CHAPTER 5
THE CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Much has happened since the first African Standby Force (ASF) Doctrine was produced. Many lessons were learned and research has been documented. The UN Capstone Doctrine was produced and the The New Horizon Initiative project of the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) continuously provides new ideas and approaches on peacekeeping. Another initiative is the Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations, facilitated by the Challenges Forum in collaboration with partners around the globe. This is how it should be; although some fundamentals will always stay true, stakeholders should continuously challenge assumptions and try to improve the efficiency in the way peace support operations (PSOs) are conducted. It will benefit all the peoples of Africa, especially those that that have no control over their own circumstances. PSO mission staff should be familiar with all relevant peace support operation documents to enhance their participation in missions.

2. The various tested peacekeeping techniques would be considered in the development of the concept of operations (CONOPS), which the ASF can employ in a PSO to achieve the desired outcomes and which will be defined in the mandate and the other guidance documents. A thorough knowledge of techniques available will allow planners and commanders the flexibility to select the most appropriate techniques for gaining and maintaining the initiative, especially when the use of force is not available, appropriate or restricted. The key to success lies in the selection and application of a combination of techniques that are either designed to promote co-operation and consent by persuasion and influence, or to control, compel and coerce by enforcement. Mission management staff should therefore be familiar with and capable of applying all techniques.

FACTORS TO CONSIDER

3. **Force structures.** The technique to be applied will dictate the force configuration, which should be adequate for the objectives to be achieved. The capabilities should also be fully trained to fulfil their tasks with competence and efficiency. A PSO capability has to be task-organised and be in a position to quickly escalate or de-escalate activities to match whatever opposition may be proffered by the parties to the conflict.

4. **Involvement by the host nation and parties to the conflict.** The best way to consolidate peace is to involve the host nation and the parties themselves in addressing the root cause of the conflict. If these parties can be given responsibilities that actively

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1 Adapted from the UN Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008.

involve them in the successful outcome of the operation, if they can in effect be made shareholders in the peace process, then their willingness to co-operate will be greatly increased. Whenever possible, parties to the conflict should be given opportunities to co-operate with each other and to provide specific services that contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Such opportunities should be linked to incentives and reinforced with appropriate rewards and penalties. However, such involvement is not without risk and will require close supervision.

5. **Technique categories.** Techniques fall broadly into two categories, namely consent and control. These will either promote co-operation and consent, or control the operational environment. Control techniques may include a variety of techniques that are designed to coerce inducement and may require an offensive posture to enforce the mandate.

6. **Consent promoting techniques.** Consent-promoting techniques address attitudes and perceptions directly and are of critical importance to the success of a PSO. Of these, effective communication, which is the responsibility of the mission management team (MMT), is very important. The MMT must ensure the relevance, timeliness, accuracy and depth of information through structures information operations. These are central to the mission’s ability to influence, disrupt or debase antagonistic behaviour towards the mission objectives.

   a. Information operations are actions taken to disrupt the information provided by and the information systems of adversaries while defending one’s own information flow and information systems. An information operation can employ different methods and capabilities to achieve the objectives. For many people in Africa, the radio is the only source of information. It is often used by forces opposing a PSO to spread misinformation and requires mission initiatives to counter this. Public information outreach activities, especially by radio, will reach the maximum number of local inhabitants. Of fundamental importance is the management of this information.

   b. A well-designed, public information strategy should be designed to inform the population and the international communities, influence the parties, and protect the image of the mission and its personnel. It should be implemented as early as possible and successfully managed by the MMT as far as the planning, organisation, conduct, coordination and the monitoring of information campaigns is concerned. Monitoring is required to determine the impact and success or failure of the strategy. Adherence to the information strategy by all mission components and sectors is essential to achieve an understanding of and confidence in the peace process. It should build trust among the parties to a conflict; assist in maintaining consent, legitimacy and credibility; manage local and international expectations; and generate support for national reconciliation as well as the mission’s work on the ground.

