This document is based on the contributions made by the RECs at the request of the African Union
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs)

I. ECOWAS

Background

1. The challenge posed by the threat of violent and armed conflicts in West Africa has become a critical factor for sub-regional stability and economic development. Successive United Nations Human Development Reports since 2000 rank almost all the 15 Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the category of the world’s most poor. Within the last 15 years, ECOWAS has grappled with a plethora of conflicts which have sapped enormous energy and resources meant for economic development and sub-regional integration. Most recently West Africa hosted three separate UN Peacekeeping/Support Missions totaling about 30,000. The cost of maintaining these blue helmets is enormous. In addition, the burden of disarmament, reconstruction, and rehabilitation is so huge that it would surely take years for the wounds of conflict to heal. Economic prosperity, cooperation and integration can only be realized in an environment that is peaceful, stable and secure. Peace and security are therefore pre-requisites for sustainable economic development and human security.

2. Successive outbreaks of conflicts and other emerging security challenges led to the call for the creation of a sub-regional peace and security framework in the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty. In December 10, 1999 at Lomé in Togo, the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (otherwise known as the Mechanism) was signed. The Mechanism is an elaborate framework document that encompasses the security sector issues and its relationship to peace in West Africa. However, addressing the structural and dynamic causes of conflicts is critical to preventing West Africa’s myriads of conflicts. Thus in December 2001, ECOWAS adopted a specific Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as supplement to the December 10, 1999 Protocol which set out guiding principles for intra-state relations that would help foster participatory democracy, good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a balanced and equitable distribution of resources.

3. The imperative for a paradigm shift towards a culture of prevention was well amplified with the establishment of a sub-regional security observatory. Chapter IV of the 1999 protocol established an Early Warning System that would detect, monitor and analyze signs of threats or breakdown in relations within or between member states (conflict indicators) in accordance with Article 58 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty and make reports for use by the Executive Secretariat. The Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) located at the Executive Secretariat, with four zonal information and reporting bureaus in Cotonou (covering Benin, Nigeria and Togo); Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger); Monrovia (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana); and Banjul (The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal) was established.
Status of the ECOWAS Early Warning System

4. Though the process of transforming the idea of an early warning system from a paper concept into reality has been slow and challenging, it is yielding remarkable progress. In 2001, the European Union gave a grant that was able to kick-start the process with the recruitment of Zonal Bureau officers and the purchase of limited office equipment. The capacity deficit remained a major challenge, as the grant was not entirely used. In the backdrop of this challenge, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) after a series of consultations provided a grant for a two year project aimed at increasing the capacity of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Mechanism through partnership with existing network organizations on ground. The West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP), a network organization with knowledge of early warning and peace-building was chosen to partner with ECOWAS through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to reinforce the capacity of ECOWAS in operationalizing the early warning system.

5. ECOWAS and WANEP embarked on a series of activities. First, there was an assessment of the capacity of ECOWAS in the early warning conflict prevention; human resource and infrastructural capacity. Second, an experts’ forum that determined key areas of training for early warning conflict prevention was convened and the outcome was the production of a region-specific training manual. Third, three major consultations that brought together ECOWAS staff from OMC and other departments, representatives from member states, WANEP, and other civil society organizations, think tanks and research institutions to deliberate on appropriate way forward for early warning in West Africa was organized.

6. One of the major outcomes of these consultations was a data of salient indicators of conflict and peace. A computer-based database for systematic tracking and monitoring of conflict and peace trends was designed. Aware of the pressure from critics, donors and international partners calling for major structural changes in the ECOWAS Early Warning System (EWS)\(^1\), rendering the EWS (as it is) operational and functional and at the same time drawing the necessary lessons for eventual improvements and amendments was the strategy ECOWAS adopted. It has been admitted and upheld, however, that the role of the civil society (and other non state actors like the academia, professional organizations, think tanks, researchers) is indispensable for effective early warning not only in Africa but world-wide.

7. A remarkable development is that ECOWAS elicited the services of 15 focal points in the 15 Member States whose task would be to input data into the EWS. In addition, we also have recruited 15 civil society focal points (monitors) that are also feeding the system with information. A total of 30 staff would embark on the monitoring process, in addition to the four Zonal bureau heads and four civil society coordinators who would play the role of quality control of data and analysis. It is apparent that these designated staff cannot do effective monitoring without developing their respective network of grassroots monitors. At the headquarters in Abuja, the Director of the centre

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\(^1\) ECOWAS made it clear that the Early Warning System is part of a protocol signed by the Heads of State and Government that can only be changed at an appropriate time.
directs a team of staff that comprises analysts, management staff and other support staff including a civil society liaison officer. ECOWAS insists that its early warning drive is focused on human security and open source information to avoid the temptation to assimilate or equate early warning with the traditional intelligence gathering. So far, our sensitization of Member States on this issue has been an asset to the process.

