comments

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 353rd meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, on 25 January 2013, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) considered the situation in Mali. In communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCLIII) adopted on that occasion, the PSC, after stressing the need to put in place the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of the African Standby Force (ASF), within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), requested the Commission to submit a report on the progress made and the difficulties faced, prior to the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, in May 2013. The 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, on 27 and 28 January 2013, in its Solemn Declaration on the Situation in Mali [Assembly/AU/Decl.3 (XX)], approved the PSC communiqué. In adopting that decision, the Heads of State and Government had in mind the fact that the operationalization of the RDC of the ASF would significantly facilitate the promotion of African solutions to the problems facing the continent, and enhance the ownership of, and leadership by, the continent’s efforts to resolve conflicts and crises in Africa.

2. It is in this context that the Commission took the initiative to organize the 6thmeeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety (STCDSS), preceded by a preparatory meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Staff, to consider the operationalization of the RDC and enable the finalization of the recommendations to be submitted to the appropriate organs of the AU. The present report has been prepared to facilitate the deliberations of the STCDSS. It gives an account of the status of operationalization of the ASF and its RDC and provides the context within which the PSC and the Assembly of the Union adopted the above-mentioned decisions, highlighting the lessons to be learnt from the Malian crisis, given the limited military capability to react swiftly to emergency situations. The report contains concrete proposals on the establishment of an African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity.

II. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

3. The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000 and of the Protocol Establishing the PSC, in July 2002, marked critical steps in the overall efforts to build Africa’s capacity to address the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent. In particular, the PSC Protocol established the APSA, designed as a set of institutions and standards to facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution. The APSA is underpinned by two main considerations: first, the principle of non-indifference, which means that the AU can be seized with all situations that may threaten peace and security on the continent, including intervening in a Member State in case of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, or at the request of a Member State, to restore peace and security; and second, finding African solutions to African problems, it being understood that this approach does not exclude the development of partnerships with other international actors, particularly the United Nations, whose Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

4. The ASF is one of the key components of the APSA. It consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. The mandate of the ASF covers a wide range of actions, from observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian assistance, to more complex peace support missions, intervention in a Member State in grave circumstances, or at the request of a Member State, to the restoration of peace and security, preventive deployment and peace building.

5. In conformity with the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol and the Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (CSC), finalized in May 2003and approved by the 3rdOrdinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, from 6 to 8 July 2004 [Assembly/AU/Dec.35 (III) Rev. 1], the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) have made sustained efforts to operationlize the ASF. The Policy Framework specifies the concept of the ASF, as well as the major stages for its operationalization. Subsequent meetings of the Chiefs of Staff and Heads of Security and Safety Services, as well as of the Ministers of Defense, have provided supplementary guidance on how best to operationalize the ASF. It is in this context that three roadmaps were successively prepared to provide guidance for the efforts of the Commission and of Member States.

6. Roadmap I, adopted in March 2005, for the period June 2006 - March 2008, resulted in the preparation and adoption of the basic documents relating to the ASF. These documents related, particularly, to doctrine, logistics concept, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), training and evaluation, and Command and Control, Communications and Information System (C3IS). A feasibility study on the Continental Basic Logistics (CBL) was launched, while the Planning Elements (PLANELM), , were put in place in almost all regional standby forces.

7. Roadmap II, adopted by the 3rdmeeting of STCDSS, held in Addis Ababa, on 15 May 2009, and endorsed by the Executive Council, at its 15thOrdinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, from 24 to 30 June2009 [EX.CL/510 (XV) Rev.1], covered the period April 2008 -December 2010. This Roadmap, identified measures to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues in the implementation of Roadmap I and consolidate the progress thus far achieved. It also underscored the development of AU capacity in the management of multidimensional peace operations (scenario 5). As for the RECs/RMs, they were expected to continue to build their ability to deploy the Mission Headquarters under Scenario 4 of the ASF (peacekeeping missions). These efforts resulted, in October 2010, in the conduct of a Continental Command Post Exercise (CPX), called AMANI AFRICA, which paved the way for the testing of the deployment and management of a scenario 4 type mission. The Evaluation report on this Exercise concluded that the ASF has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

8. Under Roadmap II, additional staff at all levels was also recruited for PLANELM. Training was intensified to improve the professional skills of the staff. Furthermore, other basic documents were prepared to provide more effective guidance for the development of the ASF .The documents in question focused particularly on the support, including medical support, strategic lift, protection of civilians, the Formed Police Units (FPUs), and the RDC. On this latter point, the Roadmap, after taking note of the work in progress, requested the Commission to organize the planned seminars on the RDC Concept with a view to providing the requisite harmonization and facilitating future actions.

