AFRICAN UNION

POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
AND
THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

(PART I)

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## PART I

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 African Member States, in transforming the OAU to the African Union (AU), have created a Protocol to enhance peace and security on the Continent. Central to this is the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

1.2 In establishing the PSC, AU Member States have clearly indicated that they are willing to take additional concrete steps for peace and security in Africa. In particular, they have signaled their intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace, and again indicated they are ready to accept their share of responsibility for ensuring durable development of the Continent, particularly in the area of peace and security.

1.3 The protocol establishing the PSC sought to create a number of structures, including the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC). To advance consideration of these issues the AU has embarked on a process to prepare a Policy Framework. The Policy Framework was considered, improved and revised by the AU Regional Economic Communities and other African and External Partners at Addis Ababa on 14-15 April 2003, and subsequently by a meeting of Government Experts in Addis Ababa from 12-14 May 2003.

ACDS Recommendations

1.4 The Meeting noted that the African Chiefs of Defence Staff made a number of substantive recommendations in their Second Meeting, held in Harare, in 1997 (See Annex A). In particular, these included the following important recommendations relevant to this Policy Framework:

a. All Peace Support Operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration. This will enable the OAU to mobilize for action and to acquire UN support for the initiative.

b. The conflict situation should guide the level at which the OAU considers involvement. In an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment. As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency in the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body.
c. Where the OAU deploys a peace operation, this should be an all-African force.

d. Operational procedures for the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations exist and are well documented at the level of the UN. The OAU should use these references and adapt them to unique continental and organizational factors.

e. The OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances.

f. The OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for standby capacity.

g. The OAU should devise a standard structure for battalions, brigades, and perhaps even a division for future OAU deployments.

h. Training should be conducted according to UN doctrine and standards, and should draw on the available training materials, training aids and courses available through the UN system. UN training manuals should be complemented by Africa specificity.

i. Centers of expertise for Peace Support Operations training should be established, which are capable of conducting research into training; formulating guidelines for training; producing common training syllabi; and conducting control and evaluation functions.

j. The Secretariat be tasked to establish a stand-by system to be based on Member States’ indication of peace support capabilities. These would include information on size and types of forces on stand-by and their general standards of training, equipment and state of readiness.

**Development of African Peace and Security Initiatives**

1.5 The ACDS recommendations should be taken in the wider context of overall developments in African peace and security. The Meeting also noted that for some time now, in particular over the last decade, commencing with the Cairo Declaration of 1993, African Member States and Regions have increasingly addressed peace and security on the Continent, and developed the capacity to participate in peace operations at the continental and regional level. An outline of the history of this development, the existing operational capability, and a number of critical limitations to the conduct of peace operations are at Annex B.
Conflict and Mission Scenarios

1.6 A number of typical conflict scenarios, outlined below were used to develop the proposals in this document:

a. **Scenario 1.** AU/Regional Military advice to a Political mission.

b. **Scenario 2.** AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission.

c. **Scenario 3.** Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission.

d. **Scenario 4.** AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.

e. **Scenario 5.** AU PKF for complex multidimensional PK mission-low level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).

f. **Scenario 6.** AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.
CHAPTER 2

REQUIREMENTS, ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ASF

Generic Components of a Peace Operations Capability

2.1 The generic components of a valid multidimensional peace support operations capability comprise the following:

a. A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter.

b. A multidimensional strategic level management capability.

c. A mission HQ level multidimensional management capability.

d. Mission components for multidimensional peace operations.

Mandating Authority

2.2 As noted in the Chapter 3 of this Policy Framework dealing with African Goals, and particularly with regard to the provisions of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the AU PSC is a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This view is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) (of the Central Organ) Meeting, Harare 1997.\(^1\) However, due regard needs to be taken of the provisions of the UN Charter (Chapter VII Article 51) on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, subject to such measures being reported to the UN Security Council, as well as the provisions of Chapter VIII on enforcement action by Regional Arrangements, in particular subject to authorisation by the Security Council, which shall also be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies (Articles 53-54). In this context, it is to be expected that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcement actions, African Regions similarly will seek AU authorisation of their interventions.

Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability

2.3 Based on UN advice, instructive experiences of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, the Meeting recommends a series of strategic level HQ structures for the AU needed to manage operations

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\(^1\) In 1995, the ACDS proposed that each Member State earmarked peacekeeping-trained standby forces. Subsequently in 1996 (Addis Ababa) and 1997 (Harare), they made further substantive proposals for the establishment of an OAU observer force of 500 standby personnel, with 100 drawn from each of the 5 sub-regions, within the framework of the UNSAS. In addition, the ACDS recommended the formation of sub-regional standby brigades consisting of bilateral or multilateral national contingents.
for each of the Scenarios. These are provided at Annex C to this Report. These structures could be adapted by a Region, if it were authorised to manage an operation.

**Mission HQ Level Multidimensional Management Capability**

2.4 Given the goal contained in the Protocol establishing the PSC to involve the UN in the conduct of missions in Africa, any mission HQ level structure should be able to be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN PSO with relative ease. UN structures are subject to rigorous consideration within the Secretariat and in various UN legislative and budgetary bodies. For this reason the Meeting has based its advice on structures used in UN Missions. This approach is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting. With the exception of Scenario 6 (intervention) the structures are shown at Annex D.

2.5 Based on the level of coherence required at the field HQ level for an intervention mission, particularly those involving an opposed early deployment, such operations are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation. The initial entry may best be undertaken by the lead nation with rapid follow-up by the other nations in the coalition. This would mean that the lead nation HQ would need to deploy “as is”, with limited change to its existing structure to cater for multinational representation. For this reason a proposed structure for a mission HQ for Scenario 6 (intervention) is not shown. As a long term goal, the ASF should be capable of conducting such interventions without reliance on lead nations. This would require a standing AU multinational military HQ at above brigade level, plus the capability to assemble and deploy rapidly well prepared and capable military contingents.

**Mission Components**

2.6 **Military.** The Meeting endorses the recognition, contained in the recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting, of the importance of the brigade level as the basis for a viable peace operations capability. The brigade is the first level of military command where multiple arms and services are grouped under one HQ. It is also the first level that is genuinely self-contained and capable of sustained independent operations. In addition, the number of manoeuvre units can be easily adjusted depending on the situation. It is a sound building block for the military component of Scenarios 4 and 5 [traditional and complex AU/Regional peacekeeping forces (PKFs)]. A reduced version of a brigade HQ can also provide the HQ for Scenarios 2 and 3 (co-deployed and standalone observer missions). Structures for the military component for each Scenario are shown at Annex D together with indicative strengths. The military component of Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) is a model structure for a brigade deployed in the field.
2.7 **Other Components.** Scenario 5 (complex PKF) involves components other than the military. The UN is the most experienced Organisation in these types of activities. Examples of typical UN mission structures for police, human rights, governance, DDR, and reconstruction components are shown at Annex D.

**Goals, Priorities and Deployment Timelines**

2.8 The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby force structures and arrangements. Linked to this is the type of conflict into which they will deploy. Given the fluid and uncertain nature of conflict, particularly in Africa, coherence on deployment will be critical. This demands that units and HQ staff will have trained together prior to deployment. Significant implications of varying readiness levels are:

a. At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a requirement for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. Apart from large military alliances such as NATO, individual Member States may be best placed to provide this capability.

b. At 30 days readiness collective training at least involving HQ command post exercises must occur prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade HQ with its attendant HQ support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the HQ structure. In its system, contingents deploy fully self-sustained for 60 days. This is not normally the case with African contingents. In the African context ASF owned logistics bases will be required.

c. At 90 days readiness there may be time available to conduct collective training to develop a level of coherence prior to deployment. There is also time to establish a HQ and logistics stocks. A requirement does exist, however, for a small full time staff to manage the standby system, and to standardise procedures and doctrine.

2.9 Bearing this in mind, the Meeting recommends the following long-term deployment targets for the ASF (all timings are from an AU mandate resolution):

a. Scenario 1-4 should be able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been taken).

b. Scenario 5 should complete deployment in 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been undertaken; and
c. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, Scenario 6, it will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days.

2.10 The AU possesses a limited capability of deploying in Scenarios 1 and 2. The UN would normally be able to deploy in Scenarios 3 and 4 and Scenario 6 requires a capable nation that is prepared to assume leadership. Given this, development of the ASF should concentrate on Scenario 5, in particular the military component of this Scenario. The building block of this capability is robust coherence at brigade group level.

2.11 The Meeting emphasised that the issue of resource constraints was a key considerations in the achievement of the long-term deployment targets listed in paragraph 2.9.