8. ECOWAS in consultation with its partners contracted the services of the Boston based Virtual Research Associates (VRA) to improve on the process. The modalities for data base collection, processing and access; and exchange of information modalities have been laid down in the improved ECOWAS Early Warning System known by the acronym ECOWARN. The ECOWAS situation-reporting database that comprises close to 100 indicators is currently on its trial phase. An incident report format has also been designed and is also in its testing phase since June 2006. In addition to these developments, an information exchange bulletin has also been created to allow for comments, suggestions and additional input and information from key stakeholders.

Next Steps

9. ECOWAS intends to reinforce data collection through development of automated online media integration into ECOWARN System, which will include subscription to PANAPRESS, Reuters, and other reliable media sources, particularly national news organs. ECOWAS also envisages equipping the OMC Situation Room and Zonal bureaus with modern communication equipment such as video conferencing facilities, V-Sat or any other reliable communication gadgets, satellite phones, back-up power supply facilities. Filling the vacant positions within the OMC Organogram in order to increase the human resource capacity within the OMC structure, particularly the analytical capacity is also a priority.

10. Developing a geographic information system (GIS) to enhance effective location of hot spots and their geographic specificities on maps is also an imperative. Also of priority are specific capacity enhancing trainings in early warning and early response analysis, particularly in the building of scenarios for response and/or contingency planning; appropriate collaboration between ECOWARN and specialized agencies such as UNHCR, OCHA, FAO, for better coordination, information sharing and development of context specific indicators and analysis. Above all, we look forward to effectively interfacing with the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

II. CEN-SAD

11. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was established on 4 February 1998, in Tripoli in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by Treaty concluded between the Great Jamahiriya, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Today, it gathers twenty-three (23) countries in a single community from as far as the Atlantic Ocean, the Red Sea and across the Pacific Ocean. The community covers a surface area of thirteen million six hundred and ninety-one thousand square kilometres (13,691,020 km²), representing about 45% of the continent’s surface area with a population of four hundred and thirty-five million inhabitants (435,000,000) that is some 48.2% of the African population.

13. The Treaty to establish CEN-SAD underscores the need for signatory States to ensure peace, stability and security in the Sahel-Saharan community.

14. Articles 2 and 3 of the said Treaty specifically provide that:

- Member States pledge to prevent the use of their territories for activities that seek to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any State of the Community;

- States resolve to afford mutual assistance as appropriate and to cooperate in all areas in a spirit of solidarity and fraternity.

15. This strong political resolve was crystallized by the Security Charter of the Community signed on 5 February 2000 in N’Djamena, in Chad, which reaffirms the need to promote peace and security. It led to the adoption of the Niamey Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, during the 5th Summit in Niger (14-15/3/2003). In this Declaration, Member States solemnly committed to set enabling conditions for peace, security and stability by prioritizing, among Member States and non-Member States, the peaceful settlement of prevailing or potential conflicts.

16. Although the instruments of the Mechanism are pending adoption, it has not deterred CEN-SAD from partaking actively to the management of conflicts that have sparked in its community and beyond, by lending support to the UNO, AU, IGAD, CEMAC and ECOWAS, specifically in Somalia, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, etc.

17. CEN-SAD lacks an early warning system. However, the surveillance and conflict prevention response system, once operational, may act as such.

18. Yet, special circumstances have prompted the Community to intervene directly along the Chad-Sudan border, in conjunction with the AU. The instruments vindicating such intervention include, *inter alia*:

- the Treaty to establish CEN-SAD, signed on 4 February 1998 in Tripoli;

- the Security Charter adopted by CEN-SAD States, signed on 5 February 2000 in N’Djamena;

- the Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, signed in Niamey, on 15 March 2003;
- the Security Cooperation Convention between CEN-SAD Member States signed on 15 May 2004 in Bamako;

- the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism adopted on 15 May 2004 in Bamako (some of its organs such as the Distinguished Ombudsman for Peace and Security are already operational).

19. It is worth recalling that the 2nd ordinary Conference of Leaders and Heads of State held in N’Djamena on 5 February 2000, commissioned the high-profile office of Distinguished Permanent Ombudsman. This Organ is enshrined in Article 5 of the Mechanism.

20. Pursuant to the provisions of this Mechanism, hinging on the concept of collective security, CEN-SAD Member States seek to promote the culture and ownership of peacemaking and peace-building as much as further security and stability in a bid to join, alongside the international community, the effort to establish a new, fair and balanced order. Under this concept, any threat of aggression against a Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community. By the same token, any threat to the security of a Member State constitutes a threat to the security of all the other Member States.

21. The objectives of the Mechanism are as follows:

- to prevent the outbreak of conflicts;
- to achieve peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building as well as further security and stability within the community;
- to enhance cooperation in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as early warning systems;
- to combat organized cross-border crime, international terrorism, proliferation of mines and illegal circulation of small weapons;
- to establish institutions and implement appropriate policies for the sake of coordinating military and/or humanitarian operations.