9. The 5thOrdinary meeting of STCDSS, held in Addis Ababa, on 26 October 2011, adopted Roadmap III of the ASF, which was approved by the 20thOrdinary Session of the Executive Council, held in Addis Ababa, from 23 to 27 January 2012 [EX.CL/Dec.681 (XX)]. This Roadmap urged the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs to spare no effort to ensure the timely implementation of the provisions contained therein, in order that the ASF may attain Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2015. More specifically, the Roadmap III has three main objectives, namely to: (i) finalize the pending actions under the Roadmap II, in the operational, legal, logistics and structural areas; (ii) review the ASF Vision to ensure its coherence with Africa’s needs, as determined in APSA (iii) highlight the new priorities and challenges: RDC, humanitarian action, management of the Police component and coordination of the civilian component. Many actions were set in motion for implementation of Roadmap III.

III. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

10. The ASF Policy Framework stipulates that "in an emergency situation, the AU should take a preliminary preventive action, while preparing for a more comprehensive action that could include the participation of the United Nations. The emphasis here is on rapid action and deployment". The RDC is a key component of the ASF, the aim of which is to enable the AU to respond swiftly to crisis situations.

11. In the Declaration adopted at its 2ndOrdinary Meeting, held in Addis Ababa, on 28 March 2008, the STCDSS recommended that the RDC be an integral part of the Regional Standby Forces, it being understood that this capacity would be deployed at the entry point, as a precursor to the deployment of a larger mission. Pursuant to this Declaration, the Commission, together with the Regional Standby Forces, a at a meeting held in Wolisso, Ethiopia, on 15 and 16 April 2010, prepared a Concept Note defining the parameters and timelines for the operationalization of the RDC in five (5) RECs/RMs. Roadmap Ill of the ASF recommended that the RDC be tested, evaluated and operationalized by 2012. This objective could not be attained.

12. In September 2011, in Addis Ababa, the AU, with the support of the European Commission (EC), launched a training cycle, known as AMANI AFRICA II, which is to conclude with a field training exercise (FTX) in 2015. The objective of the FTX is to "validate the capacity of the African Union to grant a mandate for the use of a Rapid Deployment Capability, as an initial operation (Scenario 6) and to lead, in the process, a fully-fledged multidimensional peace support operation (Scenario 5)". The Initial Planning Conference (IPC), held in Addis Ababa, from 7 to 9 March 2012, made it possible to finalize the Exercise Specifications (EXSPEC) and to determine the general framework of the cycle.

13. As part of the preparation for the 6thmeeting of the STCDSS, the Commission sent a questionnaire on the status of operationalization of the RDC to all the Regional Standby Forces. The responses received led to a better evaluation of the progress made in the regions, and the difficulties that need to be overcome and facilitated compilation of recommendations from all stakeholders on the way forward.

IV. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE ASF, INCLUDING THE RDC,IN LIGHT OF AFRICAN INITIATIVESIN THE MALIAN CRISIS

14. The Malian crisis highlighted the need to expedite the operationalization of the RDC and, more generally, to accelerate the establishment of the ASF and start working on the basis of the procedures developed within this framework. It should be recalled that, in the management of the crisis, the AU and ECOWAS endeavored, from the outset, and concurrently with the efforts of the Mediation, to deploy a mission to support the restoration of the authority of the Malian State in the northern part of the country, then occupied by armed, rebel, terrorist and criminal groups and to ensure the security of the Transition institutions, established after the coup d’état of March 2012.