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3 Radio Okapi is a radio network that transmits in five languages and operates under the control of the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It has a staff of 200 and provides news and information to the entire urban population of the DRC Wikipedia.  
4 Adapted from reference 2, para 2.2.2
c. Information operations thus cover a wide range of military, police, civilian and government activities, and should protect and/or exploit designated information domains in support of specified initiatives. They are directed at the population receiving the mission, its neighbours in the sub-region and indirectly at the military contingents and civilian agencies involved in the operation. Media operations are designed to provide more accurate information from the operational area to the media the international community and especially those nations contributing military forces and other resources to the operation. Information operations should be fully coordinated with the activities and operations of the PSO components so as to reinforce the overall message the higher authority wishes to convey in a credible, reasonable and consistent way. Information operations are among the most effective weapons a higher authority possesses and, as such, requires personal direction. The ‘how’ of information operations is not discussed in detail in this document as this aspect should be captured in the applicable standard operating procedures (SOPs).

d. In an African context, information operations may prove particularly difficult owing to the size of potential operational areas, limited communication infrastructures, lack of access to radio and television by the population and illiteracy. Communications to remote areas to inform village elders of the nature of an operation will greatly enhance good public relations between the PSO and the local population. In this respect, a public information officer could be of great value for the head of mission (HOM), the force commander (FC), the police commissioner (CONOPS) and others.

e. Military-civil affairs and civil-military cooperation/coordination (CIMIC) describes activities undertaken by the military that are normally conducted by civilians and that may not require detailed civil-military coordination. CIMIC is concerned with the harmonisation of civilian and military relations within a theatre of operations. The immediate aim is to fully coordinate civilian and military activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition.

f. CIMIC is also concerned with co-ordinating and maximising the use of resources designed to remedy the deprivation and suffering of the populace concurrently with reconstruction activities. CIMIC is furthermore designed to enhance the credibility of the PSO force, to promote co-operation and consent for the operation, and to persuade the parties to the conflict and the uncommitted members of the host nation that their best interests lie in peace. The longer-term aim of generating sufficient stability and self-dependence is directly linked to the desired end-state and exit strategy. This activity should reduce overall dependence on external aid. Civil-military considerations should play a significant role in the budgeting and planning process, both to identify tasks and operational constraints.

7. **An integrated approach.** Whenever possible and appropriate, military operations should be coordinated with the activities of the host government or the local community, as well as the work of aid agencies. In certain circumstances, however, aid agencies may be working on a separate agenda and may not wish to cooperate with the military. Should this be the case, it may prove counterproductive to attempt to draw them in.
International civil aid programmes are usually coordinated by a designated lead aid agency. Regardless of who this agency is, it is vital that the civil-military programme is fully integrated into, and aligned with, the overall mission plan and the day-to-day conduct of operations. Coordination is best achieved by establishing CIMIC centres at all appropriate levels and ensuring that they are manned on a full-time basis. Coordination must occur to ensure that identified tasks and requirements, within the overall aid and reconstruction programme, are handled by the most appropriate agency, be it military or civilian, or a combination of both. Coordination is also necessary to ensure that the civil-military programme reinforces, and is in-turn reinforced by, information operations and those activities designed to foster good community relations. A fully coordinated and positive civil-military programme will be a critical element in the success of any campaign.

a. **Civil-military projects.** CIMIC projects provide the link between security, stability and peace–building, and as a PSO develops towards the end-state, the emphasis will swing from relief to reconstruction and development. Within the guidelines and priorities established within the overall aid programme, projects in support of the local community may be conducted independently by the military, but will more usually be conducted in conjunction with civilian agencies, utilising local firms and facilities.

