IncReps,” the integration of Situation Reports, or “SitReps,” to the information collection framework is important. SitReps enable observers to provide contextual information and narratives on a regular (typically weekly) basis; thus ensuring continuity in the data stream collected at the field level. More importantly, SitReps monitor pre-curors to conflict and cooperation.

As noted above, another source of event baselines is news reports. Within this approach, a software application automatically monitors and analyses numerous international news service feeds as well as regional and local news sources to develop the baselines similar to the field data baselines discussed above. The African Union has partnered with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre to design and deploy an Africa-specific news tracking system for exclusive use by CEWS and its partners. This application, the Africa Media Monitor, has begun tracking news reports in real time using the same basic events data parameters.

Whether tracking event parameters or topics, this events data approach yields a measurable baseline for the full range of social, political, economic and environmental events reported in the news. From these events data, dynamic baselines are compiled from which subtle inflections and anomalies in their incidence may be visualized. In other words, the inflections in the baseline of reported activities can be flagged prior to their escalation into a volatile situation and possible violence. When inflections over time indicate a possible escalation, especially when the deviation is large relative to historical patterns, an alert is generated. This alert in turn is examined by an analyst and/or early warning expert on the basis of conflict and cooperation assessment frameworks (to be discussed below) to determine whether the deviation has surpassed a threshold that may call for action or at least further analysis. CEWS thus can conduct near real-time baseline monitoring and communicate timely alerts to relevant parties. Alerts then may be considered the analytic product of the information collection and monitoring step.

Such data driven analysis is also usefully considered a pre-requisite for effective early warning and response. With both types of indicators (structural as well as dynamic), baseline analysis of the changes over time is a pre-requisite for effective early warning and early response. By continuously tracking the evolution of both structural conditions and events (behavior), CEWS early warning officers are able to compare baselines over time, assess risk potential and anticipate subtle changes that may lead to escalations in a conflict situation, instability or disruption. Structural baselines reveal slowly changing, structural issues that may exacerbate a conflict. On the other hand, and stemming from the continuous monitoring of on-going behavior and interaction by actors, events baselines are critical as they relate to the immediate timeframe, revealing a stable situation, with relatively little change, or an escalation (or de-escalation) of conflict. The approach of using data driven baselines applies to the structural data of a country context, the attribute data of actors and their networks, as well as to the dynamic data of interactions and behavior.
Conflict and Cooperation Analysis

The CEWS's methodology second step is that of Conflict and Cooperation Analysis, a phase that corresponds more closely to the traditional understanding of SCAs as discussed above. As part of the analytical framework with which events and structural baseline deviations referred to above are interpreted, SCAs help to contextualize the alert against the specific nature and background of the situation in question, possibly resulting in the production of early warnings and other types of reports. Yet, differently from the traditional undertaking of a SCA, the CEWS strategic conflict and cooperation analysis stage is wholly integrated with the development of baseline data and information as detailed above. Indeed, strategic conflict and cooperation analysis as performed by the CEWS would normally be developed as an on-going process rather than just undertaken prior or during the production of early warning reports.

Conflict and cooperation analysis begins with an understanding of structural sources of conflict – requiring the identification of key sources of tension that have led to or are likely to lead to conflict. These key structural sources may be found in political, economic, security, social, religious structures; they may also be found at local, regional, national and international levels. Defined broadly, “structures” are considered the “long term factors underlying violent conflict”. They are regarded as “cleavages” in the political, economic and social realms upon which the mobilization of individuals and groups for violent conflict is often undertaken. They are regarded as “pervasive and long standing factors and differences that become built into the policies, structures and culture of a society and may create the conditions for violent conflict” (UNDG ECHA 2004, 5). It is also useful to differentiate between different geographical levels (local, regional national, international), on the one hand, and different arenas (political, security, economic, social), on the other. Some weighting (in terms of relative importance) of the sources of tension and conflict needs to be undertaken – a task made easier by the structural risk assessments discussed above – as do the linkages and connections between sources of tension in different sectors and levels. The benefit of structural country profiles as well as structural risk assessments maintained by the Situation Room as part of its information collection, monitoring and management function for structural analysis should therefore not be underestimated. Indeed, the analyst conducting the SCA or writing the early warning report has at his or her disposal a considerable repository of relevant and up to date structural data.