22. The CEN-SAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism in addition to the aforementioned Distinguished Permanent Ombudsman have the following organs, consistent with the African Peace and Security Architecture established by the AU Commission:

23. **Main organs:** they include:

- the Conference of Leaders and Heads of State (it is the highest decision-making organ of the Mechanism);
- the Sahel-Saharan Council for Peace and Security of the Community: It comprises ten members, including eight elected by a two-third (2/3) majority for a two-year mandate renewable once, based on geographical distribution, and two *ex officio* members (the incumbent and outgoing chair). The UN Secretary-
General and President of the AU Commission or their representatives may attend proceedings as observers. The Council may validly conduct business only if a simple majority of members are present. Decisions of the Council shall be taken by simple majority in respect of procedural issues and two-third (2/3) majority in respect of substantive issues. The Council determines the procedural or substantive nature of an issue by simple majority. Sessions of the Council shall hold at three levels:

- the meeting of Leaders and Heads of State,
- the meeting of Ministers,
- the meeting of Ambassadors.

24. **The Ambassadors’ Committee; and**

25. **The General Secretariat:** As the lynch pin of the organization and seat of the Military Staff, it is empowered specifically to recommend appointees for the office of Special Representative and Force Commander to the Sahel-Saharan Security Council; to appoint members of the Committee of Wise Persons under Article 22; to supervise political, administrative and operational activities as well as mission logistic support; to prepare, for the consideration of the Sahelo-Sahelian Security Council, periodic progress reports of the mechanism; to field, upon appraising the situation, enquiry and/or mediation missions ; to convene, upon consultation with the Chairman of the Conference, all meetings of the Sahel-Saharan Security Council, Panel of the Wise and Defence and Security Committee set out in article 21, in addition to providing support services thereto; to implement decisions of the Council.

26. Established in the Office of the Secretary-General and headed by a senior officer acting as Military Adviser, the Military Staff is charged with initiating and carrying out all activities pertaining to the defence and security of Member States, in furtherance of the implementation of the Mechanism.

27. The Military Staff shall, in this respect, be assisted by logistic and operational units in respect of planning, build up, training and monitoring operations on the ground, and receive requisite equipment and personnel to perform its duties.

28. **Subsidiary Organs:** They include the following:

- **the Defence and Security Committee:** Member States are represented by Chiefs of the General Staff or persons ranking as such or their representatives, security officials or their representatives, experts of Ministries in charge of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, experts from other relevant bodies of Member States concerned by the issues on the agenda. The Defence and Security Committee examines technical, administrative and operational matters and assesses logistic needs in peacekeeping operations. It assists the Sahel-Saharan Security Council in the following areas: defining the mandate of the Sahel-Saharan Intervention Force; drafting terms of reference of the mission; appointing the Force Commander; deciding on the composition of contingents;
• the Panel of the Wise: is composed of highly respected, eminent personalities, both civilian and military, advocating peace, security and greater African solidarity, nominated by Member States. Each country is entitled to two nominations. They are appointed for a three-year term renewable once by the Secretary-General to whom they are answerable.

• the Sahel-Saharan Intervention Force (FSSI/CEN-SAD): It comprises units of the Army, Gendarmerie, Police and other relevant bodies for the accomplishment of specific missions, assignments and deployment on the territory of each Member State. The Sahel-Saharan Security Council shall have the prerogative to decide on the deployment of FSSI/CEN-SAD whose missions shall include: preventive deployment; observer and peacemaking missions; peacekeeping and peacemaking; support and assistance to humanitarian work; application of sanctions where applicable; demobilization, disarmament and peace-building operations; maintenance of law and order by \textit{inter alia}, combating fraud, crime, illicit activities; and any other operations decided by the Sahel-Saharan Security Council.

29. To ensure sound appraisal of potential conflicts and appropriate early warning systems, a Regional Peace and Security Response System, referred to as Conflict Prevention and Surveillance Response System has been established in the Office of the Secretary-General.

30. Moreover, Member States resolve to form, on their national territories, pre-assigned and readily operational Units of Stand-by Forces endowed with the requisite tactical and logistic capabilities.

31. Furthermore, during its 6th Summit (Bamako - Mali, 15/05/2004), CEN-SAD established an intelligence body, that is up and running, comprising the External Security Services of Member States (FSSE/CEN-SAD), akin to the AU’s CISSA. This organ has an Operational Secretariat within the CEN-SAD General Secretariat. This entity helped CEN-SAD to successfully deploy observers along the Sudan-Chad border as part of efforts to solve the crisis between the two countries following the Peace Agreement signed by both countries on 8 February 2006 in Tripoli, under the aegis of the CEN-SAD Distinguished Ombudsman, the Guide of the Al-Fatah Revolution, Brother Muammar Al-Kaddafi, with the support of the AU.

32. On account of its importance and operational urgency, the Secretary-General is seriously considering to table a proposal for the adoption of the mechanism, upon its ratification by the majority of countries, during the next Summit. In the same vein, a request for assistance has been made to the European Union, courtesy of the African Union, to qualify for the Africa Peace Facility expected to go operational in 2007.

III. IGAD / CEWARN

33. CEWARN is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the seven Member States (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD in 1996 expanded its mandate to include peace and security, with the realization that the presence of
peaceful and stable environment and concerted regional efforts are prerequisite to sustainable development and growth. And to this end, IGAD has the platform that provides a regular forum for various stakeholders of the region to tackle various issues of regional context and expand cooperation among its members.