b. Civil-military projects can cover a wide range of activities within local communities and should thus be driven by local authorities. Such projects could include medical and veterinary care, the provision and distribution of water, waste disposal, electric power, the removal of unexploded ordnances, the restoration of public services, and the construction and development of schools and community centres. Projects such as these will often require assistance from military specialists, such as engineers, medical and veterinary officers, military police, military provost staff and Special Forces, and are likely to require extensive logistic support. Experience indicates that a civil-military synergy will speed up the delivery of projects, make the most effective use of funds and, as a consequence, enhance the credibility of the national contribution to the mission. Before commencing any such project, the plans should be coordinated with the host nation and NGOs operating within the PSO area of operation. If conducted in isolation and not in accordance with set priorities and direction, civil-military projects may lose their effectiveness. Short-term successes may prove counter-productive in the longer term. Projects that do not use local resources and manpower may create a long-term dependency culture that may prove damaging to peace-building plans. Priorities should therefore be coordinated at the formation level and integrated into an overall plan. All elements of the PSO should support such programmes in a coherent and consistent way.

c. **Community relations.** Good community relations are enshrined in the legitimate and impartial status of the operation and the conduct of the PSO. As an element of both information operations and civil affairs programmes, community relations refer to the deliberate fostering of social contact with the local population. The purpose of community relations is to create favourable perceptions locally and to encourage cooperative responses to PSO activities. Relations may be developed through formally hosted events or informal meetings during the normal course of military operations. These
activities require careful coordination to ensure that they are not perceived as being blatantly manipulative or conducted in a way that might prejudice the perceived impartiality of the PSO force.

8. **Negotiation and mediation.** Negotiation and mediation activities have the intention of reaching agreements to which all parties subscribe and that will help to contain, de-escalate and resolve the conflict. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter emphasises the importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as the most effective means of settling disputes. At all levels, negotiation and mediation should be the first course of action to be developed to create positive relationships between the factions and the PSO, and enable agreements to be reached and conciliation to be promoted. Objective and effective negotiations that are generated, controlled and fostered at every level by the PSO will develop the climate of mutual respect and cooperation necessary for the successful resolution of the conflict. Details of the negotiations and mediations process should be provided in the applicable ASF SOP.

9. The ability to negotiate and mediate will place a premium on language skills. However, the use of interpreters is currently the more usual practice and the skill required for this should be practised before deployment. Working through locally recruited interpreters may be a short-term solution, but reliance on such a source of linguistic support may have disadvantages.

10. **Liaison.** Conflict thrives on rumour, uncertainty and prejudice, which can be countered by good liaison. The timely release of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a conflict region. Effective liaison requires the timely provision of information and the notification of intentions, and will assist with the lodging of protests, the coordination of activity, the managing of crises and the settlement of disputes. Poor liaison will cause misunderstandings, friction and opposition that could contribute to an escalation of the conflict. A liaison system that links all stakeholders through skilled liaison officers should be established at every possible level.

11. **Observation and monitoring.** Information gathering through observation and monitoring will verify adherence to agreements and provide evidence of breaches, should they occur. Where politically possible, multiple observation teams could be deployed simultaneously into the same theatre of operations. Their efforts should be coordinated with those of PSO components and the information gathered should be shared. Specific tasks include but are not limited to the following:

   a. Operational-level observation and intelligence gathering by maritime and air assets. Such operations will generally provide their own force protection.

   b. Observation of buffer zones and cease-fire lines

   c. Confirmation of the withdrawal of forces

   d. The monitoring of conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of war-preparation or increased tension

   e. The monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses
f. The inspecting of industrial facilities to verify compliance with AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) resolutions.

12. Communication and information system (CIS). A CIS system should give all stakeholders, civilian agencies, parties to the conflict and other legitimate users the ability to communicate any observation. The establishment of an effective CIS is one of the primary tasks during mission planning, where issues of compatibility, inter-operability and connectivity should be addressed.

13. Command and control (C²) strategies are applicable across the spectrum of conflict and have an important role to play in a PSO. In the conduct of a PSO, the C² strategy should be linked to all political, civilian, media-related, civil-affairs and NGO programmes associated with the mission. Military capabilities to protect a PSO’s C² strategies should be incorporated in the operational security (OPSEC) policy to address vulnerabilities in CIS and other OPSEC areas. Continuous analysis of the media resources of the belligerent parties is important to evaluate their objectivity and their C² means to incite violence and opposition to the mission.