As part of the SCA, the CEWS methodology requires that actors – main protagonists (groups, institutions, individuals) who influence (positively or negatively) the situation under analysis – be analyzed. Actor analysis assesses their interests and motivations, and also looks into their relationships. The interest is on both the actor's potential for conflict and for cooperation. Actor analysis is meant to focus on shorter term issues and dynamics and be comprehensive in the sense of including as many internal and external relevant actors as possible. Possible actors include: governments (and within them government departments and ministries), armed and security forces, political leaders, non-state armed groups, traditional and community leaders, trade unions, political parties, businesses, other interested governments, MNCs, humanitarian and human rights organizations, etc. At a later stage, the formulation of policy and response options also depends on knowledge of the “capacities for peace” of different actors. These may refer to structures, mechanisms, processes and institutions which exist in society to peacefully manage conflict (practical examples being: a strong civil society, role of traditional authorities, informal approaches to conflict resolution, etc). On a macro-level, understanding existing and potential capacities for peace can help us understand a country’s “peace-building capacity”.

Once structural causes and actors are analyzed and identified, the next step is dynamic analysis: identifying possible aggravating, inhibiting and triggering events and behavior will allow for scenario development and a prognosis. In addition to proximate causes of conflict, it takes a case specific trigger to turn a constellation of structural and agency related facts into a situation where violent conflict actually is breaking out. Triggers are understood as single acts, events or their anticipation that may set off or
escalate violent conflict (examples could include coup attempts, sudden changes of government, a forthcoming election, assassinations, sudden movements of large numbers of people, spill-over effects from neighboring countries or the anticipation of such effects, the discovery of new mineral resources, etc.). However, sometimes a conflict might not be triggered by a single identifiable act, but just start on the basis of aggravating factors. Also, certain aggravators can act as triggers. Likewise, certain activities, events or perceptions can work against the escalation of conflict or the occurrence of violence – these factors are called **inhibitors**. These can be incentives to the conflicting parties (like the prospect of becoming part of a power-sharing arrangement), strong non-conflict interests of a third-party to the conflict, the threat of an intervention, etc.

Finally, this analysis also takes into account the responses of other international actors. In a first instance, responses of international actors in a variety of fields is investigated – including in areas such as humanitarian relief, development assistance, political cooperation, security, etc. Both aggravators and inhibitors can be summarized at different geographical levels and in different fields or arenas.

**Policy and Response Formulation**

In the final step, *Policy and Response Formulation*, the focus is on the development of possible scenarios and actionable options. As noted by Clark,

> Scenarios are used primarily for planning and decision-making. Scenario planning is normally used to explore possible future conditions given a set of assumptions. Each scenario represents a distinct, plausible picture of a segment of the future. Because it is impossible to know the future precisely, the solution is to create several scenarios. These scenarios are, essentially, specially constructed stories about the future, each one modelling a distinct, plausible outcome. (Clark 2004, 173)

Scenario development enables the CEWS to come up with recommendations for action to AU decision makers. Recall that the process of information collection and monitoring “begins” with continuously observing events and actors in their unique contexts. However, the process also “ends” with these observations. In other words, the information collection and monitoring process is continuous, and it merges into the regular analysis of the data driven baselines, keying off of the alerts that represent deviations and inflections from the past. Likewise, the analytic process is continuous and feeds into the process of formulating response options. Ideally, of course, the formulation process anticipates conditions in a proactive mode as opposed to simply offering reactive responses.

It is the contextualized and actor specific negative and positive scenarios that drive the formulation of response options. Thus the formulation process begins with the specification of alternative scenarios representing a worse (to be avoided) and best (desired) case, and the default status quo condition that marks the starting point or conditions as described in the strategic analysis. Is the conflict likely to escalate, de-escalate or remain at the same level of intensity? And what needs to be done if these things happen?