34. One of the main objectives of IGAD and thus the Peace and Security Division was to prevent and manage conflicts of intra and inter-state conflicts through dialogue by creating a mechanism within the sub-region that will bring about peace and stability, hence, the establishment of a conflict early warning and response system. In a meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Khartoum in 2000 a decision was taken to establish CEWARN. Following a series of assessments of all IGAD Member States and consultations, the Council of Ministers of IGAD endorsed the Protocol Agreement in 2002, providing CEWARN with a legal entity and operational framework. The Protocol entered into force in July 2003 having received the necessary instruments of ratification from the State of Eritrea, the Republic of Kenya, the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan. The Republic of Djibouti ratified the Protocol in April 2005.

35. The CEWARN Protocol states that the mandate of CEWARN is “to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry”. However, CEWARN was mandated by the Member States to commence its monitoring and reporting on cross-border pastoral conflicts. Such a pilot project was of mutual interest to all IGAD Member States which held common benefits in addressing the problem and could be a means of gaining and encouraging cooperation among countries in the Horn since:

i) The arid and semi-arid cross-border areas with a livelihood system of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists run along all the borders of IGAD, with similar ethnic groups along the boundaries where each State is vulnerable to spillover effects of violent conflict in other states of the region.

ii) Such focused implementation shall provide member states capabilities to further enhance their capacity in CPMR.

iii) Society versus society conflicts, one of them pastoralists among themselves and pastoralists with agro-pastoralists, are prominent in all of the Member States.

iv) The recurrent cycle of drought, famine and food insecurity and displacement of population are common in these areas which have fed into the cycle of conflict.

v) The management and resolution of pastoral conflict shall indirectly tackle the problem of illicit arms and light weapons.

36. CEWARN is a mechanism that coordinates and enhances the cooperation of existing systems of CPMR within each national country and between Member States. Thus in operationalizing its early warning and response mechanism, IGAD adopted a ‘bottom up’ and process-oriented approach that builds upon existing efforts, mechanisms and skills within the sub-region.
37. Using the established a system of local information collection networks to collect and document relevant information at the national level, each network is composed of several Field Monitors (FMs), trained in collecting information, categorizing and placing that information into prescribed reporting formats. For the time being, fourteen FMs have been deployed in the Areas of Reportings of the Karamoja Cluster since mid-2003 and eight FMs in the Somali Cluster since June 2005.

38. In each of the IGAD Member States, CEWARN has identified National Research Institutes (NRIs) and contracted them as partner organizations. Each NRI has a CEWARN Country Coordinator (CC), supported by an assistant, who is responsible a) to organize and supervise the required field monitoring, b) to coordinate information and data collection, and c) to analyze the data and submit EW reports.

39. The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is the regional hub for data collection, conflict analyses, information sharing, and communication of response options. It acts as a clearing house and is responsible for quality control. It supports CEWARN stakeholders in capacity-building (including training), coordinates the different CEWARN organs, assists in developing regional cooperation structures and is the driving force for the political process behind the Mechanism. The office started its work in 2002.

40. At the national level, the CEWARN Mechanism builds upon Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) as focal coordinating units integrated to operate within relevant Ministries of IGAD Member States. These units are directed and managed by CEWERU Heads who are nominated by the Member States themselves. Each CEWERU is mandated to form a Steering Committee including representatives of relevant ministries, security bodies such as police, intelligence and military, legislative bodies, civil society organizations, academia, religious organizations or other influential members of societies. Bringing together governmental decision makers and civil society representatives, the CEWERUs are the responsible bodies for response initiatives on a country level to be implemented in close cooperation with Local Committees or Sub-Regional Peace Councils.

41. The two regional coordinating structures of the Mechanism are the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). At the intermediate level, the Heads of CEWERUs collectively form the Technical Committee, which convenes twice a year to run technical consultations on the CEWARN Mechanism including the discussion of early warning reports and response options. The TCEW submits its recommendations to the CPS that comprises of senior governmental representatives designated by IGAD Member States. The CPS is the policy-making organ of CEWARN and it reports to the Council of Ministers which in turn reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Executive Secretary, the Director of Peace and Security Division and the Director of the CEWARN Unit are ex-officio members of the CPS. CEWARN has fully implemented its mechanism in three countries – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The National Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) has been established in all other member countries except Somalia.
Structure of CEWARN

IGAD Council of Ministers

IGAD Secretariat

TCEW
Technical Committee on Early Warning

CEWARN Unit

Policy Decisions at Regional Level

Sub-Regional Peace Councils
(to be created)

CPS
Committee of Permanent Secretaries

CEWERU
Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (Steering Committees)

Local Committees

FM
Field Monitors

NRI
National Research Institutes

CC
CEWARN Country Coordinator

Flow of Information

Flow of Information

Structural Relation

Regional Coordination, Monitoring and Quality Control

Peace & Security Division
Agriculture & Environment Division
Economic Cooperation Division

NATIONAL

LOCAL

REGIONAL

= structure in all IGAD Member States

EARLY WARNING

EARLY RESPONSE

Coding and Analysis of Information

Data Collection in Areas of Reporting

Response Initiatives

Implementation at Local Level

Policy Decisions at National Level

Policy Decisions at Local Level
42. The methodology adopted by CEWARN involves (1) information collection and (2) analysis, (3) formulation of best/worst/most likely case scenarios and response options, and (4) the communication of these to the decision makers. Taking a comprehensive approach it collects both qualitative (violent event data) and quantitative (constant behavioral factors) information through identified indicators that will enable it collect both conflictive and peace developments. The analysis of data uses the analytical framework of root causes, proximate causes and triggering factors.