14. Information assurance mechanism. Such a mechanism helps to ensure that policies, procedures and systems are developed and implemented and have the capability to share secure information between authorised users. Encryption management infrastructures are key to meeting the needs for secure communications.

15. Electronic warfare (EW). The employment of EW is essential to ensure a PSO’s ability to use the electronic spectrum, to issue threat warnings immediate and to protect the force. Military commanders at all levels should consider employing EW assets to support their overall objectives. All sides to a dispute may have sophisticated electronic systems capable of monitoring, threatening or disrupting the activities of a PSO. EW can provide early warning that may prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict. It can also support diplomatic activity by monitoring compliance with agreements and sanctions. If hostilities do occur, EW can reduce the threat posed by certain weapons systems and provide military commanders with other options than the use of physical or lethal force.

16. Intelligence requirements. The intelligence requirements of a PSO entail obtaining detailed assessments of the geopolitical situation, including historical and cultural influences, and continuous updates of assessments on the attitudes, capabilities, intentions and likely reactions of all local forces, civil leaders, ethnic groups and interested parties to the conflict, particularly those that are potentially hostile.

17. The gathering of intelligence is an integral part in the conduct of any PSO and is necessary to enhance the PSO’s ability to intervene timeously. Intelligence operations work through a continuous cyclical process of direction, collection, interpretation, evaluation, collation and dissemination that must be managed by the MMT. The intelligence capacity must be flexible and task-oriented, and intelligence units must augment their capacity to include the necessary specialists.

18. Interposition. Whether at the operational level, using maritime and air forces, or in the detailed conduct of operations on the ground, the interposition of forces between opposing parties remains one of the basic military techniques in PSO. Traditionally it has applied to the establishment and maintenance of cease-fires within the context of
demobilisation operations. Interposition may be described as “separation of forces operations”. (See the applicable ASF SOP for details of interposition, emergency response and interpositioning tactics.)

19. **Protection of civilians (POC).** The UN Security Council (UNSC) has since 1999 included the POC as a peacekeeping task. This is a major challenge to peacekeepers and the UN has, in collaboration with member states, done much to define requirements, formulate policies and design relevant training modules. Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) or troop contributing countries (TCCs) must ensure that their contingents are adequately sensitised for their roles, and sufficiently trained to manage the POC.

20. POC will often require close control to be exercised directly by physical measures or information operations in collaboration with the host nation and other stakeholders. Close physical control can be exercised by the routine presence of police units and troops, and the use of specific techniques and operations such as cordon–and-search operations, or other combat operations.

21. POC must be adequately planned and is best achieved when all mission components (military, police and civilian), the host nation and involved civilian agencies cooperate. Relevant ASF SOPs must be developed.

**Mission deployment**

22. A well-developed integrated mission plan is only the beginning of a mission’s success, which will eventually be determined by the extent to which the desired end-state is achieved. There are a number of factors that will influence the success and duration of missions, which should be kept in mind at all times. These are:

- The quality of the mission plan, including the relevance and authority granted through the mandate, rules of engagement and other guidance documents
- The quality of leadership as far as command, control and communication is concerned
- The quality of the forces with regard to manpower, equipment and leadership
- Skills in the application of the most suitable techniques

23. Not one PSO will be the same as the previous or the next one, and although they may go through the same phases they will evolve differently. Mission management must be flexible, but with continuous focus on the formulated end-state. PSO missions typically progress through the following phases:

- Mission start-up
- Conduct of the operations – implementation of mandate
- Transition – either a handover to the UN or withdrawal and liquidation of the mission
24. The lead time required to deploy a mission varies and different AU PSO scenarios require readiness from a RSF/TCC to be within the mission area at the latest in 14 days for humanitarian intervention (i.e. human disaster/genocide), and 30 or 90 days for complex and/or multi-dimensional missions from the time the PSC mandate is received. This does not mean that the total force has to arrive within the stipulated times, but sufficient capacity should arrive to ensure a successful start-up. The rest of the force may be rolled-out as required. This requires detailed planning with well-aligned and exercised procedures.