A basic type scenario is called the *demonstration scenario*, pioneered by Herman Kahn, Harvey De-Veer and others at RAND in the early days of systems analysis. As noted by Robert Clark, “in this scenario, the writer first imagines a particular end state in the future and then describes a plausible path of events that could lead to that state. The branch-point version of this type of scenario identifies decisive events along the path (events that represent points at which key choices determine the outcome)” (Clark 2004). This notion of branch points is very important for the purposes of scenario building as part of the CEWS methodology. By mapping out all the possible paths by which a specific situation (scenario) can materialize, the early warning officer/analyst becomes sensitive to these key moments – as they ultimately provide opportunities for preventing, diverting or facilitating a particular set of processes.
In order to structure policy and response options around demonstration scenarios it is useful to focus on three basic scenarios: (1) a worst case scenario, (2) the continuation of the status quo and (3) a best case scenario. The worst case scenario refers to a feared state of affairs, a deterioration of the present situation; the status quo describes the situation as identified through the conflict and cooperation Analysis detailed above; and the best case scenario outlines a desired, but also attainable situation. The case-description then has to be matched with a preliminary outline of goals or strategies – what kind of activities, by whom, would contribute towards the realisation or achievement of the described scenario? Finally, recommended courses of action (COAs) which are based on actual mandate, instruments and political will should be attached to each of the three scenarios.

The primary utility of scenario building for the formulation of response options lies in the specification of the key or decisive events along the paths that shape the outcomes. The specification of these paths represents the range of response options for courses of action to be considered in any given situation. The process of specifying these alternative paths helps illuminates opportunities in terms of timing as well as in terms of the key networks or nodes of influence that can help achieve the desired outcomes. And these can only be fully understood on the basis of a prior SCA, as detailed above, whereby the analyst has identified the structural root causes, key actors, conflict dynamics etc.

Once scenarios of desired and undesired developments have been built, the formulation of response options can begin. This process of formulation links the present to the desired (or undesired) scenarios and is informed by the data driven analysis. Alternative paths are specified that begin with the current conditions and highlight the choice points along the way. These points serve as markers of progress and can guide the formulation of response options. The formulation of options is also based – on past experience and a wide range of principle courses of action as detailed in the PSC Protocol and discussed in several chapters in this volume.

Validation of the dynamic analyses described above ideally entails testing of the recommended response option in a similar past situation. To the extent that the historical conditions are analogous to the present, such validations can lend insight into likely levels of likely future success for alternative COAs. In other words, the process of validation can help illuminate the lessons learned, both positive and negative, from past interventions. For example, if the baselines for pastoral conflict reveal seasonal fluctuations in the raiding at a particular time of year, one can assess the prior attempts to address these raids to identify the most efficacious response option under similar conditions in subsequent seasons. To formalize this validation procedure, analysts should track each course of action taken and its outcome as well as the conflicts themselves. This approach offers feedback to the entire process beyond the basic data quality control procedures that are typically associated with validation. To be sure, validation certainly includes ongoing quality control of the data collection process.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the process of development of the CEWS from an institutional as well as methodological point of view. Although the CEWS in and of itself is not mandated to undertake response actions (a responsibility given to several of the institutions discussed above) it plays a vital role at the centre of the African Peace and Security Architecture. As discussed above, the purpose of the CEWS is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa to several key institutions of the Africa Union. The analysis and advice to be provided by the CEWS have a very specific purpose, namely to enable the development of appropriate response strategies by the African Union and its institutions.

The CEWS’ ability to carry out this very specific mandate by successfully implementing the methodology and set of procedures outlined above will ultimately determine its usefulness and validity. Yet, a fun-
damental part of this is, of course, the ability of the CEWS to engage AU decision-makers appropriately and influence decision-making. The extent to which the various “outputs” produced by the CEWS under the methodology outline above will achieve this goal must therefore be the subject of on-going evaluation as the link between analysis and response must be a fundamental underpinning of CEWS’ operations.