15. To facilitate the mobilization of the necessary international support and the authorization of the planned mission by the United Nations Security Council, the Commission, together with ECOWAS, paid particular attention to the preparation of the documents required by the Security Council under its resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012) of 5 July and 12 October 2012, respectively. It was in this context that the Commission led the process of preparing the Strategic Concept for the resolution of the Malian crises. This document, which was the subject of in-depth consultations with various stakeholders, stipulates the measures to be taken to speed up the resolution of the crises in Mali. The Strategic Concept was adopted by the meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group, held in Bamako on 19 October 2012, endorsed by the PSC on 24 October 2012 and subsequently transmitted to the UN Security Council.

16. It was on this basis that the AU Commission, in close coordination with ECOWAS, the core countries, the UN and other partners, was actively involved in the preparation of a harmonized Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of an operation in Mali. The Draft harmonized CONOPS was endorsed by ECOWAS Summit and the PSC respectively on 11 and 13 November 2012.It provided for the deployment of a 3,300 strong African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). On 20 December 2012, the Security Council adopted resolution 2085 (2012) authorizing the deployment of AFISMA in Mali for an initial period of one year. However, the Security Council has not responded to the AU’s request to establish a support package funded by statutory contributions of the United Nations, merely contenting itself with the establishment of a Special Trust Fund to receive voluntary contributions for AFISMA and another Fund for the Defense and Security Forces of Mali (MDSF). Similarly, the Security Council subjected the launch of possible operations to recapture the north of the country to a series of political and technical conditions.

17. The first quarter of 2013 saw rapid developments in the situation on the ground. Indeed, while the operationalization of AFISMA and mediation efforts were continuing, the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups launched a massive attack on Malian army positions in Konna, in a clear attempt to control Sévaré, the key entry point to the area and the location of the airport, which was to serve as the launchpad for the deployment of AFISMA.

18. On 10 January 2013, the Security Council, expressing grave concern at the situation and, in view of the urgent need to counter the growing terrorist threat in Mali, requested the Member States to provide assistance to MDSF. They also expressed the wish for the urgent deployment of AFISMA. Both the AU Commission and the PSC strongly condemned the attacks by the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups, expressed AU’s solidarity with Mali and appealed to all AU Member States to provide the necessary logistics, financial and capacity building support to the MDSF.

19. At the request of the Government of Mali and, in pursuance of resolution 2085 (2012), France launched the "Operation Serval" to block the attempted advance of the rebel, terrorist and criminal armed groups. At the same time, several ECOWAS Member States and other African countries pledged troops for AFISMA and/or accelerated their deployment. As a matter of fact, the situation precipitated the deployment of AFISMA, whose initial authorized strength of 3,300 uniformed personnel, was quickly surpassed, in view of the seriousness of the threat. The Operation Serval enabled the recapture of the north of the country and the launching, jointly by the Malian and AFISMA forces, notably the Chadian contingent, of operations to secure and stabilize the north of Mali, which opened the way for the planned deployment of a UN operation.

20. Moreover, the AU and ECOWAS prepared a revised and harmonized CONOPS for AFISMA, during a Planning Conference held in Bamako, from 15 to 20 February 2013. The strength of the Mission was increased to 9,620 troops. The revised Concept, which entrusted the leadership of the Mission to AU, was approved by the 42ndOrdinary Session of ECOWAS Authority, held in Yamoussoukro on 27 and 28 February 2013, and subsequently by the PSC, at its 358thsession held, in Addis Ababa, on 7 March 2013.

21. In light of the aforesaid, three observations are pertinent. First, there was considerable delay in the operational readiness, logistical preparation and strength build-up of the units placed at the disposal of AFISMA, due, in particular, to logistical and financial constraints. It was only after the French intervention that the deployment really began in earnest and in emergency conditions which did not always allow for the requisite preparation. To date, and despite the progress made, AFISMA operates under difficult conditions that negatively impact on its capacity to fulfill its mandate.

22. The second observation relates to Africa’s inability, despite its political commitment to Mali, to confront the emergency situation generated by the offensive launched by the terrorist, criminal and armed groups and to respond adequately to the Malian government’s request for assistance. The only recourse was the French intervention to stop the offensive of the armed groups and launch the process of restoring the authority of the State in the north of the country. It is obvious that the existence of a truly operational capability at continental level would have enabled Africa to play a more effective role on the ground and assert its leadership, on the understanding that this role does not exclude international assistance.