25. The scale and tempo of deployment for an operation would steadily increase from start-up and initial deployment to reach a plateau during mandate implementation. It would taper off once a handover to the UN occurs, or at the conclusion of a mission when withdrawal begins. The mission is a continuing process where the various phases of the mission lifecycle may overlap. There may also be spikes of activity during implementation as situations change, i.e. an escalation of conflict may require the additional deployment of a robust force to quell the turmoil and protect mission personnel. It is important to focus on the critical milestones and tasks and ensure that they are achieved.

26. Each phase of a mission presents specific difficulties. Although ASF contingents will be on standby and should have been alerted about possible mission requirements, the mobilisation of an adequate force remains a challenge. ASF headquarters (HQ) will alert the particular standby region in advance of the possible mission and the required configuration. The AU ASF planning element (PLANELM) will be in continuous communication with regional PLANELMs to ensure readiness as per requirement. It is desirable that regional command/management personnel is part of the development of the mission plan and they must thus be quite familiar with the mission objectives and desired end-state.

27. The process of handover, withdrawal and liquidation begins following a decision to that effect by the PSC. It involves the departure of mission personnel following the handover of all remaining tasks to partners and the final disposal of mission assets and infrastructure in accordance with AU/UN rules.

**ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A MISSION**

28. The timely and successful deployment of forces into the mission area depends on a number factors, as follows:

a. *Timely availability of the required capabilities.* While considering the various ways a particular conflict/situation can develop, the ASF HQ’s PLANELM will alert the regional ASF Standby Force of specific requirements. The AU PLANELM can also, depending on the CONOPS and mandate, alert or negotiate with a second RSF to have certain components ready, or to complement capabilities of the first RSF. Such a step would depend on the willingness of other member states to contribute ASF contingents (military, police or civilian) to a particular operation, and the availability of financial and other resources. The full spectrum of the requirement needs to be planned for, and where the ASF cannot fulfil all the operational requirements, partnership agreements should be considered. Close collaboration with the UNDPKO must be maintained, as the UN might later be required to assume
command and control of the mission, or become a partner in the mission to form a hybrid mission.

b. *Effective intelligence.* The Conflict Management Division of the AU Council (AUC), in collaboration with the regional early warning centres, monitors all situations in Africa that might give rise to turmoil and conflict. As situations escalate, more detail and evaluated information-in-context (intelligence) will be required to accurately predict likely developments. For successful military operations, commanders need to understand the way that the "opposing forces" are structured, organised and deployed, as well as their strong and weak points. It requires specialist staff, adequately equipped.

c. *Mobility of the RSF.* In a vast continent like Africa, the ability to deploy and mobility are essential, and the RSF and the AU ASF HQ must ensure that strategic lift (air, rail or maritime) has been contracted and is on standby. Certain mission start-up equipment will be available at the Continental Logistic Depot and must be deployed from there into the mission area.

d. *Robust configuration.* The force configuration must always allow for the possible escalation of a situation and must therefore design for robust intervention in case this is required. The "robust force" must then be capable of and be mandated to use the required force, with lethal and non-lethal weapons supplied to ensure freedom of action. Such a capability could be the ASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), which is on standby.

e. *Competent leadership.* The command, control and communication abilities of an MMT are an essential element of a successful mission. MMTs need to be supported by competent staff and trained to tested SOP standards. Ideally the MMT should be selected to function in a team context and be trained accordingly. Too many missions are disadvantaged by inexperience leaders and not being able to work together as a team.

f. *Logistical endurance.* Logistics supply/support remains a major challenge in any operation and the possibly long supply lines in Africa makes the requirement for detail and careful planning a necessity. Service agreements/contracts and MOUs for the supply, sustainment and maintenance of the mission’s logistical requirements must be negotiated in advance. Strategic lift for the transport of adequate force numbers within short periods and logistics over long distances need special attention.