**Doctrine**

2.12 To be effective, a multinational peace operations capability requires standardised doctrine. As in other areas of African capability, the Meeting endorses the recommendation of the Second ACDS Meeting that peacekeeping doctrine used by the ASF should be consistent with doctrine produced and used by the UN, and complemented by African specificity. In this respect, the Meeting notes that the UN has almost completed a Multidimensional Peacekeeping Handbook, with publication slated for August 2003 at the latest, which will serve as the base document for all UN peacekeeping doctrine. Doctrine for the ASF should be based on this UN document when it enters into circulation and use. The Meeting also notes that peace operations SOPs have already been drafted by the AU, as well as by ECOWAS. In this sense, the two Organisations are ahead of the UN. The UN has indicated that it will comment on the AU SOPs and the outcome of this Report will affect the scope and content of the draft SOP. It is logical to suggest that draft Regional SOPs will have to be harmonised with that of the AU.

2.13 In the UN context, production of detailed doctrine for how units will complete normal military tasks, e.g. conduct of a reconnaissance patrol, is a national responsibility. The UN has produced policy for subjects that are common in a multinational peacekeeping environment, such as civil-military co-ordination. These should be adopted by the AU. Doctrine for what could be termed multinational war fighting tasks is not available from the UN. Production of this type of publication is a major task for military alliances such as NATO, where there is a significant standardisation structure in NATO HQ. In the case of intervention, the AU may wish to seek NATO and European advice.
Training

2.14 Training for peace operations has a number of elements, both military and civilian. As far as peace operations are concerned, a basis for the military component is sound capability in the full range of normal military tasks. While this cannot be over stressed, training in these tasks is a national responsibility. Even in large military alliances, there is limited standardisation of this type of training, as a result of differing national doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures. It may be impractical to try to develop standardised training at this level in the African context.

2.15 On the other hand, there is some degree of standardisation on issues specific to peace operations. In addition to doctrine, Africa should use UN training standards and material, modified as necessary, for Africa. The UN has made significant effort in recent months in this direction, particularly as part of its Standardised Generic Training Modules Project.² Because African Member States have been, and will continue to be involved, this Project will be useful and should inform African peace operations training.

2.16 The relevant AU and regional training framework should provide for some amount of co-ordination of AU, Regional and national training, as well as for the establishment and designation of centres of excellence for peacekeeping training at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. An example of this is that, within ECOWAS, broad thinking is to designate the Zambakro PKTC (Côte d’Ivoire) as a tactical institution; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) as an operational level centre; the National War College (Nigeria) as the strategic level institution. Other regions have their own training centres and institutions, both nationally and regionally, including the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe, the PSTC Kenya and the Cairo International PK Training Centre. Regionally the establishment, through the Training for Peace project of an African Chapter of African peacekeeping training centres may be useful in the pursuit of doctrinal harmonization and sharing of lessons learnt.

2.17 While this arrangement does not seek to micro-manage issues of standardisation of doctrine and training, it provides a practical framework for standardisation based on UN doctrine and training standards, and the promotion of cohesion.

2.18 It is also to be recalled that national military training frameworks provide for training cycles normally incorporating progressive training activities. AU and sub-regional training should therefore be designed on the basis of a cycle that dovetails into these national arrangements. In this respect, there will be the need for some degree of harmonisation among Member States signing up to the

² The Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) Project is being conducted by DPKO, in close collaboration with Member States, to produce recommended training modules and content. Sixteen SGTM s have been distributed covering a range of peacekeeping training.
standby arrangements. Such harmonised training cycles, if synchronised with UN and other external initiatives such as ACRI (as well as Operation Focus Relief and African Crisis Operations and Training Assistance - ACOTA), RECAMP, BPST, the Norwegian funded Training for Peace program, etc., should help to harness support for AU training for PSO by channelling external assistance towards quality support at the centres of excellence. This will enhance African peacekeeping capacities, as well as provide a framework for joint tactical and operational field training exercises (FTX), command post exercises (CPX) and telephone battles to practice common doctrine and techniques and test readiness. It will be particularly useful if training is focused towards structures established as part of the ASF.

2.19 Troops that participate in peace support operations are placed under particular scrutiny regarding their adherence to the highest standards of international humanitarian law/Law of armed conflict. This subject should be covered in national training as well as by any regional peacekeeping training institutions. Reference could here be made to bulletin issued by the UNSG in 1999 on international humanitarian law.

**Brahimi Issues**

2.20 The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel\(^3\) have made collaboration with the UN System even more fundamental. It is instructive to call to attention the Brahimi Panel’s view:

> “There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”

2.21 The Brahimi Panel’s Report and Recommendations raise serious challenges that have far-reaching implications for AU and Regional peace support efforts, especially in the areas of organisation, equipment, training, operational doctrine, and capacities for mandate accomplishment, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), as well as for Quick Impact Projects (QIP). In operationalizing the ASF, the AU should borrow extensively from the relevant lessons drawn in the Brahimi Report and give serious consideration to those issues relating to mission-capable forces within the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) for regional training, standardisation and organic

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logistical support. The rationale for this view is that the relevant recommendations impose a higher premium on standards and capacities that, if met, will facilitate the full participation of African countries in UN peace operations.

**Issue of AU/Regional Consultations and Co-ordination**

2.22 The need for consultations, harmonisation and co-ordination of the security mechanisms of the AU and Regions is predicated on the framework of the CAAU and relevant decisions of the Durban Summit (July 2002). Within the framework of the PSC Protocol, Regional security mechanisms should be envisioned as a crucial part of the regional security architecture.

2.23 Another pertinent reason for closer AU-Regional collaboration stems from the fact that there is a limit to the burden that sub-regions can bear for their own security, and the lack of sub-regional capacity may tend to prolong conflicts. The AU has provided diplomatic support for sub-regional interventions, but its financial and logistical contributions to such Regional efforts has been limited.

2.24 The lack of fully co-ordinated and harmonised regional security mechanisms and intervention efforts has also created competition among and between African regional organisations for external assistance, to the detriment of concerted efforts at building African and regional capabilities.

2.25 In reality, the more ambitious objectives of the PSC Protocol and the ACDS recommendations which envisage sub-regional components of the ASF demand the full participation of the Regions. Their respective security mechanisms need to be harmonised with that of the AU, in order to synergise African security efforts.

2.26 To achieve effective consultations between the AU and Regions on these subjects, as well as with external Partners, there is the need for clearly designated focal points at all levels.

**Issue of Collaboration with the International Community**

2.27 AU co-operation with the international community occurs in the areas of diplomatic, political and economic activities, in addition to resource (financial and material) mobilisation in support of its peace and security agenda. In the context of building African capacity for peacekeeping, the AU is expected to continue to

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4 It is estimated that the total AU funding for ECOWAS peace support efforts, as of October 2001, stands at about $750,000 as follows: 1) $300,000 from General peace Fund towards projected ECOWAS deployment on the Guinea-Liberia border -- it was in lieu of a specific ECOWAS request for logistical support and equipment for that purpose; 2) $200,000 in December 1995; and 3) $250,000 in August 2000 for disbursement to the Government of Sierra Leone for the DDR program ($100,000), another $100,000 to alleviate the plight of amputees, and $50,000 to ECOWAS for the operationalization of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone within the framework of the Lomé Agreement (1999).
be the recipient and beneficiary of external support programmes, such as support for the establishment of the Conflict Management Centre (CMC), and financial support for the establishment and sustainment of peace operations. In addition, the Union and Regions have benefited from other financial and material assistance programmes such as the ACRI (US), RECAMP (France), as well as support from the British (BPST), Norwegian, Canadian, Danish and other Nordic countries. These have helped to enhance skills, further doctrinal standardisation, and improve the logistics capacity for African peacekeeping.

2.28 Nevertheless, while external initiatives have helped to improve some African peace support capacities, the level of external assistance has been lower than expected, and has not always focused on key African concerns. In particular, the OAU/AU has not been fully involved in determining the nature and scope of the initiatives.

**Sustainability and Logistical Support Requirements**

2.29 In order to develop advice regarding sustainability, logistic support and funding, the Meeting adopted assumptions regarding rapid deployment, periods of self-sustainability and methods of providing logistic support. These are that:

a. Scenarios 1 to 3 will deploy with self sustainability for 30 days.

b. Scenarios 4 to 6 should ideally involve contingents deploying with self sustainability for 90 days.

2.30 The identification of broad sustainability, logistical support, and funding requirements are key components for the deployment of any peace operations. The UN has developed a number of documents which are used to establish these requirements. Examples are shown at Annex F. Past experience has indicated that the rates used by the UN may be too high for adoption by the AU. It is therefore recommended that the AU use the information in these documents as a guide and build on this information, making changes as appropriate in the scales of reimbursement, the consumption rates, etc., to fit the African environment. The resulting documents, formatted to fit AU parameters, will provide valuable planning tools to determine the sustainability, logistical support and funding requirements needed for peace operations. This will also assist a smooth transition to UN operations, if necessary.

**AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO**

2.31 Considering that poor equipment and logistics have often undermined effectiveness of African PSOs, the AU should initiate an investigation into an appropriate concept for logistical infrastructure and resupply system, including ASF Military Logistical Depots (AMLD), for Phase 2. During Phase 1 Member States should focus on national readiness (own reserves and stocks) while an appropriate and cost-effective concept for Phase 2 is investigated. In general,
when involved in peace support operations, force projection and sustainment should be executed by outsourcing strategic lift capabilities from the international environment.

**Equipment Standardisation**

2.32 While standardisation of doctrine and procedures are both desirable and possible, it should be clear that due to different development processes of Member State defence forces, equipment standardisation will not be possible across the whole spectrum of ASF military equipment. However, the clear identification of key areas where interoperability is essential, such as inter-unit communications, is urgent. The issue of standardisation policy and the development of suitable technical solutions, where necessary, should be centrally managed at the AU. Apart from the possible impact that this could have on national government procurement practices, interoperability is also an issue to be taken on board by the various external capacity building initiatives listed elsewhere in this document.

**Funding and Reimbursement**

2.33 The parameters for financing the peace operations of the ASF and other operational activities related to peace and security (Article 21) provide for the establishment of the AU Peace Fund, subject to relevant AU Financial Rules and Regulations. The Peace Fund also receives additional contributions from African and international partners. Excepting the regular budgetary appropriations that could be guaranteed, the AU has no guaranteed control over the other sources. The PSC therefore needs to be aware of the responsibility of making available such financial resources as are requisite for ASF mission accomplishment. In this regard, however, it is recalled that the Second Meeting of the ACDS made the following recommendations on funding:

- a. Initiating an annual fund raising week.
- b. Increasing contributions of Member States to the Regular Budget; increasing the percentage of the budget dedicated to the Peace Fund, that is, from six (6) to ten (10) percent.
- c. Soliciting for individual donations in cash or kind, and involving insurance corporations.

2.34 The issue of reimbursement for troop commitments, movements and airlifts, and logistical, as well as other operational costs incurred by Member States, is one that needs careful consideration. Except for some coalition interventions, particularly in West, Central and Southern Africa, lack of central funding and reimbursement for peacekeeping costs have severely inhibited the full participation of less endowed Member States. This situation has undermined multinational efforts of Regions and engendered sub-regional polarisation.
2.35 An appropriate policy decision is required on reimbursement rates for Member State commitments to the ASF. In addition to reimbursement of Member States, the contribution of the Region itself needs to be considered when formulating a system of reimbursement.

**Command, Control and Communication Considerations**

2.36 Multinational brigades raise legal as well as technical command and control issues that need to be resolved prior to deployment. This could be achieved through appropriate AU command and control policies\(^5\), Letters of Exchange (LOEs), Letters of Intent (LIIs) or MOUs. In general, the command of the brigades will need to reflect the multinational nature of the formation, and be combined with a system of rotation of staff appointments, having regard to the capacities, contributions, and professional competence levels in the respective defence forces of Member State.

2.37 **Skeleton Rapid Deployment Headquarters.** For rapid deployment of a multinational force, UN, African and other experience clearly indicate the need for an effective mission HQ to be functioning very early. As mentioned above for readiness at 30 days or less, experience indicates that this can only be achieved by the core of such a HQ already existing full time which is trained and competent in the appropriate command procedures. Standby procedures similar to the SHIRBRIG concept and the UNSAS “on call” HQ described in Annex E will assist development of such a capacity.

2.38 **Status of Affiliation of Contingents.** It is likely that not all the units contributed to the ASF will be self-sufficient, and that some will lack adequate operational resources. Such units will have to be regrouped with much stronger contingents of the ASF. This may engender some amount of political and legal implications in placing units under command of foreign officers and practical issues at the tactical level that will need close attention.

2.39 **Communications.** The Meeting pointed out that deployed missions and operational activities require effective communications. This is one area requiring close examination to achieve a required level of standardization and interoperability. While the use of satellite communications may be convenient in limited observer missions and between missions and the Commission/Secretariats, they are expensive and are not ideal for communications internal to peacekeeping force operations. Careful consideration therefore needs to be given to the types and mix of communications proposed for the respective mission scenarios.

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\(^5\) The UN has issued guidance on UN Command and Control authority that may assist development of AU Policy. See DPKO Paper of October 2001 titled “Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions”.
CHAPTER 3
AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: A SUGGESTED ACTION PLAN

3.1 By the provisions of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the ASF will be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. It further states that the ASF shall, *inter alia*, perform functions in the following areas:

a. Observation and monitoring missions.

b. Other types of peace support missions.

c. Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU).

d. Preventive deployment.

e. Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation.

f. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and

g. Any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly.

3.2 As an approach, the development of the concept of the ASF must be informed by the dynamics of relevant conflict and mission scenarios, the instructive experiences of the existing Mechanism, as well as by the experience of the UN System in peace operations, and by other models evolved outside of Africa. As far as possible, the ASF will use UN doctrine, guidelines, training and standards. The concept will also need to be validated against pragmatic conflict scenarios.

3.3 There are clear, significant and fundamental gaps between the capabilities needed to realise the AU goals and current capacity. The main areas of concern being lack of political will and readiness; lack of financial resources; lack of equipment and logistical capacity; and in some areas, lack of training. For these reasons, the full development of the ASF will need to be viewed as a longer-term project.
3.4 Taking into account financial reality, previous ACDS guidance and experiences, in broad outline the Meeting recommends that the ASF be developed in phases to provide:

a. A reasonable level of staffing to develop a strategic level HQ (PSOD) capacity, managing an on-call individual reinforcement system to gain mission level (ASF) HQ capacity, and specialist mission level civilian components, such as those dealing with human rights.

b. In due course a system of sub-regionally managed standby brigade groups, eventually capable of deployment in 30 days, that maintains a small full time core planning staff (15) with individual on-call reinforcement of other brigade HQ staff positions, and a pool of units on standby in Member States that are supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.

c. An AU managed high readiness brigade capable of deployment in 30 days comprising a HQ, including a full time planning staff of 15, plus a pool of units able to be committed by Member States from all sub-regions, supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.

d. An AU-managed standby system of military observers and police capacity, preferably consisting of individuals nominated to on-call lists. Alternatively, if it is impracticable to provide names, Member States could also advise the numbers of appropriately trained and prepared military observers and police that they could provide.

3.5 The entire standby system would use as its basis for doctrine and training, concepts and material developed by the UN and SHIRBRIG and other organisations (as outlined in the Standby models described in Annex E). It should also be linked into the UNSAS.

**Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability**

3.6 While the AU should provide overall political direction to peace operations in Africa that are not commanded by the UN, it is clear that some missions could be managed at the strategic level by Regions, but with AU and UN sanction as appropriate. Indeed, such Regional-mandated missions should have the involvement of the AU and the UN, which should, to various degrees, provide not only diplomatic support, but also direct financial and logistical assistance and assistance to mobilise material and financial support.

3.7 Financial constraints and a need to avoid duplication with the UN System dictate that, for the foreseeable future, full time strategic level HQ capacity in both the AU and Regions will be minimal. Besides ongoing efforts to enhance staffing levels within the relevant peace operations Directorates (this applies to
the AU and ECOWAS, for instance), the AU and Regions should supplement their Commission/Secretariat HQ capacity by using UN and On-Call Member State personnel. It is possible reinforcements may also be available from other sources, e.g., external Partners and initiatives, the SHIRBRIG, etc. The AU should therefore explore avenues for the formulation of MOUs with these entities to that end. As far as the UN is concerned, the possibility of such an MOU exists.

3.8 Phases. The Meeting recommends that strategic level AU HQ management capacity should be developed in two phases:

a. **Phase 1. (Up to 30 June 2005).**

(1) **AU Capability.** The AU should develop and maintain the full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2 (military advice to political mission and co-deployed observer) missions, and establish a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 (stand alone observer) missions. The structure is at Annex C. Experience suggests that at this level, a senior officer of the rank of Brigadier will be required in the PSD to provide an appropriate level of strategic military advice. The AU should also commence to develop a high readiness brigade capability.

(2) **Regional Capability.** Regions should within capacity develop their standby brigades within this phase. Where they can develop standby brigade groups, Regions should, by the end of this phase also develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) missions.

b. **Phase 2. (1 July 2005 - 30 June 2010).**

(1) **AU Capability.** In this period, while maintaining its full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2, the AU should develop the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions. The structure is at Annex C. Experience suggests that at this level, a senior officer of the rank of Major General will be required in the PSD to provide an appropriate level of strategic military advice.