The implementation of the CEWS, now in its 3rd and final stage, is well advanced, even in the face of constraints of a varied nature, as discussed below. The technical ICT applications necessary for running the CEWS are at an advanced implementation stage. In July 2008 cooperation with the EU Joint Research Centre in Milan was started which led to the joint development and implementation of a number of important technical tools, among them the Africa News Brief (online-based search engine and dynamic data bank-generating tool modeled around the Europe Media Monitor which has been vastly enhanced with regard to coverage and language, violent event extraction, dynamic indicators); a country profile database (Country Profile); an Indicators’ Module; storage modules; visualization tools etc. These applications, plus a variety of relevant AU and REC documents, have been integrated into a CEWS Portal, which is accessible for the RECs too.

The development of the CEWS’ methodological framework during 2007, which resulted in the CEWS Handbook discussed above, has been a key achievement. Since then, the focus has been on AU CMD staff development and training on the basis of the analytical tools contained in the Handbook. As a result of this methodology which builds on comprehensive and real-time monitoring function, the CEWS has developed a new type of report, the Early Warning Report. This type of report will serve as an instrument on the basis of which and through the appropriate channels a specific issue or incident is tabled for discussion by the PSC – by communicating to other Divisions, to the Commissioner on Peace and Security and to the Chairperson the urgency of a specific issue or event. The AU CMD has since early 2009 began testing the production of early warning reports on the basis of this methodology. Of note is the fact that in the development of these tools, early warning analysts, situation room staff as well as the desk officers have played a lead role and develop the highest level of ownership.

As emphasized above, the development of appropriate modes of engagement by the CEWS with the Chairperson of the Commission is key to the fulfillment of the CEWS primary functions. The Chairperson’s pivotal role in efforts and initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts – by bringing to the attention of the PSC any matter which may threaten peace and security in the Continent – require the CEWS to contribute in an efficient and timely manner to the formal as well as informal communication between both institutions on peace and security matters. In this regard, the CEWS role in contributing to the Chairperson’s reports to the PSC as well as to the Assembly of Heads of State plays a critical role.

The implementation of additional strategies for engaging decision-makers and in particular, the development of an effective outreach strategy in support of key AU structures as well as other stakeholders outside the AU is also critical priority. In this regard, the ability to simultaneously reach as well as integrate the views, policy initiatives and recommendations of a number of key AU institutions is critical (systematic feedback loop). These include the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, with the United Nations and other international organizations and with Civil Society Organizations.

Other types of interaction with decision-makers such as on-demand briefings and unstructured interaction – not in prejudice of formal lines of communication – constitute also an on-going priority. In this regard, the Situation Room, in its role as “Point-of-Contact”, must increasingly play the role of “point of contact” between the AU and its various field missions, Member States as well as other Organisations; answering requests for information and inquiries from a wide variety of stakeholders as well as serving as the main point of contact between the CMD and UNDPKO.

As was noted above, RECs are a constituent part of the overall security architecture of the AU and in particular the CEWS, where they are given an important and specific role. Not only are the monitoring and observation units to be linked directly to the situation room in Addis Ababa, but Regional Mecha-
nisms are urged to continuously inform the PSC on their activities and when necessary brief the PSC – a request that is based on reciprocity. Harmonization and coordination are therefore key and will largely be a function of an effective partnership between the Regional Mechanisms and the PSC. We recall the Roadmap’s recommendation to the effect that “rather than attempt to create a single, unified system applicable to all early warning systems involved, and following closely the recommendations of the RECs, this Roadmap proposes the development of a ‘continental framework’ of information and analysis sharing able to build and supplement the efforts already developed by Regional Mechanisms” (African Union 2008a).

The conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the RECs in January 2008, and the series of quarterly meetings which since then have brought the AU and the RECs early warning teams together have played a critical role, as detailed in the chapter by Gomes Porto and Engel below. This MoU was signed by representatives from the African Union and the following RECs: CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC und UMA (Maghreb Arab Union).