THE MISSION START-UP PROCESS

29. Conflict or turmoil within member states will initiate the process of conflict management and resolution with the objective of returning the condition to that of sustainable peace. Peaceful settlement will be negotiated with all belligerents under the guidance of the chairperson of the AUC (CC), whose special representative (SRCC) will negotiate a ceasefire agreement. The first months after a ceasefire or peace accord has been negotiated is often the most critical for establishing a stable peace mission since it will determine the credibility of the operation and could bolsterer initial successes.
30. The term “mission start-up” is used to describe the earliest phase of establishing a mission in the field. During mission start-up the main priority is to bring internal mission processes, structures and services to an initial level of operating capability that will allow mandate implementation to begin across the mission area.\textsuperscript{5}

31. The mission start-up process covers several notional stages that could overlap and is discussed below.

a. The assurance of readiness for deployment is a process managed between the ASF HQ and the PLANELMs of the RECs/RMs. ASF HQ is responsible for ensuring that the required force numbers can be provided by the RFS and that they are ready for deployment. Amongst others, it involves tasks such as pre-deployment visits to TCCs/Police contributing country (PCCs to assess readiness and to negotiate Status of Mission/Status of Forces Agreements (SOMA/SOFA), the mobilisation of strategic deployment stocks from the AU Logistic Depot or through other agreements for the provisioning of major supply and services. The ASF HQ must also, by means of negotiations with partners/sponsors, budget for the conduct of the mission and ensure that the required funds will be available.

b. The prompt deployment of an advance team to commence with the establishment of mission premises and other prerequisite infrastructure and administrative systems that will permit the reception of larger numbers of staff and contingents as start-up progresses. The core of the staff will be from the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), which will be familiar with mission planning and objectives. These will be complemented by specialist staff from the RSF.

c. The start-up of mission headquarters occurs when the MMT arrives and managerial, command and control systems are formed. Functional and support personnel will then increasingly arrive at the mission to form an initial operating capability. Start-up also involves the establishment of liaison offices and logistical hubs, if required.

d. The start-up of functional components and the field office occurs alongside the establishment of the central mission HQ and involves the coordinated establishment of different substantive civilian, police and military command and managerial capacities, as well as the start-up of sector HQs and field offices.

MANAGING THE MISSION START-UP PROCESS

32. Mission start-up can be a fast-paced and a seemingly chaotic experience. Small numbers of staff are pitted against time to put in place the foundations of a complex, new structure, often in an unknown and volatile operating environment. At the same time, new staff and contingents begin to deploy and start scoping out initial operations. Mission leaders must use these early weeks, sometimes referred to as a “honeymoon period”, to push ahead political progress with the parties in order to sustain the

\textsuperscript{5} Adapted from the UN Capstone Doctrine.
momentum of the peace process. During this critical phase, it is essential that mission leaders and personnel adhere to the basic principles of UN peacekeeping, and actively seek to establish the mission’s legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the parties, the host population and the international community.

33. Effective leadership, conflict management, and strong managerial skills are at a premium during start-up. The MMT would have been carefully selected and trained/sensitised and developed as a team prior to its deployment. If basic systems and procedures are not established early on, this can result in the confusion being compounded as the mission rapidly expands during start-up. Without effective and streamlined institutional processes to control the fragmentation of a large and diverse mission being installed, e.g. the establishment of decision-making forums, information-sharing and information management protocols, reporting lines, etc., they will become increasingly difficult to introduce later.

34. *Incident management.* Faced with a situation of actual or threatened violence, servicemen and military forces should in the first instance be capable of defending themselves, either by evasive manoeuvre or by fire, or a combination of both. Having reduced the threat to a manageable level, the resolution of an incident will generally follow a particular sequence of steps. (See the applicable ASF SOP on incident management procedures.)