**Analytical Framework for the Analysis of Conflict**

**ROOT CAUSES**
- Used to assess the risk potential of a country (background)
- Necessary but not mostly static
- Embedded in historical/cultural context

**PROXIMATE CAUSES**
- Can create conditions (with the root causes) for armed conflict
- Inter-play with root-causes
- Are time-wise closer to the outbreak of armed conflict
- May change over time
- Often linked to the (in)ability or willingness of a government to cope with situation

**POSITIVE INTERVENING FACTORS**
- Decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict

**NEGATIVE INTERVENING FACTORS**
- Increasing the likelihood of armed conflict

Two types of Field Data are being collected:

- Incident Reports
- Situation Reports

Incident Reports: violent pastoral and related conflicts - submitted as they occur
Situation Reports: general cultural, social, economic and political situation of the targeted areas - submitted weekly

Four Categories of Violent Incident Indicators

- Raids (including theft)
- Armed Clashes (b/n communities and other armed parties ie. militias, govt. officials)
- Other Crimes (banditry and assault)
- Protest Demonstration (peaceful and violent)

7 Categories of Situation Report Indicators:

- Communal Relations
- Civil Society Activities
- Economic Activities
- Governance & Media
- Natural Disaster & Resource Use
- Safety & Security
- Social Service
**Indicators of Situation are:**

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<th>Alliance Formation</th>
<th>Peace Initiatives</th>
<th>Exchange Behavior</th>
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<td>Inter-ethnic group alliance</td>
<td>Women peace messengers</td>
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<td>Ethnic group – government alliance</td>
<td>Weapons reduction program</td>
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<td>Local peace initiatives</td>
<td>Gift offering</td>
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<td>Religious peace building</td>
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<td>NGO peace initiatives</td>
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<td>External armed support</td>
<td>Land competition</td>
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<td>Livestock disease</td>
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<td>More livestock in secure areas grazing areas abandoned</td>
<td>Small arms disclosure</td>
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<td>Harmful migration policy</td>
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<td>Harmful livestock policy</td>
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43. The main achievements of CEWARN since it began its EW and ER work are:

- CEWARN has a unique database providing timely, consistent and accurate information on cross-border pastoralist conflicts of its two pilot areas.
- The CEWARN approach tries to cope with the dynamism of conflicts and combines quantitative with qualitative analysis of field data.
- CEWARN reports provide a good basis for developing intervention options and mechanisms for response.
• CEWARN has conducted capacity building for conflict prevention, management and response (CPMR) in the region through skill training of CEWERUs, National Research Institutes, Field Monitors and local committee members in IGAD Member States.
• CEWARN has increased awareness among governments, civil society actors and other stakeholders regarding the nature, intensity and magnitude of cross-border pastoralist conflicts.
• CEWARN has managed to provide a platform where state and non-state actors could collaborate and adopt strategies toward addressing violent cross-border pastoral conflicts.

V. COMESA

44. The COMESA mandate on CPMR is conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy and is rooted on Article 3(d) of the COMESA Treaty. At the inception of the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security, emphasis was also placed on the fact that the Programme would operate within the framework of the African Union Peace and Security Council and also that the programme’s activities would ensure to compliment and coordinate with other RECs.

45. The COMESA mandate on early warning is derived from its conflict prevention mandate. Right at the core of conflict prevention is early warning, and depending on the stage of the conflict and the extent of the response, a good early warning system will result in conflict prevention in all its forms: it should be able to prevent impending conflicts from starting and for ongoing conflicts, from intensifying and spreading geographically, and or reduce human suffering through prompt humanitarian assistance.

46. The COMESA mandate on Early Warning also stems from (i) the Decision by the COMESA Authority, which specifies that the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security should operate within the AU Framework; and (ii) that COMESA is among the RECs that form the building block to the African Peace and Security Architecture, which has the AU as the focal point. The mandate of COMESA and the other RECs is thus to build the pillars that support this architecture and among these pillars is the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). COMESA and the other RECs are therefore expected to support the establishment of the CEWS by setting up an early warning system at the sub-regional level.