(2) **Regional Capability.** All Regions should try to develop capabilities up to that of a standby brigade in this period, and those with existing brigades should increase their rapid deployment capability.
Mission HQ Level Management Capability

3.9 Even though the Director PSD should exercise overall responsibility for the establishment of the ASF, it is argued that the peculiarities of the standby arrangements and the initial requirements for its effective management, training and possible deployment, strongly suggest the need to develop a skeleton mission headquarters in Addis, under a Chief of Staff (COS), of the rank of Major General; this rank is considered appropriate for missions involving brigades or contingents drawn from more than one sub-region.

3.10 The COS and his skeleton HQ should be embedded with the Planning Element of the AU high readiness brigade. With the benefit of his peacetime command, control, training and administration of the standby arrangements, the COS could be redesignated as FC/CMO to deploy rapidly with the skeleton HQ/Planning Element Staff to ensure that the impending mission is provided with effective operational management and guidance. Alternatively, the COS and his HQ could remain in the mission area for the first 3-6 months of an operation, to make for its gradual relief by a mission headquarters staffed by personnel recruited for that purpose.

3.11 The Meeting recommends that such capacity should be developed using an on-call system of individuals and standing logistics infrastructure as follows:

a. **Phase 1. (Up to 30 June 2005).**

   (1) **AU Capability.** The AU should develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenarios 1-3.

   (2) **Regional Capability.** Where they develop standby brigade groups, Regions should also develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF).

   (3) **Lead Nations and Coalitions.** Especially in regions lagging behind with the establishment of peace and security protocols and mechanisms, the Meeting recommends that encouragement be given to potential lead nations to form coalitions of the willing as a stop-gap arrangement, pending the establishment of Regional standby forces arrangements. In addition, however, it is recommended that at the AU level, potential lead nations be identified for Scenario 6 (intervention) type operations. These lead nations would be those Member States with standing deployable HQ capacity of greater than brigade level, and with forces that are capable of seizing points of entry, ideally using airborne or airmobile assets.
b. **Phase 2. (1 July 2005 – 30 June 2010).**

(1) **AU Capability.** The AU should develop the capacity to deploy a mission HQ up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF).

(2) **Regional Capability.** Regions should continue to maintain and improve on their capacity to deploy a mission HQ for Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF).

The staff structure is at Annex C and logistics guidelines are at Annex F.

**Mission Components**

3.12 **Military.** The Meeting recommends the following:

a. **Military Observers.**

(1) The AU should centrally manage a standby roster of individual military observers in order to be able to establish up to two Scenario 3 (standalone observer) missions simultaneously. This would mean at least 300-500 officers in accordance with the ACDS recommendation. Those observers on the roster should be trained nationally and/or within regional Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTC), to UN standards and be held in Member States at 14 days notice.

(2) UN Guidelines for Military Observers should be used and modified as necessary for AU conditions. The Observers should be paid by their parent Member States, while the AU administers travel, mission subsistence, and other allowances in accordance with its established Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs.

(3) AU observer missions should be supported from the AU logistical infrastructure, which should include equipment maintained centrally (AU MLD).

b. **Formed Units.**

(1) Where capable, by 30 June 2005, the AU and Regions should establish standby brigade groups (in the case of the AU this should be a standby high readiness brigade) that would consist of:

(a) A small full time Planning Element (PLANEML) of 15 staff, who should have the requisite experience and skills. They should be nominated as an entity for Group 1 of the
UNSAS On Call List, and should be paid by their Member States with a post allowance being paid by the Region on the basis of the cost of living in the relevant HQ location. Facilities, common costs and staff helpers for operation of the PLANELM should be provided by the Region.

(b) Selected PLANELM staff officers could undertake on-the-job experience with the Copenhagen-based SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to use the Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa to fund this. Selection should be a consultative process involving the UN, the AU, Regions and SHIRBRIG.

(c) The remainder of the brigade staff would be on call in Member States. These must be individuals who are identified by name and who possess the requisite experience and skills. All should be nominated as an entity for Group 2 of the UNSAS On Call List.

(d) Identified brigade units would be on standby in Member States, but must be subject to verification visits by the PLANELM staff to identify standards and shortfalls. Units should be nominated for the UNSAS RDL. Where shortages of major items of equipment are identified, these should be addressed through the use of central Regional stocks (this is described below).

(e) The pool of units that are identified as part of the system should exceed that required for an operation. This redundancy will allow for Member State decisions not to deploy, as well as allow for rotations and possibly more than one simultaneous mission.

(f) Central AU/Regional logistics facilities. Regional MLDs should hold standard stocks to cover typical shortages for sustainment and key items of equipment. The stocking policy should cover a brigade level deployment for 180 days. The MLDs should be controlled through a joint AU/Regional mechanism, but operated by regional staff. Alternatively, they could be managed by a contractor. Stocks should only to be used for UN/AU mandated or authorised missions.

(g) A system that would link the issue of equipment from the MLD, with final collective training, and certification that brigades/units are operationally deployable. Staff to support this collective training could be drawn from regional centres of excellence and/or from Member States. Ideally, if funding
were available, dedicated collective training institutions could be established.

(h) The AU should jointly agree on locations of logistics infrastructure (MLDs) and training facilities with Regions, in order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.

(2) Where a sub-region does not possess the capacity to establish a multinational brigade group organic to the Region, or where for whatever reason a Member State wishes to contribute outside the brigade group framework, two options should remain open:

(a) **Option 1.** A Member State may wish to offer to serve as a lead nation with an established brigade HQ. In this case other Member States could provide additional units on standby in a manner similar to that described above, with bilateral support to bring the unit up to RDL level as required.

(b) **Option 2.** The AU should manage a central high readiness brigade and standby system of units similar to SHIRBRIG and UNSAS. Units should be able to reach RDL level standards, if necessary through bilateral assistance. In particular, the units providing enabling capability for rapid deployment, should be included in this option.

(3) As regards employment, the Meeting noted that a brigade would not be restricted to undertaking missions in its own sub-region. Where a Regional standby brigade is employed within its own region, the Meeting is of the view that the command, control and management of such a brigade will be a Regional responsibility.

(4) Two or more brigades could be linked to establish a Scenario 5 (complex PKF) mission. Where such brigades are drawn from more than one Region, or where a number of single nation standby units are composed for an ASF mission, the AU should assume command, control and administrative responsibility for such missions.

(5) Standby brigades could also be used as follow-on forces after the initial lead nation forced entry in a Scenario 6 (intervention) mission.

(6) Solutions should cater for a multilingual environment. In this vein, the formation of brigade groups should not exacerbate
linguistic division that can be exploited by external actors. Multilingual capacity should be developed in the staff of the Planning Elements, perhaps through in situ language training, and ideally with the non-permanent staff.

(7) In some instances, Member States may offer specialised units that may be useful, but would not normally form part of a brigade group. To cater for this, the AU should include them in centralised arrangements managed at AU level.

3.13 **Police.** The Meeting recommends the following:

a. **Individual Police Officers.** By 30 June 2005, the AU should establish and centrally manage a standby roster of individual police officers in order to be able to establish the police component of up to two Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions simultaneously. This would mean at least 240 officers, some of whom would act as staff officers on the mission HQ. These individuals should be trained nationally to UN standards, or at regional and other centres of excellence, and be held in Member States at 14 days notice. UN Guidelines for Police Missions should be used and modified as necessary for AU conditions. Police Officers should be paid by their parent Member State, while the AU administers travel, mission subsistence and other allowances, in accordance with its Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs. Individual police standby arrangements should be linked to UNSAS.

b. **Formed Units.** Some Member States maintain formed units of police such as gendarmerie. By 30 June 2005 the AU should establish and centrally manage a standby system that would contain at least two company level units on 90 days notice, in order to be able to support two Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions simultaneously. These would be managed in a similar fashion to the RDL arrangements with verification visits, and as required, use the central AU logistical infrastructure. In a manner similar to formed military units, Member States providing police units would be reimbursed under a system similar to the UN, subject to necessary variations to suit AU conditions. The AU should be linked to UNSAS.

3.14 **Civilian Components.** The Meeting recommends that by 30 June 2005 the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component structure shown at Annex D. Qualifications should be similar to that required by the UN, while the AU roster should be linked to UN rosters. On deployment civilian experts should be paid by their parent Member States, while the AU administers mission subsistence and other allowances in accordance with its Administrative, Logistic and Financial Guidelines and SOPs. An alternative for some capabilities may be to establish
partnerships with other organisations that have relevant expertise, e.g., UNDP, UNHCHR and World Bank, for reconstruction, governance, DDR, human rights, etc.

AU, Regional and Member State Responsibilities

3.15 While there is broad collective responsibility for the system, the establishment and maintenance of the ASF will involve specific responsibilities for the AU, Region and Member States as follows:

a. **AU.**

   (1) Sole African mandating authority for peace operations in situations consistent with the UN Charter and the CAAU.

   (2) Establishment and maintenance of a capacity for direct management of missions as required, with initial emphasis on Scenario 1-3 missions from 1 July 2005, and up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions by 2010.