Once fully operational, CEWS will fulfill a number of functional roles and in the very practice of doing so will set standards for the African continent (and beyond). These standards will be both of a technical and of a methodological nature. And they will cover mainly information collection, information sharing and processing. Partly, the standard setting role of the AU will be due to the fact that the AU is the first African institution to introduce a fully-fledged EWS (i.e. covering all aspects of violent conflict and all geographical areas of the continent); and partly is it because of a specific division of labor evolving between the AU and the RECs. For instance, when it comes to data collection from open sources, the AU, by default, not only takes a continental, but also a transnational perspective. On the other hand, the RECs currently enjoy a different advantage, i.e. access to and analysis of sub-national or sub-regional information. Hence, a particular modus of sharing information can be foreseen for the CEWS, one that involves an optimum division of labor and resources between the AU and the RECs. In addition and because of its mandate to liaise with other institutions – such as the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations as well as continental and international research centers, academic institutions and NGOs –, the CEWS will become a standard setting hub for the collection and exchange of open source-based information on early warning with relevance to Africa.

In processing this information, the CEWS is making use of state-of-the-art technology which places it in a unique position not only vis-à-vis other EWS on the continent, but also internationally. And, finally, in the analysis of the information collected, the CEWS utilizes a set of indicators that is continental wide and African-specific. Against this background, the CEWS framework is set to play an important role in setting harmonizing standards and procedures in African early warning.

For CEWS to set meaningful and useful standards however, it will require interoperability and a division of labor among the RECs. Although the RECs have been engaged throughout the CEWS formation process, the details of system (AU-RECs) inter-operability have yet to be jointly resolved as it affects all aspects of communicating on early warning between the AU and the RECs, including – in the case of information collection and monitoring – the question of applications, data, formats, indicators etc. Thus, this is a critical issue on the CEWS agenda in the immediate period being addressed through periodic consultations with the RECs, both bilaterally and as a group. The optimal division of labor, however, is likely to involve policy considerations that transcend the technical issues.

One plausible scenario is to build upon existing strengths and resources among the RECs, specifically their proximity to the conflicts within their respective regions. Such a scenario might draw upon the RECs to continue their field information collection and monitoring while CEWS coordinates the sharing of data summaries among them. Meanwhile the CEWS Situation Room can take primary responsibility for information collection and monitoring of news reports given that it is a more centralized activity the results of which can be readily distributed to the RECs. Another area where the CEWS may take a central
The CEWS SitRoom can manage a “basket” of indicators to which RECs may contribute and from which the RECs may use for their information collection and monitoring activities in the field. Such a division of labor with respect to indicators module would facilitate interoperability and data sharing among the RECs. It would also support the setting of common standards while encouraging region-specific in-depth analysis.

During this stage of implementation of the CEWS, a number of questions need to be addressed concerning the sharing, exchange and ownership of data. Specifically, protocols for collaboration and measures to insure confidentiality of sensitive information will be paramount. In addition, procedures for controlling the dissemination of information and the harmonization of a common indicator framework jointly used by the AU and the RECs will need to be detailed. In the future it will be crucial to systematically address questions of operational development and sustainability of the CEWS. Among others, this includes, finance and staffing, training, monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the organizational interactions with external partners need to be assessed regularly with a view to further integrating and harmonizing the CEWS.
1. BACKGROUND

Article 12 of the PSC Protocol provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. As stipulated in article 12 (2) of the Protocol, the CEWS shall consist of; (i) an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “the Situation Room”, which is located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the African Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis; and (ii) the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs), which shall be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

The Governmental Experts meeting on early warning and conflict prevention, held in Kempton Park, South Africa in 2006, adopted the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which was subsequently endorsed by the 10th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, held in Addis Ababa, in January 2007. The Council requested the Commission to take all the necessary steps for the timely and full implementation of the Framework, to ensure that the CEWS is fully operational.

2. INTRODUCTION

As indicated in the Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology of CEWS, the “efficient management of data and information must include adequate collection, compilation, management and distribution systems”. The Roadmap refers to the CEWS as “an open-source system where information is gathered from a variety of different sources, including, inter alia, governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-governmental organisations, the media, academia and think-thanks”. In fact, “while key sources of data include those generated by the AU itself (Commission, AU Field Missions and Liaison Offices), as well as that generated at the level of the RECs (Regional Economic Communities) and Member States, collaboration with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs” (§ 11) is clearly stipulated by the PSC Protocol.

Appropriate information collection, compilation, management and distribution systems are therefore critical for the functioning of the CEWS. In order to guide the process of data collection, management and dissemination, there is an ongoing development, review and refinement of tools, indicators and parameters by CEWS staff (analysts and Situation Room staff).