47. There have been several discussions on the establishment of an early warning system. The COMESA Authority, the ultimate decision making body for COMESA, has directed COMESA to set up an early warning system. During the Tenth Summit of the COMESA Authority, held in June 2005, the Authority directed COMESA to:

   a) establish an early warning and response mechanism to compliment the Continental Early Warning and Response Mechanism with focus on the dynamics of the conflicts in the COMESA region. COMESA should focus on addressing the gaps that exist in the mechanisms established by the regional mechanisms covering COMESA member states, as well as focus
on the early detection of the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons;

b) ensure that the Early Warning and Response Mechanism in COMESA is built on the experience of early warning and response mechanisms that exist in the COMESA region on the basis of a comprehensive study to be commissioned by the Secretariat.

48. The Secretariat was not able to raise the requisite funds until recently, and has therefore not set up its early warning system.

THE FOCUS/STRUCTURE FOR COMESA EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

49. Several discussions have ensued on the subject with tendencies toward the establishment of an early warning system that would aim at addressing war economies and which would focus on mineral resources that propagate conflicts in the region. A second focus will be early warning to anticipate and prevent terrorist activities in the region.

a) Early Warning to Deter War Economies

50. Africa has large deposits of natural resources in the world. Nigeria, Angola, Algeria Libya and recently Sudan have a large proportion of the global crude oil, while countries like South Africa, Botswana, the DRC and Sierra Leone possess strategic minerals such as gold, diamond, chrome and coltan. These resources have been a major source of income and have, to some extent, benefited the respective countries through foreign exchange earnings. On the other hand, the struggle for the control of these resources has, in some countries, had devastating effects in continuing violence and instability.

51. The role of exploitation and marketing of precious natural resources to propagating conflicts in the COMESA region has been in focus for a long time. Apart from propagating existing conflicts, the control, exploitation and marketing of natural resources is a factor in the relapse into conflicts of countries where peace has been restored. There is therefore need to monitor and address these causal factors at the early stages.

b) Early Warning on Terrorism

52. A second area of focus for COMESA is Counter Terrorism. COMESA has been designated a focal point for the African Union Center for Study and Research in Terrorism (CAERT). COMESA is currently waiting for the equipment, which will link COMESA to CAERT and facilitate dissemination of information with respect to activities that could point to terrorism.

53. The basis for this has been the recognition that terrorism is clearly a very real threat for the region and the bombnings in recent years in Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania are a case in point. In Kenya, for example, tourism accounts to 12% of the GNP and the subsequent losses of US$ 1 million per day were very significant to the country.
Egypt has been a target for terrorism since the early 1990s with huge losses in life and infrastructure damage.

**Status of development of COMESA early warning system**

54. COMESA is now set to establish a conflict early warning unit with support from the Africa Peace Facility (APF). While the bulk of the funds go to supporting peacekeeping missions, there is an envelope designated for capacity building for the AU and the RECs for the short and the long term. In September 2006, the AU and the RECs met to evaluate the most urgent capacity building needs and identified the need to develop early warning capability for the RECs as one of the two priorities for the short term. This will be done according to the respective needs of the RECs taking into consideration that some RECs have more advanced early warning systems than others. This capacity building process is expected to commence in the first quarter of 2007.

55. For COMESA, the following have been identified as the initial steps:

   a) putting in place dedicated staff to coordinate the project and an analyst;

   b) through experts and workshops with the various stakeholders, including governments and civil society to: clearly define the COMESA early warning system, Develop a comprehensive methodology to provide the early warning information; and build consensus on an early response strategy.

56. Several key decisions will need to be made such as whether or not common indicators will be defined for all the countries or if there shall be a minimum common indicators and then customized per country depending on the specific country-level peculiarities, in which case it may be practical to start with a pilot; whether to work with qualitative and quantitative indicators and how to treat the qualitative data; clear definition at all levels on the structural, propagating and trigger factors; the identification of all stakeholders, their orientation to conflict (entrepreneurs, peace makers, spoilers, etc), and their respective motives, strategies, power and linkages; and several other decisions.

**Existing tools within COMESA**

57. There are various tools that are in place and which will benefit the establishment of an early warning system, including the advantage of COMESA distinctive competence in trade related programs; COMESA network of civil society and private sector; and the communications connectivity to COMESA member states using VSAT technology.
a) **COMESA Core Competence**

58. COMESA’s core competence is in regional integration and this has included various trade facilitation programs, including that COMESA has got the only free trade area in Africa. COMESA, given its focus, is well suited to work towards transforming war economies to economies that will benefit the respective countries and COMESA as a region. Various programs and projects are being put in place to address aspects of war economies, including:

   
   a) study to improve understanding of causes scale and processes of formal and informal mining in the DRC, and to improve the understanding of trade flows from the DRC. This is a tripartite project with USAID and the DFID. The second phase of the project will be to strengthen regional trade. This project has started;

   b) the East African Community (EAC), COMESA and IGAD have put together a Conflict Prevention (CP) strategy for the Eastern and Southern Africa, which has designated COMESA to play the leading role in the fight against war economies. Among the outputs of the project, it is worth mentioning the strengthening of the legal framework against all kinds of illegal activities related to the conflict; the development and collection of early warning gender aggregated indicators, develop war economies information systems, among other activities. This activity is scheduled to start during the second quarter of 2007.