   (3) Overall supervision of the AU system of standby arrangements to ensure standardisation, currency of information and sound linkages with the UNSAS.

   (4) Establishment and detailed management of central standby arrangements for:

   (a) AU HQ reinforcement staff, including an MOU with the UN and other willing Partners and agencies.

   (b) Mission HQ staff and the Planning Element of an AU high readiness brigade.

   (c) Single nation military units in sub-regions where no sub-regional organisation or lead nation state has established a standby brigade group.

   (d) Specialised military units that would not normally form part of a brigade group.

   (e) Individual civilian police.

   (f) Formed police units.

   (g) Individuals for civilian components of missions
(5) Review of UN doctrine and training material as necessary to suit African conditions and then promulgate this to Member States, Regions and the UN.

(6) Co-ordination of efforts to establish a logistical infrastructure consisting of a central and regional MLDs, as well as efforts to mobilise external assistance towards the establishment and stocking of the MLDs.

(7) Co-ordination of efforts to mobilise, harmonise and focus external initiatives (ACRI, RECAMP, etc.) towards standardisation of doctrine and quality peacekeeping training for peace operations.

b. **Regions.**

(1) If within capability, establishment and maintenance of a capacity for direct management of missions, with emphasis on Scenario 4 missions.

(2) If within capability, establishment and maintenance of standby arrangements for:

   (a) HQ reinforcement staff, including an MOU with the UN, under the auspices of the AU.

   (b) Mission HQ staff for a Scenario 4 mission.

   (c) A standby brigade group, including training at brigade level.

   (d) Direct management of sub-regional logistical and training infrastructures.

   (e) Elements nominated to the AU high readiness brigade.

c. **Member States.**

(1) If within capability, provide individuals and units to AU high readiness and sub-regional standby arrangements, including permitting required verification visits by the AU, Regions and UN.

(2) Train individuals and units in basic military tasks using national doctrine and procedures.

(3) Train individuals and units in the particular tasks involved in peace operations, using UN standardised doctrine and training
material, and where necessary, consistent with AU SOPs reflecting African situations.

d. **Priority of Effort.** The Meeting recommends that, where required, the following factors be taken into consideration in determining the priority of effort in establishing the sub-regional standby brigades:

(1) Regional volatility.
(2) Regional political cohesion.
(3) Existing security architecture and infrastructure.

### Enhancing Co-operation with the UN

3.16 There are a number of areas where the ASF Concept and overall African peace and security agenda can be enhanced through co-operation with the UN. The Meeting recommends that:

a. **HQ Capacity.** In establishing high readiness and standby brigade groups, the AU and Regions should establish an MOU with the UN to reinforce strategic HQ capacity, using an on call UN Planning, Liaison, and Advisory Team. Additionally the UN should consider on request of the AU reinforcing the UNLO office in Addis with a peacekeeping specialist.

b. **Standby Information.** Where Member States approve, the AU should ensure African standby information is included in UN standby databases. The UN should share its detailed requirements for military, police and civilian standby with the AU.

c. **Doctrine and Training Material.** The AU should consult closely with the UN to gain access to the latest UN peace operations doctrine and training material and modify this as necessary to suit African conditions. Essentially, all African peacekeeping centres of excellence should have and use such material. The AU, Regions and Member States should actively participate in the activities of the DPKO Training and Evaluation Service Standardised Generic Training Module Project. To that end, the UN (DPKO) should be invited to participate in the planning and conduct of all forms of peacekeeping training and exercises, including those within the frameworks of external initiatives.

d. **On the Job Experience.** The AU and Regions should co-operate closely with the UN to gain experience at UN HQ, and with the Planning Element of the Copenhagen-based SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to fund this through the appropriate Trust Fund.
e. **Logistics Co-operation.** Given the AU goal of handing over an operation to the UN as soon as possible, the AU should approach the UN with a view to co-operation in logistics support.⁵

f. **UN Consultations with TCCs.** In order to take advantage of this provision, the Meeting recommends that one or more ASF operational brigades should be organised in accordance with UN standards to be fielded in UN peacekeeping operations along the lines of SHIRBRIG. The strategy of task-organising special contingents for UN missions is currently being adopted by some national defence forces—India is a good example—which have, as a result, reaped enormous benefits, including operational expertise and financial resources, from participation in UN peace operations. The funding of regional operations could thus be “subsidised” with funds from ASF’s participation in UN missions. In addition to their being harmonised with commitments to the UNSAS, ASF databases will also benefit from that of the UNSAS and help provide a formal framework for bilateral MOU and/or LOEs between African TCCs and the AU Commission. This is consistent with the coherent brigade group concept contained in the Brahimi Report.

**Command and Control Functions**

3.17 Reiterating the assumption that the structures of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are of relevance, the Meeting recommends the following command and control relationships and functions:

a. **Strategic Chain of Command and Functions.**

   1. In accordance with Articles 6 (Functions) and 7 (Powers) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC, as the decision-making institution, should be the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace missions and operations.

   2. In accordance with Article 10 (The Role of the Chairperson of the Commission), political command and control of missions mandated by the PSC should be vested in the Chairperson, who should then submit periodic reports to the PSC on the progress of implementation of the relevant mandates of such operations and missions. The Reports of the Chairperson should include, but not be limited to the following matters:

      a. Introduction.

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⁵ A key step in addressing the issues of African TCCs in the logistic support requirements for peace operations took place recently during the Partners in Peacekeeping Conference in UNAMSIL, 3-5 March 2003. Follow-up on these issues should be aggressively pursued by the AU.
(b) Progress of implementation of the ceasefire and/or agreement.

(c) Status of the mission.

(d) Status of work of other commissions and agencies.

(e) Humanitarian developments.

(f) Human rights.

(g) Confidence-building measures, etc.

(h) Observations and recommendations.

(3) The Chairperson should, however, delegate authority for the political direction and administrative control of AU peace operations and missions to the Commissioner for Peace and Security. As part of his functions, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, should exercise delegated authority for:

(a) Enhancing the rapid and effective response of the Commission to conflict situations.

(b) Providing the Commissioner with early warning information and timely, informed analysis of current and potential conflicts, to facilitate appropriate and effective decisions and actions by the Commissioner and the PSC.

(c) Providing facilities for collection, collation and dissemination of early warning data, and communication linkage with Member States, Regions, peace operations and missions.

(d) Providing analysis of conflict- and security-related information, and research into the root causes of conflicts, for the formulation of specific-, medium- and long-term policy options.

(e) Providing facilities for collection, collation and dissemination of early warning data, and communication linkage with Member States and field missions.

(f) The detailed planning, preparation, conduct, direction and sustainment of AU peace operations and missions.
(g) Assisting Member States and Regions in any activity related to peace support missions, defence and security matters.

(h) Providing planning guidance for the implementation of post conflict reconstruction.

(i) Provide administrative and technical support for PSC meetings and dissemination of its decisions.

(4) Similarly, the PSOD should be responsible for the routine execution of all decisions and issues relating to the planning, deployment and sustainment of missions.

3.18 **Chain of ASF Command.**

a. In Scenarios 2 and 3 missions, overall political control and overall direction, as well as the activities of the mission and consultations with other Organisations and agencies in the field, should normally be exercised and co-ordinated by an AU Special Representative (ASR) designated by the Chairperson. All heads of major components should report to him.

b. The Chairperson of the Commission will provide the ASR with legal and political advisers, and with a civilian administrative staff, as necessary.

c. Notwithstanding the designation of a Special Representative, command and control of the military components of an AU mission should be vested variously in an FC or CMO, who should be appointed by the Chairperson. He should be provided with appropriate HQ facilities based on the type of mission to be undertaken.

d. Military personnel of AU peace missions should be under the authority of the Chairperson of the AU, through the FC/CMO, and should be directly answerable to FC/CMO for the conduct and performance of their duties. Member States contributing contingents and other military and civilian staff components to AU missions shall allocate them under the command and control authority of the AU.

e. The outline chain of ASF command and control in a top-down mode should be:
(1) Commissioner, Peace and Security Department, supported by Director (PSD) and Head (PSOD).

(2) Head of Mission (AU Special Representative).

(3) FC/CMO.

This reporting channel should not preclude the Head of Mission, as and when appropriate, from direct access to the Chairperson of the Commission.

Communications

3.19 The Meeting recommends the following capacity for communications:

a. AU responsibility for providing communications will be focused at supporting the following:

(1) An HF digital encryption-capable communication systems linking the AU Commission with Regional Secretariats, Regional Offices and ASF Missions (administration and operations), combined with land/GSM telephones and faxes, as well as broadband and Internet facilities.

(2) ASF HF digital encryption-capable communication systems (administration/operations) with rear link to the AU Commission, Regions and Regional Office(s).