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AU AND MISSION HEADQUARTERS**

35. The AU manages missions at two levels, namely through its ASF Strategic HQ, situated at the AU, and the Mission HQ in the mission area.

   a. *Strategic-level.* The greatest challenge for an AU PSO lies at its ASF Strategic HQ. It is here that missions are planned, launched, managed, sustained and eventually liquidated, and where sufficient and competent staff is required. The unique nature of the ASF allows its capacity to be utilised for the planning of various types of missions, ranging from missions to intervene and handle humanitarian and natural disasters, to complex and multi-dimensional PSOs.

   b. Within the AUC, the PSOD is responsible for providing PSOs with policy guidance and strategic direction, and senior AUC staff with policy advice and guidance. The proposed PSOD organisational structure allows for a core of the ASF HQ staff to be part of mission start-up. They would, in collaboration with the designated RSF, form integrated teams to be deployed as the advance team and assist the MMT with its initial mission responsibilities. These teams would provide a principal entry point for missions and would be familiar with applicable policy and administrative guidelines and procedures. They would also be permitted to delegate decision-making and associated accountability to the mission. The ASF HQ "mission core staff" would return to their PSOD positions once the start-up phase has been completed.

   c. *Operational level.* In the field, the HOM exercises operational authority over the PSO’s operational activities, including its military, police and civilian resources. Military personnel provided by the RSFs fall under the operational control of the AU FC. However, once they have been assigned to AU
operational control, contingent commanders and their personnel report to the AU FC and they should not act on national direction, particularly if those actions might adversely affect implementation of the mission’s mandate or run contrary to the AU/UN policies applicable to the mission.

d. In integrated missions, the SRCC/HOM is a civilian who reports to the AUCC through the Commissioner Peace and Security. The PSOD would be responsible for general communication between the strategic and mission levels, as shown in the adjacent diagram. Note that in cases of intervention by a robust force and where such a force predominantly comprises military or police, the CC can appoint the FC or COMPOL as his/her SR/HOM; a civilian can assume the responsibility once the situation has stabilised. The SRCC/HOM is given significant delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the political process on the ground. The SRCC/HOM is responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire AU/UN system in the field and is assisted in this task by deputies and the DSRCC/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator, who is expected to serve as the principal interface with the UN country team (UNCT). It is most likely that the AU mission will by this time be either a hybrid AU/UN mission or be in the process of transferring to a UN mission.

e. The SRCC/HOM, his/her deputies and the heads of the major functional components of the mission form part of the MMT, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the mission’s activities, where applicable together with the assistance of the "core team" at ASF HQ. The two teams should operate as one team and support each other both in developing a political strategy for the mission and in managing the operations and resources to support that strategy.

THE CHALLENGE OF MISSION INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION

36. Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the AU/UN engagement in countries emerging from conflict. The UN has the unique ability to employ a mix of civilian, police and military capabilities under a unified leadership to support a fragile peace process and in Africa the AU ASF is one of the major contributors of capacity. UN peacekeeping operations are almost always deployed alongside a variety of external actors (international organisations, NGOs, civil society organisation CSO, etc.) that have widely differing mandates, agendas and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus further compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the AU, the UN and
the range of other actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings.

37. In essence, an integrated mission is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional AU PSO/UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT under the leadership of the SRCC and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG)/Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The SRCC is the senior AU representative in the country with overall authority over all the activities of the AU and is responsible for ensuring that all the AU components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach in collaboration with UN agencies. The DSRCC/RC/HC is responsible for aligning AU initiatives with those of the UN humanitarian and development operations, and for maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors and the broader humanitarian and development communities. Ultimately, successful integration and coordination requires a high degree of sensitivity to the interests and operating cultures of the following three broad sets of actors:

- Mission components
- UNCT members
- External partners

38. Integration is more than just a matter of bureaucratic reporting lines. The adjacent diagram presents a simplified view of what is, in fact, a highly complex operating environment. The various components of a UN peacekeeping operation (civilian, police, military and support) come under the direct authority of the SRSG/HO and the MMT. In large integrated missions, the MMT is normally supported by the following structures, which are designed to facilitate integration between the mission’s components:

a. A Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which collates situation reports and operational information from all mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. JOC also acts as a crisis coordination hub.

b. A Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) that provides integrated analysis of all sources of information to assess medium and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MMT decision-making.

c. An Integrated Support Service (ISS) that harnesses all logistical resources of the mission.

d. A Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) to coordinate the provision of logistical support, in accordance with MMT priorities.