23. Finally, the geographical position of Mali in the Sahel-Sahara region, at the crossroads of the Western, Northern and Central regions of Africa and the deployment of units belonging to two different RECs initially presented challenges in terms of coordination. The revised CONOPS sought to clarify AFISMA’s chain of command, since AU had overall authority over the Mission. In this regard, the Commission established in Addis Ababa, a Mali Integrated Task Force (MITF), comprised mainly of representatives of AU, ECOWAS and UN, with responsibility for strategic coordination of AFISMA. The MITF, in its present form, is an ad hoc structure.

24. Evaluation of all the information gathered on the operationalization of the Regional components of the RDC and the observations made earlier show that the RDC is yet to be operational. Indeed, the initial concept, based on the mobilization of 2,500 troops per regional standby force and the parameters governing its deployment remain valid. Consequently, the implementation of the concept remains a medium-term objective to be pursued as a priority and in a sustained manner.

25. Judging from the current status of their establishment and, given the capacity disparities between the regions and the Member States, it appears unlikely that we can upgrade the regional RDCs to a satisfactory operational level within a reasonable timeframe, in a way that translates the political will expressed at the highest level by the Member States into practical action, to be able effectively to respond with the required urgency to situations such as those that Mali experienced in January 2013. For this reason, a transitional formula should be considered, which would provide Africa with the urgently needed operational collective security instrument. Such a formula should be flexible, action oriented and effective, and driven by the principle of promoting, as far as possible," African solutions to African problems” with its corollary of " collective self-reliance", in which Member States contribute on the basis of equity and their capacity. Such a formula would constitute the “African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC)”.

V. MODALITIES TO OPERATIONALISE THE AFRICAN IMMEDIATE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPACITY

a. General Principles

26. The objective of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity is to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political, decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent. The aim is to establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. The establishment of AICRC will be contingent on the setting up of military capabilities, force multipliers and resources from the continent. To this end, assessment will be conducted and units meeting specific training and equipment standards will be certified and put under a Force Rostering System (FRS). AICRC deployment will be subject to the appropriate decision-making processes of the relevant AU organs.

Indicative Planning Sequence

(for the diagram refer to the report in pdf)

27. The overall objective of inserting a robust continental force in a crisis is to stabilize the situation (that is to say, to neutralize the center of gravity or the sources of the crisis). The composition of the initial capacity will differ according to circumstances, but it must be rapid (within a maximum period of 10 days) and strong enough to contain the situation. Furthermore, it must be sufficiently autonomous, with at minimum period of 30 days of self-sustainment.

b. Roles of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity

28. The roles envisaged for AICRC are the following:

(i) stabilization, peace enforcement and intervention missions;

(ii) neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and

(iii) emergency assistance to Member States within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians.

c. Operational Concept

29. The AICRC concept aims at making the AU more reactive, capable and coherent, by enabling it to respond quickly to crises with military means in the service of a political decision. The AICRC is a military tool, a reservoir of 5,000 troops, with operational modules in the form of tactical battle groups of 1,500 personnel (BG 1500) that can be deployed rapidly. The capacity will be modular in nature, will operate under a centralized command, will have suitable combat and combat service support, with a minimal initial autonomy of thirty (30) days. It should enable the continent to provide an immediate response to crises in the short term, while allowing for a political solution to the crisis or, where appropriate, the adoption of measures for a mandate consolidation and expansion under a fresh mandate by the PSC and/or the UN Security Council.

30. More specifically, the concept is contingent on the identification of specific needs of the BG 1500 in terms of strategic lift and logistics support. The BG of 1500 personnel will operate on the principle of multinationality and can be pledged by a Lead-Nation or by a group of AU Member States. Interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. Member States may also provide specialized capabilities that may be specific elements of high value addition to the BG which must have a minimum initial self-sustainment period of 30 days.

d. Planning, command and control structure

31. The political direction and strategic management, as well as the activation of AICRC fall within the ambit of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, who shall grant general delegation of powers in this matter, to the Commissioner for Peace and Security. A compact and flexible advisory and planning staff, based on existing capacities within the Peace and Security Department will be dedicated to this task. Thus, the planning, mobilization and coordination of AICRC will be directly undertaken at the strategic level of the AU.