(3) Sector/contingent/detachment (combat net radio), communications, rear link to ASF HQ.

(4) Broadband and cc-mail presence which should be provided by the ASF.

b. Contingent responsibility for providing communications should be focused at supporting the following:
(1) Forward communications capable of maintaining the required command and control, security, and logistics nets required to support operations within the units’ areas of responsibility.

(2) Separate contingent rear link to home country.

c. These links include telephone, VHF/UHF FM and HF communications available and meeting mission requirements.

3.20 **Force Integrity.** The Meeting recommends the following in order to ensure force integrity and morale:

a. **Multinational Balance.** As much as possible, staff appointments at ASF mission HQs should reflect the multinational nature of the force, and should be characterised by the same principle of geographical distribution, subject to technical aspects of levels of command, the size and attributes of contingents, and the rank structure of their staff. Appointments should also be rotated periodically (12 months) to ensure balanced national exposure and to forestall tendencies that excessive familiarity with particular appointments could breed.

b. **Consultations with Senior National Officers.** Senior national officers within the mission should be consulted on issues pertaining to the operations of his/her contingent.

**Enhancing Co-operation with Regions**

3.21 In general, the Meeting recommends that in order to enhance AU-Regional co-operation, consultative meetings between the PSC and Regional security organs should be formalised. Additionally, the appropriate sub-regional Departments responsible for security should be involved in ASF mission planning.

**Enhancing Co-operation with the International Community**

3.22 It is in the interest of the AU to maintain co-operation with its traditional Partners in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on the PSC. Such co-operation should however be reviewed to allow for increased joint AU ownership of the relevant external initiatives and assistance. Towards this end, the Meeting recommends that:

a. The AU should negotiate with its Partners to share in the planning, objectives and conduct of external support initiatives; the objectives of training exercises should accord with requirements of the AU,

b. The AU should encourage its Partners and donors to meet UN equipment standards in their assistance and initiatives.
c. The AU should negotiate with the Partners and donors to have equipment donations through multilateral arrangements towards stocking, maintaining and managing MLDs.

d. Explore through MOU, the possibility of strategic airlift of ASF equipment and personnel to and from mission areas, from external Partners.

3.23 In general, the harmonisation of security mechanisms and collaborative multilateral regional and sub-regional security with the UN and international community will facilitate global African strategies for peace support and peace-building efforts. In terms of external assistance and initiatives, it may facilitate a shift or change in the competing nature of external initiatives, and a move away from bilateral arrangements towards multilateral regional assistance arrangements. The G8 approach emphasising multilateral regional arrangements with African ownership underscores this point.

**Other Suggested Actions**

3.24 The Meeting is of the view that the following additional actions need to be considered:

   a. **Mandates.** Ceasefire or peace agreements negotiated by the AU, to be implemented by the ASF, should meet threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines.

   b. **Entry-Exit Strategies and Mandates.**

      (1) There is the need to highlight the requirement for a framework of entry and exit strategies informed by realistic criteria addressing the legal, political and moral dilemmas of intervention. The Fund for Peace (FfP) Seminar\(^7\) suggested that AU and Regional operations should be designed with the view to eventually handing over mandates and responsibilities to the UN, with or without the subsuming of regional forces. Where intervention takes place before appropriate authorisation, ex post facto, the approval of the AU and/or the UN should be sought. The PSC must be clear in its

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\(^7\) Reference is here made to the outcome of the Fund for Peace (FfP) Seminar, *Regional Responses to Internal War on the (African) Continent*, (Washington, 2001). In the main, the Conference recommended that: 1) the UN Security Council is the preferred authorizing body for military intervention; 2) in emergencies in which urgent action is needed, military intervention may be authorized by the AU (formerly OAU) or sub-regional organizations, but the Security Council must be informed and ex post facto approval must be sought. Sub-regional organizations must likewise inform and seek approval from the AU; … 7) in exceptional cases, military intervention may be carried out legitimately by an African coalition of the willing provided that any such coalition immediately seeks ex post facto authorization from the UN Security Council, the AU, or from the relevant sub-regional organization, etc.
entry and exit strategies for each of the scenarios for which the ASF is being designed.

(2) For intervention, the level of coherence and capability required is such that a phased concept of deployment is required, involving a lead or single nation to seize a point of entry(s) to stabilise the situation, followed by standby brigade group(s) deployment.

c. **Staffing.**

(1) **Best Practices Capability.** Although not included in currently approved structures (PSOD), similar to DPKO, the PSD should develop a Best Practices capability, possibly using serving as well as retired officers.

(2) **AU Military Advisory Staff.** Considering the enormity of the military aspects of AU-UN consultations and the implications of AU/Regional peace operations, the Meeting is of the view that serious consideration needs to be given to the inclusion of a military liaison and advisory officer of appropriate rank on the staff of the AU Permanent Mission to UN HQ in New York, to facilitate appropriate military staff actions on issues relating to peace and security.

d. **IT.** IT needs to be considered as a vital tool for ASF command, control and communications. Ongoing improvements in IT resources and facilities at the AU Commission and some Regional Secretariats should therefore be extended to the ASF. The ASF must also be provided with appropriate reliable and effective multiple link communications, including Internet access and mission Intranet facilities. In this sense, consideration should be given to the need to establish a small IT/EDP cell at the Commission (within the PSD), Regional Secretariats and within the rapidly deployable ASF HQ, which resources could then be expanded during deployment.

e. **Quick Impact Projects.** Even though the ASF will not be expected to undertake serious humanitarian projects, it should be endowed with appropriate resources and capacity in specialised units, to undertake QIP and limited post-conflict reconstruction. This accords with the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel for UN peace operations.

f. **Reimbursement.** The meeting recommended that the AU should reimburse contributors. Indications are that some Member States would be unable to contribute to operations without adequate reimbursement. If reimbursement is determined, using the relevant UN scales of reimbursement as a guide, the AU, in consultation with Regions, should
determine its own scales based on its capacity to fund the reimbursement regime. A sample of the UN scales of reimbursement is at Annex F. The meeting recommended that the AU establish a working group, comprising at least of one nominated member from each sub-region, to provide options for ASF re-imbursement, guided by the following considerations:

1. Re-imbursement for personnel and equipment are considered separately.
2. Reimbursement follows the format of the UN.
3. The scale of reimbursement is determined for sub-region actions, and AU mandated actions based on sub-regional and AU respective expert considerations.
4. A mission may be initiated at sub-regional level, later receive AU mandate and thereafter UN – mandate and thus would move through three levels of re-imbursement process.
5. Preferably AU – mandated missions do not involve different scales for personnel and equipment within one mission.
6. Bi-lateral funding and/ or resource allocations towards a sub-regional/ or AU mission is accommodated, not reimbursed but accounted for as per bi-lateral arrangement.

**g. AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO.** Any AU logistics support strategy should aim to enable rapid and effective deployment, on the one hand, and mission sustainability on the other. To this end, it is suggested that the AMLD should be incorporated into a system of sub-regional MLDs.\(^8\) In future, external logistical facilities in the region should be negotiated to support these MLDs. Alternatively, the AMLD could be centralised like the UNLB (Brindisi); this has the advantage of maximising the management and maintenance resources of the facility, even though it will also entail higher costs in strategic air and sea lifts.

**h. Equipment Standardisation.** This will probably involve various technical working groups in areas such as communications and IT, as well as key areas of logistics. Because of its very well developed system in this regard, NATO should be approached for advice on the systems they use.

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\(^8\) Essentially, the idea of an OAU MLD started with the establishment of the Cairo Declaration establishing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. It was given practical expression with a US initiative of providing military equipment assistance to support the projected 100-man OAU military observer force (MOF), in order to enhance the capacity of the OAU for PSO. The recommendations of the ACDS for the establishment of a 500-man OAU-MOF and the standby brigades made its establishment more urgent. Subsequently, equipment has been donated by China (PR), France, Germany and South Africa. A new thinking on the MLD is the establishment of regional MLDs such as the EMLD and not a single MLD in Addis Ababa.
i. **Funding.** To ensure availability of funds for the implementation of the Protocol, the Meeting suggests that consideration be given to additional means being considered by some Regions, such as the levying of a peace tax. Additionally, assessed supplementary quotas could be made to meet the cost of specific PKOs. Furthermore, to stretch the value and application of available funds, and strengthen the confidence of external supporters, stringent measures for probity, accountability and transparency, need to be maintained. Stringent inspection and verification regimes at all levels of missions, and by appropriate AU Departments and Offices, will help to ensure this.
CHAPTER 4

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Establishment

4.1 The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is to be established pursuant to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol. In this respect, it should be established as a standing advisory military committee to the PSC.

Composition and Membership

4.2 According to the relevant Article, the MSC shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Member of the PSC. It also provides that any Member State not represented on the MSC may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities.