b) **COMESA Civil Society Network**

59. From its inception, one of COMESA strategic focus has been the involvement of non-state actors including civil society, private sector and parliamentarians. The program has spent some time to put in place structures and rules of engagement for the NSAs. This was done firstly by the compilation Rules of Accreditation for Civil Society and Private Sector to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security, which was done by a wide range of stakeholders including the governments. Effectively, all stakeholders, have ownership to the rules, and hence it is expected that the states will fully support the involvement of civil society and private sector to the early warning network. The second phase involved country-level dissemination through national consultations. Seven countries have been reached so far and the applications of 18 Civil society and private sector organizations are being reviewed. CSOs and PSOs will be very useful in the collection of early warning indicators and also in the analysis and scenario development.

c) **Communications Connectivity within COMESA**

60. With respect to communications infrastructure, COMESA is in the process of installing a VSAT through the COMESA Infrastructure Division, which will also provide improved connectivity at the member state level. It is expected that the VSAT will be installed at COMESA Secretariat by December 2006. This COMESA system will be a closed system that will link COMESA Coordinating Ministries at the member states (Ministries responsible for Commerce) to the COMESA Secretariat. The member states
will also be linked to each other. It will therefore be very easy for the proposed COMESA Conflict Early Warning System to utilize this communications infrastructure at very low incremental costs.

PROPOSED MODEL FOR EARLY WARNING INFRASTRUCTURE AT COMESA

THE PROPOSED TIMEFRAME

61. The timeframe for the establishment of COMESA Conflict Early Warning System (COMCEW) is dependant on the approval of funding from the African Peace Facility. Another important date in the timeframe is the Eighth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which is scheduled for May 2007, because the MOFAs will consider the progress made to that date and make their recommendations for the Authority to make a decision.
VI. EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC)

1.0 Introduction

62. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community acknowledges the fact that peace and security are a prerequisite to social and economic development. It provides that Partner States shall undertake to promote and maintain good neighbourliness as a basis for promoting peace and security within the Community; Partner States shall evolve and establish regional disaster management mechanisms which shall harmonise training operations for the management of refugees; cooperate in the handling of cross border crime, provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters including arrest and repatriation of fugitive offenders and the exchange of information on national mechanisms for combating criminal activities.

1.1 Background

63. In order to prevent, mitigate and manage conflicts and threats in region, there is need to ensure timely collection of data and relevant information that decision makers and other stakeholders can use. This calls for a sound mechanism that will facilitate collection, verification and analysis of such information, monitor and warn of any potential threats and recommend timely and appropriate response to decision makers.

2.0 Development of the Protocol on EAC Early Warning

64. The EAC Council of Ministers directed the development of a mechanism for early warning, establishment of databases for disaster management and development of capacity to manage disaster situations. The development of the Protocol on Early Warning is based on the principle of promoting regional peace, security and stability and creating mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter - and intra - state conflicts.
65. Proliferation of conflicts within the Eastern African region constitute a threat to peace and security, undermine the efforts to improve the living standards of the people and therefore calls for collective actions to preserve peace, security and stability, enhance regional co-operation and eliminate all forms of threat thereto. In the development of the EAC Early warning mechanism, it is acknowledged that there are other regional early warning mechanisms which should not be duplicated but rather, complemented.

2.1 Objectives and functions of the EAC Early Warning mechanism

66. The objective of the EAC Early Warning Mechanism shall be to strengthen and complement other regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in line with the provisions of Article 124 of the Treaty.

67. The functions of the Early Warning Mechanism shall be: -

a) To promote exchange of information and collaboration among Partner States on early warning and response on the basis of the principles of i) timeliness ii) transparency, iii) co-operation iv) free flow of information

b) Gather, verify, process and analyze information about conflicts in the region according to the guidelines provided in the Annex to this Protocol.

c) Communicate all such information and analysis to decision makers of EAC policy organs.

d) More specifically, the early warning functions of CEWARN shall include:

   i) receiving information and reports from National Early Warning Units;
   ii) processing, analysing and verifying information;
   iii) bringing that information to the attention of the Secretariat;
   iv) providing the necessary feedback to the National Early warning units;
   v) disseminating such information as it is authorised, to those who are authorised, and in a manner that Partner States prescribe;
   vi) updating and synthesising information;
   vii) setting standards;
   viii) monitoring and coordinating information collection and reporting;
   ix) promoting dialogue on information and analysis;
   x) networking among information gathering organisations;
   xi) monitoring the implementation of this protocol; and
   xii) Peace making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and inquiry.

2.2 Institutional framework for the implementation of the Early Warning Mechanism

68. The Draft Protocol establishes an institutional mechanism through which the protocol shall be implemented. This includes the policy arm comprising of the Summit,
Council of Ministers and the joint chiefs of defence, police and intelligence. The administrative arm comprises of the Department of Political Affairs of the EAC. The Technical arm comprises of Committee on Peace and Security, the Regional Centre for Early Warning, the EARLY Warning Units situated within the Partner States. It is envisaged that the Early Warning Centre will be situated at the EAC Hqs fully equipped with a situation Room and human capacity and linked with the national Early Warning Units.