32. At the operational level, a BG will have a Force Headquarters (FHQ) deployable with the operational and strategic capabilities (strategic lift and logistics) pre-identified during the theoretical Force generation process. The FHQ, which will have a core nucleus of about 50 staff, shall be an integral part of the AICRC. It shall be organized and equipped to perform the tasks related to the command and control of its level. It shall be deployed in the same conditions as the combat and combat service support units and equipped with the means to establish communications link with the Commission and with the Command Posts of units deployed at the tactical level, as well as with other units if necessary.

33. Member countries contributing troops to the AICRC will be responsible for the administrative control of their Force in the theatre of operations. They shall pledge to support them at least during the initial 30 days in the theatre before the AU and/or the United Nations make up for the possible shortages.

34. The overall chain of command and subordination of the AICRC is as follows:

Generic chain of Command and Control


(for the diagram, please refer to the report in pdf)


e. Composition and Organization

35. The AICRC will be structured around three tactical battle groups, which will be configured on modular basis with three infantry battalions (850 troops each), combat support capability (indirect fire) and light armored elements at squadron level. An Organizational chart is annexed herewith. The "combat service support" function focuses on engineering capabilities (combat and infrastructure) organized within a battalion (600 men) with three companies adaptable to infantry battalions. Each tactical BG and each battalion can be deployed, independently, for specific missions limited in time and space.

36. An airmobile and air component (400 troops) is encompassed in this function and includes, in particular, aircraft and helicopters for Close Air Support (CAS). A tactical air transport component (helicopters and tactical transport aircraft) will be integral to the force. All the means acting in the 3rd dimension will remain committed to the strategic level. They can be placed under the operational control of the FHQ. The Operational and strategic force multipliers will be mobilized, as necessary, from the AU Member States capable of providing them.

37. The support function is organized around the "transport supply", “Level 2 Health Support ", "maintenance ", "human support" and "information and command" components. Part of the initial autonomy of the combat support and combat service support components will be held within this component. The AU Member States make the necessary commitments for this function and assume them within a predetermined framework.

38. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) will be given in detail once the generic structure AICRC is approved.

f. Deployment concept

39. The deployment concept should allow the AICRC units to obtain an IOC within a period of ten (10) days after the mandate is given by the PSC at the appropriate level. Deployment will be in two phases:

(i) Phase 1 - Preparation of the AICRC units and the deployment of their initial elements, including the FHQ with the protection units; and

(ii) Phase 2 - Deployment of other AICRC elements.

g. Preparation, Training and Certification

40. Training is a key requirement for tactical battlegroups. To be effective, the BG 1500 must undergo a specific training and carry out targeted exercises to test the procedures, military skills and readiness. A Training Needs Analysis (TNA) should be conducted, and the results incorporated into the AICRC training programme. For purposes of the AICRC certification, an Evaluation Plan should be included in the Training Programme with a clear division of responsibilities and labour between the Member States concerned and the AU.

41. To be considered as an AU BG 1500, the units must meet defined military capability standards. The standards and criteria will be detailed in the AICRC concept and AU will provide the Member States with specific guidelines and directives for the preparation of their units, to ensure coherence between the building blocks of the complete tactical battlegroups, taking into account the requirements of multinationality and interoperability. A basic principle is that tactical training is the responsibility of the Member States concerned. AU will facilitate coordination between the Member States. The Certification of the BG also remains the responsibility of the contributing Member States. The Peace and Security Department will ensure the certification process, which must be performed according to agreed AU standard procedures.

h. Force generation

42. AICRC shall be established on the basis of national modules pledge by the Member States and which will be selected after a process in compliance with the operational criteria in terms of organization, equipment, interoperability and autonomy. The selected units will be seconded by the Member States to the AU Commission and activated in conformity with the decisions of the appropriate AU decision making organs.

i. Force multipliers

43. Initially, calling upon the resources of the Member States will be the rule for the establishment of the AICRC and ensuring its preparation and use. Eventually, and depending on the availability of sufficient financial resources, outsourcing will be sought systematically. It will, thereby, support the ability, through binding and dedicated service contracts, concluded with state or private operators and to ensure at the outset strategic projection, as well as support at the level of the theatre of operations in areas such as the strategic lift, strategic intelligence, GIS, fuel function, level 3medical evacuation and above, the development of infrastructures, media communication, unsecured or operational communication systems, the reconditioning of equipment and transport, at the end of the initial period of autonomy.