4.3 Regional Representation. Given that operational capacity of the ASF is largely based on sub-regional groupings, the views of the sub-regions should be represented in the MSC. This creates a responsibility for Member States to consult with their sub-region, in order to accurately reflect the sub-regional position, and to periodically invite Regional representatives as observers to MSC meetings.

4.4 MSC Membership. Membership of the MSC should accord with those of the PSC. Members will serve the terms of their elected Member States serving on the PSC. In the event that an elected Member State of the PSC is not permanently represented by a sufficiently Senior Military Advisor in Addis Ababa, that Member State may authorize/designate another Member State which is not a Member of the PSC, to serve on its behalf on the MSC.

Functions

4.5 Having due regard to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol and informed by the functions of the MSC of the UN Security Council (Article 47), as well as similar provisions of NATO, the EU and the SHIRBRIG, the Meeting proposes the following military advisory functions for the MSC:

a. To advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

b. Similarly, to keep the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) of Member States serving on the PSC and MSC well informed of all decisions of the PSC, and their implications on peace and security in Africa, in order to
facilitate their deliberations and decisions during MSC meetings at the level of ACDS.

c. To ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with sub-regional mechanisms.

d. To enhance co-operation in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding through consultations with the PSD (PSOD).

e. Prior to submission of plans to the Chairperson, co-ordinate with the PSOD.

f. Subject to the decision and authorization of the PSC, participate in or undertake visits to ASF missions, and other peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts.

g. Carry out any other functions, which the PSC may entrust to it.

**Chairperson**

4.6 The modalities of the Chairperson of the MSC should be guided by those of the PSC. Thus, the Member State holding the Chair of the PSC should also provide the Chair of the MSC.

4.7 In accordance with the Provisions of the PSC Protocol, the Chairperson of the PSC should take appropriate measures for convening meetings of the MSC at the level of the CDS. In all other cases, the Chair of the MSC will convene meetings and take appropriate follow-up measures.

**Rules of Procedure**

4.8 **Agenda.** The Meeting recommends that the MSC should derive the agenda of its meetings from two sources:

a. Members of the MSC should be given notification of all PSC meetings at the same time that members of the PSC are being notified, in order to facilitate their own deliberations, consultations, and provision of advice, prior to meetings of the PSC.

b. As and when it is necessary to convene on its own accord, the MSC should develop its own agenda. The provisional agenda of such MSC meetings should be determined by its Chairperson on the basis of items proposed by its Members, or advised/suggested by the PSD. The inclusion of any item in the provisional agenda may not be opposed by a Member.
c. In general, the draft agenda may include the following items:

(1) Adoption of the agenda.

(2) Reading and adoption of the minutes of the previous meeting.

(3) Chairperson’s remarks and information.


(5) Substantive points (to be presented by nominating Member).

(6) Date and draft agenda of next meeting.

(7) Any other business.

4.9 Meetings. The Meeting proposes that:

a. The MSC should be in permanent sessions and should meet at the level of Senior Military Officers and CDS. It should convene as often as required, prior to all meetings of the PSC at the level of the Senior Military Officers, but at least once a month, prior to meetings of the PSC, which they should also attend to offer any necessary clarifications and advice when invited to do so. The MSC should also convene normally once per year at the level of the CDS, and include Regional representatives, to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, and to review the activities of the MSC.

b. Upon notification of PSC meetings, the MSC should meet to deliberate on the military security implications of all issues coming before the PSC, and formulate common understanding and position on such issues.

c. If and when necessary/possible, it should arrange consultative meetings with the PSD in order to seek further clarifications on issues, or to acquaint the PSD with the perspectives and/or position of the MSC on issues.

d. The MSC should prepare briefs detailing the perspectives and/or position of the MSC regarding issues coming before the PSC, in order to facilitate the deliberations and decisions of the PSC.

4.10 Quorum. The number of Members required to constitute a quorum should be two-thirds of the total membership of the MSC, that is, 10 out of the 15 Members.
4.11 **Conduct of Business.**

a. In line with the PSC, the MSC should hold closed meetings, during which any Member who is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the MSC should not participate, either in the discussion or in the decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such a Member should be invited only to present its case to the MSC as appropriate, and should, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings.

b. When the MSC decides to hold open meetings:

   (1) Any Member which is not a Member of the MSC, if it is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the MSC, should be invited to present its case as appropriate, without the right to vote, in the discussion.

   (2) Any Member which is not a Member of the MSC may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the MSC whenever that Member considers that its interests are especially affected.

   (3) Any Regional Mechanism, international organization or civil society organization involved and/or interested to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation, may be invited.

c. In appropriate ways and with appropriate institutions, the MSC may hold informal consultations with parties concerned with or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration, as well as with Regional Mechanisms, international organizations and civil society organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities.

d. The MSC may also establish such working or working groups as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

4.12 **Decisions and Voting.**

a. Each Member of the MSC should have one vote.

b. Decisions of the MSC should generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In situations where consensus cannot be reached, the MSC should adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters should be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.
4.13 **Other Rules of Business.** Within the foregoing framework, the MSC should evolve and submit its own rules for the conduct of business, records of meetings and any other relevant aspect of its work, for due consideration and approval by the PSC. The Chairperson of the MSC may avail him/herself of the services of the PSC Secretariat for the production of the records of meetings and any other relevant aspects of the work of the MSC. The MSC will further be guided by the relevant traditions of the PSC.

**Accountability**

4.14 The MSC should be an advisory Committee accountable to the PSC, even though it may consult with other institutions as explained in these provisions. It should have no executive powers of its own except as and when assigned by the PSC.
CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

(1) The Basics of the Force

5.1. It is recommended that an ASF be established in two phases, with Phase 1 to 30 June 2005, and Phase 2 to 30 June 2010. The Meeting confirmed the importance of the brigade level as the basis for a viable peace operations capability. Taking into account financial reality, previous ACDS guidance and experiences, in broad outline the Meeting further recommends that the ASF be developed in phases to provide:

a. A reasonable level of staffing to develop a strategic level HQ capacity, managing an on-call individual reinforcement system to gain mission level (ASF) HQ capacity, and specialist mission level civilian components.

b. System of Regionally managed standby brigade, eventually capable of deployment in 30 days and a pool of units on standby in Member States that are supported by appropriate administrative, logistics and training infrastructures.

c. An AU Strategic HQ located at the AU Commission capable of managing, planning and conducting all necessary arrangements for employment of the Standby Force. The Strategic HQ must be supported by necessary systems capable of rendering appropriate support for its operations and functions.

d. An AU-managed standby system of military observers, civilian and police capacity.

(2) Goals, Priorities and Deployment Timelines

5.2. The Meeting recommends the following long-term deployment targets for the ASF from an AU mandate resolution:

a. Simpler missions (scenarios 1-4) should be able to deploy in 30 days;

b. Complex missions (scenario 5) should complete deployment in 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days; and
c. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, (scenario 6), it will be important the AU can eventually deploy a robust military force in 14 days.

(3) **Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability**

5.3. The Meeting recommends that strategic level HQ management capacity should be developed in two phases:

a. **Phase 1 (Up to 30 June 2005).**

(1) **AU Capability**

The AU should develop and maintain the full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2 (AU/Regional military advice to political mission and co-deployed observer) missions, and establish a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 (stand alone observer) missions. The AU should also develop a system of communication with the Regions.

(2) **Regional Capability**

Regions should within capacity develop/evolve their standby brigades within this phase. Where they can develop standby brigade groups, Regions should by the end of this phase also develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) missions.

b. **Phase 2 (1 July 2005 - 30 June 2010)**

(1) **AU Capability**

In this period, while maintaining its full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2, the AU should develop the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions.

(2) **Regional Capability**

All Regions should try to develop a standby brigade in this period, and those with existing brigades should increase their rapid deployment capability.
(4) **Mission HQ Level Management Capability**

5.4. Although the Director PSD should exercise overall responsibility for the establishment of the ASF, it is recommended that a skeleton mission headquarters be developed in Addis Ababa.

(5) **Mission Components**

5.5. The Meeting recommends the following:

a. **Military Observers**

The AU should centrally manage a standby roster of individual military observers, consisting of at least 300-500 officers at 14 days notice.

b. **Formed Units**

Where capable, by 30 June 2005, the AU and Regions should establish standby brigades that would consist of:

1. A small full time Planning Element (PLANELM).
2. Selected PLANELM staff officers could undertake on-the-job experience with the Copenhagen-based SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to use the Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa to fund this.
3. Identified brigade units would be on standby in Member States, but must be subject to verification visits by the PLANELM staff to identify standards and shortfalls.
4. The pool of units that are identified as part of the system should exceed that required for an operation. This will allow for Member State decisions not to deploy, as well as allow for rotations.
5. Regional MLDs should hold standard stocks to cover typical shortages for sustainment and key items of equipment. The stocking policy should cover a brigade level deployment for 180 days.
6. The AU should jointly agree on locations of logistics infrastructure (MLDs) and training facilities with Regions, in order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.
c. **Police**

The Meeting recommends that by 30 June 2005, the AU should establish and centrally manage a standby roster of at least 240 police officers in order to be able to establish the police component of complex PKF missions. These individuals should be trained nationally to UN standards, or at regional and other centres of excellence, and be held in Member States at 14 days notice. By 30 June 2005 the AU should also establish and centrally manage a standby system that would contain at least two company level formed police units on 90 days notice, in order to be able to support complex PKF missions.

d. **Civilian Components**

The Meeting recommends that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction components of a complex PKF mission. Qualifications should be similar to that required by the UN, while the AU roster should be linked to UN rosters.