2.3 Status of development

69. The Protocol on Early warning is in its second draft, it’s currently presented to the stakeholders at the national level for validation and input. Thereafter, the EAC will convene a regional stakeholder’s workshop including experts from the region to review and approve it for adoption. It is envisaged that the Protocol will be adopted by the 14th Council of Ministers that will take place in May 2007.

3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTOCOL ON CONFLICT PREVENTION MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

70. The EAC Partner States have witnessed several conflicts internally and externally and in the neighbouring countries. This calls for a mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts amongst the Partner States and a forum under which the EAC can participate in resolution of disputes within the region. The absence of an effective mechanism for consultations towards peaceful settlement of disputes leads to real or imagined threats to peace and security which undermine efforts aimed at improving the well being of the people of East Africa.

71. The framework will provide for a clear mechanism for detecting danger signals in potential areas of conflict and the method for their management and resolution. The EAC is in the process of developing a regional framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in order to respond to obtaining and potential conflict situations in the region. The framework for CPMR will work hand in hand with the mechanism for early warning. At the moment, the EAC is at the stage of commissioning a study to develop a framework for negotiation among the PARTNER States. It is envisaged that the draft framework, funds permitting will be ready for adoption by November 2007.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND REMARKS

72. Upon adoption of the Protocol by the Policy making organ of the EAC, We shall then develop the implementation strategy, including the indicators.
VII. SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

INTRODUCTION

73. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) highly embraces and has taken considered cognizance of increasing host of challenges to the development and integration of the Southern African region. It is a widely accepted fact that economic development can only take place in an environment that is peaceful and stable.

74. Hence, SADC has decided to establish a Regional Early Warning System comprising of National Early Warning and Regional Early Warning Centre. The main objective of the SADC early warning mechanism is to strengthen regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

OBJECTIVE OF THE SADC EARLY WARNING CENTRE

75. The overall objective of the SADC Regional Early Warning Centre is to strengthen the SADC mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, in line with the provisions of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ.

FUNCTIONS OF THE REGIONAL EARLY WARNING CENTRE

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REWC INTER ALIA INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:-

- To implement early warning mechanism to promote peace, security and stability in the region;
- To articulate holistic approach in anticipating potential conflicts in the region;
- To support regional mechanism for conflict prevention;
- To strengthen existing national mechanisms to feed into SADC mechanism;
- To establish a database system for early warning in the SADC region;
- To compile strategic assessment and analyses of data collected at regional level;
- To conduct research on conflict issues;
- To share information among Member States on major issues that threaten the SADC security and stability; and,
- To arrange technical review meetings among relevant institutions to review methodologies and operational issues with the view to making early warning mechanisms more effective.
THE STATUS QUO ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SADC EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

- The meeting of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation held in Maseru, Kingdom of Lesotho in June 2004 approved the principles underpinning the Concept of SADC Early Warning System and constituted a team of experts to work on the planning and processes towards the establishment of the system.

- Subsequently, the Ministerial Committee of the Organ at its meeting held in July 2004 in Sun City, South Africa, mandated the Troikas of SADC and the Organ to initiate the establishment of the Regional Early Warning Center in two phases.

- Phase 1 which was executed by a SADC team of experts constituted the working on the concept, propose the structure and working system as well as administrative and financial issues. This activity was concluded by September 2004.

- A follow up activity in this regard was the deployment of expertise at the SADC Secretariat to take charge of initial groundwork activities leading to the operationalization of the system. This was done by way of initially seconding officers while the actual recruitment of permanent staff/personnel was to unfold.

- The process of developing the SADC Early Warning Insecurity and Conflict Indicators is also at final stage of completion. After the 28th Session of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee in July 2006, approved the indicators, the latter are currently being streamlined with a view to render them more regionally focused.

- The follow up activity will involve the programming of these indicators into an ICT-based system/model.

- Phase 2 of the establishment process encompasses the physical establishment of the Early Warning Centre and it involves, among others, the following:
  - Determining office facilities and equipment,
  - Design, determine the connectivity and set up of the Situation Room, and
  - Establishment of the National Early Warning Centers.

76. The SADC Early Warning Facility/Situation Room is located in the SADC House, the Headquarters of SADC in Gaborone, Botswana.

77. As regards the equipment of the Center, these are being gradually procured as they are quite costly and cannot be purchased all at once.
78. While the Member States are in the process of establishing National Early Warning Centres and ensure their compatibility and secure connectivity with the Regional Early Warning Centre, they have in the meantime designated National Focal Points who are dealing with early warning issues between Member States and the SADC Early Warning Center.

79. The SADC Summit in August 2005 emphasized on the importance and urgency of having a regional early warning system in place and thus directed that the system be operationalized as a matter of urgency.

80. It is against this background that the Center is envisaged to be inaugurated/launched during the first quarter (January – March) of 2007.

CONCLUSION

81. The process of the establishment of the SADC regional early warning mechanism has reached an advanced stage. In spite of challenges facing the realization of this important undertaking, it is suffice concluding on a point that the region is determined to achieve this objective in line with its plan of action.