The Situation Room is responsible for undertaking the task of regular information collection, monitoring, management and dissemination. The CEWS Methodology, as detailed in the CEWS Handbook which was developed in 2008, outlines three generic clusters within which these activities can be subsumed:
The Data Collection and Monitoring Function of CEWS

1. Overview of the Africa Media Monitor

The AMM is developed in collaboration with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center (JRC) as an advanced web mining and information extraction tool for application to electronic media monitoring and open source information. Media monitoring addresses the need to follow news reports in policy areas. Dedicated systems are developed to allow end users to edit newsletters, to feed topic-specific news to their products, and to create alerting systems.

The Internet is the richest reservoir of human knowledge that has ever existed. Advanced software tools, including AMM are needed to monitor and process the vast amount of material available online. These tools, firstly, retrieve data from the internet according to user-specified criteria and then, secondly, extract information and “facts” from resultant reserves of unstructured text. They also should be multilingual and be able to function in as many languages as possible.

AMM exploits techniques developed by the JRC for rapid textual analysis of incoming articles. It has the capacity to process 40,000 articles every ten minutes in four languages and generates automatic subject alerts for email and SMS. AMM scans about 1,400 news sites 24/7 and detects any new articles in four languages. These articles are then filtered into one or more of about 400 Keyword definitions.
The Data Collection and Monitoring Function of CEWS

(or Categories). Keywords can be current affairs of the AU Commission or names of Commissioners or countries and themes.

The AMM has two interfaces:

I. The Africa Brief News Page
II. The News Desk

_Africa Brief_ – is clustered and categorized live news, which is updated every ten minutes. All information gathered through the AMM tool will be presented live through the Africa Brief News page. Africa Brief presents the top stories of the moment as “Breaking News” and gives access to all the topic areas. The breaking news is identified through a statistical procedure which identifies keywords currently mentioned more than usual.

_NewsDesk_ – is the key tool, which has a user-customised view and is used by the Situation Room to inform decision-makers of important events. This is achieved through SMS alerts, e-mail alerts, daily news highlights and other custom made news letters. In general, this is a collaborative editorial interface that facilitates the day-to-day work of the Situation Room. It allows the Situation Room to undertake information feeds monitoring, reports generation, and notifications delivery. This is also a broader tool of management where one can manage user accounts and their roles, as well as defining key words that dictate the information retrieval by AMM. NewsDesk possesses the following features:

- Easily manipulated web application
- Concurrent access to the same report
- History (log) of actions
- Predefined and manageable roles/access rights

A NewsDesk Workgroup is composed of:

- Situation Room staff: for feed analysis, articles selection, notification delivery (SMS, email etc), and managing newsletter layout.
- Editors: Reviewing and publishing final product.
- Workgroup Managers: Resource allocation, user accounts management, access rights.

For both interfaces the system for automatic information aggregation and analysis is applied to news pages and other sources (such as news wires or subscribed analytic sources) through:

- Gathering
- Filtering and classification
- Aggregation
- Presentation and visualisation
- Trend detection and user-alerting
- Distribution (web pages, email alerts, RSS feeds, SMS messages, WAP, automatic newsletters)

Despite the capabilities of the AMM two issues are crucial factors in governing its success: The availability of appropriate sources and appropriate key words. The information gathered through the AMM is useful in analysis through the production of:
The Data Collection and Monitoring Function of CEWS

- Alerts
- Immediate dissemination of information (text messaging, email)
- Statistical analysis
- Clustering of news
- Geo-coding
- Filtering

The following picture depicts the different roles and functionalities attained by the AMM system. The two tasks, namely, the Editor / Analyst (the day to day operation of a Situation Room) and the Categorization Expert (who defines key words and categories that shape the functioning of AMM) are the most important components for the efficient functioning of the tool.

Figure 1: AMM System Overview

2. Overview of the Africa Reporter

Africa Reporter is an online analytical tool that is tailored to the CEWS indicators and templates to facilitate the submission of incident and situation reports from AU Field Missions and Liaison offices.