(6) **Doctrine**

5.6. The Meeting endorses the recommendation of the Second ACDS Meeting that peacekeeping doctrine used by the ASF should be consistent with doctrine produced and used by the UN, and complemented by African specificity.

(7) **Training**

5.7. The Meeting endorses the recommendation of the ACDS that Africa should use UN training standards and material, modified as necessary. This training shall include International Humanitarian Law. The UN has made significant effort in recent months in this direction, particularly as part of its Standardised Generic Training Modules Project.

5.8. The AU and regional training framework should provide for some amount of co-ordination of AU, Regional and national training, as well as for the establishment and utilisation of existent centres of excellence for peacekeeping training.

(8) **Equipment Interoperability**

5.9. The Meeting noted that clear identification of key areas where interoperability is essential. It is therefore recommended that the issue of
standardisation policy and the development of suitable technical solutions, where necessary, should be centrally managed at the AU.

(9)  **Enhancing Co-operation with the UN**

(a)  **HQ Capacity**

In establishing high readiness and standby brigade groups, the AU and Regions should establish an MOU with the UN to reinforce strategic HQ capacity, using an on call UN Planning, Liaison, and Advisory Team. Additionally the UN should consider on request of the AU reinforcing the UNLO office in Addis with a peacekeeping specialist.

(b)  **Standby Information**

Where Member States approve, the AU should ensure African standby information is included in UN standby databases.

(c)  **Doctrine and Training Material**

The AU should consult closely with the UN to gain access to the latest UN peace operations doctrine and training material and modify this as necessary to suit African conditions. The UN should also be invited to participate in the planning and conduct of all forms of peacekeeping training and exercises.

(d)  **On the Job Experience**

The AU and the Regions should co-operate closely with the UN to gain experience at UN HQ, and with the Planning Element of SHIRBRIG. The UN should be approached to fund this through the appropriate Trust Fund.

(e)  **Logistics Co-operation**

Given the AU goal of handing over an operation to the UN as soon as possible, the AU should approach the UN with a view to co-operation in logistics support.

(f)  **UN Consultations with TCCs**

The Meeting recommends that ASF operational brigades should be organised in accordance with UN standards along the lines of SHIRBRIG.
(g) **AU Military Advisory Staff**

Serious consideration needs to be given to the inclusion of a military liaison and advisory officer of appropriate rank on the staff of the AU Permanent Mission to UN HQ in New York.

(10) **Command and Control Functions**

5.10. The Meeting noted that an agreed AU command and Control policy needed to be developed based on the existing UN command and control guidance, and including the following relationships and functions:

- a. Overall political control and overall direction, as well as the activities of the mission and consultations with other Organisations and agencies in the field, should normally be exercised and co-ordinated by an AU Special Representative (ASR) designated by the Chairperson. All heads of major components should report to him.

- b. Command and control of the military components of an AU mission should be vested variously in an FC or CMO, who should be appointed by the Chairperson.

- c. Military personnel of AU peace missions should be under the authority of the Chairperson of the AU, through the FC/CMO, and should be directly answerable to FC/CMO for the conduct and performance of their duties.

(11) **Enhancing Co-operation with Regions**

5.11. The Meeting recommends that in order to enhance AU/Regional co-operation, consultative meetings between the PSC and regional security organs should be formalised.

(12) **Enhancing Co-operation with the International Community**

5.12. The Meeting recommends that:

- a. The AU should negotiate with its Partners to share in the planning, objectives and conduct of external support initiatives in accordance with requirements of the AU.

- b. The AU should encourage its Partners and donors to meet UN equipment standards in their assistance and initiatives.
c. The AU should negotiate with the Partners and donors to have equipment donations through multilateral arrangements towards stocking, maintaining and managing AU/Regional MLDs.

(13) Reimbursement, Logistics and Funding

a) Reimbursement

5.13. Past experience has indicated that the reimbursement rates used by the UN may be too high for adoption by the AU. The AU should make appropriate changes to the UN scales of reimbursement, the consumption rates, to fit the African environment. The Meeting recommends that the AU establish a working group, comprising at least one nominated member from each Region, to provide options for ASF re-imbursement, guided by but not limited to the following considerations:

a. Reimbursement follows the format of the UN. Re-imbursement for personnel and equipment are to be considered separately, and take into account the capacity of the AU

b. The AU should determine the standard scales of reimbursement for troops and equipment.

c. A mission may be initiated at Regional level, later receives AU mandate and thereafter UN mandate and thus would move through three levels of re-imbursement process.

d. Preferably AU mandated missions do not involve different scales for personnel and equipment within one mission.

e. Bi-lateral funding and or resource allocations towards a Regional or AU mission is accommodated, not reimbursed but accounted for as per bi-lateral arrangement.

b. AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO

5.14. Any AU logistics support strategy should aim to enable rapid and effective deployment and mission sustainability. To this end, it is suggested that the AMLD should be incorporated into a system of regional MLDs. During Phase 1 Member States should focus on national readiness (own reserves and stocks) while an appropriate and cost-effective concept for Phase 2 is investigated. In general, when involved in peace support operations, force projection and sustainment should be executed by outsourcing strategic lift capabilities from the international environment.
c. **Funding**

5.15. Excepting the regular budgetary appropriations that could be guaranteed, the AU has no guaranteed control over the other sources. The PSC should therefore be aware of the responsibility of making available such financial resources as are requisite for ASF mission accomplishment. In this regard it is recalled that the Second Meeting of the ACDS recommended increasing contributions of Member States to the Regular Budget; increasing the percentage of the budget dedicated to the Peace Fund from six (6) to ten (10) percent. To ensure availability of funds for the implementation of the Protocol, the Meeting suggests that consideration be given to additional means being considered by some Regions, such as the levying of a peace tax. Additionally, assessed supplementary quotas could be made to meet the cost of specific PKOs.

**MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE**

5.16. The Military Staff Committee should be established as a standing advisory military committee to the PSC. It should have no executive powers of its own except as and when assigned by the PSC.

5.17. The MSC shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the members of the PSC. Members will serve the terms of their elected Member States serving on the PSC.

5.18. The following military advisory functions are proposed for the MSC:

   a. to advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa;

   b. to keep the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) of Member States serving on the PSC and MSC well informed of all decisions of the PSC;

   c. to ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with regional mechanisms;

   d. to enhance co-operation in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building through consultations with the PSD (PSOD);

   e. prior to submission of plans to the Chairperson, co-ordinate with the PSOD;
subject to the decision and authorization of the PSC, participate in or undertake visits to ASF missions, and other peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts.

5.19. The modalities of the Chairmanship of the MSC should be guided by those of the PSC. Thus, the Member State holding the chair of the PSC should also provide the chair of the MSC.

5.20. The MSC should derive the agenda of its meetings from two sources:

   a. members of the MSC should be given notification of all PSC meetings at the same time that members of the PSC are being notified, in order to facilitate their own deliberations, consultations, and provision of advice, prior to meetings of the PSC;

   b. as and when it is necessary to convene on its own accord, the MSC should develop its own agenda.

**FOLLOW-UP**

5.21. By August 2003, the Chiefs of Defence Staff in the five regions should meet on a regional basis to set in motion regional processes.

5.22. Workgroups should be established in the regions to identify standby forces; rapid reaction elements; centres of excellence for peace support operations training; list of military and civilian observers; regional logistics support required; location of early warning (situation rooms for region); and communication/IT capabilities.

5.23. At the same time, Member States/Regions should nominate members to the AU to determine feasibility and/or options regarding the following:

   a. SOPs and doctrine for PSOs (drafts to be finalized)
   b. Communications and IT
   c. Early Warning (situation room) and its links to Regional Early Warning (situation room)
   d. Reimbursement policy and SOPs
   e. Financial management systems
   f. Logistic support during AU missions
   g. Command and control for AU missions

5.24. Regional work groups must conclude their work by December 2003, including draft doctrine SOPs, list of terminologies etc.

5.25. Preferably by January/February 2004, the 4th meeting of the ACDS should be convened.