39. The integrated planning function, discussed earlier, allows the AU/UN system to maximise the impact of its engagement in countries emerging from conflict by ensuring that its activities are guided by a common strategic vision. Within an AU mission, this does not mean that all AU/UN and other actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure. The UNCT, although an important ally
in the achievement of mission objectives, does not fall under the overall authority of the SRCC/HOM; like other UN agencies they are governed by their own mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements, which are distinct from those of the AU/UN peacekeeping operation. As a result, integration among the members of the broader AU/UN family cannot simply be imposed by edict from above, but can only be achieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned.

40. AU objectives are ultimately also UN objectives, but there is no single approach to achieve integration among AU/UN actors in the field. There is a range of implementation modalities through which an integrated mission may pursue common AU/UN objectives in its mandated areas of activity. Close collaboration between the AU and UN is essential and the AU/UN system should decide at the country level which implementation modalities are best suited to the achievement of the common objectives. To this end, individual UN actors may need to revise their respective country programmes, annual work plans and other frameworks to reflect the new plans that have been developed.

41. Collaboration between MMT, AU and UN staff is aimed at defining the strategic priorities at country level and at ensuring that the activities of all actors contribute to the achievement of the mission’s strategic objectives. This entails respect for the diversity of approaches being pursued in a post-conflict context and the need for international strategies to evolve over time along with those of the PSO.

42. Coordination with external partners. The large number of international and national actors at all levels who are involved in the implementation of activities in post-conflict environments precludes the development of one common plan or strategy, much less one common structure or programme. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to meet regularly and share information with all actors, and to harmonise activities. It is important that the mission objectives are formulated to the greatest extent possible in consideration of the objectives of the other role-players by seeking their early inputs into the mission’s planning process. It will not be possible to accommodate all, but active and substantive response to requests for cooperation might create the synergy to advance the mission. The actors could include:

- Bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and NGOs or contractors working for donors

- Non-AU/UN-led military formations deployed nationally under the aegis of a regional organisation or as part of an ad hoc coalition

- The diplomatic corps and other regional or international political actors

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other components of the international movement, as well as other independent humanitarian actors, such as humanitarian NGOs.

43. These actors normally pursue independent agendas, which may or may not coincide with the strategic priorities identified within the PSO. Some may be operating according to widely different timelines and work methods, or they may simply not be
capable of engaging in intense cooperation owing to the periodic nature of their engagement in the country. In these circumstances, proactive sharing of information by the mission is still important, even if the intensity of cooperation is limited.

44. Humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC, have as an institutional imperative the maintenance of a high level of visible independence from political-military structures to ensure the safety and feasibility of their actions and personnel. UN peacekeepers must be cognisant of the concept of “humanitarian space”, which can be understood as the space created through respect for the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality. It is in this space that humanitarian action takes place. As such, a clear distinction must be made between politically motivated actions to end conflict and a move towards national development, and apolitical humanitarian assistance based exclusively on an impartial response to assessed need, aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining or restoring the dignity of people affected by conflict. Maintaining this distinction better assures humanitarian agencies safe and secure access in a conflict zone.

45. It is incumbent upon a PSO to regularly meet and share information with all actors and, to the extent possible, harmonise activities by seeking their input into the mission’s planning process. This includes the sharing of non-operationally sensitive geospatial data. The mission may also be requested to assist with critical large-scale humanitarian responses. For this eventuality, the Mission leadership team (MLT), through the SRCC/HC/RC, should seek to establish effective information-sharing and coordination mechanisms to ensure maximum coherence and to prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and development operations. Because of the high turnover of some mission personnel, coordination arrangements and induction programmes should be designed to minimise the burden on partner organisations.