44. This aspect induces the establishment and management, of a high-performance "contract/procurement" function, capable of anticipating the needs.


j. Force Rostering

45. Maintaining troops for a long period of time, with a 10 day notice of movement, is expensive and difficult. The effectiveness decreases after a certain period. A Force Rostering System must be agreed between the AU and the Member States concerned, which will be requested to fulfill an "operational contract".

k. Communication and Information System

46. Effective command and control presupposes the availability of a robust and reliable communications and information system, as it is the means by which command and control is carried out. The AU will be responsible for deploying a mobile FHQ with an integral communications system, relying on the resources of its Member States, capable of providing links (via satellite, HF and other means available), with the strategic HQ, on the one hand, and with all subordinate units, on the other. The communications means for the HQ must be deployable from contributing Member States.

47. Deployed military units must provide their own means of internal communication.

l. Logistical Support

48. The AU will have to support the AICRC after the initial period of a minimum of 30 days of self-sustainment. The strategic deployment will be essentially carried out by air. The BG 1500 engaged with the FHQ should be deployed from their respective Member States directly to the area of operation. The rest of the AICRC, including the logistics detachment and Level 2field hospital, should be deployed in the shortest possible time.

49. After the period of 30 days of self-sustainment, the administrative and logistical support of the AICRC becomes the responsibility of the AU and will be conducted along two lines of support:

(i) 1st line of support: food rations, maintenance and ammunition; and

(ii) 2nd line of support: fuel and water.

50. The third line of support could be established, depending on the development of the mission.

51. The division of responsibilities will be as follows:

a. AU:

(i) launch of the mission;
(ii) communications link between the AU Commission and the FHQ;
(iii) chartering and strategic lift, if necessary;
(iv) Memorandum of Understanding covering the logistical needs; and
(v) interaction with the United Nations and international partners.

b. TCCs/nation framework:

(i) self-sustainment for 30 days;
(ii) logistical support for training;
(iii) strategic deployment; and
(iv) medical evacuation outside the area of operation.

52. Appropriate arrangements are to be made on an ad hoc basis, as regards strategic mobility and transport, military intelligence and all other aspects of the operationalisation of the AICRC. A legal framework between the AU and the Units and/or means contributing Member States to the AICRC will be put in place so as to enable unfettered use of the said units and resources.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

53. The Malian crisis has highlighted the shortcomings of the AU in terms of capability and the need for the continent to urgently take necessary measures to address these shortcomings, pending the full operationalization of the ASFRDC. The political credibility of the AU and its ability to give meaning to the principle of African solutions to African problems are at stake. In so doing, the objective is not to discard the assistance of the international community, particularly that of the United Nation whose Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Rather, the objective is to ensure that Africa contribute in a more active and substantive manner to collective security, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, in a spirit of partnership and burden sharing.

54. The Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU provides an ideal opportunity for Africa to take the decisions called for by the current situation and to give itself means commensurate with its ambitions in the field of peace and security. The establishment of the AICRC will constitute a tangible expression of the will of the African leaders to fulfill, in the spirit of pan-Africanism, the aspirations of the peoples of the continent to peace, security and stability, which are a pre-requisite for Africa’s renaissance.

Posted by Messay
Last updated by Limi Mohammed

We use cookies on our website and mobile app to improve content display and overall user experience. The cookies we use do not store personally identifiable information nor can they harm your computer.
We intend to provide you with the right knowledge on-demand at the right time and in the appropriate format to ensure that you engage the African Union constructively in your specific role.
If you have any questions please contact directly PSD web Administrator at shashlm@africa-union.org

TAGGED IN REGION(S) :
Headquarters - Addis ababa Mali

COMMENTS