One of the two basic types of field reports is the incident report. Incident reports are irregular reports that describe the attributes of certain events or incidents. These reports are irregular because they focus on the episodic occurrence of events, typically violence or conflict but sometimes the events are defined more broadly to include cooperation. For CEWS, these events are called security related incidents.
Situation reports are regular assessments of a country, with a focus on emerging conditions of conflict, instability and other security related situations. The regular submission of these reports will help in developing a baseline for the specific area of reporting.

The tool also has a built-in analytic capability through the use of graphs, maps and summaries. The Situation Room does pre-analysis of submitted reports through quality assurance and the production of weekly / monthly summaries, before the submission to analysts.

3. OVERVIEW OF THE LIVE MON

The Live Monitor (LiveMon) system is a customized web-based content delivery system. It gets RSS feeds from AMM and other sources, and displays a geo-localized content on an African map.

The animation of live news articles on the map helps decision makers to follow current news, at a glance; and hence LiveMon versions are installed at the Bureau of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner for Peace and Security and Director for Peace and Security.

This tool is developed in collaboration with the European Commission's JRC.
4. OVERVIEW OF THE CEWS INDICATORS AND PROFILES MODULE

This module encompasses a set of web-based applications, with multiple functionalities, and is developed in house. The main purpose of this tool is to serve as a repository for structural and narrative country profile data.

This module consists of the following sub-modules:

- Indicators Module:
  - Specifying the low level CEWS Indicators
  - Extract structural data from different sources based on CEWS Indicators
  - Output data for Indicator driven analysis (by country and by indicator)

- Profiles Module:
  - Provide summary Profile for the AU and the RECs
  - Provide detailed Profile information for all the AU Member States based on the top-level indicator baskets
  - Automated scrapping of profiles data from different sources

- Documents Archive Module
  - Provide easy access to documents from different sources

- Management Module
  - Updating structural and profiles data
  - User management
  - Document uploading

Figure 4: Screen shots from the CEWS Indicators and Profiles Module

5. OVERVIEW OF THE CEWS PORTAL

The CEWS Portal is a one-stop shop for making relevant information as well as data collection and analysis tools accessible to CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs. The in-house developed portal consolidates multiple information sources into a single user-friendly interface and is designed to facilitate a single point of access to CEWS suite of applications.
The CEWS Portal contains the following:

- **Document Archive:**
  - Facilitate sharing of CEWS, RECs and PSD documents as a whole

- **CEWS Forum:**
  - Provide a platform for communication
  - Information sharing on important events on the continent

- **Election Database:**
  - Database of past, present and upcoming elections in all AU Member States

- **African Peace Agreements:**
  - Database of all African Peace Agreements

There is an ongoing refinement of the CEWS Portal, which is part of an overall strategy to enhance coordination and collaboration, information sharing as well as the exchange of best practices with the early warning systems of the RECs.

Fig 4: A snapshot from the CEWS Portal
6. OVERVIEW OF AFRICA PROSPECTS TOOL

Africa Prospects is a tool designed to assess and forecast the vulnerability of countries to conflict escalation based on its set of structural indicators. The tool tries to identify the underlying influences and constraints embodied in sets of structural indicators with respect to the intensity of the countries’ associated conflict, violence or similar target measures. Currently this tool is a Microsoft Excel add-on, with future plan of integration with the other CEWS tools.

The forecasting model used with Africa Prospects is called the Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence (FASE) model. It is a non-linear, non-parametric, machine-learning algorithm that follows hybrid method, incorporating elements from statistics, fuzzy logic and possibility theory.

Africa Prospects approach for the Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) of countries:

- Learn the links between historical profiles of structural indicators and their levels of conflict
- Forecast future levels of the conflict from the structural indicator profiles
- Identify the common and country-specific structural drivers for each forecasted level of conflict
- Triangulate the forecasted conflict results with country, continental and global data
- Support the formulation of contextualized structural prevention and mitigation options

Even though a number of Independent Indicators are being used (at times more than 50) at different times of the structural vulnerability assessment, the preliminary dependent variable uses the Overall Level/intensity of Conflict, (COSIMO) Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIK).